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ABSTRACTS 
Ghana Television shares many of the post-colonial historical features that public 
broadcasting systems in African countries inherited at independence. The television 
producers’ perceptions of role and job function, politics and organisational structures 
impact the role of Ghana Television and its contribution to contemporary Ghanaian 
society. Through a consideration of national post-colonial history and theories of 
media, communication, culture and  development communication, this thesis 
considers the agency of Ghana Television in social development by analysing 
producers’ perceptions of their production system and broadcast outcomes. Ghanaian 
public television service faces many challenges that are primarily political and 
historical. Producers struggle to straddle a line between instinctively championing 
ideals within content creation processes and maintaining a ill-functioning system and 
politicised culture of production. The research finds that there are difficulties inherent 
in delivering a truly public service remit, within the historicised post-colonial context, 
and highlights the challenges as well as opportunities for improving the delivery of 
public television service. It draws conclusions that have lessons for similar countries 
in the post-colonial South. 
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PREFACE 
 
The challenge of social development in African countries has been marred by two 
major misunderstandings – European invaders disregarded African history and 
culture, and also plundered the continent and its peoples; the vicissitude of which has 
been a tangled incoherence of social problems and opportunities; all was not evil but 
neither was all good. Secondly, too many African leaders have lacked visionary and 
moral integrity. In misunderstanding their role, they have done as much, if not more, 
damage to Africa‘s image as the European invaders did. 
 
There is little to be gained from looking back, yet history serves an orientating 
purpose. The challenge facing Africa and the developing South is simply a need to 
become orientated to the realities of present social conditions and, from there, to 
envision a way forward.  
 
Having worked in television and film, this thesis forms a crystallising of my thoughts, 
experiences and frustrations, as well as my realisation of opportunities. The education 
I have received in the United Kingdom, through the aid of Her Majesty‘s government 
and many excellent lecturers, has given me the opportunity to understand what 
development roles and opportunities are possible. I cannot claim to have all the 
answers, but to have some answers is better than to have none. 
 
And this much is true: the media have a role to play in the social development of 
every nation, yet understanding the nature of that role is a perilous journey. However, 
there are guiding theories that serve as useful handles, and every piece of incremental 
knowledge facilitates a better understanding of how its usefulness can be enhanced. 
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Chapter I: INTRODUCTION 
Background to Research 
Every society is placed in nature. And it seeks to influence nature, to impose such 
transformations upon nature as will develop the environment of its society for its 
better fulfilment‖ (Nkrumah 1964, pg. 71 - 72). 
 
The need to exert some control over the destiny of humankind can be said to the most 
fundamental motivation for knowledge quests. When knowledge is acquired its 
distribution and application does not come about automatically. The social context of 
a people; their cultural life, acts as an information processing and filtering mechanism 
that produces belief systems which define their world views and attributions of cause 
and effect, and their own agency as humans or ascriptions to the intervention of 
metaphysical forces. Knowledge, therefore, is enlivened within a culturally 
determined context that has consequences for its application to the problems of a 
society; acquiring knowledge directly results in human ―competence‖, subject 
familiarity and perceptions of ‗truth‘ (Lehrer 2002, pg. 5). This diegesis therefore 
locates humankind at the core of a social elaboration of development that is shaped by 
location, history and aspiration, as alluded to by Nkrumah in the quotation above.  
 
The sources of information, and the mechanisms for transferring knowledge, 
therefore, have been historically critical for shaping the attributions of knowledge - its 
veracity and the viability of application of its edicts to problem solving. The 
perceptions of quality and character of the mediator of information and knowledge 
plays a significant role in the acceptance of the mediated content; ‗trust‘ in the source 
of a message directly impacts its ability to influence attitudes and behaviours, as well 
as its continued acceptance as a source of truth.  
 
Thus, the media have become an important part of the daily routine of life for a lot of 
people the world over. As a vehicle, it delivers into varieties of social settings the 
news, information, entertainment, and distanced events; connecting people from 
disparate communities into a virtual social community able to witness, in real-time or 
through time-shifted programming, media content that impacts social impressions, 
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beliefs and knowledge systems about a plethora of social and physical realities 
(O'Shaughnessy and Stadler 1999).  
 
While there are cultural and socially structured relationships which affect the salience 
of the media, any attempt to understand the roles of the media in a society requires a 
historicised location of the media within the society and in relation to its dominant 
social uses. Undoubtedly, television has become very important in this work of 
information and knowledge distribution. In the case of television, beyond serving as a 
socialising utility, the usefulness of television as an apparatus for social engineering 
has been part of a wide ranging debate since its inception as a broadcasting service in 
the 1930‘s (Schramm 1964; Katz and Wedell 1977; Schramm 1979; Noelle-Neumann 
1981; Raboy 1996; McPhail 2009).Within the last century, especially since the birth 
of twenty-four hour television and the rolling news, most national governments have 
become dependent on an engagement with media to prompt citizens to their changing 
environments; to communicate urgency and responsibility, and to redefine ideologies 
about national values, cohesion and inter-dependencies, both internal and external 
(Osabuohien P. Amienyi 2004). In the West this mode of broadening governance 
exists as a necessary evolution of the general media and the public broadcasting 
service, and serves to refine the efficiency of communication between society and 
government, with television playing an essential role (Smith 1978 in Ursell 2003).  
In the current era of modernisation and globalisation, the media, especially through 
televised content, is also increasingly being used to promote Western concepts of 
modernity that governments in developing countries find unsuited for their 
development goals but accede to in order to be accepted as progressive (Arat 2003). 
The advance of the liberal market argument, and its impositions on governments of 
developing countries (Raboy 1996; Heath 2001), is competing with a nationalist 
agenda and may be contributing to the fragmenting of governments‘ attitudes towards 
the media; governments in the post-colonial South, and similarly developing 
countries, are trying to reconcile to another institution, presumably powerful, which 
they often see as having a competing role within society. The results are the 
emergence of evidences of tensions in the relationship between governments and the 
media (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Street 2005).  
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However, the media are seen as critical to broadening the communication processes 
between society and government in developing countries, and the publicly owned 
media is situated at the nexus of interactions between government and society. A 
recent indication is in the fallouts of the infectious phenomenon branded ―Arab 
Spring‖ which started in North Africa (Bowen 2011). Nile TV, the state broadcaster 
in Egypt was partially shut down and its coverage of Tahrir Square events were 
compromised (Reuters 2011). An internet shutdown in Egypt, as well as attempts to 
disrupt Al Jazeera‘s coverage of the social revolution as it happened (Anon. 2011; 
wtyw7newschannel 2011), were all media gagging strategies used to try to control the 
social effects of the media in the process of social change as it spread across the 
affected Mediterranean countries, from inception in Tunisia via social media to Syria 
and the Gulf Emirate of Bahrain, and Yemen. In its aftermath, media companies are 
warning of a possible backlash in new and stricter forms of media regulation from 
governments that would want to control the media‘s role in facilitating political 
change (BBC 2011 (b)).  
 
These tensions, seen as antecedent to social growths in polity, are often a consequence 
of promotions of new, Western, ideas about modernity and progress; governance and 
democracy, society and government, the ‗public sphere‘ and the ‗public interest‘, as 
well as the agency of the media in facilitating social discussions on urgent social 
matters that include the directions for a nation‘s economic, political and social 
policies; a mediated debate on national social development. To enable such social 
discussion, the media have to both present a platform for the debate and also perform 
a social education function that equips the society with knowledge that is believed to 
be true. Thus, television, especially, becomes a contested site for such tensions in 
developing countries because of the power of the moving image and televised ‗real-
life‘ events to carry loaded convictions of authenticity and veracity for largely 
illiterate populations. The urge has been for governments to control society, especially 
through the public media, in manipulating the amount of knowledge, the fairness and 
balance of such knowledge and the perceptions of canons in order to enable a social 
engineering process that is implicitly politically ideological. This raises further 
tensions within society as it struggles against the political machine in order to realise 
emancipation from subversive politics through the acquisition of knowledge that 
enables it to hold governments and other social institutions accountable at 
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representing its interests and executing functions on the basis of a full and balanced 
weighting of ‗truths‘; ‗truths‘ since these are facets of reality variously constructed by 
the social segments that exist in any nation. Hence, there are also tensions within the 
broad society, as the general mass population, and the media that serves it. Society 
looks to its media to present a fair and balanced representation of social facts and to 
provide it with some of the knowledge that would enable it judge the actions of the 
politicians who serve it, as well as other kinds of knowledge that would contribute to 
social emancipation. 
 
Thus, on the basis of the understanding that there is an obvious contribution of the 
processes of knowledge distribution to the growth and development of societies in 
whatever location they reside in, this thesis offers a contributory understanding of 
television by considering what its potential contributions have been to on-going social 
change processes within the context of national social development in a typical 
African context; a post-colonial, post-independence and African society. It focuses on 
studying Ghana Television as a public broadcasting service, and utilises a critical 
cultural theory approach to understanding the impact of public service broadcasting in 
a typical post-colonial environment. Utilising a cultural theory approach makes it 
possible to account for the localised historical and cultural factors that were often 
ignored in development communication literature, and to situate them within current 
social realities. In Africa, a real challenge for the media role has been the question 
‗what should governments in developing countries do‘ with the public service 
broadcasting institutions they more or less control? Are these economic liabilities that 
should be divested to private interests (Heath 2001; Alhassan 2005), or are they to be 
maintained as a critical part of national social development policy for use as vehicles 
in promoting vital social change programmes necessary for public education, 
democratisation and social development? 
 
 
Research Context I: The Post-colonial Context of Development in 
Africa 
While there are several social conditions and economic factors impinging on current 
under-development in the developing and ‗transitional economy‘ countries, the 
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condition is perhaps exacerbated by the impact of media images and messages 
exchanged between the developing and developed economies concerning social 
conditions: democracy, wealth/poverty and the opportunities for individual 
advancement. The persistence of under-development in these countries has led to 
various efforts to catalyse the social change processes required to create optimum 
conditions for  social development. Some of these efforts have been through the use 
of communication and technology-based media; using development communication 
strategies championed by Western donor agencies and Non-governmental 
organisations to help bridge gaps in literacy and knowledge-sharing among 
communities where poverty-reduction programmes and other social intervention 
programmes have been implemented. The media projects started within the post-
colonial, self-governance, efforts of these countries and their communication 
strategies are embedded in the service deliveries of the public service broadcasting 
organisations that operate in these countries. 
 
Characteristically, the post-colonial developing world features in global news media 
as places of economic and political under-development (Dimbleby 2005; Mukhongo 
2010). The condition of under-development in these parts of the world are almost 
never reported as the direct effects of a history of colonisation that worked to extract 
resources, disrupt social structures and cultures, create states where none existed 
before, re-configure traditional trade practices and establish new trade links that, still 
persist today (Adu-Boahen 1990; Martin and O'Meara 1995). However argued, the 
legacy of the colonial period is perpetuated by conditions in world trade arrangements 
that work to impose conditions for trading, and access to the capital needed to invest 
in development projects, in the global market place. The World Bank has been 
criticised for enabling the continuance of such a global status quo (Arat 2003; Bretton 
Woods Project 2005). 
 
Furthermore, in most of these countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, a historical 
dominance of local manufacturing, export/import business and extraction industries 
by foreign firms, and the repatriation of profits made in these countries have 
contributed to an impoverished and deteriorating state of economic achievement. 
Rodney (1982) suggests that CFAO, SCOA, Barclays Bank Plc and Unilever Plc are 
especially guilty of profiting from historic links to the trade systems that supported 
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African slavery and the resulting economic disadvantaging. However, there are also 
problems of leadership and ability to perform at social enterprise that have also 
militated against national development. In the wake of the independence struggles that 
gave birth to the post-colonial era in Africa, historical accounts show that some 
national governments nationalised industries and firms owned by foreigners, yet, the 
competence of the inheritors was much to be desired (Fanon 1963; Coleman and Sklar 
1994; Kimenyi, Mbaku et al. 2003). Fanon puts forward that the inheriting native 
elites knew little more than how to be trade brokers, in no small way due to the 
structures of colonial trade relationships that had prevailed in the era before 
independence. Consequently, the colonial structures that were established were 
emulated and followed by the new administrators and led rapidly to the degradation of 
environments as the extraction industries maintained position as key earners, and 
communities lost not only farmlands and lifestyles but also young people to the 
commercial and capital cities of the new states (Martin and O'Meara 1995). 
 
In the decades after the Second World War, with the entrenchment of neo-liberal trade 
policies in the nineteen-eighties, as part of the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT) and later, World Trade Organisation‘s world trade arrangements, the 
impact of global trends on social change in Africa (and the developing world) 
becomes easy to catalogue (Eribo and Jong-Ebot 1997): 
 
 Age-old social traditions and moral values are questioned. 
 Societies face a breakdown of the old collectivist social order, and 
consumerism is increasing individualism. 
 The imposition of liberal trade policies dilutes nationalist efforts towards 
development. 
 The spread of global media influences, through the News especially, is 
breading what most totalitarian governments have feared – a socially active 
media championing liberal democracy values, and 
 lately, with increasing access and imitation of Western television, a shift is 
occurring around culturally taboo subjects, politics and social discussion, and 
portrayals of ―Western‖ behaviours that in many places is creating divisions in 
society (Eribo and Jong-Ebot 1997; Rinnawi 2006). 
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The genesis of these changes has not solely been because of changes to trade 
structures, it is reasonable to assume that the resulting cultural changes were as a 
result of the exposure to the cultures of trade partners; colonialism having been 
essentially a trade phenomenon. Accordingly, Frantz Fanon (Fanon 1963), in his 
writing, draws strongly on the Algerian struggle with France, yet he is also quite 
aware of the rest of Africa, and articulates some of the problems of national culture 
and nationalism that have defined post-colonial national social development. He 
broadly sketches the relevance of culture to the development of a national 
consciousness that, he suggests, must necessarily occur in order for a nationalist 
agenda to be pursued. He wrote, on nationalism, of a need to ‗destroy‘ imperial modes 
of thought within the social elites of a colonised people as part of the process of re-
forming natives into newly conscious citizens of self-determining nations. The 
problem, as he saw it, was that these upper classes were rooted in a thought and 
dialogue process that had very little resonance with the general population.  
 
However, if, as he suggests, the colonial period forced African natives to accept that 
their history and cultures were barbaric, and the colonial system was complete in its 
denigration of the native history, then it is fair to assume that not only the elites 
needed re-orientation, to regain a historic sense of national consciousness and culture, 
but also the broad masses who would have assimilated the western influences, from 
the forceful and coercive constraints of colonial administration, and the mode of 
thought that would root their thinking in terms that would be fundamentally different 
from that of the  pre-colonial native. It was the need to overturn these negative 
outcomes of colonial history and identity that became  fuel for post-independence 
culture projects in Africa and its Diaspora, such as the Pan-African Movement and the 
―Negritude‖ emancipatory project (Ahluwalia and Ahluwalia 2001, pg 26). In Ghana, 
the first Black African President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, formed his governing ideas 
on ―consciencism‖ (Nkrumah 1964), as a response to the post-colonial struggle for 
social and political development that would overturn the historical antecedents 
previously mentioned. In Ghana, as in many other post-colonial countries, the state-
making projects of the immediate post-colonial era were many and led to problems of 
prioritisation. African states were amalgams of different tribes and therefore the prime 
project was the forging of a national identity (Fanon 1963; Hyden, Leslie et al. 2003; 
McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003; Alhassan 2005). 
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For Dr. Nkrumah, the forging of a national identity had to be linked to an 
emancipatory project that would yield results in both human and social development. 
Many of the fraternity of political leaders struggling with colonial regimes had turned 
to Eastern Bloc countries with which they formed natural allies against the West, even 
though many of these had gained their education from the West. A history of Western 
oppression may have played a part in this preference, but for Nkrumah the affiliation 
with socialism was more ideological. In Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for 
De-colonisation, he elaborates a philosophical approach to an Afro-centric 
emancipatory project and suggests that the post-colonial heritage needed to be part of 
the accounting of the efforts to socially and economically develop African nations. 
His philosophical approach understands that the traditional African society was 
socially egalitarian and imbued with moral values concerning the centricity of 
humankind towards itself, the spirit world and the natural environment from which it 
borrows resources. He asserted that community, was at the heart of the pre-colonial 
African conception of society, and ―communalism‖ (Nkrumah 1964, pg. 98) was a 
breed of African political socialism that pre-dated the formal offerings of 
contemporary socialism. He suggested that communalism was expressed in the social 
groupings that existed at the base of traditional societies and it held that the welfare of 
the whole community was more important than an individual‘s, in as much as the 
whole community was responsible for the individual. Nkrumah, thus, held 
colonialism responsible for introducing elitist social hierarchies into Africa; in its 
peculiar needs for administrative forms of power recognisable to it. This alien form of 
power relationships came on the back of education and trades that created social elites 
through modern professionalised employment – ―doctors, lawyers‖ (ibid. pg. 69), etc, 
as well as ―individualism‖ in ―conscience‖ and social ―accountability‖ through 
Christianity (ibid. pg. 70). These Western influences, together with Islam, therefore 
had become part of the psychological heritage of the post-colonial African. 
 
In his view, ―consciencism‖ would allow the factoring of these new influences to be 
accepted as part of the contemporary African existence and its new ―conscience‖ 
(ibid. pg. 79). Its objective would be the development of the community through the 
development of the individual. This he felt was not contradictory to African-ness, in 
that so long as rules for emancipation are ethical they can embrace methods that are 
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dialectically oppositional if they hold true to an original purpose; such as the 
development of a society. The social purpose of all societies, as he saw it, was to 
achieve ―development‖ through the creation of social institutions and ―logistic 
mobilisation‖ of ―social forces‖ (ibid. pg. 98). For him, the difference between 
capitalism and socialism was in the matter of egalitarian values. Capitalism was 
merely an extension of the principles underlying ―slavery‖ and ―feudalism‖ (ibid. pg. 
71) which worked in an exploitative manner to serve the interest of a social margin, 
and thus biased social development towards elites, with whom power also resided. In 
socialism, therefore, he found ―social justice‖ (ibid. pg. 72) values that were in 
consonance with African communalism; socialism being the more commendable 
alternative in that it proposed a socio-political system that was also applicable in a 
―technologically advanced‖ (ibid. pg. 73) contemporary society.  
 
It is salient to note that these postulations of Nkrumah still find resonance in 
contemporary social studies research about Ghana. Assimeng (2009) concluded that 
modern Ghanaian society broadly functions, within its traditional belief settings, on 
an understanding of an all-encompassing cosmological interplay between the spiritual 
and the physical; that existence is meta-physical, and the course of destiny follows an 
action-reaction path not entirely designed by the human but dependent on the 
observances and consequences of moral or amoral acts. Assimeng (ibid.) argued, 
much as Nkrumah did, that environment and metaphysical beliefs shape and produce 
societies and affords them the underlying motivations for evolving solutions to 
existential problems. Most Ghanaian cultures, as identified in the various tribes, 
believe that the world and its affairs are a product of meta-physical actions beyond 
personal or individual control. Thus the tendency to impute causative action and 
‗aggressive‘ will to personal development or social advancement is viewed as 
‗witchcraft‘ because it is dislodged from communal efforts at progress through 
collaboration with peers and the spirit world. 
 
Nkrumah‘s ideologies also coincided with Fanon‘s, in that they both agreed that post-
colonial Africans were psychologically different, changed by ‗imperial‘ influences.  
Nkrumah suggested that African countries were now tied through capitalism and 
―neo-colonialism‖ to a mode of society that did not fit with the traditional past of its 
societies, and therefore a ―revolution‖ was needed to totally change the post-colonial 
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society into one that was in consonance with its ―communalist past‖ (ibid. pg. 74.), 
and thus advocated the same militant approaches as Fanon, in the desire to urge 
African liberation, but the thrust of their philosophies were substantively different. 
Nkrumah did not oppose militarism, but for Fanon that was fundamental to liberation 
(Fanon 1963). For Nkrumah, the psycho-philosophical approach was more salient, 
and he assumed that his philosophy would sit naturally with Africans as they accepted 
a ―material reality‖ (ibid. pg. 79); which was to say that in the African philosophical 
context all things, physical and spiritual, are in existence, are dynamic and therefore 
transmutable. Hence material change and social change are not inimical to African 
thinking, and development is merely a changing of social forms in order to achieve 
emancipation which is the goal of all societies, as set out in the quote introducing this 
chapter. 
 
Thus in the post-independence era, Nkrumah would call on all ‗social forces‘, 
including the media, to be marshalled into the national development project. In 
socialism he believed he had found a means to attempt a recreation of the collective 
social enterprise and cohesion spirit of age-old ‗togetherness‘ in a typical African 
community, which was Ghana. However, to understand the role of the media in 
Ghana‘s social development, and its peculiarities, it is necessary to locate its history 
within the larger trajectory of post-colonial media development on the continent. 
 
Post-colonial Africa: A Media Overview 
Generally, African media has seen tremendous growth and is permuted in many 
varied ways across the continent. Print, radio, television and the internet has found 
both local and trans-national modes within which to operate and present product 
offerings (Middleton and Njogu 2009). The broadcast media, however, present a 
different historical trajectory to the print and ICT-based media; print being a much 
older medium and the internet gaining a limited, but growing, presence from the 
nineteen-nineties. This overview looks at the development of the broadcast media. 
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Historical Development 
―The single most important factor in that has influenced the development of 
broadcasting in Africa is the continent‘s diverse colonial heritage‖ 
   (Lycombe Eko in McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003, pg. 175). 
 
Historically, the development of public service broadcasting in Europe was promoted 
by conservative intentions regarding electro-magnetic spectrum access and nationalist 
debates on preserving cultural values and giving public information and education, 
but in the colonies it was mainly a tool for imperialist control bundled with 
‗education‘ programmes intended to assimilate natives into the imperial cultures 
(Hodson 1939 cited in Bourgault 1995; Alhassan 2005). The British Empire, 
especially, developed replica BBC institutions in the colonies as a means of providing 
connections between commonwealth natives and settlers with the imperial country 
(Lycombe Eko in McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003). Hyden et al (2003) argued 
that the genesis of public broadcasting in Africa was motivated more by the desire of 
colonial powers to use propaganda communication to maintain the status quo in the 
structured relationships between White settlers and natives in the colonies, although in 
the mother countries the need for broadcasting services in the colonies had been sold 
to governments as a means to provide ―upliftment‖ (ibid. pg. 83) to the backward 
cultures of natives. Much of the content was devoid of any programming useful to 
natives and what was done was offered as privileged state-provision on the basis of 
governance targets; funding was withdrawn when such goals were not met (ibid.). It 
was mainly during the Second World War that the broadcasts took on propaganda 
functions aimed to get Africans to back the colonialists, to disseminate government 
messages and spread Christianity (Briggs 1979, Williams 1950 and Amour 1984 cited 
in Hyden et al. 2003). 
 
Public service media in Africa, thus, developed as an extension of the political 
communication processes of new states; post-independence governments carrying on 
much of the communication modes and tactics of colonial administrations by 
assuming the ―monopolistic traditions‖ that existed (Lycombe Eko in McCauley, 
Peterson et al. 2003, pg. 175) The suppression and limitation of the rights to own 
broadcast media to the State was also a significant carryover of colonial attitudes 
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towards the nationalist press institutions. The press had been started by private 
individuals associated with the independence struggles across the continent and had 
been subject to strangle-hold tactics by colonial governments afraid that media would 
be used to destabilise governments (Hyden, Leslie et al. 2003). Thus, latter public 
media, under political control of governing parties, would often be used to delineate 
different political sides in post-independence countries; with governments‘ seeking 
prolonged ―legitimacy‖ (Arat 2003, pg. 79; Heath, 2001) as representatives of the 
people, versus an opposition usually maligned as usurpers of stable government. 
Consequently, over the years, state-owned media in Africa became analogous to the 
‗regime voice‘ (Heath 2001). 
 
The private media that existed suffered in the post-independence era under the one-
party state systems and military juntas which only tolerated an upper-handed 
relationship with society (Gros 1998), and used restrictive media laws (such as 
criminal libel laws), and resorted to extra-judicial infringements on journalists to 
oppress the press in much of the post-colonial era; non-public media were seen as 
enemies of post-independence governments when they sought to exercise civic rights 
of expression (Karikari 1994; Eribo and Jong-Ebot 1997; Hyden, Leslie et al. 2003).  
 
In line with aspirations in the new African dawn, moves were made to change content 
characteristics on the electronic media taken-over from colonialists. An African voice 
and representation was desired and programmes were done by experimenting with the 
modes of production and formats copied from the Western service models in 
existence (Lycombe Eko in McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003, citing Mazuri 
1996 and Hassan 1996), especially the two dominant modular forms of the public 
service media: the British Broadcasting Corporation in British territories, and various 
permutations of the French system through the specially formed Societé de 
Rediffusion de la France d‘Outremer (reformed as the Organisation de la Radio et 
Télévision Française) in the French African colonies (Heath 2001). All models re-
diffused programming from the imperial countries across the continent.  
 
Africa, thus, has a very diverse mediascape for types of models of public service 
broadcasting (Lycombe Eko in Hyden, Leslie et al. 2003; McCauley, Eric E. Peterson 
et al. 2003). These models of public broadcasting also differed in their structural 
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underpinnings; while some were wholly state-subsidised most of the operations 
inherited from British, French, Portuguese and Spanish administrations operated part-
commercially using advertisements to fund some operations even though these were 
marginal in relation to overall operational costs, and also the French systems tended to 
be more centrally-controlled, and functioned as integrated parts of the colonial 
administration (Lycombe Eko in McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003).  
 
Thus, over the half-century of post-colonial self-rule, the public service broadcasters 
of African countries have incrementally found ways to collaborate and share 
resources and ideas on the development of an ‗Africanised‘ public media system as 
well as to integrate and encourage private commercial media. Those efforts have 
served as antecedents to a modernising and strengthening of the media in Africa, 
outlined below. 
 
Developments in Continental Policy 
The fragmentation in media systems, that was largely the result of colonisation, and 
an uneven access to global information
1
caused African broadcasters to begin an 
exploration of means to collaborate and to share content. Furthermore, during the 
early post-colonial period of the nineteen-sixties, emerging independence, pan-
Africanism and ―a need for regional identity‖ (Sesinyl 2005) created a need to plug 
the gap of dependence on imported content. The effort resulted in the formation of the 
Union des Radiodiffusions et Televisions Nationales d'Afrique (URTNA) ―in 1962‖ 
(URTNA 2002) from among the member nations of the Organisation of African Unity 
(Mensah 1994). For many years, until the turn of the millennium, URTNA gave 
African public service broadcasters access to continentally produced  content, 
technical assistance and training (URTNA 2002).  
 
However, towards the end of the last century the growth of information and 
communications technologies, deepening democratisation processes, and belief in the 
potential of public service broadcasting was leading African media practitioners and 
governments to begin an active consideration of policy directives to better enable 
public media. Human rights activists campaigned for a levelling of the playing field 
                                                 
1
 See discussion on Dependency Theory, pg. 77 - 78 
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that would see existing public service broadcasters made more independent in order to 
better represent plural society (Heath 2001, citing Ansah 1991, Karikari 1994 and 
Koomson 1995). The URTNA scheme covered much of the continent, with at least 
forty-two member countries, yet there were now increasing numbers of private 
broadcasters. This stretched and challenged the original organisation‘s purposes. In 
2001, an African Charter on Broadcasting was adopted (Article 19 2003) to provide a 
starting framework that recognised the changes in technology, governance and the 
need for media development and public interests protection through the use of public 
media. In 2006 URTNA was renamed African Union of Broadcasters and opened 
membership to private broadcasters both on and off the continent. 
 
However, much of the effort to improve the performance and roles of the media in 
Africa is supported by international aid and agencies from the West. For example, in 
2006, the BBC World Service Trust published its African Media Development 
Initiative report that emphasised the enabling role of media in continental 
development efforts, covering seventeen sub-Saharan countries in its study (BBC 
World Service Trust 2006). Since 2008, the EU and African Commissions have 
engaged in a partnership to deliberate the structuring and implementation of a ―road 
map‖ (Africa-EU in Partnership 2012) for democratic and socially integrated roles for 
the media in promoting development agendas as well as critical perspectives in 
African media content. Of course, such efforts only gain the neo-colonialist 
arguments about Africa‘s Western dependencies more currency.  
 
These development, however, indicate that contextually localised 
policies are needed to foster social development across Africa, 
using the media as a tool. Such a development has been limited by 
the history of African media ownership. Ownership and Trends 
In terms of the ownership of electronic media in Africa, it had for many decades 
remained state-owned and national governments brutally restricted private-ownership 
(Nkotto 2005). This state of affairs was against the background, in the development 
decades after the Second World War, of significant optimism that media would be a 
beneficial accessory to the development agendas in the developing parts of the world. 
In Africa, particularly regarding the ‗traditional‘ broadcasting media, it was assumed 
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that governments would use these in national interests and there was the implicit 
assumption that they ―would always be controlled by the state‖ (Tettey 2003, pg. 83; 
Karikari, 1994). Much of that optimism was to degenerate as expectations failed to 
materialise (McPhail 2009).  
 
Since the mid-1980‘s, and particularly during the early years of the 1990‘s, the 
democratisation of many African states has also led to the emergence of plural media 
in both radio and television (Article 19 2003; Middleton and Njogu 2009). Eko speaks 
of a ―wave of democratisation‖ that has transformed the continent‘s electro-magnetic 
mediascape as both ―surrogate‖ and ―re-broadcasters‖ have joined with privately-
owned companies to offer a more diverse choice of output (Lycombe Eko in 
McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003, pg 185). This development has manifested 
differently across the continent but can generally be catalogued thus: 
 
Radio 
Private FM radio stations and community media, to a lesser degree, have opened up 
the airwaves to greater freedom in media expression: 
 
―In West Africa, radio stations number has gone from around 40, in 1993, to 
426 in January 2001. But what seems more interesting is their diversity. The 
number of company radios is now higher than that of community radios, and 
the number of radios outside capitals is higher than that of urban radios. The 
main characteristic of those new radio stations is their being local and their 
closeness to people‖ (Nkotto 2005). 
 
A survey of developments in radio across Africa from 2000 – 5 shows that it is still 
the electronic medium of choice across the continent and dominates electronic media 
growth and plurality due to low-cost capital market entry and low-cost of receiver 
acquisition (BBC World Service Trust 2006). The Trust‘s report shows that most 
radio stations are regional and non-state, private and commercial, being advertising-
funded, with huge plurality figures ranging from a hundred and fifty regional 
commercial radio stations in DR Congo, eighty-four in Ghana, fifty-six in 
Mozambique, to as little as five and six in Sierra Leone and Angola, and Zambia, 
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being the exceptions. During the time of the survey, nine out of the seventeen 
countries surveyed had shown huge growth changes in radio station numbers. Some 
of these are community radio stations funded either by the State (Mozambique) or by 
non-governmental organisations. 
 
Also, in the seventeen African countries surveyed statistics available showed that by 
2005, most countries were reporting over seventy per cent radio listening per week, 
with a bias towards ―heavy listening‖ in countries including Ghana, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique and Uganda, which reported over ninety per cent 
radio listening per week. ―Light listening‖ figures were those reporting under seventy 
percentage points and included DR Congo, Senegal, Ethiopia and Cameroon (ibid, pg. 
23). The high percentages in listening figures can be linked directly with increased 
access to radio sets. It is suggested that by the beginning of the millennia there might 
well have been over a hundred million radio sets on the continent, having grown over 
a hundred million per cent from the middle of the last millennia (Fardon and Furniss 
2000). Middleton and Njogu (2009) estimate that beyond 2002 more than a fifth of 
Africans had access to a radio. 
 
The strength of plurality and diversity in radio is also substantial as broadcasts are 
often in local languages, with direct global trans-national broadcasters such as  the 
BBC, Deutche Welle, and RFI, offering both African and world news bulletins in 
dominant local languages across the continent, such Swahili, Hausa and Arabic, 
giving illiterate and remote rural dwellers as much knowledge and connection to 
global and national events as literate urban dwellers (Fardon and Furniss 2000; 
Lycombe Eko in Mccauley 2003; Middleton and Njogu 2009). Militon and Njogu 
(ibid) show that the initial directions taken by commercial radio stations was to 
provide music-driven programming, some marginal news (local) and partnering with 
trans-national broadcasters for news content that they could not produce. Of course, it 
cannot be far-fetched to deduce that this was strategically to distance them from 
political heavy-handedness, in the initial wave of de-regulation. Currently, talk-radio 
or the ―palaver tree‖ (Lycombe Eko in McCauley 2003, pg. 188) has seen tremendous 
growth as both commercial and public service operators use the format to bring local 
participation into programming, and in conjunction with the licensing of FM 
technology, has made it much easier to get stations on air and connect them to local 
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audiences and issues than was the case with short-wave radio (Middleton and Njogu 
2009), which was the technology inherited post-independence. 
 
Television 
The academic effort to understand and document the presence of television in the 
current African milieu is poor, with most analytic works having been done before 
1995, though newer material better attempts to engage with empirical data as 
difficulties to obtain these are diminishing (BBC World Service Trust 2006). Most 
other efforts are tangential in studies or commentaries from other social science areas, 
typically development communication, journalism and politics, and economic studies. 
However, the little that exists provides some background: 
 
Many countries in Africa, until much recently, typically have had a single television 
channel service, provided through a monopoly public service broadcaster. These have 
traditionally enjoyed dependent nationwide audiences even though the extent of reach 
is not as great as radio due to the higher cost of box television acquisition (Bourgault 
1995; Eribo and Jong-Ebot 1997; Middleton and Njogu 2009).  
 
Since the mid-nineteen eighties, with external pressures to democratise and deepen 
participation in governance (Rudra 2005), public policy has changed to accommodate 
both private-owned radio and television services, which closely replicate public 
television services (Karikari 1994). There are, also available, in many countries, 
multi-channel services from digital satellite broadcast service providers, but these 
services have a high access barrier, due to cost, for most people and are only available 
to an urban and affluent few (Bourgault 1995; Middleton and Njogu 2009). In 
Western and Southern Africa the Intelsat service provides a platform for DStv which 
has about 1.4 million subscribers to its 144 channels (Mahajan 2009), compared to the 
about one billion people that inhabit the continent. 
 
While good statistics are much more difficult to collate, all attempts suggest that there 
has been strong growth in television stations and viewership though the statistics lag 
far behind comparatives to radio. There are also comparative differences between 
radio and television with regards to access; television is accessible via community 
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viewing centres, in Niger for example (Bourgault 1995), or is shared with neighbours. 
Thus in the World Service Trust‘s survey (BBC World Service Trust 2006), 
Mozambique and Senegal reported high access rates of over eighty-eight per cent with 
slightly lower ownership rates.   
 
However, in spite of challenges, the last two decades have seen tremendous changes 
to the electronic broadcasting mediascape. Article 19 (2003) reported that ―[b]y 2002, 
direct to home satellite TV had reached 41 countries in Africa‖. Within countries that 
are allowing private television ownerships – South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria, for 
example – Multi-channel Multipoint Distribution Service (MMDS) as well as Direct 
Broadcast Satellite (DBS) broadcast technologies have been increasingly adopted as a 
way forward to providing multi-channel programming from a single station. Typically 
such stations give over a channel or more to the transmission of local programming, 
while the other channels provide broadcasts of satellite-received content from global 
media broadcasters, usually news and entertainment shows. Notably the Voice of 
America (VOA) got a Congressionally approved Independent Broadcasting in Africa 
Act 1998 passed on the premise of the invaluable agency of ‗independent‘ 
broadcasting in promoting democracy, and thus specially targets broadcasts into 
Africa, along with the BBC and Cable News Network (Lycombe Eko in McCauley, 
Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003). However, many local broadcasters still face structural 
problems that relate to governing media laws, finance and the ability to attract 
competent staff and they typically produce low-quality programming, but are no less 
ambitious (Mahajan 2009). 
 
Structural Deficits 
Local media institutions in post-colonial Africa are, therefore, grossly under-
developed and may be overlooking the full range of potential roles within national 
communities (BBC World Service Trust 2006). Their organisational ability to 
perform is often hampered by under-resourcing and inadequately-trained personnel, 
and their programming continues to be dominated by representations of the 
government voice. Thus they often fail to approach a nationalist role in delivering a 
plural and diverse array of programing for citizens (BBC World Service Trust 2006). 
Their under-resourcing makes them also unable to perform as programme originators 
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for other non-continental and global media organisations, in which role they could 
have served as windows to the rest of the world about African experiences. 
Unfortunately, governments have also either been unwilling to relinquish control of 
these institutions or have adopted attitudes that make it difficult for these 
organisations to be anything other than sycophant. Public broadcasters have not been 
able to develop internal cultures that would allow them to challenge restraints or 
transform them into impartial agents within society in order that journalists, producers 
and citizens can freely engage in the democracy and governance debate (Heath 2001; 
Alhassan 2005).  
 
In the current era, however, there are structural changes evolving and Galloway 
(undated) writes that television, for example, in the developing world is changing 
mostly because the utilisation of modern broadcast technology has given the 
opportunity to leap-frog most of the developmental phases that advanced countries 
have gone through. Yet, the regulation of television is particularly weak and 
institutions suffer from a lack of enabling engagement with the governments that own, 
virtually, the public service broadcasters (ibid).  
 
Research Context II: Ghana’s Political History 
Gaining independence on the 6 March 1957 the British colony formerly known as the 
Gold Coast was joined with the Trans-Volta Togoland British Protectorate and the 
new state, named Ghana after an old African empire to the north-west of the present 
country, became the first country to gain independence from British colonial rule in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Independence was led by Dr. Nkrumah‘s Convention Peoples Party (CPP), which was 
a breakaway section of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) which was headed 
by J. B. Danquah (Anagwonye 2009; Asante 1996). Nkrumah had been Secretary of 
the UGCC, but felt that its ‗considered‘ approach to ‗demanding‘ independence from 
the British was much too slow and broke way in 1949, demanding ―Positive Action‖ 
(Gocking 2005)
2
. Nkrumah had been educated in the United States, where he studied 
                                                 
2
 A concise history of Ghana, examining its economic and political controversies is given in Gocking, 
R. (2005). The history of Ghana, Greenwood Press.. 
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theology, education and philosophy, in which he also lectured. Under transitional 
arrangements under the colonial administration, he had become Leader of 
Government Business, amended later to Prime Minister, and also became President, 
after winning the elections when Ghana became a Republic in 1960 (Gifford 2004). 
He was titled Osagyefo, ‗liberator‘, in Akan. Under Nkrumah, a programme of 
funding for the independence struggles of other African nations was organised, as 
well as for the African National Congress, and many African nations would become 
independent in the nineteen-sixties (Gocking 2005). The Organisation of African 
Unity was formed to galvanise sovereignty in the new African states, and Nkrumah 
used it as a platform to canvass an agenda for continental unity. He instituted many 
community development projects, built the Akosombo Dam, a hydroelectric project 
that created the world‘s largest man-made lake, and instituted a planned economy 
along with several state-owned corporations to transform and accelerate national 
development along socialist lines. He also spearheaded a referendum that voted to 
make Ghana a one-party State in 1964 (Gocking). 
 
However, the national economy suffered and Nkrumah was overthrown by a Central 
Intelligence Agency-assisted military junta (Gifford 2004), the National Liberation 
Council (NLC), on 24
th
 February 1966. They accused Nkrumah of totalitarianism and 
despotism (Asante 1996), and Nkrumah, who was on his way to China, exiled himself 
to Guinea, where he later died from cancer. He, however, had left an indelible mark 
on Ghana‘s political ideologies and party politics; ―big man rule‖, ―disregard for the 
rule of law‖ and ―neo-patrimonialism‖ (Gifford 2004, pg. 1-7). The NLC was a 
combined rule of both Army and Police, and led by Generals Afrifa, Ankrah and 
Kotoka (Asante 1996), which had taken over at a time when the country was 
struggling economically, and would hand over to a civilian government after 
mismanaging the economy.  
 
The new government of the Progress Party, headed by Dr. Kofi Busia in 1969, was 
diametrically opposed to Nkrumah‘s ideologies (Asante 1996). The Progress Party 
was an amalgam of old elements of the UGCC (Gocking 2005), and thus were natural 
enemies of the CPP, which had usurped their role in the independence struggle when 
Nkrumah spilt from their camp. Thus, Busia‘s regime would institute a neo-liberal 
economic policy, and reverse many of the development strategies formed under 
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Nkrumah. Busia himself had also been educated abroad, with degrees in Philosophy, 
Economics and Politics, as well as Social Anthropology, from Oxford and University 
of London. Yet, he fared no better.  
 
In 1972, the National Redemption Council (NRC), led by Gen. Ignatius Acheampong, 
overthrew Busia‘s government, citing ―economic mismanagement‖, ―corruption‖ and 
―arbitrary dismissals‖, and an undermining of the work of the Army and Police 
(Asante 1996, pg. 59). Nkrumahists were hopeful that the coup d‘etat would enable 
them to return to power, but this did not materialise immediately although the next 
civilian government would be a pro-CPP one (Asante 1996). Acheampong‘s ideology 
though was pro-Nkrumah, in that he voiced the mantra of ―one people, one nation, 
one destiny‖ (ibid. pg. 59). The NRC suffered from internal political wrangling in its 
attempts to legitimise its rule through a plebiscite on an idea called ―Union 
Government‖ or Unigov, which it won. However, a worsening economic crisis 3 , 
labour agitations and student protest led to a ‗palace coup‘ that replaced Acheampong 
with Gen. Fredrick Akuffo, in 1978. The NRC was transformed into the Supreme 
Military Council (SMC). Under the NRC, Ghana returned once more to socialist 
economic planning, though more tempered than the ideals of Nkrumah (Asante 1996). 
 
In 1979, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by Fl. Lt. Jerry John 
Rawlings, ousted the SMC from power and summarily executed, by firing squad, 
Generals Akuffo, Acheampong and Afrifa, and five other senior Army officers. 
Ordinary people, who had supported the ‗revolution‘, suffered severely under the 
regime, both from the harsh economic situation as well as the street justice and 
‗kangaroo‘ courts or ‗people‘s tribunals‘ as they were called, that used brutality to 
mete out punishments. It also ‗nationalised‘ private enterprises deemed to have been 
acquired through corruption
4
 (Asante 1996, citing Shillington 1992; Gifford 2004). 
The AFRC handed over power to Dr. Hilla Limann of the Peoples National Party, an 
Nkrumahist incarnation that won the general elections of the Third Republic in 1979. 
 
                                                 
3
 A popular political legend of the time was that Acheampong had a penchant for generously pear-
shaped consorts, to whom he would give VW Golfs as gifts. 
4
 Spiraling inflation and scarcity of basic goods prompted the introduction of a ―controlled price‖ 
regime. Those suspected of selling above this were publicly stripped and flogged, and had their goods 
confiscated. A lot of these instances were spurred by social jealousy (see Gifford 2004; Gocking 2005) 
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On 31
st
 December 1981, Rawlings led a second coup-d‘etat against the civilian 
government he had installed barely a year before, and inherited a plethora of 
economic difficulties and a drought that left the economy on the brinks of severe 
hardship (Gifford 2004; Asante 1696). Again, the brutalities that had been the 
characteristic of the AFRC continued in the immediate era of Rawlings‘ new 
government, the People‘s National Defence Council (PNDC). There were ‗killings 
and disappearances of some three hundred people, and at its height, the murder of 
three judges, ―one of whom was as pregnant woman‖ (Gifford 2004, pg. 2). The 
bloody regime was responding also to a populist demand for rough justice; students 
were shouting the slogan ―let the blood flow‖ (Asante 1996, pg. 73). The PNDC by 
the mid-eighties was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB) for assistance, despite its espoused socialist political ideologies, 
and embraced a raft of neo-liberal economic policies under a Structural Adjustment 
Programmes of the IMF, in the nineteen-eighties (Asante 1996; Boafo-Arthur 2007). 
Democratisation pressures from the international community finally led to the writing 
of a new Constitution in 1991, and elections in 1992, which was won by Rawlings 
and his PNDC, now legitimised as the National Democratic Congress (NDC). 
 
―Well endowed with natural resources, Ghana has roughly twice the per capita 
output of the poorest countries in West Africa. Even so, Ghana remains 
heavily dependent on international financial and technical assistance. Gold and 
cocoa productions, and individual remittances, are major sources of foreign 
exchange. The domestic economy continues to revolve around agriculture, 
which accounts for about 35% of GDP and employs about 55% of the work 
force, mainly small landholders. Ghana opted for debt relief under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) program in 2002, and is also benefiting from 
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative that took effect in 2006. Thematic 
priorities under its current Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy, … are: 
macroeconomic stability; private sector competitiveness; human resource 
development; and good governance and civic responsibility. Sound macro-
economic management along with high prices for gold and cocoa helped 
sustain GDP growth in 2008‖ (Central Intelligence Agency 2009). 
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The current social context of Ghana is very much a product of the Western and 
Eastern influences Nkrumah had noted. Christianity and Islam hold great salience for 
major sections of the population. The burden of post-independence social and 
economic transformation, still remains a burden; Ghana has been out-stripped in 
economic performance by countries such as Malaysia, with which it shared per capita 
statistics at the time if independence (Gifford 2004), although recent oil finds may 
provide new economic impetus; it has already, significantly, helped the country to 
achieve middle-income status. Political activity is still dominated by the progeny of 
the UGCC, the socialist Nkrumah and the liberal Danquah traditions. National politics 
and social debate remains fractious across the lines politics and religion, as they have 
been intertwined over the many years of political history (Gifford 2004). 
 
Within the society, two types of hegemony dominate Ghana: Christianity and Akan 
culture (Gifford 2004; Gocking 2005). Christianity in Ghana started with the 
―orthodox‖ Catholic and Anglican, and Protestant churches (Gifford 2004, pg. 23), 
and a synthesis with traditional religions also produced ‗spiritual‘ churches, also 
known as the ―African Independent Church‖ (ibid. pg. 21). Christianity is very much 
embedded in the social fabric, even on occasions where Moslems are present. Its 
significance is immeasurable, having contributed to the social fabric of the nation 
through shaping the socialisation of young adults in its educational institutions for 
over a hundred years, through local development work, political and social justice 
activism (Gifford 2004). Biblical symbolism and idioms are applied to every sphere 
of life, from enterprise names and on-vehicle scribblings of public transport, to 
political and social activists‘ slogans (Gifford 2004). These strong religious 
affiliations have produced a traditionally conservative society, and in the orthodox 
Christian, still rooted in the European church approach to worship, an African culture 
incorporation has been slow to develop. 
 
On the other hand a huge growth, since ―1979‖ in the ―charismatic‖ strand of 
evangelical Christian doctrine and practices has spawned hundreds of churches across 
the country that preach modernist ideologies, and theologically-mediated 
Americanisms embedded in faith messages – ―faith/prosperity/health-and-wealth‖, 
―demonic causality‖ or angelic mitigation of well-being, and ―financial success‖ 
(Gifford 2004, pg. 23 – 26) among others. Thus, the type of humanist philosophy that 
 36 
was the cornerstone of the Enlightenment and Western ideologies of human agency is 
not found in the Ghanaian socio-psychological perception of progress and human 
agency; ‗fa ma nyame‘, to whit ‗leave it in the hands of God‘, is the popular Akan 
saying that best illustrates this. The charismatic movement is dynamic in borrowing 
extensively from its home-grown roots, in both language use and worship style, and 
the Americanisms are additional constructs that define the social status‘ of 
congregations (Gifford 2004). These churches are on an up-surge, being very young 
and very much on the pulse of emotive national and social justice perceptions 
(Gifford 2004). 
 
The Akan culture has also contributed extensively to the social forms of Ghana‘s ethic 
and cultural institutions; ―Akanisation‖ (Gocking 2005, pg. 10) has affected language 
forms, social practices and traditions, and passed on through centuries-old Ashanti
5
, 
conquests of neighbouring tribes, marriage and migration (Gocking 2005). Akan 
dialects are widely spoken and understood from north to south and the modes of 
communication and power relationships, between subjects and traditional, as well and 
national political, authorities is very much influenced by Akan cultural practice. 
However, this also causes some friction in the inter-tribal relationships and politicians 
have found it expedient to exploit the tensions, creating lines of fracture between the 
tribal groupings which tend to dominate in specific regional sectors of the country. 
These social groups are often linked with specific political traditions; the most 
evidence of this politicisation was in the eras of Nkrumah and Rawlings (Gifford 
2004; Gocking 2005). 
 
Thus while there are many factors to consider in a careful historiography of Ghana, it 
is immediately identifiable that culture, politics and religion have been factors that 
have defined the social realities of Ghanaians and have had roles to play in the social 
development of Ghana from the colonial to post-independence eras. These very 
factors have also contributed to the nature of the development of the media, although 
politics has had the greatest effect on the national media through the attitudes of 
various governments over time. The nature of that course is explored below: 
 
                                                 
5
 The largest Akan ethnic group 
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Media Development in Ghana 
Throughout the turbulence in its political history, Ghana‘s post-independence media, 
especially the State-owned, had played a central role in the propagation of both 
nationalist and sectional ideologies; the State media working to ―legitimise‖ the socio-
economic agendas of all ruling regimes and showing unwillingness to be a politically 
conscious entity (Asante 1996, pg. ix). Yet, this unwillingness was not merely due to 
blind sycophancy. History had taught the media institutions that ‗authority‘ (Asante 
1996, citing Wilcox 1977) was to be respected in the interests of personal and 
institutional self-preservation:  
 
K. B. Jones-Quartey (1974) wrote, that the earliest press in the, then, Gold Coast was 
started by the Crown Governor Sir Charles McCarthy, from 1822-25, ceasing when 
the governor was killed in a war with Ashanti. In 1857, Charles and Edmund 
Bannermann started the Accra Herald. Charles was jailed in 1862 on contempt of 
court charges for an editorial. Asante (1996) continues that post-1893, many 
newspapers were started in the crown colony which expressed nationalist sentiments. 
In 1893 the Newspaper Registration Ordinance would become the first in a long-line 
of media-muzzling efforts and starting a long history of media suppression by 
governments in the colony and, later independent country. They included the Book 
and Newspaper Registration Ordinance 1897, and Sedition Ordinance/Criminal Code 
Amendment Bill 1934. During the colonial administration several newspapers 
flourished, starting from the hand-written copies of Charles and Edmund 
Bannermann; they included James Hutton-Brew‘s Gold Coast Times and Western 
Echo (1874), and the first daily newspaper, Gold Coast Express (1897). There were 
also missionary installations that were often nationalist in sentiments (Asante 1996, 
citing Ekwelie and Edoju-Ugwuoju 1985). Thus, in 1921, the colonial government set 
up the Gold Coast Pioneer as a counter-publication to the nationalism in the private 
press (Asante 1996). 
 
In these pre-independence days the liberation leaders on the continent were allying 
themselves to the private press and using their channels to help in their anti-
colonisation project. Also in the Gold Coast, the Nigerian Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was 
editor-in-chief of the African Morning Post. He would be jailed for six months and 
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fined sixty pounds, along with his Sierra-Leonean Managing Director, I. T. A. 
Wallace-Johnson for publishing an article titled ―Has the African a God?‖ which was 
brazen in framing the colonial government as deceitful and violent towards Africans 
(Asante 1996, pg 4). The two men would win an overturn of their judgement at 
Appellate Court against the colonial government but they were conveniently expelled 
separately from the Gold Coast (Asante 1996; Gocking 2005). Nkrumah was also 
involved in the press. He started the Guinea Press that would publish three instalments 
including the Accra Evening News in 1948, the Morning Telegraph in 1949 and the 
Daily Mail, distributed in the key towns of the colony (Asante 1996). Nkrumah took 
the initiative to publish The Evening News also in local languages, including Fanti, 
Ewe, Ga, Hausa and Twi. In 1950, Nkrumah was handed a three-year sentence for 
sedition but would serve fourteen months only – his Convention Peoples Party (CPP) 
won the Parliamentary elections, hence he would be released to become Leader of 
Government Business in the colonial Legislative Assembly (Asante 1996). 
 
Under Nkrumah, the press suffered both repression and consolidation; his Guinea 
Press would annex most of the existing presses, as well as acquire negotiated control 
of British publisher Cecil King‘s Mirror Group‘s installations, the Daily Graphic and 
Sunday Mirror, through the CPP. These papers would be held as a nationalised press, 
to which the CPP would add the Ghanaian Times and Weekly Spectator (Asante 
1996). These papers are still in circulation today. The CPP would not tolerate a plural 
media, as Nkrumah  
 
―believed that the mass media should be completely under government control 
to assure their full utilisation and commitment to the urgent aims of national 
interpretation and modernisation‖ (Asante 1996, citing Udofia 1982 pg. 389). 
 
The role of the amalgamated press was to play a ―revolutionary‖ function in 
―consolidating …. freedom‖, ―sovereignty‖ and ―independence‖ (Asante 1996, pg. 
13), but they were viewed as a ―government propaganda tool‖ by Western 
governments (ibid. citing Ainslie 1966, Hatchen 1971 and Zeff 1983). The CPP‘s 
press policy was described as ―neo-communist‖ (ibid. pg. 13) and integrated most of 
the existing press into the government information service. Nkrumah saw the press as 
perfect tools for promoting cohesion and development and advocated a dogmatic 
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(Asante 1996, citing Ainslie 1966) and ideological press system that advocated 
African independence and nationalism (Asante 1996, citing The Spark 1965 pg. 3). 
Thus, the Ministry of Information and Broadcast dictated media output, and media 
personnel were government functionaries or party activists, or if not so, still expected 
to tow the government‘s official position (Asante 1996). The system was elaborate in 
using State information vans, decorated in party colours and symbols, to reach across 
the country and, effectively, giving the CPP a dominant position in national discourse 
outside urban centres. It used a ―publicity secretariat‖ to determine and control 
content published by the ―national media‖ (ibid. pg. 18). 
 
In 1958, Nkrumah would pass the Preventive Detention Act which allowed the 
government to jail for up to five years, without trial, anyone whose actions were 
deemed to be treasonable, ruinous to foreign relations or destabilising. By 1964, the 
jail term would reach up to ten years (Asante 1996). Citing Howell and Rajoosria 
(1972), Asante states that anyone failing to prove Ghanaian ancestry could be 
deported on the grounds of being a foreigner. In 1959, the ―False Reports Act‖ and 
―Sedition Act‖ were passed (ibid. pg. 20) which allowed fifteen year and five year jail 
terms, respectively, to be imposed on persons whose publications were deemed to be 
ruinous of the State, government functionaries or government itself (ibid. citing 
Rivers 1970). A Criminal Code (Amendment) Bill was added in 1960, which limited 
the actions of ―a persistent element‖ dealing in media materials and content not in 
consonance with the government‘s communication agenda, and a censorship and 
inspection committee was set up to investigate and remove publications that were 
publicly available but contained ―undesirable‖ content (ibid. pg. 38, citing Afrifa 
1967). All these were in direct disregard to the 1
st
 Republican Constitution, and 
Asante suggests that these measures were thought to be necessary to counter the 
influence of ―Western media‖ (ibid. pg. 29) and to ensure the maintenance of the 
government‘s socialist ideology in the media. 
 
Thus, Nkrumah‘s ruthless press tactics would be inherited by the NLC and continued 
to be in operation very much as the CPP had designed it, unchanged, apart from a 
rescinding of the censorship rules (Asante 1996). The State press regime remained as 
before but the editors were sacked and replaced by appointees. The press responded 
by instantly changing allegiances to the junta, and proclaimed them ―liberators and 
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true democrats‖ (ibid. citing Daily Graphic, February 28, 1966, pg. 1). The press was 
continuing a sycophantic relationship, but now in support of Constitution usurpers. 
Persons detained by the CPP were released and CPP functionaries were held in 
―protective custody‖ (ibid. pg. 38), including CPP journalists. Those deported by the 
CPP were allowed to return, and General Ankrah proclaimed a ―new press‖ (ibid. pg. 
41) that could be assured of full press freedom with a ‗constructive‘ and 
‗responsibility‘ publishing caveat. The NLC also set up an advisory ‗publicity office‘, 
similar to Nkrumah‘s, but with a function to massage the image of the junta out-going 
messages to the public. Its effect was to control the publications of the State-media, 
especially after General Ankrah lambasted the press for sensationalist reporting of the 
―Arab-Israeli conflict‖ (ibid. pg. 41), and warned that government as pay-master 
could with-hold salaries and wages of journalists. Thus even though the regime 
attempted to encourage critical journalism in reporting on government performance, 
the press resorted routinely to ―self-censorship‖ as a strategy to stay in favour with the 
government (ibid. pg. 42). Also, the NLC repealed the Preventive Detention Act 
1958, but replaced this with the Prohibition of Rumours Decree 1966 [NLCD 92] that 
acted as a censoring stick, in that it prevented the publication of material that might 
cause ―disaffection‖ (ibid. pg. 43) against it, and also reviewed the Criminal Code Bill 
to allow detentions for up to twenty-eight days, without trial. Under its Rumours 
decree, offenders would pay hefty fines or serve three years in jail, or both (Asante 
1996). It passed decrees to make it impossible to sue the State-owned media or their 
editors for injurious publications. It sacked its own editors appointed to the State-
media for unfavourable publications, and deported an East German correspondent of 
the ADN news agency (ibid.). They passed a television licensing decree and in 1968 
established the GBC as a public corporation, wresting it from the Nkrumahist 
tradition of direct Presidential control and stating that it should be ―impartial and 
independent‖ (Appendices 2). 
 
The NLC scrapped its press control laws and allowed multi-party activities prior to 
the 2
nd
 Republic of Kofi Busia‘s United Party, in 1968. Busia maintained the NLC‘s 
press controls, however, the administration was more tolerant and was credited with 
having enabled the most plural and free press environment in the immediate post-
independence era by repealing Nkrumah‘s Newspaper Registration Act. However, it 
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also fired Camron Duodu as editor of the Daily Graphic and sued Kofi Badu, editor of 
the Spokesman (Asante 1996).  
 
When General Acheampong‘s NRC overthrew the Busia government, an immediate 
act was the arrest and detention of three editors of the State press, whom he 
subsequently released, but he put in place the Defamation by Newspapers Decree 
1972, personally took charge of the Information Ministry, made it impossible for law 
courts to hear cases against newspapers that maligned previous government 
functionaries (Asante 1996, citing Udofia 1982), and favoured the State-media over 
the private press. Under the NRC, newspapers were once again required to obtain 
licenses, at pains of a fine or a year in jail. There was direct interference in the 
running of the State press, which proved too much for the normally acquiescent press 
and there were agitations for the formation of a Press Trust, which the government 
refused to accede to (Asante 1996). The NRC, however, encouraged the mass media 
to back Acheampong‘s ―self-reliance and patriotic nationalism‖ ideology, although 
press repression machinations were re-instituted, with a recap of the Prohibition of 
Rumours Decree 1977. The press, by now, had learned from experience and fell in 
line, and were rewarded with ―cash‖ and drinks at press soirees6 (Asante 1996, pg. 
65). The press, thus, lost credibility with the public. Yet, some State journalists went 
on strikes and protests over a ―lack of recognition‖ (ibid.) and poor salaries and 
working conditions. Asante writes that, these were the reasons for the Essah 
Commission of 1978, which amongst other things noted that some journalists would 
write inflammatory articles without regard to journalistic standards if their core 
presentation would flatter the government, knowing that such actions would curry 
high favours. The report suggested that the public‘s poor perceptions of journalists 
had led to low morale in those within the profession who were desirous of good 
standards yet felt incapable of leaving the profession. The loss of face the press 
suffered came at a bad time; for this was the time the nation needed its media to stand 
between it and government in asking for public accountability. Yet, the reality was 
that the press, especially the state-owned, had never really practiced reputably to strict 
ethical journalist‘s standards (Asante 1996). 
                                                 
6
 It has become common practice for media personnel at State functions to be given brown envelopes, 
―solicitation fees‖ or ―soli‖ in the industry‘s slang. Doubtless, the intention is counter ‗subversive PR‘ 
and ensure good and favorable media coverage. 
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It is into this incendiary situation that the AFRC junta inserted itself, and exploited its 
volatility to mete out its brand of justice. However, it did not show much interest in 
controlling the press; it stayed in power for only a few months, and the press, now 
knew what not to do, and therefore what it had to do. 
 
Under the 3
rd
 Republic of Dr. Limann, however, a Press Commission was provided 
for in the Constitution; to manage the State media and its relationship with political 
authority. It would be directly responsible for appointing the heads of state media, and 
had this been implemented would have provided a turning point for press freedom in 
Ghana. However, Limann decided to appoint heads to the state press before the 
Commission could be inaugurated. This led to an ink war between the President and 
his appointee to the Daily Graphic, Mdm. Elizabeth Ohene, who had rejected the 
appointment as ―mischievous‖ (Asante 1996, citing Daily Graphic, February 18 
1980). Together with five other journalists she went to the Supreme Court for a 
constitutional ruling, and the State was fined one thousand cedis (Asante 1996). 
 
On 25
th
 July 1980, the Press Commission (PC) was inaugurated. A month later it 
dismissed the Boards of state-owned media, ostensibly, to re-appoint them under its 
mandate and therefore nullify the President‘s appointments, and on 21st January 1981, 
a Press Complaints Commission (PCC) was set up, which would become a battle 
ground for confrontations between the government and journalists (Asante 1996). 
Although, there was now some degree of insularity, the Boards of state media still had 
government sympathisers on them, thus the Boards also became battle grounds for 
editors who opposed pro-government inclined Boards; the Daily Graphic, being the 
most influential medium of the era would see several legal actions between its Board 
and editors (Asante 1996). And, thus, the 3
rd
 Republic era saw the beginning of a 
―new political and social climate‖ (ibid. pg. 89) within the press institutions as a 
meshing between the interests of press personnel and their social environment, the 
national public, began to form.  
 
The 31
st
 December 1981 second coup of JJ Rawlings and the PNDC, truncated the 
growth of the Ghanaian press, and in many ways ended professional media practice. 
All editors of state-owned media, including the GBC, were asked to proceed on 
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―indefinite‖ (ibid. pg. 94) leave, and were replaced. Such a dense culture of self-
censorship pervaded the press to the extent that when ―university students … beat up 
editors, painted graffiti on walls of national press houses….and damaged property‖, 
even these protest actions were not reported in the media (Asante 1996, pg. 95). The 
news media was no longer considered reliable as a source of truth and acquired a 
reputation as not only being self-seeking and self-preserving, but also serving the 
government just as it had done under Nkrumah (Asante 1996). Gifford (2004) states 
that the state media were ―transparently biased‖ and that the Daily Graphic‘s 
―columnists could be mindlessly sycophantic‖ (pg. 8). Asante continues that the 
PNDC directly censored some media content, including Western music (citing Pellow 
and Chazan 1986), and carried out brutalities against journalists critical of its 
governance. These included the detention and physical harassment of Gariba Bawa of 
the GBC; Tommy Thompson, John Kugblenu – who died in jail, and Mike Adjei of 
the Free Press (Asante 1996); Kweku Baako Jr of the Crusading Guide was arbitrarily 
detained, Kwesi Pratt of Insight served fourteen years, and Gershon Dompreh served 
twenty (Ansu-Kyeremeh and Karikari 1998; Asante 1996); while Eben Quarcoo of 
Free Press and Kofi Coomson of The Ghanaian Chronicle were put on trial but saved 
by the advent of a 4
th
 Republic, but many journalists left the country for fear of their 
safety (Gifford 2004).  
 
The judiciary could not be trusted and many social institutions, including chieftaincy 
were co-opted into the PNDC machinery, such that social justice no longer had 
currency in Ghana (Gifford 2004). Asante (1996), notes that in its media policy the 
PNDC revived the Newspaper Licensing Law, introduced the Law on Defamation 
1984 that banned caricaturing, and also banned pornographic films; all commercial 
media activities were proscribed by strict licensing regimes to the extent that it was 
literally impossible ―to publish a newspaper that will at least offer an alternative 
view‖ (ibid. pg. 96, citing Kabral Blay Amihere in Index on Censorship 1987).  
 
Thus, more than in any other era before it, the PNDC‘s extreme socialist leanings and 
revival of Nkrumah-style governance had the most significant influence on the social 
psyche and the media professions, due to its immediate contemporaneous context. 
The PNDC would not even favour its own functionaries who stepped out of line; its 
Secretary of Information, Kwesi Yankah, would discover this when he published the 
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last words of one of the killers of the judges, Lance Corporal Amartey-Kwei, whom 
Rawlings had executed by firing squad (Asante 1996). 
 
Asante sums up the techniques of media control as observed in a Ghana to have been: 
 
1. Censorship, either self-imposed or made so by law, 
2. Physical harassment or coercion that closed down publications; beating up 
journalists and detaining media persons, 
3. Legal prosecutions for libel and sedition, 
4. Withholding information in the respect that government officials did not 
provide answers to questions, 
5. Press licensing, 
6. Appointments and dismissals of editors, 
7. Rewards – promotions, cars and luxury gifts to journalists who towed the 
government‘s line (citing Hatchen 1971), 
8. Reduction in government advertising to starve media houses of funds, and  
9. Newsprint allocations to media houses. 
 
The historical journey of Ghana‘s media is not lodged in a distant past, many 
journalists are alive today who can testify to the events of the post-independence era, 
and the PNDC and its NDC re-incarnation would rule the country for nineteen years 
till the very turn of the millennium. Yet, the PNDC would be forced to abandon its 
press restrictions, in 1991, as a new constitution was approved and the country 
prepared for multi-party elections (Asante 1996). 
 
Ansu-Kyeremeh and Karikari (1998) confirm Asante‘s analysis of Ghana‘s media 
development history and its key events, and include that professionalism in the media 
always improved under constitutional regimes, and that the state‘s monopolising of 
the media in the nineteen-sixties was the direct result of a national social control 
policy, while the seventies and eighties were the worst times for press freedom in 
Ghana as they engendered a of ―culture of silence‖ in the press, and did not allow the 
media to ―grow, mature and develop‖ (pg. 3). The authors further suggest that the 
repressive press regimes did not allow editors of the state press to be ―critical and 
creative‖ in improving ―standards of the profession‖ (pg. 3). Along with poor 
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remuneration and working conditions, the history of coercion had the effect of making 
state media enterprises unattractive to well-qualified and educated professionals 
(Ansu-Kyeremeh and Karikari 1998). The authors opine that just as it was in the case 
of Governor McCarthy‘s newspaper, the introduction of radio was designed to serve 
the interests of the ―political and educated elites who consisted of European settlers, 
colonial administrators and small groups of educated Africans‖ by re-diffusing ―BBC 
news and programmes‖ (citing PAV Ansah 1985, GBC Golden Anniversary 
Lectures). 
 
Thus, in Ghana, as elsewhere in Africa, the prime media institutions – press and radio, 
were founded by the British colonial administration. It is important to clarify that the 
trajectory for press and electronic media were different. Newspapers were much 
easier to set up and were quickly latched onto by native elites and in many ways these 
became fundamental instruments in independence struggles (Jones-Quartey 1974). 
However, electronic media was nationalised and state-controlled and used in the 
nationalist project that sought to foster allegiance to the new state (Asante 1996). The 
effort, in Ghana, was to create a nation-state on the basis of a common colonial 
experience among the tribes, and to contain the former colony‘s geographic 
boundaries as the new state; pre-colonial tribal structures and patterns of life had been 
disrupted and allegiances coerced to make the colony possible (Fanon, 1963; CFA, 
2005; Alhassan, 2003). In this way the public service media did not initially develop 
as a social institution professionally reflecting on social, political and economic issues 
as was the case in Europe (McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003). 
 
However, currently, there is an observed vibrancy and integration of the ‗new‘ media 
freedom, under the 4
th
 Republican Constitution, into normal life routines in Ghana. 
Hastings (2005) writes this and states further that radio and television gossip, along 
with inter-personal information and opinion exchanges, are punctuating and defining 
life routines, and forming and framing political perceptions; a ―collective exercise of 
interpretation‖ that draws in ―local, national and global events‖ (ibid. pg. 1). She 
states further that the dominant discourse is what is in the news; blending a variety of 
―formal‖, broadcast and print or journalistic sources, with ―informal‖, social 
imaginations and personal, first-hand, accounts and sources. The state-media have 
regained some composure and remain the ―most provocative and influential news‖ 
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(ibid. pg. 1) sources; in a clear dichotomy, state-media emphasis the government 
agenda, are conservative and manifest political propaganda techniques, while the 
private media focus on scandalous and oppositional rhetoric. Intense, confrontational 
and heavily politicised, the Ghanaian ―public sphere is ….crucial to the cohesion of 
the nation-state in the new dispensation of democracy‖ (ibid. pg. 1). However, 
―Ghanaian journalism‖ represents ―a broader historical and cultural context as an 
apparatus for the production and reconfiguration of distinctive forms of African 
modernity, post-colonial nationalism and global articulation‖ that is underpinned by a 
notional approximation of ―liberal modernity‖ that is rooted in ―historicised cultural 
understandings of political authority and resistance as well as notions of African 
sociality and discursive propriety‖ (ibid. pg. 5). Hastings agrees with Gifford in citing 
that Ghanaian media practice, especially of journalists‘, works within the ‗neo-
patrimonial‘ culture, which she refers to as ―notions of authority and patronage‖ (ibid. 
pg. 5) that frames journalistic media productions. In essence, state journalists 
―reproduce‖ a ―hegemonic project of the state‖, as they notionally believe this to be 
the ethos of their position, although on a personal level they may experience conflicts 
between reproducing this ideal with their personal ―contradicting experiences‖ as 
social members (pg. 33). 
 
Broadcasting Policy 
The government of Ghana has, after many years of neglect, decided that public media 
in Ghana needs a sound footing to enable it play a part in socio-economic 
development. To this end the current President, Professor John Atta Mills of the NDC, 
commissioned a sector policy review on public broadcasting intended to safeguard 
GBC‘s on-going and future role. The mass media in Ghana is regulated by the 
National Media Commission (NMC), a constitutionally mandated and independent 
body, which differentiates between public, commercial and community media 
(Ministry of Communication 2004). Among other things it states a mission to 
―promote a free, independent and public-spirited media that provides access to all‖ 
(ibid. pg. 3), and has oversight of appointments to the state-owned public media in 
order to safeguard their independence. The President‘s action, in 2009, had been 
predicated on advocacy within the industry and concessions by the previous liberal 
government of the New Patriotic Party (NPP): 
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1. In 2006, the mission of the NMC was integrated with the aims of the Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy II (GPRS II). The Minister of Finance at the time, 
commenting on an increased allocation of funding to the Commission, said the 
objective was to enable the monitoring of ―how much development content‖ 
was reflected in media output, and to also monitor ―negative‖ reportage that 
would undermine public confidence in elected officials, adding that the overall 
strategy was to enable the media to contribute to the objectives of the GPRS 
(GNA, 2006). 
 
2. In 2007 non-state media, led by the Ghana Journalists Association, signed a 
communiqué urging the broadening of the public service remit to obligate all 
media houses to a minimum quota of public service broadcasting (GNA, 
2007). Crucially, the communiqué also called for government to enable the 
Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) to ‗transform into a true public 
broadcaster‘. 
 
3. Again, in 2007, the National Communication Authority (NCA), which is 
charged with the regulation of communications and administration of 
broadcast frequencies, received applications for fifty television licenses from 
private broadcasters. Importantly, the NCA issued a directive for all 
broadcasters to switch to digital terrestrial transmission in order to better 
utilise the national frequency spectrum (The Stateman 2007). 
 
4. In May 2009, a ―stakeholders‘ dialogue‖ made recommendations to the 
government urging re-structuring of the GBC to enable it function as a public 
broadcaster in a competitive environment that, at the time, included ten 
commercial television stations and over a hundred and thirty public and 
private radio stations. The meeting further suggested a license fee (already in 
existence but poorly collected) as a special tax to fund the GBC (GNA, 2009).  
 
It was thus, that in August 2009, the Minister of Communications announced the 
formation of a cabinet sub-committee to review and recommend a re-structuring of 
the GBC with a view to creating a ―true public service broadcaster‖, which would 
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among other things ―give voice to the voiceless‖ and ―be more accountable to the 
people‖. The review would propose new license fees, review the law establishing the 
GBC and make it more independent of government (GNA 2009b; GBC 2009). 
 
The process to migrate to digital terrestrial broadcasting became policy in 2010 (NCA 
2010). It was suggested by the Minister of Communication, Hon. Haruna Iddrisu, that 
the move was necessary for the country to embrace new media technologies, as well 
as to free up the electronic spectrum for additional services and contribute to a 
bridging of the global north-south digital divide (Government of Ghana 2010). It was 
a move also prompted by an agreement of the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) to implement digital broadcasting in its member countries by 2015 (APC 
and Balancing Act 2011). The project implementation uses the GBC as the custodian 
of the new broadcasting platform and this has raised concerns with private 
broadcasters about possible government interference. The government‘s control of 
GBC, it is feared, would make it possible for government to switch off the broadcast 
signals of a station it was unhappy with. The private broadcasters recommended, as an 
alternative, the pooling of all broadcast equipment into an independently managed 
entity (Ghana B&F 2010). However, that is not the only controversy: GBC has 
pioneered a digital television service with a Swedish company, Next Generation 
Broadcasting (NBC) called Smart TV. It effectively jump-started on the competition 
without the authorisation of the NCA. However, despite the protests of the 
competition, and the NCA‘s admission that GBC has no authorisation to pilot or begin 
a digital service, the broadcaster has not desisted, lending suspicion to the presence of 
political engineering by well-connected interests (Ghana B&F 2010). 
 
Thus, the public service broadcaster has an influential role in affecting industrial 
developments, as well as sharing a close history with the development of media in the 
country. However in order to assess its social contributions, it needs to be understood 
as an institution that operates within the context of the devolution of electronic media 
into the territories of colonial Africa, and therefore shares a remarkably similar 
evolutional history with similar institutions on the continent. 
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Ghana Broadcasting Corporation 
In 1935 the British colonial government established Station ‗ZOY‘ to aid cultural 
‗educational‘ communication between the Crown colony and the Home Office and 
this became the basis of the Gold Coast Broadcasting System in 1954. After 
independence, the unit became the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, and was made a 
public corporation under the National Liberation Council, (NLCD 226) in 1968. 
Television broadcasting had been added to radio services in 1965, broadcasting in 
black and white till colour was enabled twenty years later in 1985 (Alhassan). 
Broadcasting infrastructure had been affected during the years of economic 
mismanagement but the return to free market policy saw aid flows into the economy 
and Japan and, the former, West Germany would instrumentally equip GBC in that 
same year with short-wave radio transmitters, colour television equipment and a 
modernised television studio among other assistances. However, a liberalised 
broadcast environment would only emerge in the middle of the next decade as the 
NDC initially entrenched itself in the early days of the new democratic process urged 
by ‗donors‘, and assured itself of implicit control of the most media outlets through 
the GBC‘s national network of radio and television coverage (Heath 2001; Panford 
2001).  
 
Currently, GBC operates one free-to-air television service, Ghana Television, and also 
owns fifty-per cent commercial interests in Metro TV, and minority shares in 
Multimedia Broadcasting Corporation, although it has not received any revenues from 
these ventures. It also operates three short-wave national radio services and ten 
Regional FM radio stations (one each in ten Regional capitals) and held a 
broadcasting monopoly for some six decades till the liberalisation of broadcasting in 
1994 although it is still dominant in the local industry (Buckley, Apenteng et al. 
2005).  
 
The efforts at nation building incorporated the GBC into the government development 
agenda, and in reflection of the popular ‗dominant paradigm‘, the belief that 
development through electronic mass communication use could inject by ‗hypodermic 
effect‘ a catalysis on social and national development. It was therefore required to 
produce programming that reflected this – education programming, as well as 
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information, entertainment and cultural programming (McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et 
al. 2003; Buckley, Apenteng et al. 2005). 
 
The GBC is still funded through a state-sponsored subsidy that in 2004 amounted to ¢ 
42 billion (about £1.9million) and pays basic salaries for one and half thousand 
employees, and although there is a licence fee charged all viewers (at about 15p per 
year) it‘s worth less than the cost of collection due to inflation (Buckley, Apenteng et 
al. 2005) and failures to adjustment the levy. 
 
Ghana Television 
 
 ―Ghana‘s Television...will not cater for cheap entertainment, sensationalism 
and commercialism. Its paramount objective will be education in the broadest purest 
sense. It will supplement our educational programme and foster a lively interest in the 
world around us. Television must assist in our social transformation‖ (Ghartey-Tagoe 
2010, pg 78). 
       
The above quote is taken from the address given by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, at the 
inauguration of Ghana Television and sets forward, succinctly, his vision for that 
service, expressing the optimism that the communication system would engage with 
and enable social change and development. Ghartey-Tagoe also accounts for the 
genesis of an historic problem alluded to in this research, the tension between the 
television wing and other departments of the GBC, in stating that because the 
television wing was his contribution to the GBC organisation, the department received 
the President‘s attention, and he appointed as Director of Television, Shirley Du Bois, 
the wife of the Pan-Africanist writer W. E. B. Du Bois, who was a close friend of 
Nkrumah, and the first woman to hold such a position in the world (Horne 2002). 
Ghartey-Tagoe, suggests that at the time, when there were just the two wings of Radio 
and Television, the new staff for Television had a higher base ranking than for Radio, 
and this led to a ―fierce‖ (ibid. pg. 79) and fractious relationship between the two 
departments though they managed to work together.  
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At inception, GTv‘s new offices and studios cost about twelve million pounds in 
current money (Horne 2002), produced at least seventy-five per cent of its 
programming (Horne suggests that eighty-five per cent was intended), more than 
anywhere else on the continent, and it broadcast thirty-five hours of programming per 
week. Censoring of imported programmes with scenes deemed unsuitable for children 
was done, routinely, by fading to black over scenes with ―kissing, excessive shooting 
and other forms of violence‖ (Ghartey-Tagoe 2010, pg. 80). It would in particular 
emphasize on ―traditions, culture values, and the way of life of the people‖ (Asante 
1996, pg. 125), and there was the definite intention to create a television system to 
rival any in the world at the time; one that would also be less dependent on foreign 
programming, although imported educational documentaries would be shown, with 
both radio and television being used to disseminate information for agriculture, health 
and education (Asante 1996, citing Head and Kugblenu 1978). Television would 
specify an intense programming schedule with a wide-audience appeal, gender 
sensitive programming that was informative and educative, and was made available to 
viewers all over the country at village centres where local language translators were 
used to explain content (Horne 2002). Initially, television broadcast was limited to the 
southern half of the country, due to transmission challenges; the northern half would 
receive broadcast programmes a day later; the taped programmes would have to be 
carried up north by government transport (Ansu-Kyeremeh 1998). 
 
The country was not only ethnically differentiated, it was also linguistically diverse. 
The language problem in merging disparate linguistic ethnic communities into a 
nation had been tackled head-on at the inception of GBC: 
 
 ―The language factor becomes a sensitive issue because it is one of the most 
evident characteristics that define a given ethnic group and gives it identity and 
character as a distinct, homogenous body‖ (P. A. V. Ansah cited in Wedell 1986, pg. 
47). 
 
English and six local languages (McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003; Buckley, 
Apenteng et al. 2005); Akan, Dagbani, Ewe, Ga, Nzema and Hausa, were chosen as 
national broadcast languages on the basis that all communities would at least 
understand one of these. Together they represent just seven and a half per cent of the 
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seventy-nine spoken Ghanaian languages (Lewis 2009), and, with Akan being the 
most widely-spoken, are understood by at least ―eighty-five per cent of the 
population‖ (ibid. pg. 53).  
 
However, ―studies conducted on broadcasting in Ghana would reveal that limited 
airtime was being given to programmes orientated towards local communities‖ 
(Asante 1996, pg. 126, citing Ansah 1979 and Boafo 1985). Boafo‘s study, for 
example found that only about six hours of programming, about 5.8% of weekly 
airtime, was given to local language programmes that reflected local life situations, 
including programing on development issues (Asante 1996). 
 
Under the CPP, television sets were made locally by Ghana Sanyo Ltd, a joint 
partnership with Sanyo of Japan (Horne 2002), producing the ‗Akasanoma‘, ‗talking 
bird‘ in Akan Twi, brand of radio and television sets, as well as refrigerators (Ansu-
Kyeremeh and Karikari 1998). Then, as now, a lack of solid television ownership data 
leaves room for assumptive estimates about the extent of television reach and 
audience figures. It is impossible to gauge accurately who has access: it is therefore a 
socio-economic assumption that there would be a clear bias of ownership of television 
equipment towards urban and ultra-urban settlements, but this logic may be flawed as 
electricity and money are both available in rural areas, especially in the districts with 
cash crop farming that have been reached by the national electrification grid (Naylor 
2000; VRA 2007; GridCo 2009).  
 
Research Problem 
Currently, in Ghana, a diverse media landscape has led to an undercurrent of tension 
regarding press freedoms as the media fights for greater press freedom and 
recognition as a mouthpiece of the public (Ghanaweb, 2007a; 2007b). While the 
development of private broadcasting is welcomed as positive change that is increasing 
engagement between communities, the government and the media, it may be failing to 
give  social development direction as output is largely entertainment, which attracts 
audiences but does not sufficiently engage with issues of social development. Also 
non-public media are often perceived to be situated in specific political camps or 
orientated towards Western political ideologies (Hastings 2005). There also tends to 
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be a huge disparity in the issues focused on by the media between urban and rural 
audiences. In rural communities, media issues are often focused around local cultural 
values, agriculture and religious programmes. In the urban centres however, 
programming revolves largely around music formats, sports and politics, and is also 
biased towards political scandals and controversies. The burden of public education 
and information, a critical part of the public service concern, is relegated to a small 
number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working directly with specific 
communities and focusing on specific social interventions and behaviour change 
projects (Ghana-NET, 2011; Bob-Milliar 2005) and the GBC. Overall, the general 
result is that current media roles may effectively be contributing to the stagnant or 
worsening conditions of under-development by increasing the factors that fuel ‗brain 
drain‘, consumerism and disengagement from civic and political interests in-between 
elections dominated by social elites (Nyamnjoh 2005). 
 
While much of the indicative literature presented discusses media and society from 
the macro-social perspective, the critical work of the media is carried out by persons 
who attempt to imbrue media products with personal idiosyncrasies, actively or 
passively assert organisational and/or political control mechanisms on media 
products, and thus affect society either intentionally or un-intentionally. Thus, while 
the literature suggests the catalytic ability of television to quicken the processes that 
could transform traditional forms of social organisation, relationships and taboo 
subject discussion in the third world (Yong 2000; Johnson 2001; Adams 2004), each 
of these writings, alongside others looking at media and social change in developing 
countries, point to a growing need to understand the place of media in the social 
contexts of rapidly changing communities. 
 
Following the argument that the media have a central role in social development and 
emancipation aspirations, this research attempts to locate the agency of a typical post-
colonial public television service, Ghana Television (GTv), to consider its 
contribution to social development. Institutional agency, as an essential factor of 
development communication is an ignored area in research into Ghana‘s media 
development. This research therefore located its problematic to be within the scope 
and attributes of media‘s ‗agency‘. The investigation also considered the intersection 
of GTv‘s production methods and economics‘ with producers‘ understandings and 
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interpretations of the public service remit against the tableaux of post-colonial media 
history, cultural values and national social development needs. Critically, the nuanced 
problem is reflected in the end note of Alhassan (2005), which poses the question that 
is at the heart of this research project: in post-colonial countries today is public 
service broadcasting not fundamental to national social development?  
 
However, an answer to the question is not easy to arrive at (Rosengren 1981), and any 
attempt would be conditioned by conceptions about the place and role of media and 
the function of public service broadcasting within the context of governance, 
democracy, development and social change. Yet, such attempts are essential for 
evolving knowledge contributions to build better understandings of the interactions 
between media and society. Thus the following research questions were formed to 
contextualise this research problem into a suitable investigation for adequate answers. 
 
Research Question 
The aim of this research project therefore was to answer the question: 
 
―How does Ghana Television affect social development through the work of its 
producers in making programmes for the national audience?‖ 
 
The question implies the assumption of a dependent relationship between social 
development, on one hand, and media and communication, on the other. It therefore 
frames a relationship as existing between social development and television 
programme-making, and the consequent output as a broadcast service, in an affective 
way. The assumption was that systemic processes and relationships exist between 
broadcaster, and its producers, and the consuming public that can be understood 
through appropriate social research methods in order to understand the contribution of 
the public television service to the nation through programme production and 
broadcast. 
 
Thus the research constructs frameworks for achieving such an evaluation by 
considering the different parts that make up the media system and its relationship to 
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society within the context of this research
7
. The frameworks therefore borrow from 
critical culture theories and media studies texts that explain these relationships under 
investigation; essentially, theories and texts on communication and its contributions to 
understanding broadcasting practices, as well as public service broadcasting. To 
achieve the research  aim, the following objectives were essential to be met:  
 
1. Gaining an understanding of the contextual placement of Ghana 
Television as defined by legal and statutory documents that define its role, 
functions and relationships? This will define the public service role of 
GTv: 
a. reviewing the legal provisions that govern the GBC, and hence GTv‘s 
remit, as well as GTv‘s Mission Statement, and 
b. understanding conceptual ideas about ‗public service‘ and ‗public value‘ 
that may be contained in these and other documents to evaluate possible 
evolutions in these concepts over time. Crucially, have these concepts 
changed to accommodate a liberalised media market? 
c. Reviewing the structural dependencies that impact GTv operational 
control. This includes its direct dependence on government, statutory 
funding sources and relationships with the National Media Commission 
(media regulator) and the National Communications Authority (broadcast 
spectrum administrator).  
 
2. Gaining an understanding of GTv‘s functioning through the programming 
role of the television producer at GTv; as content makers, their perceptions 
of their work roles and the television service, in general, is fundamental to 
the realisation of GTv‘s role in the society and for development 
communication: 
a. questioning concepts of ‗public value‘ and ‗public service‘ as understood 
by programme producers in order to understand how producers situate 
their work and that of their organisation within notions of the ‗public‘ and 
the service intentions for it, 
                                                 
7
 See Justification for Research on pg. 57  
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b. questioning the ideological foundations of programmes from the point of 
view of the producer to discover their notional relationships with the 
achieving of the public service mandate, and 
c. sampling the broadcast schedule to understand airtime use in terms of 
programme types, genres, language use, origination of content and content 
values that can be inferred, in order to discover the degree to which the 
structural modes of content creation are reflected in the intended ‗public 
service broadcasting‘ output. 
 
Justification for the Research 
―Why television? It‘s true that radio is the medium to which most Africans 
have access, but that is changing rapidly. There are an estimated 25 million tv sets in 
Nigeria and more than 5 million sets in South Africa. Television ownership is 
growing quickly... Television will play an increasingly important role in African 
societies in the next 10 years and will become a powerful tool for influencing 
government and society‖  (Galloway, undated). 
 
Given that television combines both aural and video signals to form its 
communication, and that communication is implicit in the passing of ideas that could 
promote social development (Ansu-Kyeremeh 1997), it had been assumed by social 
theorists, in the middle of the last century, that the public broadcasting services of 
under-developed countries were well-positioned to contribute extensively to the social 
development efforts required to modernise developing countries (Katz and Wedell 
1977; Bourgault 1995). The focus on the use of public service broadcasters as aids to 
social development was because in many parts of the developing world they were, and 
continue to be, the only media institutions in existence, and they often have the widest 
geographical reach (BBC World Service Trust 2006), even though this may be rapidly 
changing. The full consequences of the media impact for post-colonial communities 
can only be understood in an examination of the history of development and social 
development, as it has occurred in these nations in relation to the disruption of the 
colonisation process (Rodney 1982). This research project contributes to the national 
debate, and academic discussions, about the interaction between government, 
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national/state media and audiences. Its focus being on the dynamics of this inter-
relationship as it has occurred within post-colonial history of Ghana.  
Much of the literature already cited suggests a strong co-relation between social 
development and the media; that development is only really possible under conditions 
of true democracy, reiterated by free media institutions – good democracy makes free 
media, and free media makes good democracy (Berrigan 1979; Coleman and Sklar 
1994; Bourgault 1995; Ansu-Kyeremeh 1997; Eribo and Jong-Ebot 1997; Arat 2003; 
Article 19 2003; BBC World Service Trust 2006). The conversion of inherited 
broadcasting institutions to aid national social development through programming, 
especially when states inaugurated television systems, has further deepened the need 
to understand the role that these media systems play in social development (Wedell 
1986; Eribo and Jong-Ebot 1997; Fardon and Furniss 2000; Hyden, Leslie et al. 2003; 
McPhail 2009; Middleton and Njogu 2009; Ghartey-Tagoe 2010). 
 
Thus the underlying rationale for this study was that it would essentially be an attempt 
to understand how a typical post-colonial media system, represented by the Ghana 
Television service, could be involved in development as a social emancipation 
project, understood as not only the social development agenda of government but also 
the emancipatory aspirations of Ghanaians as expressed in their engagement within a 
nationalised ‗public sphere‘. The use of the term here manifests an essentially African 
rendition of a mediated arena in which citizens receive education and information, to 
which they respond in passive learning, debate or civic action (Nyamjoh 2005, citing 
Rowland 2004). It is ‗communal‘, in being interpersonal, and public due to mediation. 
Yet, it is different from the Western practice of publicising both what was 
traditionally private and what are State, governance or civic interests; a situation that 
has been fuelled by the meshing of sectarian and mass interests in sensationalised 
media content (McKee 2005) and the growth of a technologically mediated, instant, 
information society. There is therefore a close relationship between the public sphere 
and the ‗public interest‘, which is the construction of what media consumers want that 
runs along a continuum from individual interests to grouped/communal interests 
(Nyamjoh 2005).  
 
Central to the mediated social development agenda is a government agenda that seeks 
to urge an emancipatory ‗project of the state‘, which has in recent years changed from 
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the self-reliance struggle, post-independence, to reflect contemporary national 
cultural, political and economic realities reflected in the various policy documents 
published by the sitting government (Government of Ghana 2012). That agenda can 
be categorised as: democratisation; public accountability (economic performance and 
governance); the modernisation of institutions, infrastructure and systems of labour 
employment, and the reiteration of the nation-state. These categories of social 
development concerns, however, may not fully capture the full latitude of the ‗public 
interest‘ when that term is understood to mean ‗the over-riding concerns of private 
citizens for their own welfare‘, nor would it reflect the various interests of sectional 
social groups. Simply, it is empirically impossible to assemble a full representation of 
the public interest at any given time and to achieve a comprehensive servicing of this. 
It, however, remains the challenge of the media to represent the interests of the public, 
to serve and give voice to these, in order to facilitate a construction of a national 
‗public sphere‘. Thus GTv, as a public broadcaster, is charged with reflecting the 
national ‗public sphere‘; constructed in the National Media Policy (Appendices 4) as 
the reflection of plurality in debates, cultures, social sustenance, social diversity and 
governments‘ development agenda in broadcast output, in a manner that also presents 
a Ghanaian character in the media product. Thus, the achievement of representations 
of ‗public interest‘ and social development communication in the form of public 
education in a mediated and national ‗public sphere‘ depends on the agency of the 
public media system and its content producers. The facilitation of the public sphere 
must also occur within the context of an African ―communal‖ society, whose 
priorities, social forms of organisation and ways of debating issues, especially in 
politics and power relationships, are markedly different from Western conceptions of 
―subject‖ and ―citizen‖ due to the dual acceptance of these states of being (Nyamnjoh 
2005, pg. 32 – 35). 
 
Definition of Terms 
In writing a body of work such as this, it becomes necessary to set out a definition of 
key referential terms that are important for a correct reading of content: 
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Consciencism: used to mean ―philosophical consciencism‖ as proposed by Kwame 
Nkrumah (1964)
8
. 
 
Conscientization: means the enablement of praxis (the application of learning) 
resulting from establishing critical pedagogy within learning programmes. Within 
television programming, this refers to the embedding of producer–audience co-
creation of education and information content to enable evocative referencing in 
problem-solving that also affects social behaviour. 
 
Development – the term is employed as a short-hand for social and economic 
development (see Chapter II, pg. 60). 
 
Modernity, modernization: the ideas pertaining to social organisation and lifestyle 
suggestive of cultural and technological progress; aspirational towards contemporary 
industrialised social forms as typified by ‗the West‘ (Barker 2005). 
 
Nationalism: the existence of an ―imagined” ―community” that is a ―limited‖ 
affiliation of peoples who can make a claim to a certain fraternal relationship deemed 
to be ―sovereign” (Anderson 1991,pg. 3 – 7). It further produces the adjectives 
‗national‘ and ‗nationalist‘. 
 
Post-colonialism: the term‘s usage associates closely with the imports of the terms 
‗neo-colonial‘, ‗neo-liberal‘ and ‗neo-imperial‘. It implications are stated in critical 
theories and arguments advanced by several writers referenced in this work, such as 
Nkrumah, Rodney and Fanon, whose views are anchored in a socialist paradigm. It 
also embraces other contemporary critical cultural theory writers such as Toyin 
Falola
9
. The term also denotes the political fact, chronologic and geographic spaces of 
post- independence nationhood and sovereignty of erstwhile colonies. 
 
Public Broadcasting System (PBS): a broadcast media system that is ‗public-owned‘ 
in accountability and ethos. 
 
                                                 
8
 See Chapter I, pg. 20 
9
 See Chapter I 
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Social change: transformations in the structural form of a society, especially in its 
power relations and ideology, in a way that progresses a realisation of aspirations, 
either towards liberal modernisation, social development, or conservatism.  A lack of 
change establishes stasis
10
.  
 
 
Social development: intentional transformations of society through social agents and 
praxis; a purposed instigation of social change
11
. Social development communication, 
thus, is the form of communication practice that engages with society-wide 
development through communication processes that present opportunities for social 
and cognitive elaboration of ideas to inform praxis. 
Outline of Thesis 
While this first chapter of this thesis has elaborated on the common factors existing in 
the historiographies of media and post-colonial Ghanaian society, indeed in most parts 
of Africa as a whole, the following chapters deal with the carriage of the research 
exercise and its outcomes: 
 
Chapter II, firstly, considers social change and offers a post-colonial location of 
context in order to facilitate a relevant juxtapositioning of media theories for 
considering macro and micro levels of interactions between media and society. Its 
focus is to illustrate current paradigms on media‘s influence on society. The chapter 
then offers a theoretical framework to guide the development of research strategies for 
this study. Chapter III then offers up the methodological operationalisations for the 
study, aligning philosophical and epistemological rationalisations with methods that 
were implemented, as well as a description of the research process. Chapter IV 
presents key findings and illustrative data and organises this according to the 
operationalised concepts within the guiding framework. Chapter V discusses the 
implications of the data findings in an integrated analysis with the core concepts and 
reviewed literature. Finally, a rationalised synthesis is offered to conclude the 
implications of the study, and to recommend future areas of research. 
 
 
                                                 
10
 See Chapter II, pg. 70 – 72 
11
 See Chapter II 
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Chapter II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Modernity and Development: a post-colonial analysis 
The theoretical conclusion to discussing social transformations in the context of 
Western theory‘s dominant worldview is to assume that all societies, apart from the 
―uncontacted‖ (Survival International 2009),  should be progressing towards post-
industrial, ‗modern‘ or ‗post-modern‘ social forms, depending on terminological 
preference, that are information-based and catalysed. This is the analytical trajectory 
of anthropological studies concerning social evolution that established the 
stereotyping of African peoples and cultures and set them in a primordial context 
(Davidson 1969). The narrative established Africa as a continent lacking and lagging, 
in developmental terms, the quality of humanity, enterprise and culture that a human 
―race‖ should possess (Davidson 1969, pg. 24), and its effects continue to persist in 
narratives of African culture to date (Ansu-Kyeremeh 1997). Some modern African 
academics also continue to discuss modernity in Africa in Western socio-economic 
and political constructs and find Africa wanting.  Lushaba (2009) categorically states 
that Africa is under-developed when examined under any set of development ―socio-
economic indicators‖, and further states: 
 
―Despite the diversity of debate about development in Africa, one fact remains 
indisputable: the continent remains underdeveloped after five decades of 
development efforts‖ (Lushaba 2009, pg. 1). 
 
The error in such an argument is that it fails to concede historical factors, nor does it 
propose an evaluation on the basis of local determinations and goals; it achieves its 
outcome from a rigid comparative framework. However, it becomes necessary for the 
purposes of this thesis, therefore, to understand the correlative issues that are salient 
in framing development, and how media and television, specifically, may contribute 
to such a process. 
 
Modernity is understood to be a reference to the time-frame signified by the 
Enlightenment project; beginning in the dynamic era of the eighteenth century in 
which advances in industrial technology, the extension and export of capitalism, 
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significant changes in social relations, primarily changes in European societies, 
interacted to create a contraction in time-space to the extent that events in 
geographically dispersed places had trans-national effect (Giddens 1991; Lushaba 
2009). Giddens, states further that the interlocking of global industry and the use of 
capital created trans-national capitalist institutions and organisations, which driven by 
the profit motive, rationalised trade into the promotion of consumerism. He also 
points to significant shifts in the network of political relations between states, 
globally, that produced degradations in the political ability of states to wholly self-
determine national purposes; States became inter-dependent. The Enlightenment 
project created a body of knowledge to address the changing relations between man 
and his environment, promoting rationality and science over theological explanations 
for existence that were a product of Europe, yet deemed universal and ―homogenous‖ 
(Lushaba 2009, pg. 12). 
 
In contemporary terms, modernity is described by Robertson as ―the standard of 
―civilisation‖‖ (Robertson 1992, citing Gong 1984 in Sreberny-Mohammadi et al, 
1997). He positions communism and democratic capitalism (citing Parsons 1964) as 
opposing sides seeking resolution to the problem of ‗emancipation‘ (Garnham 2000), 
or simply, human social development. The term modernity, itself, further carries with 
it the concept of globalisation; in so far as that concept refers to the ability for 
communication to happen between spatially distanced parts of the world and to create 
a unity of commune, or the inter-locking of world trading and resources and the inter-
dependence of sovereign States on governing treaties that bind and constrain their 
unilateral actions, although some academics argue that this is on overly-simplistic 
conception (Milward 2003). The crumbling of communism in the last twenty years; 
the joining into the system of world trade of erstwhile communist social systems, 
appears to validate ‗democratic capitalism‘ (Parsons, 1964) or ‗capitalist modernity‘ 
(Barker 1997; Garnham 2000) as the more progressive and modern paradigm. Thus, 
communism accedes to capitalism not only the economic war but the war for cultural 
and ideological domination in global geo-politics (Jayyusi 2005), as neo-liberal 
arguments dominate the ideologies backing the structuring of international relations, 
and all counter-points are dismissed (Milward 2003).  
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In an historic sense, modernity is seen as an unfolding progress of ‗civilization‘ from 
east to west and hence locates the contemporary energy of ‗civilization‘ and its avant-
garde manifestations in western economies (Morley 2007, citing Sakai 1988). 
Consequently, the icons of ‗modernity‘ are given as the cultural products of the West, 
and are strongly cast in a ―specifically American character‖ (Morley 2007 pg. 136, 
citing Huyssen 1986). Other academics are therefore calling for a location-based 
contextualisation of modernity (Morley 2007, citing Beverley and Oviedo 1993). 
 
The converse is that in a region of the world such as Africa, outside of the nexus of 
the neo-liberal exchange, yet no less affected by it, modernity has been constructed as 
being largely absent in contemporary times, any forms of its existence being in the 
Western ―African Diaspora‖, which exhibits a cultural-hybridity, since ―modernity‖ is 
essentially ―an European project‖ in ―timescale‖ and ―geography‖, and Africa is 
constructed as ―traditional, dysfunctional‖ and ―pre-Newtonian‖ (Uduku and Zack-
Williams 2004, pg. 20 - 21). Within Africa, also, modernity appears to be constructed 
in terms in similar opposition to traditional cultures, and referenced in terms reflective 
of its European encounter (Falola 2004). 
 
Thus, it becomes important to locate a theoretical understanding of ‗modernity‘ in the 
terms that relate to its influence on a society, and from there to develop theoretical 
tangents that explain its dominant ideological manifestations in the cultural and 
communicative workings of media systems, in order to understand their impact on 
society. And further, to locate a post-colonial historicity that accounts for African 
social change and social development in relation to the role of the media in its history. 
 
Social Change and Social Development  
Nisbet (1969) argues that, in essence, the concept of change has been with us from 
even before the Enlightenment, from the times of the ancient Greeks and Romans, cir. 
750 to 100 BC. His historical analysis shows that ancient philosophy and language 
from that region reflected concepts of progression. It developed definitive uses of 
―metaphor‖ that alluded to change seen in society, social change, as to those in 
organic ―life-cycle‖; ―death‖, ―decay‖, etc., and though these were not empirically 
evidenced facts were seen to be realities all the same. Even more importantly, he 
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suggests that ―growth‖ and ―development‖ are phenomena that were attributable to 
discrete entities – human society, a nation, a person, or a plant (pg. 3 – 29).  
 
In later writing, Nisbet (1972) addressed the concept further. He pointed to three 
principles that must come together in any attempt to evaluate and describe a change 
process – evidence of ‗differences‘ that can be measured or observed, and that has 
occurred over ‗time’. These first two elements, he argued, must coincide and happen 
to a singular ‗identity‘ / ‗entity‘ / ‗social structure‘ in order for ‗change‘ as a concept 
of marking difference to be empirically valid (pg. 1 – 4; 15). His argument was that 
change is the result of both intrinsic and extrinsic tensions causing a transformation of 
the state of being.  
 
Thus societies ‗change’ or ‗develop’ from one state to another; since ‗under-
development‘ is not a term that denotes negative change but comparatively retarded 
change. Haferkamp and Smelser (1992) therefore, sets out three key points that 
theories of social change must account for: change to the ―structural‖ composition of 
a given society that cause imbalances or tensions that trigger change, ―processes” or 
―mechanisms‖ by which change occurs, and the ―consequences‖ or resultants of 
change. They agree with Nisbet, critically, that social change, as taxonomy, is 
applicable to change in condition over a period. Its attributes are that it is directional; 
―cumulative‖ of previous achievements or ―growths‖ (Nisbet 1969, pg. 1 – 11); is 
purposeful, for example, shifting states of existence from a lower to a higher order; 
and should happen through instigating mechanics. This essay will argue that the 
media, as a channel of communication, plays a part in both the ‗trigger‘ and ‗process 
mechanisms‘ of social change, and effectually plays a part in the determination of the 
directional results of social change; anarchy, order, democracy, authoritarianism, etc. 
Media, also, plays a part in maintaining the social status quo, and is therefore also a 
structural element of modern society (Demers and Viswanath 1999).  
 
Hans Haferkamp and Neil Smelser (1992), further, lay out some key contributions to 
the debate on causes and trends in studying social change. The editors suggest that 
change has emerged as a significant part of social reality and has grown from being 
regarded, in the modern era, as the ―exceptional‖ to becoming ―continual‖ in post-
modern theory (pg. 2) and, more importantly, they opine that change has become a 
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lens for re-interpreting ancient and historical social development. They explain that 
the term ‗social change‘ encapsulates, and is therefore much more preferred to, other 
terms such as ―progress‖ and ―development‖ in that it overlooks the constraints those 
terms impose due to their implicit links with ―mechanisms, processes and directions 
of change‖ (pg. 1). This analysis contravenes Nisbet‘s argument that ‗change‘, as a 
social phenomenon, has always been recognised historically. 
 
Haferkamp and Smelser (ibid.) trace social change theory to the Enlightenment years 
and suggest that the theories proposed then were founded on hopefulness for greater 
social achievements. The Enlightenment spawned a growth in Libertarian political 
ideologies and fuelled the ―optimism‖ (ibid, pg. 2) that, with advancements in 
industrialisation and modernisation, humanity would achieve a fulfilment of greatness 
in potential and social order. Key theories of the time were concerned with questions 
of human determinism vis-à-vis the control of society by theo-political institutions; 
these debates running through the writings of Luhmann (1984)
12
, Habermas (1976, 
1981)
13
 and Locke (1689)
14
. They further argue that the term social change is all 
encompassing of various aspects that transform the human and social condition, 
whereas ―social development‖ refers to a more mechanistic change in the fundamental 
relationships governing power, money, education and aspiration within a given 
society. Within the context of change that affects the structural forms of a society, 
therefore, the term ‗social development‘ becomes a more adequate and specific 
utilisation of social change analysis due to its links with mechanisms, processes and 
directions. It can be understood that development is a social phenomenon that can be 
observed in terms relating to an ‗intentional‘ transformation of a society, community, 
nation or country, that achieves aspirational and emancipatory ends, and that can 
affect social attributes such as wealth, material goods, well-being, and cultural and/or 
civic activity. Utilised from such a perspective, the terminology of social development 
becomes interchangeable with the term ―national development‖, when the unit of 
society under consideration becomes the nation, or more appropriately, the nation-
state (Gupta 1999, pg. 120-124).  
 
                                                 
12
 Social Systems (1984). 
13
 Communication and the Evolution of Society (1976); The Theory of Communicative Action (1981). 
14
 A Letter Concerning Toleration. 
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Often defined in economic terms (Rodney 1982), social development therefore refers 
to the transforming of a society with a view to making better the lives of its under-
privileged population, preserving its ecology, strengthening its social systems, 
governance and  participation in governance (World Bank 2009). 
 
Current understandings of the term social development now reflect Rodney‘s critique 
above. It now recognises an integration of social welfare principles with planned 
economic emancipation (Midgley 1986; Midgley 1995) and emphasises the 
integration of community participation in an emancipatory process (Gupta 1999). 
National development, as a term, also recognises these new indices of measurement 
but emphasises more the role of the State in a planned process to achieve the material 
and social-wellness of its citizens; the expressed ‗political will‘ (Gupta 1999). Thus 
‗national development‘ is the term favoured by government planners, and ‗social 
development‘ is preferred by social scientists and community-based non-
governmental agencies. National development is specifically defined as: 
 
―the process of social change resulting in an increase in the capacity for a 
social system to fulfil its own perceived needs at progressively higher levels of 
material and cultural well-being‖ (Osabuohien P. Amienyi 2004, citing 
Tehranian 1994. pg. 105). 
 
This definition considers the nation-state as a self-regulating, self-emancipating, 
system with aspirational end goals requiring the application of resources and forms of 
enterprise and skill by which to fulfil such end goals. 
 
Similarly, Madzingira (2001, pg. 5) presents a conceptual definition for development: 
 
 ―Todaro (1992) noted that development implies the multidimensional process 
involving changes in structures, attitudes and institutions as well as the acceleration of 
economic growth, the reduction of inequality and eradication of absolute poverty‖. 
 
Todaro‘s interjection connects a definite interdependence of two kinds of social 
realities: the empirically measureable facets of economic progress and non-empirical 
psycho-social phenomena. There is thus an interlocking of these mutual dependencies 
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such that changes in one affect the other. Psycho-social phenomena are products of 
community and culture and thus infer the importance of culture-reflective social 
processes in the resultants of social changes that are implicated in measures of 
development. As such, the media are a product of psycho-social phenomena; events, 
experiences, history, culture, etc., and thus infer a participatory role in society, being 
at once a product and reflection of social psychologies. It is thus understandable that 
media theory is concerned with the affective role of media on society and socio-
psychological phenomena, and examines ways in which media is affective of social 
developments. 
 
Macro-social Theories: Media, Society and Social Change 
 
―By altering the spatial and temporal conditions of communication, the use of 
technical media also alters the spatial and temporal conditions under which 
individuals exercise power…allowing them to intervene in and influence the 
course of events‖ (Thompson 1995, pg. 22).  
 
The relationship between media and society is primarily analysed, in the literature, 
from an affective point of view, and questions of power and influence, both cultural 
and behavioural, dominate analyses. The presence of copy-cat American-format 
entertainment and newsreel around the world, and the consequent emulations of hip-
hop culture and Americanisms, is often suggested as evidence of not only the cultural 
effects of media, but also both its negative and positive social change effects (Price 
2006). Media, it is suggested, does not only affect culture but also sways identity 
choices, consumer choice and behaviour, language development, and information 
selection (Noelle-Neumann 1981; Kellner 1995). While there are dissenting positions, 
there is some consensus that the manipulative mechanisms afforded television content 
programming gives it the capability to carry culture opposing or affirming messages 
that could affect a population‘s cultural development direction (Rosengren 1981; 
Barker 1997). The American cultural industry, especially film and television, is highly 
organised and produces and exports at a scale that makes foreign governments wary. 
For example, Korea and China have particularly instituted policies to limit the import 
of American films, but China‘s more aggressive stance is seen as anti-liberal and the 
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World Trade Organisation has ruled that the policy be changed to conform with 
membership rules (Wang 2003; Gateward 2007; Keith Bradsher 2009). The cultural 
protectionist point of view is a suspicious reaction to what the implications could be 
for communities, with essentially collective communal values and fundamentally 
different cultural and social structures, when subjected to the individualist and liberal 
ideologies of American culture, and the key argument is outlined by the enquiry of the 
Frankfurt School, which was essentially, ‗who owns the media and how do the media 
organisations play a role in shaping our world views, and to what extent do those 
ideas and ideologies affect social perceptions in the cultural exchange process, and 
does mass media concentration in the media conglomerates that emerged post-World 
War II narrow, distort, select and ultimately decide what issues are and how and what 
the world is‘ (Louw 2001)?  
 
Time Warner, Viacom, Vivendi, Walt Disney and News Corporation are only five of 
the world‘s media conglomerates, yet together they totally dominate the world‘s 
production of cultural goods (Gripsrud 2002).  The dominance of American texts on 
discussions of the subject also means that mediated social change is often analysed 
from this liberal ideological standpoint – the preferred direction of social 
transformation/social change being towards modernisation, i.e., an industrial or 
advanced agrarian community, with democratic governance and modern production 
methods and labour management naturally develops from a rural and feudal society. 
Noticeably, regressions towards traditional cultural values are hardly ever studied as a 
consequence of media influence; the few excursions into the subject often having 
more of the form of being critical commentaries, as exemplified by Susan Faludi‘s 
The Terror Dream (Faludi 2008). 
 
In answering questions regarding the place and role of media in society, Garnham 
(2000, pg. 25 - 29) puts forward an argument that first locates the placement of media 
organisations within the exercise of power, and he posits that there are traditionally 
three centres of power identified in most historical accounts of media development; 
the economic - ―the means of production‖, the political - ―the means of coercion‖ and 
the ―means of persuasion‖. These forms of power overlap in complex ways 
(Thompson 1995). Garnham (ibid.) suggests that historically, the media has 
undermined both economic and political powers by providing a generalised means of 
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mass education for societies, and yet, from its earliest days, there has been a close 
alignment between the mass media, government and social elites. Political and social 
elites are the prime social entities whose funding or direct ownerships have aided the 
existence of media institutions and it is from this historical linkage that the media has 
borrowed its power, and allows the media to act in the middle-ground between elites, 
who hold power, and mass society, and thereby providing a means by which the 
powerful can ‗persuade‘ the masses. It is such connections between media institutions 
and the 'traditional' centres of power that makes the media a structural element 
interfacing between sources of power and the rest of society. Those who control 
media institutions, like the State when in control of media institutions, are able to 
imbue them with the rules by which they function and, through this control, affect the 
consumers of media products and order or alter the balance of power in society 
(Thompson 1995). Such connections between media institutions and power-centres 
contribute to positioning the media in a dominant role in society, but how does media 
theory explain media‘s role in the society? 
 
―The mass media ….. refer to the organised means of communicating openly, 
at a distance, to many in a short space of time‖ (McQuail 2000, pg 4). 
 
This definition of the mass media allows an encompassing inclusion of the many 
varieties of technology-enabled distance communication. The mass media include 
print, radio, cinema, television, and the internet. Mass media theories have been 
postulated to help understand the relationships that exist between society and the 
media. These theories begin from the premise that ‗mass‘ media are, by their very 
definition, far ―reaching and involving [of] everyone in society to a greater or lesser 
degree‖ (McQuail, 2000, pg. 4).  
 
This suggests several things, but importantly: 
 
o That mass media have wide penetration, everywhere they exist, 
o they are accessible to a large and dependent audience, who may or may 
not have much control over the content they receive, and 
o in places where multiple media channels (or sources) exist, there will 
invariably be tensions in competition for audience and choice, and  
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o there would be some form of control or regulation that would affect the 
organisational/institutional structure that produces the content. 
 
These are primarily the factors at the centre of debates about the power and influence 
of media on society. Broadcast television, now almost a hundred years old, 
commercially starting in the mid 1930's, has, arguably, had the most unprecedented 
impact on social life and spurred studies on the restructuring of daily lives and social 
behaviours that still unfold today. The influences of media also depend on inherent 
social variants such as cultural values, religious beliefs, economic power and access 
(Demers and Viswanath 1999). Evaluating these factors within a given social context 
provides a basis for understanding the degree of influence the media is able to exert 
on a given population, but these factors also need to be understood within contexts of 
political ―power‖, ―social integration or disintegration‖ and ―public enlightenment‖ 
(McQuail 2010, pg. 52). 
 
Change and Stasis 
While there is evidence to suggest some correlation between media content and social 
change (Demers and Viswanath 1999), theories of the media in relation to social 
change and media‘s ability to transform culture(s) – ‗culture‘ being the aggregate of 
mankind‘s actions and relations that are built around social structures that govern 
living – are largely concerned with categorising content forms and working towards a 
predictive model for media effects; the belief springing from the observation that 
―schools‖, ―religious institutions‖, ―advertising companies‖ and ―movements‖ all 
affect society through a mediation of ideas (Gripsrud 2002).  
 
Beginning with the ―Russian formalists‖ (pg. 32), as initial proponents, view that 
media content is shaped as a ‗language‘ form and that it is embedded with meaning 
and representations of the world, Gripsrund (2002) provides an account of the major 
media influence theories with the qualification that the influence theories are 
debatable even though they have defined media research for almost a hundred years. 
The theories are premised on the notion that media have a socialisation capability in 
much the same way as social institutions and normative social structures, and thus 
could be influential in socialising perceptions and thought processes. Media, thus, 
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could communicate critical and ideologically tensioned issues to audiences by 
connecting with cognitive processes. However, The Frankfurt School from 1930, and 
particularly through the work of Adorno and Horkheimer (1947, cited in Gripsrund 
2002), and also in the works of Levi-Strauss (1966) and Barthes (1957), led 
evolutionary thinking by suggesting that media texts are often based on already 
existing, dominant, hegemonic, social perceptions, and thus media serves not to 
challenge world views but confirms and promotes ―conformity‖ (ibid. pg. 33) to 
existing social structures; rationalising the status quo. 
 
Gripsrund further posits that myths are reformed in popular films and, in Marxist 
political communication theory, become sites of ‗ideology‘. This produces 
collaborative theory to the Frankfurt School that media performs a structural social 
maintenance function, holding in place power-class constructions of society. Thus 
together with the desire in the psychoanalytic field to understand ‗motive‘ in human 
actions, which also becomes popular around this time in the middle of the last 
century, there develops a supportive theoretical conclusion that the media has social 
affectation potential that works through messages becoming buried in the sub-
consciousness of an audience. The emergent theory, ―the critique of ideology‖, thus 
holds that the media adds to the structuring of the social world, and this theoretical 
field underlies much of social debate about the possible ―effects‖ of popular culture 
products, especially film and television (ibid. pg. 35 – 37). 
 
In an earlier publication on the subject, Chomsky and Herman (2010)
15
 analyse the 
workings of the American news media as fostering hegemonies in the reproduction of 
conservative views, and suggest that most people, including practitioners themselves, 
do not recognise this systemic culture. In opposition to the unfettered analysis of 
Hindman (in Demers and Viswanath 1999), that is shown below, Chomsky and 
Herman propose a ―propaganda model‖ analysis, their basic theory being that media 
systems under state-control essentially reproduce the official voice of government. 
However, American media systems, believed to be free and diversely 
representational, also produce hegemonic work that supports the officialdom that is 
represented by government, big enterprise and social elites. Thus the rest of society is 
                                                 
15
 First published 1994 
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socialised into pre-set discourses that are structured to protect special interest groups, 
even when the ―discourse‖ is launched on competitive, private platforms (ibid. pg. 2). 
While government-controlled media often exercise forms of censorship, private media 
present limited dialogic opportunities and constrain the range and breadth of 
discourses. The model analyses that the constraints to free dialogue works to achieve 
a propaganda, or hegemonic communication agenda, through a ―set...of filters‖ (ibid.) 
that, in America particularly, includes: 
 
1. market-dominance, ―ownership and wealth, and profit-orientation‖, that works 
in favour of the views of the media entrepreneurs; 
 
2. reliance on ―advertising‖ for revenue, that works to avoid conflict with the 
companies which as sources of funding provide direct support to the media; 
 
3. ―reliance‖ on ‗official‘ sources for news, making sound-bites and ―experts‖ 
opinion leaders and narrowing opportunities for alternative opinions;  
 
4. veiled threats of possible media sanction, when regulatory agencies become 
the sites of coercion towards consensus; and 
 
5. ―anticommunism as a control mechanism‖, in that it suggests that alternatives 
to liberalism are necessarily non-American and communist. 
 
The analysis agrees with Jacque Ellul‘s (1965, cited in Jowett and O‘Donnell 2011) 
proposition that propaganda is both a ―technique‖ of communicating specific 
ideologies and a subconscious reproduction of hegemonic ideals (pg. 4). In this 
analysis, the propaganda model fits into the same theoretical mould as the ‗dominant‘ 
paradigm in suggesting that socialisation of modernist hegemonic ideologies is 
possible through intentional media output (Sparks 2007; McPhail 2009) in order to 
provoke specific types of behaviour in message recipients (Jowett and O‘Donnell 
2011 citing Bogart 1995). 
 
Hindman (in Demers and Viswanath 1999), citing Demers‘ (1996) work in analysing 
newspaper ownership and social effects, however, sets out that media under corporate 
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ownership is more likely to affect social change through the publication of alternative 
opinions. Constructing an analysis of current society as an ―information society‖ (pg. 
109), largely in terms of new media, Hindman suggests that media now has the 
potential to act as social change agent since it now possesses the ability to overcome 
censorship and control barriers that existed in earlier media-society configurations. 
Now, ―instantaneous‖ (ibid. pg. 110) message exchange processes offer a multiplicity 
of opinion sources and ―stimulate discussion‖. He, however, suggests that broadcast 
media are only able to offer alternative menus that provide for individual choice but 
do not build inclusive ―publics‖ (pg. 110, citing Rheingold 1993), suggesting that the 
creation of an all-inclusive public sphere remains a problem. 
 
Thus, intentional or not, the media works through content structuring mechanisms or 
purposeful communication techniques to affect society with hegemonic ideals, and 
preserve static social conditions. However, it can also offer alternative culture-
opposing messages. This paradoxical contest is resolved when the dominant social 
mood is for change in the status quo; the social urge for emancipation exerts no 
pressures on the ‗trigger‘ mechanisms of the media in the absence of threat or 
perceptions of social repression. Thus, the social change agency of the media is very 
much sited in its participation in a popular class struggle, mass resistance to power 
abuses or social crisis (Martin-Barbero 1993), and its agency will be dependent on its 
control, either by government or oppositional factions. Thus media is never truly 
critical but responsive to the balance of power within a society from which it draws 
relevance and justification of its content ideologies, depending on the degree of social 
acquiescence to structural forms and institutions. Thus, the media in any society, 
generally, either reflect the social interests of the mass society or the leadings of its 
elites, both government and corporate, although within this there has historically been 
found alternative and oppositional media , even in the absence of free press 
provisions. 
 
However, the lack of evidence to support notions of hypodermic effects of the media 
on society has led to a greater reliance on time-longitudinal effects theories; this has 
been important in studies on the changes in social relationships regarding social 
groups, and their minority and excluded groups (Burton 2005, Adams, 2004). This 
also makes it more convenient to evaluate social and media history using a 
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longitudinal approach and to draw correlations between media and social transitions 
in a broader scope that looks at social development in relation to media influences. 
Burton (2002, cited in Gripsrud 2002; Burton 2005) lists nine changes that could 
result from media influence on a society and includes 'reality formation', 
'socialisation', 'social control', 'agenda setting'  and 'attitude change', while noting that 
these effects could be at variance with what programme makers may originally intend. 
His position, however, is that the notion of media influence is best understood in 
terms of the broad contextual factors that may be present during any reading of media 
texts, and in summary, the most noteworthy aspects of media influences are that: 
 
o they are as much benign as malignant, 
o are the result of collective and concerted functioning of the media, 
o are conditioned by the individual and social factors, 
o are conditioned by the context of reception, and 
o are more likely to be affective if reflecting an already exiting social attitudinal 
preference (Burton 2005). 
 
Theories of Development Communication 
Over the course of several decades there have been several paradigms of theory 
regarding the interconnectedness of global media and its influences on society. That 
field of discourse has gone through shifts from Schramm‘s seminal publication 
(Schramm 1964) that put forward the ‗dominant‘ paradigm or ‗modernisation theory‘, 
through ‗cultural imperialism‘ to the current ‗globalisation‘ theories, in explaining the 
nature of media‘s influence and contribution to national, community and social 
development (Sparks 2007): 
 
‘Modernity Theory’ 
The ‗dominant‘ paradigm was the post-World War II theory leading off from 
Schramm‘s paper that essentially advocated the direct benefits of transforming society 
through linking economics and politics to mass media communication processes, and 
emphasised an application of Western ideas about society, politics and economics to 
developing ―lesser‖ developed nations by making them more western. Championed 
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by academics who styled themselves as ‗social scientists‘ 16  the belief was that a 
propaganda communication model could be used to encourage aspirations to a 
‗Western‘, or conceived as ‗modern attitudes and beliefs‘, life-style in order to bring 
about social change in less-developed countries (Sparks 2007; McPhail 2009). Chiefly 
fronted by the United States Foreign Office, donor monies were used to initiate mass 
media, usually in radio broadcasting, projects in Third World countries (McPhail 
2009 pg. 4). Key theorists of the developed ‗paradigm‘ included Daniel Lerner (1958) 
and Everett Rogers (1969).  Rogers had stated that: 
 
―…development is a type of social change in which new ideas are introduced 
into a social system in order to produce higher per capita incomes and levels 
of living through more modern production methods and organisation‖ (cited in 
Sparks 2007 pg. 21).  
 
Such new ideas, it was believed, could be spread by mass media agencies. Before 
Schramm‘s seminal work others had built foundational work for this world view. 
McPhail catalogues that Lipset (1959) had argued that economic and political 
development was important to the formation of modern democracies, and Lucien Pye 
(1963) had also set forward the idea that communication was important in the forming 
of democracies through enabling participation (McPhail 2009). The mass media was 
seen as a vehicle for socialising developing societies into modern ones by specifically 
transforming the members of the society through exposition to ―new‖, ―strange 
situations‖ and ―opinions‖ to which they would later become familiar (Lerner 1958 
cited in Sparks 2007, pg 23). The transformations would end older traditions, social 
structures and economic production methods that were believed to be symptomatic of 
under-development. ‗Modern‘ was western and the ideas that formed western 
societies could be transplanted to develop under-developed countries. Also, ‗modern‘ 
was bound up with technological advancement and a ―state of mind‖ (Sparks 2007 pg. 
24; McPhail 2009).  
 
The ‗dominant‘ theory was very influential and was applied to both academic work 
and field agencies‘ practices in development aid in Third World countries. The net 
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effect of this theoretical trajectory was the funding of aid programmes geared towards 
the development of poorer countries by Europe and especially America, but these aid 
programmes did not deliver the promised results as the donor funds were 
misappropriated by despotic governments (McPhail 2009). Also, in the belief that the 
development work would require human agents to ‗diffuse‘ Western ideas, the 
paradigm also became linked with the process known as the ―diffusion of 
innovations‖ (Lycombe Eko 2003, pg. 176). It proposed the use of local elites, who 
were considered to be more in favour of Western innovations and ideas, to become 
centres for the spread of new ideas into local populations, and hence the operational 
model of the theory worked on a ―two-step flow….centre-periphery‖ arrangement 
(Ansu-Kyeremeh 1997, pg. 14) that organised ―a coherent programme...of… 
propaganda, the sociology of elites, the effects of mass communication, and the 
science of diffusion‖ (Sparks 2007 pg. 26). 
 
And thus, even before critics from both the West and developing countries would later 
point out, the ‗dominant paradigm‘ theories influenced the work of aid agencies and 
national governments that formulated social agendas. It was driving Western-values 
that were discordant with local cultures, and critics argued that the operationalisation 
of the theory was imperialist, or neo-colonialist, in nature and was likely to provoke 
social discord from being a non-national orchestration. By the late nineteen-eighties 
and early nineteen-nineties, academic research linking ―communication to national 
development‖ was being criticised for being unchallenging of the paradigm as the 
―linear‖ fit and prescriptive nature of the theory was in doubt (Sparks 2007 pg 28 - 30; 
McPhail 2009 pg 9, 22). 
 
‘Dependency Theory’ 
Thus, an alternative analysis of the structure of global information flows emerged 
which posited that the form of structuring was a culturally imperialist conditioning of 
developing countries by advanced nations. The theory proposed that the way 
information flow worked was to create a domination, culturally, of communities by 
elite nations to leverage ―capital interests‖ through a structuring of global trade 
policies that advocated neo-liberalism as the way to development. The underlying 
socio-political reasons was claimed to be an attempt by Western superpowers to 
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create a bulwark against the advance of Eastern socialist ideology, which was 
becoming attractive to developing countries that had been disappointed by the 
development promises of the ‗dominant‘ paradigm (McPhail, pg 22). McPhail argues 
that the ―cultural imperialism‖ theory stemmed essentially from Marxist philosophy 
and social theory, and highlighted the transmission of Western-values within aid work 
and world trade relations within the knowledge transmission enterprises of 
development and development communication. These tended to emphasise neo-
liberalism in order to create, or influence the creation of, western-style social systems 
to challenge communist/socialist ideas. McPhail identifies Herbert Schiller
17
 as a key 
theorist of this alternate analysis, and suggests that the theory is based on Antonio 
Gramsci‘s18  theory of social development in Europe, which suggested that social 
benefits from planned capitalist economies had created cultural and media 
hegemonies and mitigated the social unrest that would have naturally occurred 
according to the trajectory of Marxist social development theory. Neo-liberalism, 
thus, gave western corporations economic rewards for their products in new and 
developing markets while satisfying the interests of their national governments in 
gaining geo-political strength by replacing previously ―blatant‖ methods of ―empire-
building‖ (Boyd-Barrett 1981 - 2; McPhail 2009: pg 25, citing Schiller 1970).  
 
If the state of the world‘s information flow was inimical to catalysing development, as 
had been hoped, then in what other ways could this development process be 
advanced? 
 
The UNESCO, as the body concerned with global cultural inter-play, therefore 
became the site for the debate about the net flow and effects of the exchange of 
information between nations in the nineteen-seventies (Pendakur 1983). Dependency 
theorists, the critics of the ‗dominant‘ paradigm, who supported the neo-imperialist 
argument, forced the debate during the New World Information Order talks, which 
spanned several years of the late-seventies, to the dissatisfaction of America and its 
supporting European powers. At the heart of the debate were the uses and access to 
global information and communication equipment as well as the net flows of 
information between Western states and the states of the Non-Aligned Movement, and 
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the nature of representational issues in news and media stories about conditions of 
development, etc. The response of the Eastern bloc was to align with the Non-Aligned 
Movement, which based its arguments on the cultural imperialism mode of analysis. 
This set up a conflict with Western countries and saw the withdrawal of America and 
Britain from the dialogue (Sparks 2007 citing Nordenstreng 1984; McPhail 2009). 
The contentions led to the formation of the McBride Commission (Pendakur 1983), 
instituted to research and map a process for continuing the dialogue on the basis of an 
adequate evaluation of the global information processes. The outcome of the process 
was the creation of the International Programme for Development Communication 
and various regional news agencies that sought to better share information between 
southern countries and, thereby, counter the dominance of global information by the 
major western news agencies which, being only a few, were seen to be wholly 
determinist of an hegemonic representation and selective itemisation of the coverage 
of global information in news reports (Pendakur 1983; Sparks 2007). In the end, the 
state of world mass media relations has remained an international problem (Sparks 
2007) that still continues.  
 
Micro-social Theories: Communication, Culture and 
Development 
Technology and media, in the form of global communication technology, has 
arguably provided the largest impetus to social change by bridging the distances 
between nation-states across the globe (Weinstein 2005; Chase-Dunn and Babones 
2006). The social change implied is the absorption of cultural references distributed 
by television content; it is, arguably, pervasive and could be fundamentally re-shaping 
the world through cultural exchanges (Thompson 1995; Sparks 2007; Selznick 2008). 
The major direction of this change flows from the advanced economies of the world 
to the large urban cities in developing countries and connects to their rural parts, 
distributing media content and messages as a consequence (Weinstein 2005).  
 
Part of this involves communicating new knowledge and is concerned with 
transforming social practices and promoting social consciousness and awareness 
about issues and information. Social marketing theories have evolved to provide the 
techniques associated with change communication, often called Communication for 
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Social Change (CSC) strategies. They are used in creating social change messages 
and have been applied to social projects such as behaviour change, crime prevention, 
and public education (Capobianco 2003; Quick 2003; Tufte and Mefalopulos 2009). 
CSC relies on the belief that media is able to exert social change influence on a 
population. Can such devices be used in the context of national social development, 
and how? 
 
Media forms such as radio and television present under-developed countries with the 
opportunity to mitigate the detriments of low literacy levels and allow the optimising 
of a ‗nationalist hegemony‘ for development (Alhassan, 2003). The UNESCO, and 
aid agencies of governments from advanced countries, invest significant expertise and 
funding into developing community-based agencies in under-developed countries in 
the hope that they would help the transformation of the social conditions that would 
make development possible (UNESCO 2005). It is reasonable to suggest therefore 
that for media to play a role in the development process requires that it finds a 
culturally relevant mode of communication practice and organisation model both 
suitable to its production systems and the end market of its products, where social 
change is the goal. The cultural location of the media and their control in that context 
underlines their effectiveness in a social development role. 
 
The fore-grounded theories indicate a necessary and strategic understanding of the 
role of culture in contexts of communication and development. The dependence of 
development on localised cultural factors and their influence on development is 
broadly captured in the report of the Commission for Africa (2005). It notes that the 
―dynamic‖ (pp. 121) and organic nature of cultural development creates society‘s 
―ideas and perceptions‖, and that culture holds society‘s ―values‖. This implies that 
sources of culture transmission are key factors of social transformation and 
development. The report also highlights the relevance of media‘s ―role‖ as a 
―generator of change‖ (pp. 143) and thus confirms a developmental interdependence 
between culture, media and society, and reflects the belief that the media could help 
Third World countries develop (Johnson 2001; BBC World Service Trust 2006).  
 
Culture is defined as a broad concept that captures, including the above notions, 
―beliefs, texts about the beliefs and ideas ….. systems of communication‖ (Falola 
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2008, pg 1). The relevance of culture in the African sense encompasses all forms of 
life expressions so that it becomes the dominant world view; everything is cultural, 
and culture is the lens through which everything is established, from communication, 
power structures, and identities to occupations. The cultures in African are not 
homogenous though across many cultures common phenomena are observable and 
their essences evoke a ―oneness‖ (Falola 2008, pg 4). The shared colonial history, 
with its cultural impositions from Europeans, and subsequent militancy and new 
nation projects, also means that Africans and Europeans have constructed 
diametrically opposed identities of otherness; Black versus White, native versus alien, 
―primitive‖ culture versus ―high culture‖ (ibid. pg. 5).  
 
Yet, throughout history, Africans have used culture as a defence, enabling them to 
assuage and survive various calamities, both natural and human (Bruijn, Dijk et al. 
2007; Falola 2008) and posit within it the means to both human and national 
emancipation (Falola 2004; 2008; Juang 2008). Culture within groups is important as 
it functions as an organising mechanism for African society; dictating the means and 
mechanics of interaction, representation, politics, and as a means to form nationalist 
hegemonies and seek development (Falola 2008). This means of social control is 
often in the hands of the powerful leaders and social ―elites‖; the western educated, 
who use the duality of native and foreign cultural knowledge to mark social difference 
in economic and political ways (Ansu-Kyeremeh 1997; Falola 2004). 
 
Participatory Communication Theory 
Thus, it is that the failure of earlier paradigm in development communication to 
provide adequate answers to the utilisation of media in development has not resulted 
in a ‗vacuum‘ in the theoretical field. The recognition of the importance of local 
contexts of culture and history are contributing to shaping the value and influence of 
media products within development communication and has led to alternative 
approaches to the problem of siting media within social development projects. 
Significant of these has been the ‗participatory‘ paradigm. 
 
Grounded in the factoring of cultural and social realities, the paradigm formed a 
‗third-way‘ approach and emphasised ―sustainability and peoples participation‖ 
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(Mefalopulos and World Bank 2008, pg. 7) in a new approach that encourages 
grassroots involvement in development planning and goal-setting based on local 
communication and historic factors, and in this way the importance of local social 
issues, it is hoped, would out-weigh economic measurements as prime yard-sticks for 
development aid work. 
 
‗Participatory communication‘ (Midgley 1986; Madzingira 2001; Dagron and Tufte 
2006; Sparks 2007; McPhail 2009) is the current favoured approach to tackling 
development issues and has spawned a host of communication-integrated applications 
in the activities of local level development partners at community-level and in social 
development planning processes, and is championed, once again, by the major 
Western donor institutions (Tufte and Mefalopulos 2009): 
 
―Meaningful participation cannot occur without communication. 
Unfortunately, too many development programs, including community-driven 
ones, seem to overlook this aspect and, while paying attention to participation, 
do not pay similar attention to communication, intended as the professional 
use of dialogic methods and tools to promote change. To be truly significant 
and meaningful, participation needs to be based on the application of genuine 
two-way communication principles and practices‖ (Mefalopulos and World 
Bank 2008). 
 
Increased importance is attached to civic participation in government and local 
―decision-making‖ regarding development; the ―paternalistic‖ modes of 
communication and agenda-setting being discouraged (Frank Gerace and Hernando 
Lazaro in Dagron and Tufte 2006, pg. 64). 
 
During the 1950‘s Paulo Freire did literacy work in Brazil the lessons from which, 
later, made it possible for the benefactors to make requisitions for social 
improvements and this begun Freire‘s work and influence in developing the 
participatory paradigm (Tufte and Mefalopulos 2009). The paradigm focuses on 
―dialogical communication‖ processes that emphasise ―collective processes‖ for 
developing solutions, exercises and methods to solving identified development goals 
(ibid, pg. 2), and relies for success on understanding development issues from the 
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viewpoint of local people with external expertise helping to execute or facilitate the 
execution of goals (McPhail 2009, pg. 27). 
 
Ansu-Kyeremeh (1997) argues that culturally relevant modes of communication are 
important in modelling mediated communication for social change, basing his 
arguments on the traditional dialogical communication models from the Akan peoples 
in Ghana and pointing to Freire‘s work on ―conscientization‖, which advocates a two-
way dialogical process in knowledge sharing (pg. 27 – 28, citing Freire 1981). Ansu-
Kyeremeh considers Freire‘s concept of ―praxis‖; of the human capacity for 
―reflective‖ thinking and ―action‖ as the result of cogitation (pg. 23), and suggests 
that Freire‘s work sets forward a theoretical approach to development communication 
much more aligned to the African cultural setting. 
 
Within that context, ―education is a cultural act‖ (ibid. citing Freire 1972; 1985) that 
can oppress or emancipate; stating further the Freireian view that actions are more 
affected by instructive media products than by ―dialectical‖ processes; such media 
products are ―invasive‖ and manipulative, whereas true communication is ―dialogical‖ 
and generates ―education‖ without bias (ibid. pg. 23-25). The Freireian position 
reflects a resistance to the dominant paradigm but also partially concedes 
‗hypodermic‘ effects theory in producing cultural shifts in subject populations, by 
suggesting that ―during communication there are no passive subjects‖ (ibid. pg. 24 
citing Freire 1981). This implies that dominant theory-led practices of the time did not 
achieve ‗true communication‘ but worked on an ―extension‖ (ibid.) principle that 
strengthens the communication centre. The message giver‘s objective is to control the 
receiver. Ansu-Kyeremeh, however, is of the view that the role of media in 
development communication should be embedded in an understanding of a localised 
―theory of society‖ (pg. 24) and develops an Afro-centric paradigmatic: 
 
Arguing that modes of communication are culturally deterministic and thus different 
everywhere, he borrows from Freire‘s ‗conscientization‘ theory, (Ansu-Kyeremeh 
1997, pg. 25). Culturally, Ansu-Kyeremeh posits, African societies have advantages 
that have been over-looked by academics in the desire to ‗modernise‘ them using the 
‗diffusion of innovations‘ model and the western social theory of a predictable social 
structural transition from feudal to modern societies. The advantages include 
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―endogenous media and communication systems‖ that are effective in knowledge-
sharing which Western labels disparage as being ―primitive‖, (ibid. citing Hutton and 
Cohen 1975) to suggest an absence of ―culture‖ (ibid. citing Warren 1986 and 
Brameld 1957). Ansu-Kyeremeh considers this a stereotyped approach to 
anthropological studies of ―non-mainstream Western and Eastern‖ cultures (ibid. pg. 
90). Also, within the traditional communal settings of Africa, power-relationships are 
―centripetal‖ and depend on coalescence between ―socio-groups‖19 (Ansu-Kyeremeh 
1997, pg. 92) for authoritative actions at the political level, hence the balance of 
power is always equitable between the top and bottom of  society. 
 
Ansu-Kyeremeh argues that along with these factors, the ―communal‖ space, which 
exists between the ―individual‖ and the ―mass‖, and within which social interaction 
occurs, presents opportunities for a media system to co-join and share in participatory 
knowledge formation and dissemination for development in a manner free of political 
bias (ibid. pg. 92). This space, and in which traditional African communication modes 
naturally exist, is open to all community members and often exhibits a dialogical and 
gender representative mode of communication. The communal space is not singular 
but reflects the plural and ‗centripetal‘ nature of African societies. It is scattered and 
constituted by various social groups. Thus, programmes made in this space would 
have a greater opportunity to reflect social plurality (ibid. citing Ansah 1979). This 
positioning of the utility of the communal space puts forward an understanding of the 
construct of the African ‗public sphere‘ within the traditional mode of 
communication.  
 
In his appropriation, Ansu-Kyeremeh, resolves that the ‗dominant‘ theory-led, centre 
to periphery, broadcasting practices instituted with colonialism have little relevance to 
traditional modes of communication that involve many complex, culturally 
determined, forms (ibid. pg. 36). Yet, a modern mass media technology-based 
communication system could fit into this space in a culturally relevant development 
communication role through a process of ―indigenization‖; the ―development of an 
indigenous tradition of social enquiry‖ (ibid. pg 99, citing Alo 1984). 
‗Indigenization‘, Ansu-Kyeremeh suggests, is necessary as the technological media 
                                                 
19
 See Bruijn et al. 2007 for an extensive discussion on socio-groups in Africa and also Ansu-
Kyeremeh (1997) 
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are controlled by powerful local elites that are imprinted with Western values (ibid. 
citing Genoud 1969). His position echoes Fanon‘s call for an African cultural 
consciousness (Fanon 1963; Ansu-Kyeremeh 1997 citing Manuwuike 1978), the 
advocations of the Negritude philosophy (Ahluwalia and Ahluwalia 2001), and other 
similar positions that have sought to incorporate African social democratic values into 
processes that would drive continental social emancipation projects. In Ansu-
Kyeremeh‘s opinion, indigenization would occur through a de-linking from western 
modes and re-basing on traditional cultural modes, to cancel the ‗duality‘ that is a 
product of colonial history, and in this proposition contrasts with Nkrumah‘s 
‗consciencism‘ that finds no need to undo non-indigenous cultural influences. For 
Ansu-Kyeremeh, the de-linkage would better reflect the historicity of media in an 
African setting, such as Ghana‘s, because the colonial cultures and institutions were 
super-imposed on African ones and therefore traditional cultural modes still exist and 
are salient as social utilities. This contrasts with the Latin Americas of Freire where 
local traditions were supplanted by European culture and thus made it more difficult, 
if not impossible, for natives to reconnect with native forms culture that pre-existed 
the Spanish conquests. 
 
Thus, contemporary communication research now is guided by a reforming of 
understandings around the interplay of locale, culture, trans-national media 
influences, and the language and semiotic imperatives in communication processes 
(McPhail 2007). The importance of culture in determining the directions, nature and 
pace of development cannot be over-emphasised (Ansu-Kyeremeh 1997), and 
immediately evident social factors affecting structure, social mechanics of power-
relationships, money, education and aspiration (Haferkamp and Smelser 1992; 
Wilkins 2000) become the crucial points of departure for considering how processes 
of communication may aid social development. It is in relation to this that ‗social 
capital theory‘ emerges as a contested nexus of explications on the interrelatedness of 
culture and social manifestations of development. 
 
Social Capital 
The ability of groups of people to engage in mutually beneficial ―collective action‖ 
that enhances a community‘s richness and well-being, as a result of building 
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culturally-embedded ―institutions‖ or ―networks‖ that engage to create 
commonwealth, ―trust‖ and shared interest, and works to resolve problems is referred 
to as social capital (Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002, pg. 1-3). The initial 
conceptualisation is attributed to Lyda Hanifan (Castiglione, Deth et al. 2008, citing 
Putnam 2000) who used the term to refer to the way that communities were built 
internally with regards to social conventions and practices that promoted their ability 
to get things done. Castiglione et al. (2008) goes on to explain that in the nineteen-
eighties, two social scientists working separately developed concepts on the same 
terminology. Castilione et al (ibid.) state that James Coleman (1987; 1988) regarded 
―social relations‖ (ibid. pg. 3) very much in the same way as an investment asset, thus 
attributing to it the same properties for enterprise as money, or ‗capital‘. Coleman 
analysed its extent and influence as being determined both by the reward for 
community members‘ co-operations within the social group and the expected actions 
or behaviours required by cultures and traditions. Pierre Bourdieu developed a similar 
thesis and recognised social capital as an attribute that marks social differentiation, 
and exists in social connections that facilitate transference between generations of the 
typologies of existing social characteristics. He thus considered such connectedness as 
‗capital‘ that was transmutable, along with cultural capital, into economic power. 
Social capital, thus, gives ability to make wealth or hold power (ibid). 
 
Over the years other philosophers have contributed to understanding and broadening 
the concept of social capital and its role within society, including de Torqueville 
(1840), Durkheim (1893) and Fukuyama (1995) (Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Halpern 
2005). Halpern (2005) further suggests that within the field of social studies, the term 
‗social capital‘ is contested by many researchers regarding what the term means and 
what it can really account for in society; citing Portes (1998), Anheier and Kendall 
(2002) and Nuissl (2002). Halpern, however, considers social capital as being 
composed of ―networks; norms, values and expectancies; and sanctions‖ (ibid. pg. 
10). Grootaert and Bastelaer (2002) also list the first two features but add ―trust‖ and 
―reciprocity‖ (pg. 3).  
 
Robert Putnam, however, is responsible for the current understanding and usage of the 
term. In his book Making Democracy Work he used the concept to explain the active 
communal civic behaviour of an Italian town‘s people (Halpern 2005), and later 
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refined the concept to focus more on group facets that enable the achievement of 
goals through co-operation, more commonly referred to in the literature as ―social 
fabric‖ (Halpern 2005, pg. ix). This fabric is made up of the cultural aspects of 
societies that enable people, unknown to each other, to socialise or work together 
(ibid.). 
 
The concept, though, has been criticised for vagueness and an insufficient ability to 
demonstrate cause and effect on the large scale and much new work is emphasising 
the applicability and need for stronger empirical results of horizontal investigations in 
social ―networks‖  (Bartkus and Davis 2009, citing Solow 1999). To John Harriss 
(2002) the concept has been a seductive success with global development agencies as 
it provides a means by which to shift focus from the underlying problems of neo-
liberal development planning policies and strategies championed by Washington-
based agencies. Thus, the blunt-force of neo-liberalism and its association with 
individualism could now be assuaged with a new concept that could include the 
importance of human agency in the processes of development, and also explain the 
relative differences in successes with development planning in different places. 
 
Navarro (2002) criticises the popularity of social capital theory in the social sciences, 
and sees it as the result of Putnam‘s re-modelling of the concept to fit a capitalist 
worldview. He states that Putnam‘s version of the theory, especially, makes claims of 
cause and effect that are without basis in rigorous research, such as a ―mathematical‖ 
(pg. 4) connection between social interaction and longevity. Navarro‘s main 
contention is that Putnam fails to account for the agency of political power in 
influencing social outcomes, and in the centrality of conceptualising ‗capital‘ as an 
economic resource and measurement of social performance. Thus, societies with high 
social capital should logically earn higher per capita in economic performance. 
Navarro argues that Putnam‘s appropriation of the theory resonates with global 
economic institutions such as the World Bank in that it provides them with an answer 
to global economic inequalities that overlooks that fact that the presumed poor 
performance of poorer countries is not due to a lack of social capital but rather due to 
distortions in the structures of traditional societies from communal forms due to the 
introduction of capitalism. Navarro therefore sees a contradiction in the theoretical 
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position that advocates social capital and strong community as a basis for 
development in that capitalism promotes competition and individualism. 
 
However, it is the position of this thesis that the concept of social capital is not 
incompatible with either strong community or capitalism, in that it situates national or 
regional and local communities as the competing units. When people co-operate for 
mutual benefit on the basis of trust in equitable and fair distribution of reward for 
effort, the system is both capitalist and communal. 
 
While most writers on the subject have tied their ideas mainly to communities as 
residencies of social capital, Hooghe and Stolle (2003) also consider that there are two 
other factors; the ―historical‖; culture, norms, etc, and  ―contemporary‖ agencies (pg. 
20 – 21); public policy and public or State institutions, given that these can have 
positive or negative social effects, that could have a role in shaping on-going 
affectations of social capital on a given population (citing, Berman, 1997, Foley and 
Edwards, 1998, Levi, 1998 amongst others). They suggest that a degree of ―social 
engineering‖ might be required through social institutions, in instances of low social 
capital, to get a community to begin to embrace its members in order to create the 
essential elements that makes the concept important as a mechanism for social 
change. Grootaert and Bastelaer (2002) argue that networks created by government, 
associations and groups, etc, will lack the ―cognitive‖ (pg. 3) or softer elements in 
naturally existing communities, whereas Hooghe and Stolle (2003, citing Rothstein 
2002) contradict this by indicating that Scandinavian countries enjoy high levels of 
civic participation at the instance of public institutions but put forward that levels of 
democracy are likely factors in generating social capital through state institutions, in a 
direct proportional relationship. 
 
Language 
While social capital may provide communities with the ability to work together, 
inevitably the strength of community bonds is dependent on the means of 
communication that facilitates all social interactions. In almost all of Africa various 
European languages are used as ―official languages‖ (Boateng 1978, pg. 55) and these 
are still extensively used in national communication. The languages also served as a 
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means of ―assimilation‖ of natives into European cultures (Boateng 1978), creating 
class distinctions between speakers and non-speakers of these languages (Falola 
2004). 
 
Kramsch (2008) states that language is embedded in ―multiple and complex ways‖ 
(ibid., pg. 4; Risager 2006; 2008) extending social interaction by facilitating the 
sharing and creation of experiences , references for the social and physical world, 
signifying high-order emotive experiences and creating or bridging distances between 
people and their experiences. Language serves as the basis for creating meaning and is 
therefore a signifier of embedded representations of culture, identity, experience, 
aspiration, and knowledge, and when used in both its verbal and non-verbal codes is 
able to ‗symbolise‘ and ‗embody‘ a ―cultural reality‖ (Kramsch 2008, pg. 2). The 
relationship between language and culture is of interest because language presents the 
opportunity by which to study the expressions of cultural paradigms and identities 
based on culture (Risager 2006). Culture grows human experiences but it is language 
that gives ―constrained‖ labels of reference by which those experiences can be shared 
and recorded by affording a way to make ―meaning‖ of those social experiences 
(Kramsch 2008, pg. 5) and thus offers the means also by which to ‗socialise‘ or 
‗aculture‘ those who share the language into the culture of the language speakers. 
Joined with the ―imaginations‖ of the community, language pronouncements of 
hopes, past achievements and future aspirations makes it possible for a community to 
express its ideas and ―cultural reality‖ (ibid.); an essential part of its identity and the 
mistaking of which would result in misrepresentations (ibid. pg. 7, 65). Thus, 
language functions as a ―representational system‖ (Hall 1997, pg. 7), that works 
within the codes implicit in ―metaphorical uses of the language concept‖ (Risager 
2006, pg. 3). This may be what makes language a powerful force that evokes 
historical, cultural, linguistic, regional and national identities, and to prohibit a 
language is to deny a group its existence (Kramsch 2008). 
 
While there is a clear relationship between language and culture, they can be seen in 
separate analytical conceptions that allows for policy-makers to factor and utilise 
linguistic and cultural phenomena (Risager 2006). For broadcast media, the 
problematic of language use is one of choosing a broadcast voice; to leave out a 
language is to indicate a cultural and linguistic exclusion (Fardon and Furniss 2000), 
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with dire political consequences for a national service. This is despite the fact that 
across Africa,  people  often speak several languages on a daily basis, while in many 
other parts of the world languages are in decline or ascendancy (Laitin 1992; 
Clingingsmith 2006). Multilingualism and a reliance on a ―repertoire‖ of languages is 
common practice, and people often speak different languages in different settings, 
switching easily between, ―mixing‖ and creating ―pidgins‖ and language hybrids that 
sustain and create new language forms (Laitin 1992, pg. 71 - 73; Heine and Nurse 
2000, pg. 298 - 299). It appears that for the majority of Africans, this is a normal 
occurrence in daily life that allows people to play many roles of significance and 
access opportunities situated in different social contexts, but political interference, 
such as language planning or standardisation, may instigate conflicts and allegations 
of social discrimination (Laitin 1992; Baldauf and Kaplan 2004; David Clingingsmith 
2006; Kramsch 2008). Also a functional rivalry may exist between native languages 
and established European languages (Heine and Nurse 2000). While Laitin (1992) 
opines that the use of languages does not appear to have class and stratification 
allusions being contextually appropriated, Heine and Nurse (2000) are of the contrary 
opinion, however it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the socio-linguistic 
opinions behind these assertions. 
 
Yet, the issue of language is of critical developmental importance in the post-colonial 
territories, especially in Africa where several thousands of languages are spoken, and 
for the broadcast media strategies to overcome this have included the multi-lingual 
services, as done by GBC, and the multiple single-language programming services as 
done by most international broadcasters, BBC, CNN, VOA, into Africa. Yet, it is still 
possible for dominant languages to become established with media support when a 
fostering of a major language creates reliance on its frequency as a transactional tool 
within communication to make programme access easier (David Clingingsmith 2006). 
Salawu (2006) advocates the incorporation of multilingualism as a strategy for 
development, emphasising the importance of lingua franca as media of fuller 
expression of social realities, and multilingualism as being useful for harnessing an 
understanding of all these experiences; since the oral nature of African cultures makes 
broadcast media more accessible than print media. Salawu viewed this as being 
important for continued socialisation and cultural survival. 
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Thus, in the view of Walter Rodney (1982), development means any change that 
increases a nation‘s capacity to govern its society and its exchanges with other nations 
independently. National ‗economic‘ development is taken to mean the connected 
process through which a nation would increase the value of its material well-being 
through the development of technologies from knowledge of science and the 
organisation of production modes to satisfying the needs of citizens; anything that 
would adversely impact this independent capability would produce under-
development. Rodney, however, insists that development is not limited to economic 
terms and should include issues such as the growth of civil rights and liberties, the 
advocating for gender and sexual orientation discriminations to be outlawed, demands 
for unrestricted emigration, ‗pro-choice‘ and euthanasia. These are social issues and 
attitudes towards these are often culturally determined but the debates around them 
are often led by the media establishments in the world, and thus the arguments do not 
happen in cultural isolation. In effect, the factors pushing global social change also 
become factors of nationalised social development through the media, and the 
attitudinal positions of a nation‘s media, either in accepting or resisting these changes, 
affect a nation‘s development. 
 
Furthermore, development requires the co-operative ability of a community to work in 
concert and use an internal structure that is mutually supportive of members. Levels 
of communalism and social capital thus become of key importance; the social capital 
concept residing in the notion of an ‗invisible glue‘ within communities that allows 
the finding of a commonness of purpose in working together without evident 
individual motivations for gain, in order for communities to develop (Halpern 2005).  
 
It also becomes apparent that a culturally, and linguistically (Hall 1997; David 
Clingingsmith 2006; Risager 2006; Kramsch 2008), relevant broadcasting system 
could participate in the processes of participatory communication (Ansu-Kyeremeh 
1997) and aid the building of social capital by facilitating, linking and bridging, where 
applicable, suitable and desirable, between community members and across society. It 
could provide documentation and assist in monitoring social changes, and 
disseminating skills and knowledge between homogenous communities. However, to 
provide such a strategic utility of the audio-visual broadcasting facility requires an 
appreciation of the influences of television on the larger society. 
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Television and Social Change 
Located within the home, and nested in familiarity, television presents an opportunity 
to relax and observe, in a viewing mode that is distanced, and absorbs the viewer into 
a snipped up and streamed cultural milieu (John Ellis in Bennett 1990; Silverstone 
1994), its pace regulating the rhythm of some domestic activities (Silverstone 1994). 
This situation is arguably the key factor to its assumption of a centralised position in 
most societies where it is available; its combined video and aural messaging means it 
constructs perceptual ‗authenticity‘ and exerts power and influence in contributing to 
the construction of ‗social reality‘ (Searle 1995; Daymon and Holloway 2002; Malik 
2002), and defining the ‗pictures in our heads‘ (Lippmann 1922, in Gorham, 1999) 
about the immediate social environment and the world at large. ―Social reality‖ is 
generally accepted to mean the body of ―public images‖ (Hall 1997), impressions, and 
―notions‖ (Malik 2002), accepted and unquestioned in social discussions; assumed to 
be generally true or real. Malik further argues that television is able to achieve its 
influence through the ability to adopt a ‗bystander‘ approach and to neutrally echo 
‗official‘ sources, while its operative and selective mechanism that shapes content is 
shielded (Hindman in Demers and Viswanath 1999); it therefore is able to pass off 
this audio-visual construction as a real representation of the world (ibid). Television, 
therefore becomes an important platform on which a reflection of not only deemed 
‗truth‘ (ibid) but the dominant concepts or ‗notions‘ that construct ‗social reality‘ 
which represent the world and society to itself, become conveyed in a powerful way. 
 
The main problematic in theorising the power of television is, as is apparent 
everywhere there is television, its use and fascination with all its audiences; it retains 
a high position as a leisure activity in most households with television. Television 
serves as a dominant source of opinion and information from within and without a 
community, and has direct engagement in expressions of ‗shared culture‘ (McQuail, 
2000, pg. 4; Miller 1971, cited in Glessing and White 1976) for a community. It is 
believed to be the most ―pervasive medium known to modern man‖ and as a ―catalytic 
social instrument‖ has changed society ―for better or worse‖ (Miller 1971, cited in 
Glessing and White, 1976). 
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It is this centrality to its audiences that gives television its power to compel society in 
a much more radical way than other media forms. The structures, that support the 
making of television, are important considerations in any analysis of the scope of its 
ability to influence social change. Additional to this, the politics in regulatory 
frameworks, as well as the economics of production, further frame the ability of 
television to perform in a role and to be a social transformation agent. If, however, as 
suggested by media theory previously discussed, television, in its power relationships, 
normally aids the social status quo by performing in a social control capacity, how is 
it possible for television to affect and change the structural dynamics of a given 
society? To understand television and its influence on modern society, it is necessary 
to identify the relevant theories and opinions that consider how it could perform as a 
social transformation actor. 
 
Modernity Ideology and Television 
From the mid-1980‘s television became a global medium as broadcasters sought out 
new markets made possible by satellite reach, a natural consequence of the global 
expansion of ―capitalist modernity‖ (Barker 1997, pg. 3; Giddens 1991) through the 
institutions of world trade and economics. Television itself is seen as a construct of 
modernity in technology, a ―totemic‖ (pg. 275) symbol of modernity that is in itself 
embedded in a cultural milieu; material progress, cultural enlightenment, poor cultural 
taste, and/or affluence, all being encoded associations, while the set itself is placed in 
a socialised context that reflects the owner‘s social identity construct; modern, 
progressive or successful (Morley 2007). 
 
The contextual problem of modernity as a concept in the media is situated in the 
understanding of the dynamic relations between media as a product of society, the 
motivations of content producers, and the institutions of state that regulate it. 
Garnham (2000) discusses this problematic as a continuing extension of the influence 
of the Enlightenment in the debate over how social development is mediated. He 
quotes the opposing views of Weber and Marx in regard to this, showing that the 
former believed that the emergence of bureaucracy or division of labour allowed a 
better mechanism for the realisation of social development, the key aim of the 
―Enlightenment project‖ (ibid. pg. 83), whereas the latter believe that specialisation 
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would lock individuals into roles that they could not escape from, effectively trapping 
them and nullifying individual potential for growth, or development. This produces a 
problem regarding how humankind could be effectively emancipated – set free to 
enjoy the fullness of being and realising full potential.  
 
This problem of ―emancipation‖ (ibid.) raises a dichotomy of thought regarding the 
progress, or process, paths to modernisation. The Weberian paradigm suggests that 
the media and television as labour specialisations are possessed with enough specialist 
skills in order for their ideological products to satisfy the emancipatory needs of the 
rest of society – television can tell us what to do and how to do it, and we can trust it. 
The Marxist process would require all individuals to exert equal determination in 
arriving at equal social development by contributing to all aspects of social 
determination; achieving fullness of potential individually yet contributing, by 
concomitant effect, to the whole development of society. Garnham, reviews these 
positions in relation to Kant's (1970) view that the problem is resolved if the 
dissemination of thought product is through open social communication, making 
debate and the ―public sphere‖ (Habermas 1989) the way to harness efforts towards 
social development. 
 
The media as ideology propagator is locked into this debate due to its ability to 
present opportunities for open social communication, aiding conceptions of ‗meaning‘ 
and proffering information that has influence over the rest of society. Its role 
effectively raises the question of how modernity is represented to suggest social 
development. 
 
The ‗modernity‘ concept has had profound impact on the nature of communication 
within and across the boundaries of societies. The domination of the world economic 
arrangement by mainly American and Anglophonic television products skews the 
televisual environment of social communication towards Western modes of debate, 
idea signification and representation, and forms the underlying rationale in the theory 
of ‗cultural imperialism‘ (Barker 1997). This theory explicates the global exchange of 
cultural goods in terms that suggest a direct correlation between the organisations that 
produce exported cultural goods and a resulting neo-imperial mediascape; western 
ideologies and representations of modernity communicated through media products 
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that dominate the television screens of most parts of the world, and is held by some to 
effectively shape notions of modernity, culture and identity (Barker 1997). Barker 
argues that the theory of cultural imperialism is not concrete enough to account for the 
claims it makes – essentially, blaming American tele-visual producers for socialising 
the rest of the world into ‗American-ness‘. Barker suggests that there is actually a 
diversity of alternative values in American tele-visual products, and argues that the 
hegemonic model ascribed to values communicated by American television is either 
non-existent or latent at best; the dominance of White ethnic majorities, consumerism, 
individualism and class roles is perhaps assumed or unnecessarily highlighted by 
theorists.  
 
Yet, the presence of these artefacts has been much researched and commented on. The 
process of production in American television is dominated by White Americans, and 
their perspectives, even when alternative, remain characteristically biased. This is 
suggested to be because the interaction of media and society is such that the relevance 
of media to its society is most effective when it reflects the tone of social discourse 
and positions a media institution at the confluence of struggles between the larger 
mass society and its political classes (Martin-Barbero 1993). The idea posits the role 
of media as a liberator and contributor to class struggle in a Marxist paradigm. 
 
On television, cultural ideology is seen in the ―mass production of fictions 
…television plays and series ….all pervasive, with consumption obligatory because of 
its presence ‖ that depict the ―social organisation‖ (Stephen Heath in Bennett 1990, 
pg. 46) of a, predominantly, Western society that focuses on the individual and their 
relations to their environment and other people. The ―family‖ is situated in the 
middle-ground, as the compromise to community and society, and marriage as the site 
of ―happiness‖ (Stephen Heath in Bennett 1990, pg. 47). Chris Barker (1997), cites 
Tomlinson‘s (1991), position that television viewing is a negotiated event in which an 
ideological exchange occurs between the viewer and the visual text. Thus 
contemporary television exchanges ideas of possibility and modernity with viewers; 
an example being crime shows and the ―CSI effect …the near infallibility of science to 
solve all crimes‖ (Byers and Johnson 2009, pg. 3; Stevens 2011) or the ‗modern 
sexual liberation‘ message implicit in ―love‖ and ―soap operas‖ (Barker 1997, pg. 
146). 
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If television viewing can be interpreted then as a cultural and ideological exchange, 
how can development communication messages be embedded in content as an 
ideologically emancipatory sub-text, and how would the ‗propaganda model‘s‘ 
explanations of hegemony communication, and the advancement of the ‗participatory 
paradigm‘ intersect with micro-theories that could explain an ‗effect‘ of television?  
 
Meaning, Ideology and Representation in ‘constructed reality’ 
Given the theoretical position that the media do not have a 'hypodermic' causative 
influence on society, what does media theory explain to be television's messaging role 
in society? 
 
Like other mass media, it is important to understand television‘s work for several 
reasons: it aids communities' in understanding their environment through mediating 
aspects of their social reality through representing, interpreting and evaluating issues, 
views and opinions, as well as providing entertainment, and serving as a window into 
other environments and experiences (O'Shaughnessy and Stadler 1999). Television 
products, much the same as other mass media products, are able to facilitate a 
commonwealth understanding of environmental phenomena by constructing a product 
that is a narrative combined with realism, representations, and formats (genre) 
embedded in a broader process of social discourses. Where this product meets its 
audience 'meaning' is produced – that facility that allows the audience to interpret 
television's media text. 
 
Burton (2005) discusses perspectives on message embedding in texts and audience 
reception and states that classical effects theory, akin to ―Marxist‖ ―media – society‖ 
thinking, focus on the media text as the locus of ―meaning‖ – the result of making 
sense or ―reading‖ media texts (ibid, pg. 47). This classical model sees the producer 
of the text as being responsible for imbuing the text with its meanings. The producer 
is thus a ‗conscious propagandist‘ (Chomsky and Hermann 2010). An alternative 
model (citing Barthes 1977) sees media texts as either presenting opportunities for 
rapid ‗sense making' through the use of ‗formats‘ or leaving space for 'meaning' 
negotiation to occur by allowing multiple possibilities for interpretation. Accordingly, 
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the viewer is free to infer meaning and will do so from previously socialised 
references that may not relate to a producer‘s intent. Lastly, Burton sees that scholars 
such as Fiske (1987) and Jenkins (1992) consider media texts as being primed with 
meanings that are available to the audience who can access these through their 
interaction with the text at the moment of interaction between texts and their 
audience. Some texts are easily understood because they are imbued with attributes 
that allow for such rapid decoding, and some are not. Media texts therefore are very 
much repositories of a ―potential‖ to convey meaning (ibid, pg. 48). 'Meaning', 
therefore, results as an individually constructed cognitive product that occurs at the 
interactive junction between content (media texts) and the individual, whose 
experiences of the media texts are influenced by dominant or minor ideological 
persuasions sited within social discourses on the text subject (Burton 2005; Garnham, 
2000).  
 
Umberto Eco agrees with this analytical approach and suggests that within the 
negotiation of meaning what occurs, and what results, is partly influenced by the 
programme producer but is also filtered through the psycho-social experiences of the 
viewer: ‗….between the sender and the receiving point there are many filters 
sensitised by psychological, social and cultural screens‘ (Eco in Alvorado et al 1993, 
pg. 103).  
 
There may therefore be a ‗gap‘ between the intentions of the sender and the resultant 
understanding in the mind of the viewer; the ‗gap‘ being a result of differences that 
would exist between the ‗ideological‘ intentions of the sender and the understanding 
of the viewer. Such ideological cues may awaken or deaden ‗sensitivity‘ to subjects 
within the message, and could include an awareness of representation issues inherent 
within televisual (Malik 2002) messages that progress the sense-making process. 
The concept of ‗representation‘ in the televisual message therefore allows for the 
analysis of television‘s constructed reality. Following Burton (2005), it can be 
imputed that representations of society are based on ideological constructs, or beliefs, 
about aspects of reality structured into a suitable narrative. Representation in 
television is accomplished through a 'reductive' approach to codifying texts and in so 
doing there is a loss of significant amount of information that would have presented 
more accurate constructions of the real world (Mastro 2003). Furthermore, the process 
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of reality construction is biased towards the ideological perspectives of a dominant 
social majority who, often, would be in control of the media messaging process; 
television therefore reinforces the dominant social view point (Burgoon et al, 1983) 
that propagates a hegemonic worldview that justifies existing social structures and its 
representations in the social order. 
 
Barker (1997) discusses a theory of audience roles and 'meaning' making in terms of 
the affective ideological imperatives inherent in the construction and consumption of 
television.  The need to see television as an affective mechanism that can channel it's 
audiences' uses and gratifications, especially in commercial television where 
advertisers and producers have a need to use ratings to prove dependencies and 
caused action in market awareness and consumption patterns, promoted a viewpoint 
that an audience is ―passive‖ (ibid. pg. 113) and therefore can be led perceptually as 
producers intend (Gandy 1990). Barker argues that television provides the capability 
to ―standardise and share common cultural meanings with virtually all members of 
society‖, and leads to temporal formations of hegemonies (pg. 114) when audiences, 
individually yet collectively, participate in watching a programme. Burton (2005) 
agrees that in regards to ideology, the media are thought to be either a focal point of 
conflicts for hegemonic dominance (Gramsci 1968 in Barker, 1997) or for 
manipulative use (Althusser, 2005; 1971 in Barker, 1997). Television therefore 
inflicts an ideological persuasion that is coded into its output, a dominant worldview 
that is maintained by the social classes, ―ethnically or nationally constituted‖, that is 
in control of the output; a reflection of the media-power relationship that exists 
between producers and society (ibid. citing Cantor and Cantor 1992, pg. 114). He 
further suggests that understanding television texts in this manner opens up the 
discussion for cultural imperialism in exported television content in a globalised 
television consumption arena. Barker, however, sees this as partly a ―recycled 
version‖ of the hypodermic theory, and leans towards an ―active‖ audience theory (pg. 
115). 
 
That theoretical opposition is the currently dominant paradigm in social studies, that 
sees audiences as actively engaged in the process of extracting meaning from 
television, in many ways similar to the Barthes (1977) model, but differing in that the 
television output works on the level of melding the everyday familiar with the non-
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familiar. Barker, citing Iser (1978), Wilson (1993), and Buckingham (1987) argues 
that the audience moves ―between similarity and difference, and identification and 
distancing‖ depending on the audience's ―specific‖ experience. Barker (ibid.) relates 
further theories in this ―active‖ audience theory, citing the ―radical relativist‖ theory 
as that which prefers to see sense-making in individual audience members, and thus 
projecting as many meanings as there are audience members. He also cites Hall 
(1981) in providing an ―encoding-decoding model‖ that suggests there are biases in 
content understandings that work towards a ―preferred meaning‖ (ibid. pg. 116). He 
concedes that there is therefore a case to see television sense-making as both 
dependent on ideological constructs as well as filtrations due to the internal 
mechanisms peculiar to audiences. Clearly, the role of the audience is important to 
television achieving a communicative function, even if only within the limits of 
reaching a communication goal, other than the greater desire to imbrue transformative 
power into the audience.  
 
Following the arguments above, it is apparent that formats and genres become the 
more significant aspects of theorising an understanding of how television may affect 
its audience. Umberto Eco (in Alvarado et al, 1993) argues that genres are important 
in making sense of television as they take different approaches to programme making, 
an ideological mechanism that is fundamental to structuring television, that has a 
direct link with representation. The arguments made by critics for ―appropriate‖ (Ross 
1996) representation in television is thus based on perceptions that television mirrors 
life, or reports ‗truth‘. For its language to be understood, therefore, television relies on 
a ‗suspension of disbelief‘ that works to confer that the content is ‗real‘, whereas it 
may only be partially-based on some truth. Eco therefore sees a need for audience 
education about television in order to aid appreciation of the television message; that 
not all on television must be accepted as face value truth but that it is only reflective 
of some truth. 
 
Television and Cultivation Theory 
Given the extent to which mass media content is avariciously consumed, especially 
television, questions about the extent of its influence and power over audiences are 
inevitable in theorising television. While the concept of power is evaluated in terms of 
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caused action in a subject, either through ―inducements‖ or ―sanctions‖ (Runciman 
1989, pg. 2), the theories that explore media influence often do so through an 
evaluation of the ways in which its institutions are aligned with economic and 
political structures within the society (Douglas Blanks Hindman in Demers and 
Viswanath 1999). Theories also consider how culture, internal and external of media 
institutions, impacts the production of content, the reception by the audience, and thus 
its ability to affect behaviours – resulting in many effects theories though none of 
these have been conclusively proven except in some contextual situations (Burton 
2005).  
 
On the other hand, cultivation theory (Gerbner 1973, in Gripsrud 2002) posits that 
long exposure to television content exposes an audience to structural and assumptive 
ideas about the world, which is buried in the televisual content, and therefore ‗media 
effects‘ may have a large role to play in the conceptions and presumptions that frame 
the opinions and ideas people may have about the world they interact with, that are 
carried over from their exposure to the embedded values in television content 
(Shanahan and Morgan in Demers and Viswanath 1999). Shanahan and Jones (in 
Demers and Viswanath 1999) write that cultivation theory specifically addresses the 
influence of television, which has competed with other socialising institutions in 
presenting dominant ―homogenous‖ views of the world, in establishing ―social 
control‖ (pg. 32). It attempts to explain a correlation between peoples ―beliefs and, 
attitudes, knowledge and so on‖ in dependence to their ―degree of immersion‖ in, and 
―acceptance‖ of television, analysing the degree of acceptance of viewers to the world 
views presented in content – the formation of ―common sense‖ presumptions being as 
important as opinion formation and agenda-setting (ibid. pg. 32). Such mediated 
values and ideologies can be filtered into the society at large because even audiences 
with relatively less viewing characteristics recognise the embedded judgemental 
frames since the pervasive dominance of the media texts may be used as references in 
interactions between heavy and light viewers; thus television acts as a ―message 
system‖ (Shanahan and Jones in Demers and Viswanath 1999, pg. 33; Gripsrud 
2002). Shanahan and Jones, however, consider that cultivation theory is not a media 
effects theory but a ―critical theory‖ (pg. 32) of how television, as a system, helps to 
disseminate world views by by-passing cognitive science approaches to understanding 
the social construction of dominant ideas with its content ―interacting with an on-
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going social reality‖. It is therefore a test of ―what people think about‖ through the 
―mainstreaming‖ of hegemonic ideas, and not what they do (pg. 33). Gripsrud writes 
that the media‘s ability to affect may be very much dependent on the degree to which 
the audience agrees with the message values contained in media content, thus certain 
skills are resorted to by the media in order to achieve ‗persuasion‘ including: 
 
o social marketing, 
o participatory communication, 
o communication for social change, etc. 
 
Thus understanding media products gives profound clues to the characters of nations 
through its performance of a social maintenance function (Thompson 1995; Demers 
and Viswanath 1999). Thus the problematic between media and audiences lies in what 
voices are, and are not, represented in the media; the foundational argument to 
suggesting that a public media must be widely representative of all social groups. Yet 
even when all voices are represented or choices offered, how well is the audience 
served? 
While mass communication theorists have, up till now, failed to find cause and effect 
ratios in accounting for the impact of media use; concrete correlations remain largely 
hypothetical (Adams 2004), there is scope, for a strong suggestion that imported 
television content often dramatically affects recipient societies, where imported 
content, often, has values that are different from those of the receiving society 
(Johnson 2001). There is also further scope to suggest that strategic broadcasting 
systems are able to exert influence, over considerable time, to affect social 
perceptions though these effects may not occur in the intended fashion due to the 
nature of use of the medium.  
Television, 'Nationalism' and Social Development 
In the post-colonial Africa context where disparate nations have had to be encouraged 
into becoming new and singular nation-states (Adu-Boahen 1990) and to develop a 
homogenous nationalist and patriotic ideal, a considerable role has been perceived by 
governments for the public media in entrenching nationalism and patriotism, 
suggestively, in the view that such an ideological stance would aid national cohesion 
and development. 
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While the media is often studied in its role within social and political processes, and 
viewed as a necessary concomitant to democratic evolution in states (Karikari 1994; 
Gros 1998; Tettey 2003; Nkotto 2005; Rudra 2005), the role of the media in the 
creation of a ―nationalist‖ sentiment has not been sufficiently accounted for in much 
of media and communication writing (Mihelj 2007). Much of early writing had 
largely followed  Deutsch (1953, cited in Mihelj 2007) in conceiving that an 
explosion in global communication would make nation-states less important and 
would thereafter dilute nationalist sentiments across the world. Sabina Mihelj (ibid.) 
goes further to suggest that the problematic was located in an insufficient empirical or 
sound theoretical investigations to understand the role of media systems in fostering 
―nationalism‖, such as became evident, post-World War II (Mihelj 2007). Citing 
Anderson (1983), Mihelj further argues that the root causes of nationalism, and hence 
their embedding into media products, have been ignored, noting that in earlier work 
Anderson constructed the ―imagined community‖ as produced by an intersection of a 
commercially-driven print media system with ideological belonging. Mihelj points out 
that short-comings still exist in the manner in which the subject is researched and, in 
her view, attention should be given to analysing the ―content‖ of media messages 
rather than the processes of media (ibid. citing Schlesinger 2000) in relation to how 
messages engage with the types of ―struggles‖, conflict or solidarity, that are present 
in any community (citing Breuilly 1993). She further cites (ibid.) Rubert de Ventos 
(1995) who suggests that communication processes should be seen as a ―generative 
factor‖ enabling the growth of ―national identity‖ in providing platforms for self-
referencing, ‗the nation as a collective‘ (Cox 2007) sentiment, that is stronger in 
newer nation-states than in old ones. The nationalist sentiment, in Cox‘s analysis, is a 
convergent product of ethnicity, cultural identity, territorialism, post-industrial 
modernity and symbolic relevance of ―premodern cultural collectives‖ as well as 
religio-cultural ―roots‖ (Cox 2007, citing John Armstrong 1982). In all, the agreement 
is on the fundamental importance of an ideology of belongingness and differentiated 
juxtaposition of group identities in order for ‗nationalist‘ sentiments to become 
salient. 
 
In ―Nationalism in a Global Era: the persistence of Nations‖, Young et al (2007) put 
together a collection of writings that suggest that nationalism is studied mainly by 
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academics suitably interested in the subject, who may be inherently biased towards 
their subject and therefore largely ignore many individuals for whom a collective 
world identity is practical. Napoli (1996) suggests that the large disregard in 
mainstream research concerning media in the nationalist role is because of inherent 
traditions regarding the perceived roles for the media, and these are different between 
advanced countries and the developing world. He suggests that in the advanced 
countries media is largely not expected to directly engage with a ―national economic 
and social development‖ agenda, whereas this is precisely what is expected in 
developing countries in order to ―even‖ disparities between them and the advanced 
world. Governments expected co-operation from the media and created ―development 
communications‖ programmes and practices to urge this along without regard to the 
experiences of the advanced countries they were trying to emulate that had developed 
without this tacit co-operation existing between state and media. The question, 
therefore, is: what merit does a nationalist medium bring to social development? 
 
Gupta (1999) views the media as being important in processes relating to nation, 
nationalism and ―national development‖, and contribute through ―sharpening‖ social 
perceptions regarding ―nation‖ and ―national cohesion‖, serving as a bulwark against 
―forces countervailing‖ (see also Napoli 1996; Gupta 1999 pg. 120). Gupta further 
argues that nationalism serves as a motivator in conceptualising ―common living‖ and 
―common destiny‖, and describes it as an emotive force that does not define 
nationhood in legal and geographic boundary terms, but rather emphasises the 
togetherness of all categories of peoples within a nation in a ―common purpose‖ (ibid. 
pg. 122). He suggests this is necessary for national social development. Jesus Martin-
Barbero (1993), in an example, tracks the contribution of catch phrases used by 
national social movements in Latin America via mediation into nationalist rhetoric. 
His analysis puts forward that the political social movements that changed this part of 
the world was effected through the fostering of grassroots sentiments by the press, 
which worked against unpopular national figures and political structures. Nationalist 
populisms in the media reflected populist sentiments which, when adopted by political 
figures, created a powerful wave of change during times of national crisis. This 
process was not the conscious manipulation of a national media institution but a 
movement that was engendered through the press. 
 
 103 
The foregoing discussion presents fundamental problems in discussing the use of a 
nationalist medium to create social development – is there a conscious process 
through which to harness the power of the media in a mediated social change process, 
and would an ideologically nationalist medium threaten democracy and diversity in 
opinion? What affective issues arise from access, the use of evolving broadcast 
technology and mediation processes of media in the post-colonial nationalist agenda? 
 
Public Media and Social Development 
In reflection of this, there have been many studies done, and papers written, to argue 
the role of media in developmental communication – education, social information 
and political dialoguing. These have largely been in the interests of coming to an 
adequate understanding of how media use affects roles, power structures and social 
behaviours.  
 
Analysing the objectives for national media policy in India, Gupta (1999) summarizes 
that these included: meeting specific and national social needs, the provision of 
credible information to the largest number of people in an even, dialogical, manner 
appropriate to a diverse and democratic society, and the provision of information on 
both national and international events. 
The nationalist approach to social development and communication is seen by 
developing countries as the veritable way forward to bridging the gaps in both 
economic and cultural production (Olea 1979) and also by some advanced countries 
that worry about the dominance of American cultural products and the impact on 
national cultures in the large economic blocs of the 21
st
 century (Raboy 1996). 
Whether real or perceived, the American dominance of trans-national media has 
resulted in the tendency of national governments, across the world, to attempt to 
preserve national cultural media products through policies that react to the 
‗Americanisation‘ of the national television space (Wang 2003; Gateward 2007; Keith 
Bradsher 2009). However, in as much as there have been, and continue to be, many 
major discussions on the national role of public service television, many other 
academics consider that a truly relevant system of public communication is best at the 
grassroots level of society.  
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In 1979, Frances Berrigan, in a critique, wrote that the traditional model of mass 
communication was unfit for aiding social development in rural societies and 
advanced a model of community media that envisaged a scenario of communities 
deliberating with expert programme makers to determine the content and context of 
media programming. They would determine, among other things ―access and 
participation‖ in production, and would produce programmes that were, in effect, ―an 
expression‖ (1979, p. 8) of the community. She agreed with Schramm (1979) that the 
traditional center-planning methods to development had mostly failed communities 
and held the view that communication for development ought to be done from within 
communities for which such programmes are intended, and could ―bridge the gap‖ in 
the development processes between urban and rural centres. 
 
The roots of communication models that involve citizenry in community media 
schemes, Berrigan argues, are in socio-political theory and the effort has been to bring 
grassroots participation to political processes that largely ignore citizenry, apart from 
balloting times. Locating communication for development projects within 
communities would bring benefits that should include media infrastructure that allows 
communities to create their own entertainment and information programmes. She 
points out that such schemes have traditionally been used to encourage 
minority/ethnic and special needs participation, but that such schemes had also relied 
on the traditional modes of programme formulation that still concentrated the power 
of determination in specialist hands at the centre of traditional power bases – with the 
elite, political and knowledge experts. Her proposed model of community media 
would require such experts to become facilitators, aiding communities in crafting their 
own content. 
In her argument, citizen level access to information and participation in decision-
making would produce more active citizens willing to engage in debates and problem-
solving discussions that would both help centre and periphery policy-shaping for 
development – community media would enable dialogue between centre (or state) and 
communities, and produce more effective results as citizens at the local level would 
be more empowered to the development process. This was possible given that certain 
conditionalities were met: access to information, access to communication 
infrastructure, the loosening of controls, a setting back of vested interest groups such 
as media professionals and politicians, and the removal of media gate-keepers; such 
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as editors who sculpt media output for ―dramatic‖ tastes, preserve the status quo or 
simply reflect the dominant or elite viewpoint, and also, the involvement of 
politicians, who act as gate-keepers, but are only interested in championing myopic 
causes. Without these conditions being met, she argues, media output would not be 
directly relevant to communities. 
 
Acknowledging that media on its own could not guarantee social development, she 
however argues against the view that a social marketing approach to development 
communications is enough and suggests that the media can be a much more useful 
tool than mere messenger delivering centre-programmed campaigns and public 
information. Her critique of this approach was that research had shown only marginal 
attitude changes in response to behaviour change communication strategies that use 
―non-personal‖ and mass media sources. However, she further argued, development is 
about behaviour change but this is only greatly effective if the source of information 
is ―inter-personal‖ (ibid, p. 9 -10). Citing Bordenave (1976), she advocates his 
suggestion of ‗communication as a system‘ approach that envisages equal power 
relationships between all input points into the system, which would use all inputs as 
self-correcting and orientation information. Inputs would be from participants and 
could be at any time – a participative model based on the idea that a community could 
be the point of decision-making in the self-determination of development goals. This 
would reduce or eliminate passivity and conscientise participants to their own needs 
for development, allowing them the opportunity to take control and reflect on 
achievements through the communication cycle. The approach, she posits, would 
make it easier to allocate development resources in a manner that is more beneficial to 
communities than would otherwise be achieved. 
 
Lithgow (2008) writes that community media can be useful in deepening ―collective 
and collaborative processes‖ that impact social development although access and 
participation can also be limited by systemic social inequalities that militate against 
the ideal ―public sphere‖ (Habermas 1989; Lithgow 2008, pg. 1) such as ethnic 
differences, gender relations, and the density of information flow from new sources 
and their patterns of distribution in the global era (Lithgow 2008, citing Thussu 2000). 
He theorises an evaluative framework, the community capital theory, as useful for 
judging the manner and degree within categories in which social change is likely to 
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occur in communities. Citing previous work by Kretzman and McKnight (1993), 
Markey et al (2005), Prain (2006) and Roseland et al (2005), the community capital 
framework theorises that social change usually is observed in human capital (skills, 
education, creativity, etc), social capital (relationships, trust, cultural participation and 
identity production, etc), economic capital (credits, enterprise, employment, etc) and 
natural capital (natural resources, food and water supplies, etc). The idea, by no 
means ―exhaustive‖, also includes political capital (citing Smith and Bailkey, 2006), 
which is a measurement that would reflect whether state institutions and private ones 
are ―responsive to community needs‖. The engagement of the media in these areas 
could be a way that community media could influence social development. 
 
Finally, Adams (1992) writes an analysis that joins the centrality of television to 
modern living to the fabric of society, and states that television in the social context 
can be regarded as a ―place‖, without geographic location, where people share in 
expressions and meanings, and work out distinctions between society and boundaries; 
potentially offering a means of ―social control‖ through a multiplier effect of mass 
consumption in an ―environment‖ without operative class relations (Adams, 1992, pg. 
117 - 119; ibid citing Meyrowitz 1985, Tuan 1977, Fiske 1987, Hartley 1978). This 
‗place theory‘ underpins the functional ability for the television to become an 
informal instructional tool, as indeed it has been used in development communication 
efforts (Berrigan 1979; Lithgow 2008). 
 
Public Service Television 
For Lee Artz  (in McCauley, Peterson et al. 2003) the most common use of the term 
‗public‘ is best understood as that which is not private; exclusive, yet this does not 
resolve the confusion as to what it truly signifies in terms of a totally inclusive social 
construct. The term is often applied to defining polled voters, ratings and samples, 
demographic groups, etc. However, ―The public is not singular but diverse‖ (Lee Artz 
in McCauley, Peterson et al. 2003, pg. 4) and therefore the term is problematic since 
its construction naturally over-looks the distinctions that exist in society. Artz 
suggests that the term is especially uncomfortable for ―politicians‖ and commercial 
operatives who contrive to serve constituencies and ―consumers‖ (ibid.). For Artz, the 
problem in applying the term to the media is in resolving an operational public sphere 
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in which the mass media can engage in ―discussions‖ and ―debates‖ to make 
decisions, ―meaning-making‖ and give communal ownership and ―access‖ to the 
generated content (ibid. pg. 5). Thus the growing emphasis of thought is for public 
media systems to be directly involving in programming creation and community 
social reality, problem solving and growth experiences. 
 
The question of whether or not public service broadcasting should occur in its 
dominant forms is a question to which there is no clear answer (Raboy 1996). Raboy 
sees three fundamental problems that challenge an adequate answer to the question: 
 
o Where they do exist and are controlled by ‗totalitarian‘ or ‗neo-
colonialist‘ regimes, ‗public interests‘ are ‗equated to political 
interests‘20, 
 
o how media in democratically transitioning countries would 
operationalise the practice of democracy in their output, since they lack 
the historical fortitude and autonomy that would guide their practice, 
 
o And lastly, even in countries that do have the public service 
broadcasting experience there needs to be resolved tensions regarding 
the financing, remits and the interpretations of purpose for public 
broadcasters.  
 
Historically, and up to the early 1980‘s, the dominant type of broadcaster in most 
parts of Europe and Africa that operated public broadcasters, had been publicly 
funded monopoly systems, while in the Americas and Asia, the dominant model has 
been commercial. In between these is the public/commercial model that can be found 
in the UK, Finland, Canada, Australia and Japan (Raboy 1996; Indrajit Banerjee and 
Kalinga Seneviratne 2005). Raboy analyses this history and points out that since the 
nineteen -eighties, three, almost synchronous, events have changed the landscape for 
broadcasting worldwide – new multi-channel technologies have almost exterminated 
the threat of zero-spectrum for broadcasting, the collapse of the Eastern political bloc 
                                                 
20
 See also Chomsky and Herman 2010 
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and increasing democratisation in other parts of the world, and the great gains of 
commercial broadcasting in the marketplace, as well as increasing reversion to mixed 
public/commercial models in more countries. McCauley, Peterson et al (2003) concur 
that the explosion in digital channels has led to public service television facing 
infringement from commercial competitors worsened by an absence of adequate 
policies to designate an uncontested field. These trends have pushed forward the 
question of ‗why‘ public broadcasting should continue, following the logic that 
broadcasting is not ―analogous‖ to having a social, and cultural, service (Raboy 1996 
p. 3, citing Servaes 1993) and should therefore be a market-determined service. 
 
The argument has been further strengthened by collapsing audience figures for 
national broadcasters, as fragmentation occurs with the increases in multi-channel 
television, and broadcasters seem to be losing significant proportions of the ‗national‘ 
viewership, thus diluting claims to a ‗national‘ audience. This undermines the 
traditional view of public broadcasters as the prime profilers of ―national culture‖ to a 
nation (Raboy 1996, p. 3). Again, if the ―mass appeal‖ of American television is 
indicative of a preference for ―mass culture‖ commercial television, then the case for 
the mass reflection of ―national culture‖ is annulled, and satisfying the minority gap 
can be met by other means than within the larger framework of public television. 
Effectively, the case for using mass media resources in the interest of ―national 
cohesion‖ can no longer be justified (ibid., 4 - 5). Thus public service broadcasting 
systems should be looking to answer the challenge of the commercial environment 
within which they now operate. 
 
Raboy puts forward these arguments to set the stage for a rebuttal and defence of the 
idea of public television. Citing Ellis (1994), he makes the case that the interests of 
the market economy will not lend itself naturally to the rigorous pursuance of a 
―social agenda‖ and, therefore, the project of ―emancipation‖ through social 
communication, begun with the Enlightenment, is best achieved in an idea of ―public 
spaces‖, assured by a public service that is independent and publicly organised (ibid. 
pg 5; Raboy, 1996 citing Habermas 1989). In this manner, public television becomes 
a tool for socio-cultural development (Raboy et al 1994), and the state should be a 
facilitator that allows this principle to work outside of the influence of market forces 
(ibid, citing Murdoch 1992). Commercial media, on the other hand, is also criticised 
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as being unchallenging and using reductive and selective approaches to content 
creation that does not offer truly plural and diverse programming geared towards 
dominant demographic sections, in pursuit of commercial revenues, for audiences 
―whose chief wish is never to grow or change‖ (McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 
2003, pg. xviii; Indrajit Banerjee and Kalinga Seneviratne 2005). 
 
McCauley et al. (2003) suggest that public broadcasting systems can be made more 
effective and relevant by promoting public participation in social debate, producing 
universally accessible programming to suit the comprehension of diverse groups, and 
by building systems in which public determination and contribution to programming 
is made possible. Raboy‘s (1996) opinion is that due to the complexity of meeting 
national public television objectives, and in consideration of new social development 
models, using low level community television approaches as used in development 
communication, which are ―autonomous and endogenous‖, may be a way forward to 
redefining public television service in the twenty-first century (ibid. pg. 5, citing 
O‘Siochru 1992). The theoretical basis is in recognising the ―potential for public 
communication to serve as a model for social integration‖ (McCauley, Eric E. 
Peterson et al. 2003, pg. xviii) based on Habermas‘s concept of the ―public sphere‖ as 
a space or place in which social debate happens freely to form public opinion as the 
best way to achieve social goals through ―public communication‖, especially in 
developing countries (McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003, pg. xxv; Indrajit 
Banerjee and Kalinga Seneviratne 2005). 
 
Indrajit Banerjee and Kalinga Seneviratne (2005) propose, in consideration of the 
variety and complexity of public broadcasting practices across the world, not a ―gold 
standard‖ (pg. 13),  but essential characteristics that public broadcasters ought to 
demonstrate in order to achieve a public service objective. Acknowledging the 
tensions between private-commercial interests and the public interest and the 
propensity for government subversion in the State-controlled models, the writers offer 
―factors‖ to be considered in ―judging whether a PSB is playing the role it is expected 
to perform‖ (pg. 15 - 16): 
 
 ―Universality‖ – of access to the medium in order to participate in content 
production, and to also receive the communication produced, by every citizen. 
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 ―Diversity‖ – in ―genres‖, target ―audience‖ and programme ―subject‖ (pg. 
15), in order to reflect the plurality and currency of need and use of the 
medium within the broad context of a given society. 
 ―Independence‖ – in the public sphere must be assured against the forces of 
commercial concerns and political manipulations that would undermine the 
confidence of the public in the content and messages produced by the 
broadcaster. 
 ―Distinctiveness‖ – the strength of a public service must be in its ability to 
show a difference between its output and that of other market players in order 
to justify its existence and role; providing market leadership, challenging 
conventions and providing creative impetus to industry.  
 
These standards relate to social development in this way: 
 
―only in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth and in the free exchange of 
ideas and knowledge can we achieve international peace, understanding and 
sustainable development‖ (ibid. citing Dr Abdul Waheed Khan 2003). 
 
Making Television 
Television is an institutional product and, as a technological medium, there are many 
factors of production that affect its consumption and also play a part in its affective 
communication processes. These factors include its accessibility and penetration, 
market competition between stations, and the ideological values within programmes 
that signify differentiation in programmes that are attributable to the role of 
programme makers. There are other factors, such as media literacy and media market 
regulation and economics are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Television Penetration 
Television penetration refers to the extent to which it is available to a given 
population. Its factors are the coverage area of signal reception, and availability 
and/or ownership of units of television sets (usually calculated in terms of units per 
household or per thousand in the population). In many advanced countries, there tends 
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to be multiple television accessing screens per home, as computers and multi-media 
devices are increasingly brought on to deliver both inter-active and audio-visual 
content. This relates directly to the ‗universality factor‘, in that wide penetration 
assures availability for public enjoyment of the medium. 
 
Viewer Choice 
In countries where digital television transmission formats allow a plethora of channels 
to be accessed from single or multiple sets in a household, and viewers have access to 
multi-channel programming, viewers are increasingly determining final output 
schedules using PVRs and DVRs to record and playback content at suitable times. 
While the many channels available to audiences in these countries has spurred a 
generally observed fragmentation of audiences, and this was widely predicted to be 
the future evolution of television, the evidence available also suggests that most 
television viewers still gravitate to a few popular channels and programmes (McQuail 
2000). Viewer choice is also directly related to the ‗diversity factor‘, assuring that 
various social and demographic groups find content that satisfy their use of the 
medium. 
 
Viewer choice in television is important to the extent that as a cultural medium, 
television is engaged in the processes of identity, representation and the socialisation 
of the audience en masse (McQuail 2000). Socialisation in this instance refers to that 
process that joins culture, as a societal artefact, to culture as an enfolding social 
―process‖ with television acting as an agent (Karl Rosengren 1981, cited in Ball-
Rokeach and Cantor 1986, pg. 90), accomplished through eliciting identification. 
Identification is ―the particular form of imitation in which copying a model, 
generalised beyond specific acts, springs from wanting to be and trying to be like the 
model with respect to some broader quality‖ (White 1972 cited in Baran & Davies 
2003, pg. 192). This means that to be engaged with television, a viewer must 
necessarily be able to access and identify with some cultural and/or identity 
representations that reflect their perceived circumstances and aspirations in the 
society. Rosengren‘s (1981) position is that the viewer must either be an assimilator 
or an actor, however limited, in the process of socialisation but at all times is both. 
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Abercrombie (1996) also describes that, on one hand, the audience is theorised as a 
market for advertisers; where when found in large numbers indicates 'popular' 
programming which can then serve as a target for a sponsor's message or 
advertisement. This audience as market model underpins commercial broadcast 
television, and has spawned various statistical measurement methods that work to 
identify the audience demographics that are attracted to particular programmes, and 
on the basis of which advertising rates are set. In this instance the influence of the 
audience on programming is in their indication of preference-by-numbers. On the 
other hand, the audience is seen as an active citizen needing information as equipment 
useful to their decision-making, socialisation and understanding of the rest of the 
world (see also discussions on active audience theory in Barker, 1997; Baran and 
Davies, 2003), and this is the basis of reasoning for a purposed public broadcasting 
system (Indrajit Banerjee and Kalinga Seneviratne 2005).  
 
Producer Roles 
Much of the literature discussing the role of the television producer in the medium 
does so from narrow contexts, genre production, type of organisation, and policy 
driven impacts on the environment of the producer or simply the technical and 
technological skills needed for the role (see for example Tunstall 1993 and Owens 
and Millerson 2012). However, the content creation process is helmed by human 
factors. Newcomb and Alley (in Ettema and Whitney 1982) state that ―television is a 
producer‘s medium‖ (pg. 69), and that producers play a key role in shouldering 
overall responsibility in delivering programmes by negotiating, gaining control and 
delivering on both the bottom-line and creative enterprise involved in programme-
making. Thus they deal with a bounded-rationality universe, both free yet limited by 
resources, individual ability to command power or control and reputation, and by their 
individually held creative ability and ideological persuasions which are implicit with 
working in the medium (ibid.). Citing Turner (1977) they apply ritualisation or 
enactment to the production of artistic work and suggest that production processes 
refine and represent dominant socio-cultural values and ideas in created content; 
making them viable texts for reading and understanding social reality, best 
exemplified by popular genres.  
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James Ettema (Ettema and Whitney 1982) also posits that producers exist in an 
organisational milieu, and thus the producers work should be understood by bringing 
together three factors: messages embedded in content, organisational production 
routines with its constraints and limitations, and by conflict and negotiation within the 
producer‘s media organisation and between it and its competition. 
 
Summary and Implications for Study 
The ramifications of the media theory positions reviewed have significance for 
understanding how, through television and other media, the transfer of  modernisation 
ideas of social development may become a situational problematic for post-colonial 
developing nations or nations whose cultures are less assimilated to Western 
ideological conventions of politics, economics and culture. Theories of the media also 
show that televisual messages may influence social perceptions through providing 
education and information, as well as carrying dominant social values and ideological 
discourses in programming. The overt and unintentional processes that occur in 
content production practices therefore suggests that the media space can only be truly 
diverse if the control of production is in the hands of diverse ideological actors, both 
private and public, in order to allow as many voices as possible to be represented 
across programming.  
 
Theoretical analysis of the ideological imperatives implicit in the practice and global 
distribution of television products also suggest that the Western view of the world of 
modernity and development is embedded in transnationalised content and these could 
have an impact on conceptions of development in reception communities. These 
theories and debates about the globalisation of television have mostly been researched 
and debated in such terms as capitalism, regulation, culture and media nationalism. 
However, there is an evident gap in the literature around the subject of modernity 
communication and representation in media products. The studies extensively ignore 
or do not note the contribution of Eastern (Chinese, Japanese, etc.) media products 
into developing countries. Cognisance of such factors could allow for a comparative 
analysis of the textual readings of ideology and representation between Eastern and 
Western media products in developing societies.  
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For the local situation in Ghana, an analysis of the GBC and its public service remit is 
long overdue. While a nationalist media is seen, by thinkers from developing 
countries, to be key to social development, this is conceived of as the operationalising 
of an ideological output that is balanced against the Western orientations of national 
political classes to favour a national discourse that is relevant to local cultural 
situations (Martin-Barbero 1993; Gupta 1999). The emphasis for mediated social 
change has therefore shifted from ‗broadcasting‘ in the traditional ‗one-to-many‘ 
model to a ‗many-to-many‘ model that encourages the involvement of 
community/audience participation as essential for crafting media that is responsive 
and integral to community life and development. 
 
However, not all these concerns can be fully addressed in this thesis, as it will focus 
on the structural agency of one national broadcaster, and its involvement in national 
social development. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this research followed an ethos suggested by Rudestam 
and Newton (1992, cited in Leshem and Trafford 2007), as the formulation of a 
guiding outline of the theoretical ideas underlying a piece of research, in relation to 
data to be collected, which would form a malleable model to guide the formation of 
methods for data collection and analysis. Therefore, the framework operates as a tool 
―for researchers to use rather than totems for them to worship‖ (Weaver-Hart 1988, p. 
11, cited in Leshem and Trafford 2007), and provides a guiding means through which 
both the methodology and analysis for the research finds legitimation. 
 
The conceptual framework of this study was, thus, intended to provide a mechanism 
through which a synthesis of the theoretical and empirical evidences that this research 
pulls together could make it possible to understand how the content production ideas 
and actions of GTv‘s producer-directors, as well as broadcast output, reflect on 
Ghanaian social development efforts. It thus provided the means by which an attempt 
could be made to describe and discuss the social development contribution of GTv 
to Ghanaian society through providing sets of analytical frameworks by which to gain 
an understanding of GTv‘s potential for mediating social change. This would be 
 115 
indicated through assessing broadcast communication factors that would promote 
social capital, producers‘ agency and representations of modernity in content, while 
making it possible to evaluate the implications for public broadcasting in relation  to 
social development and development communication strategies in a post-colonial 
context. Thus, the construction of the framework would necessarily follow a critical 
cultural perspective in order to achieve a correct interpretation of empirical data. As 
such it became important to also resolve the communication context
21
 and the 
corollary of culturally determined modes of communication that are employed within 
broadcast output. 
 
The rationalisation for the approach was in conceiving the public broadcasting 
services as being historically integral to the typical African post-colonial society, 
thus national political history and media policies would interact together with the 
enactments of both producers and the public media organisation to produce social 
outcomes that affect the direction, pace and achievement of social emancipation end-
goals. Furthermore, it was also considered that since television has been argued to 
exert some influence on social life and that the mass media is both a ‘structural’ 
element and a change ‘trigger’ in society, as suggested by Haferkemp and Smelser 
(1992), in contributing to social processes, the question to be answered by this 
research was ‗to what degree is that role achieved in the agenda for social 
development‘. This thesis also recognised that public broadcasting, being embedded 
in that larger mass media category, was not the only agent that mediates social 
change, and therefore acknowledges that, that larger process would include socially 
affective output from commercial stations, whose contribution to Ghana‘s society was 
not studied in this research. Following from this theoretical approach the following 
considerations for an operation theoretical framework was set out: 
 
Firstly, as one of the types of the socialist emancipation ideologies that guided social 
reformations in a post-colonial African country, Nkrumah‘s ―consciencism‖ 
(Nkrumah 1964) provides a key framework through which to understand the post-
colonial social order and how its political history played a role in the formulation, 
history and cultures of service at state institutions, such as the GBC, that were 
                                                 
21
 In this case study the context is African as set out in Ansu-Kyeremeh (1997)  
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subsumed into the national social development programme, as already discussed in 
Chapter I. In its emphasis on community, consciencism provides an older, historic, 
ideology to current ―social capital‖ (Halpern 2005) although both theories seek to 
explain the importance of an alignment between community human resources and 
social development end-goals. Both theories, thus, provide a means for assessing 
‗community‘ or ‗social cohesion‘ as an asset to social development as its strength 
would be indicative of the existence of strong social networks and a common culture 
essential to end-goal achievement. 
 
 Secondly, preceding discussions have shown that ‗culture‘ is constructed as the 
general framework within which the sum total of human activity finds expression in 
paradigmatic moulds relating to local histories and social development. The means of 
culture expression are married to forms, or modes, of communication that are the 
vehicles for idea exchange and ‗meaning-making‘. This makes communication a 
premier vehicle for social development as it is in the exchange of ideas that 
community knowledge is enriched through challenging hegemonies and historical 
interpretations, and offers opportunities for the presentation of new facts and 
evidences. Ideas also produce new human experiences that advance the expressions of 
culture in new social forms of organisation and structure. Thus, the means of 
conveying expressions become crucial in the meaning-making process and language 
becomes a prime factor in that communication process. A communal media system 
should, therefore, reflect and use the cultural means of expressions relevant and 
applicable to the community it resides in. The lens of Freirean ‗conscientization‘ as a 
form of participatory development communication through which people are aided to 
emancipate themselves through improving the basic human capital resource, 
knowledge, therefore allows  for an assessing of the empowering attributes of 
education in television programming, as well as a determination of the pedagogic role 
of culture and language use in development communication in understanding and the 
affective role of the media in a low literacy development context. Importantly, the 
adoption and use of multiple languages means that wider communities can participate 
and interact to strengthen social cohesion and nation-identity. Thus, an assessment of 
the degree of public participation in television programming would provide an 
indication of the propensity for change and modernisation within the public sphere. 
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Linking this theoretical framework to the concept of ―television as a place‖ (Berrigan 
1979) would further provide a means for assessing how the mediating of idea 
exchange and learning was being achieved for the national as well as segmented 
‗publics‘ to understand the enablement of social capital. As a nation-wide, 
nationalised, non-geographically subsisting phenomenon ‗television as a place‘ allows 
for the consideration of conscientization as a nation-wide social development and 
modernisation project that can be achieved through televisual mediation. 
 
The rationalised theoretical framework is set out below in operative terms to enable 
the formalisation and subsequent construction of a research methodology. 
 
Concepts and Operations 
Table 1, below, shows an integration of the conceptual propositions of Indrajit 
Banerjee and Kalinga Seneviratne (2005) for a public broadcasting test, Halpern‘s 
(2005) discussion of social capital and Lithgow‘s (2008) framework for community 
capital, to define key elements for producing an investigative and analytic approach to 
this research: 
 
Table 1: Concepts and Operations 
 
Concepts Indicators Operational Definitions 
Universality 
Access 
Broadcast signal reach.  
Broadcast language(s). 
Use 
Audience interaction opportunities. 
Citizen origination of programmes.  
Diversity 
Genre 
Type of programme;  
Origination.  
Audience 
Language(s); Demographics; Producer‘s 
audience awareness. 
Subject Religious; Social; Political; International 
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Independence 
Organisation 
Legal guards; Political interference; 
Funding;  
Producer 
Editorial independence; Creative control; 
Production logistics 
Distinctiveness 
Character Content differentiation 
Purpose Nationalist, social development 
Social Capital Social Cohesion Inclusive programming strategies 
Human Capital 
Knowledge and 
education 
Learning, factual programming 
Modernity Plurality Challenging and new content 
Stasis Hegemony Resistance to plurality in producer‘s work 
 
 
This thesis, therefore, constructed its theoretical framework to enable an assessment 
of the social development performativity of GTv, as a public media system, through 
linking the operational factors in programme-making with signifiers of social 
development communication in broadcast output. The important participants in the 
process therefore included GTv, and the institutional framework that guides its 
work; its cultural routines, its individual content producers‘ capabilities and abilities 
to ‗command power‘ and control production processes to create content that 
challenges hegemonies and avails community members opportunities to 
participate dialogically in social debate that ‗conscientises‘ community members 
for social change. Also, the producer’s orientation within the community; knowing 
its history, demographics, power structures, cultural values, language(s), become an 
important focus point for observing and interpreting the opportunities available to 
both the community and its public media, both as a structural element, confirming and 
helping establish order, and also as a change ‗trigger‘, bringing new ideas of 
modernisation into the community public sphere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III: RESEARCH METHODS 
The logics of theory underpinning this study are already discussed in the summary to 
the literature review chapter. The conceptual framework for this study was anchored 
in the identification of concepts that followed from the reviewed literature concerning 
social transformation through development communication; understanding the role of 
culture, media consumption and ideology within the performances of broadcast 
communication agents, and the constraints within the national social development 
context. This context is defined by the historical relationships between State, national 
populations, and the public broadcasting service that serves them in the effort to 
achieve communication goals, as well as a wider context of social and cultural factors 
present in a non-homogenous ethnic, yet ‗nationalised‘, community, such as is 
common in African countries. Therefrom, it becomes possible to construct a 
methodological framework that would enable the objectives of this research to be 
achieved; developing a philosophical outlook as platform for research design, 
selection of methods and strategy for data analysis. These are presented below.   
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Research Philosophy 
Ontology 
From a ontological perspective, this research considered the nature of social entities 
as being constructs of ‗negotiation‘ and the effects of ‗influence‘, and thus very much 
dependent on the abilities and capabilities of social actors involved in the social 
creation of reality. This thesis appropriates a ―constructivism‖ ontology of social 
reality (Bryman 2008, pg. 19) but, considered that organisations are cultural entities 
that produce forms of behaviour that are unique in character as a result of tensions 
between structural impositions and the individual actions of members. They produce 
forms of reality that become ―institutionalised‖ (Singh 2010, pg. 387). Thus they can 
be regarded as ‗atomistic‘ (Emanuel Gaziano and Cecilie Gaziano 1999; Weissman 
2000) units, which suggests that an ontological ―realism‖ (Sam Porter 2003) can be 
applied to organisations as they exist as discrete social entities. According to Emanuel 
Gaziano and Cecilie Gaziano (1999, pg. 128-129), ―knowledge‖ and ―information‖ 
can be treated as ―structural‖ ―elements‖ that set social boundaries and limit  actions 
for ―collective‖ social ―actors‖; this therefore includes such structural mechanisms as 
the legal directives that apply to an organisation and its internally socialised cultures. 
However, interpretations of textual readings offer ―meaning‖, and ―knowledge‖ is 
―conceptualised‖ within the organisation by its group(s) of social actors. Information, 
thus, is definitive, whereas meaning is subjective, negotiated and constructed. 
Organisations and their functionaries constantly reiterate objectives and practices in 
order to achieve aims; the ―social order‖ (Strauss et al 1973 cited in Bryman 2008, pg. 
19) is thus both real and transient, and the social/organisational forms that exist can be 
identified and described in the moments in which ‗objective-subjective‘ recordings 
are made. To suggest an objective recording of social events occurs in a study of 
organisation is to suggest that ―social ontology‖ is naturally occurring, and to suggest 
that subjective observations are also made is to, again, admit ―constructivism‖ 
(Bryman 2008, pg. 18-19) in the ontology. Hence both constructivism and realism 
offer joint ontological perspectives to understanding organisational cultures and 
behaviour. 
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The construction of television programmes and their consumption, this thesis has 
shown, can be understood to be constructs of reality (Burgoon, Dillard et al. 1983; 
Burton 2005) in a social context. In seeking an understanding of the key 
considerations that affects GTv, as a television organisation and its ideological 
construction of public service and development communication, this research seeks to 
understand how television, as an institutionalised system of creative culture 
production and an ideological tool, produces products intended to affect Ghanaian 
society. 
 
Critical Realism  
The need for social scientists to have available to them a tool for describing and 
evaluating ‗social reality‘ as dynamic phenomena resulting from the interaction of 
humans with their lived environments, producing results that are ―never definitely 
proven‖ (Corbetta 2003, pg. 19. Italics in original), measured or explained by the 
processed application of natural science methods, nor fully accounted for by 
peripheral observation, is the logic that provides the basis for critical realism as an 
evaluative method or strategy to explain social phenomena. Critical realism therefore 
is the research stance that proceeds from the ontological position that the research 
subject operates in an open-systemic way that does not allow for immediate causal 
explanations to be imputed. Bhaskar (1998) who conceptualised the philosophy 
explains that: 
 
―The conception I am proposing is that people, in their conscious activity, for 
the most part unconsciously reproduce (and occasionally transform) the 
structures governing their substantive activities of production. Thus people do 
not marry to reproduce the nuclear family or work to sustain the capitalist 
economy. Yet it is nevertheless the unintended consequence (and inexorable 
result) of, as it is also a necessary condition for, their activity. Moreover, when 
social forms change, the explanation will not normally lie in the desires of 
agents to change them that way, though as a very important theoretical and 
political limit it may do so‖ (pg. 52). 
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His thesis proposed that, ontologically, social phenomena can be addressed by the fact 
of their existence, but the knowledge of them cannot be drawn from natural science 
methods. He proposed a framing of a research approach that could account for the 
realism situated in the studied subject, i.e. their discrete existence and ability to cause 
actions or events, and the experience of knowledge, e.g. the feeling of pain, which 
results from a researcher‘s ability to experience and interpret the experienced. 
 
Easton (2010, pg 119) states that Sayer (1998) provides ―eight assumptions of critical 
realism‖ including the rationale that existence is independent of human encounter and 
for human encounter to explain existence a critical stance is necessary and valid, with 
the understanding that this knowledge acquisition is possible because of the situation 
of human encounter within that frame of existence. 
 
In application therefore, while the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation and GTv are 
unique social phenomena, insofar as they exist in a specific geographic and social 
milieu, they are best understood as products of an affective history. As social 
phenomena they are also part of a systemic social process; that which initially created 
the GBC and its various broadcast divisions, and the operative machinations of its 
personnel. Over time, the nature of the GBC and its GTv division have been 
influenced by its operators – production personnel and management (administrative 
and political agents) – as socially acting agents, and its current state may not be the 
original intentions of its founders. 
 
To unravel the concomitant collaboration of these agencies and resolve a project that 
best frames the social phenomena of values, perceptions and decisions that inhabit the 
process of programme-making, this researcher takes the stance of the critical realist. 
This is necessary in order to reconcile the familiarity and situation of the researcher in 
the socio-cultural milieu inhabited and acted out by GTv, and to acknowledge an 
independent rationality that allows a distanced and objective construction of the 
broadcaster‘s social reality (Cruickshank 2003). The strength of the stance is in its 
adaptability to continuous correction and growth of knowledge through incremental 
exercises of judgement and observation (Archer 2004), and its  flexible fit with a 
structural social ontology. The challenge therefore is to appropriate a relevant 
research approach that, acknowledging the differences in ontological perspectives, 
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conceptualises social ontology from a critical perspective in its epistemology; 
meshing both definite and indefinites in social realities.  
 
Epistemology 
The ―critical realism‖ (Corbetta 2003, pg. 14; Bryman 2008, pg. 14) approach is 
situated in both ontological and epistemological philosophies in social research. It 
represents a departure from traditional positivist paradigms such as ―empirical 
realism‖ in offering an accommodation for a ‗social constructivist‘ approach to 
understanding social phenomena (Bryman 2008, pg. 14). It assumes a ―modified 
dualism-objectivity‖ (Corbetta 2003, pg. 14) approach in epistemology in accepting 
theoretical explanations as causal to social phenomena. In its departure from solely 
natural science investigative methods, critical realism affords an episteme that can 
describe social reality in interpretive terms. While pure interpretivists would reject 
this viewpoint and state a clear dichotomy between ―neutral‖ and ―engaged‖ (Ezzy 
2002, pg. xii), critical realists advocate a ‗detached researcher‘ approach to studies. 
This researcher considers that theoretical explanations that arise from the immersion 
of a researcher-observer in the social milieu is useful for understanding the underlying 
factors that shape social construction and contributes much more to proper 
understanding and enunciation of the social reality in social science studies. Thus 
qualitative methods of inquiry can be appropriated in conjunction with quantitative 
methods to provide a richer epistemological approach to designing a study of discrete 
phenomena; to offer better elaboration of ‗social reality‘ descriptions and to give 
causal explanations through an ―interpretivist‖ mode of analysis, especially suitable in 
case study projects (Corbetta 2003, pg. 14). 
 
Research Approach 
This research project therefore carries out its study using a mixed-method approach. 
Much used in social research, this approach allows flexibility in the research design 
process as qualitative methods data collection processes would allow the researcher to 
gain a depth of understanding of issues under investigation than would otherwise be 
possible with the more rigid methodological quantitative approach (Bryman and 
Burgess, 1999; Cohen, 1978 in Bryman and Burgess, 1999). Also, developing 
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contextual, process and meaning understandings of social phenomena are shown to be 
more suited to qualitative research strategies (Maxwell 2005) which involve methods 
that are better suited to describing and constructing the social realities that underpin 
social processes. On the other hand, quantitative measurements allow for patterns of 
social process to emerge as illustrative constructions of aspects of the social reality 
universe. 
 
Research Design and Rationale for Methods Selection 
Punch (2005) puts forward that, where the idea is to gain ―holistic‖ (pg. 144) 
understanding of a particular phenomenon or event, the case study strategy is 
appropriate. This study examines a single phenomenon; in this instance Ghana 
Television within the socio-economic and national social development context of its 
home nation, and against a background of post-colonial history. The features of the 
proposed study include characteristics that are essential, according to Gerring (2007), 
to merit the case study approach: 
 
a. the study of a particular entity as a unique and spatially-bounded entity 
that solely exists in one territorial instance. It is also a study that covers a 
specific time-frame, historically exploring attributes of GBC and GTv  
within fifty years of post-colonial history, and 
b. pulling together evidences that include texts, records and statistics, the 
research will be both qualitative and holistic in its explorations, exploring 
between different sources of evidences, as will be explained below. 
 
The research is therefore an 'intrinsic case study type'; a study that is concerned with 
the holistic understanding of a unique phenomenon (Stake, 1995; Punch 2005). 
 
In order to gain a full understanding of the contributory role of GTv, it was considered 
necessary to evaluate three areas of operational influence on content making and 
output programming. These would include the guiding remit established by law and 
any normative documents important to the achievement of this remit, structural and 
ideation processes that producers employ for content making and evaluation of their 
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work, and an evaluation of actual broadcast output to understand broadly the types of 
content and embedded sociological factors that typically occur in schedules.  
 
This indicated specific methodological tools would be best suited to be used to garner 
the required data: textual analysis, personal interviews and the quantitative 
enumeration of broadcast output per unit time in a suitably constructed sample frame. 
 
Methods of Enquiry 
Textual Analysis  
The research, thus, analyses the texts that define the GBC and GTv‘s remit as a public 
broadcaster. These documents include Article 12 of the Fourth Constitution of the 
Republic of Ghana (Appendices 1), which sets out the constitutional rights of the 
media in Ghana; the National Liberation Council Decree 266 (Appendices 2), which 
set up the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation as a public corporation; the National 
Media Policy of the National Media Commission (Appendices 3) and its 
accompanying Broadcasting Standards (Appendices 4).  
 
The purpose was to set out an understanding from the legal frameworks and to 
compare legislative provisions that define the remit of the broadcaster, its 
responsibilities and functional role. Essentially, the analysis set out to note definitions 
of ‗public service‘, ‗public interest‘, ‗public value‘, ‗national/social development‘ and 
such other terminology that would indicate specific requirements and/or obligations, 
and to compare with other meanings that would arise from other data sources. These 
terms are often used as the ―pre-defined categories‖ (Ezzy 2002, pg. 83) but may be 
found to have different conceptualisations in varied contexts. 
 
Interviews 
The personal interview method was used to gather the qualitative research data in this 
thesis as this was the best method suitable to recording cognitive reflections and 
individual perceptions; the narrative provides the best means to constructing a social 
reality that exists within the ―consciousness‖ and is related through ―words‖ that 
contribute to ―meaning-making‖ processes that attempt to understand personal 
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experiences (Seidman 2006, pg. 7 citing Vygotsky 1987 pg. 236 - 237). Lilleker 
(2003) supports the position that interviews offer ―rich insights‖ (citing May 2001, pg. 
120) through the personal accounts related in interviews by creating windows into 
private worlds. He, however, cautions that the value of the method is often hampered 
by the very nature of the personalisation of events and experiences by interviewees, 
―exaggerations‖ and untruths (ibid. pg. 208). However, the integrity of the reported 
data could be supported through using the corroborating evidences from the number 
of participants involved in discussing the subject event, and by applying keen 
awareness to the social contexts that could instigate ‗false‘ data, usually the result of 
personal interests that influence the painting of a different picture or memory flaws 
due to the passage of time. 
 
In using the interview method, it was, therefore, necessary for some precautions to be 
taken to ensure the integrity of the data: firstly, respondents were asked to give 
personal opinions and perceptions as responses, which would not to be interpreted as 
official statements made on behalf of GBC or GTv. Due to the highly politicised 
nature of the organisation respondents were assured of anonymity in order to elicit 
their full co-operation. Secondly, where respondents have made inferences to other 
persons and job roles within the organisation and where such inferences are likely to 
reveal or indicate specific persons the job roles have been anonymised in the thesis. 
Thirdly, questions asked were restricted to reflections on the nature of work and the 
perceptions of ‗organisation‘, therefrom. While interviewees were not restricted from 
making direct inferences to other persons, follow up questions were not based on 
speculating the personal characters or motives of the inferred but on the subjective 
perceptions that motivated the inference. In avoiding personalisation, it was possible 
to avoid adversarial narratives, except where including such accounts were directly 
indicative of systemic functions within the organisation and were corroborated by 
similar data from other respondents. While this does not fully constitute 
―triangulation‖ (Lilleker 2003, pg. 211 citing Davies 2001) for data verification, it 
does ensure that data used was indicative of a severally-held perception. 
 
Thus, the research carried out interviews with eight persons with work experience at 
GTV, and included producers at various levels of responsibility and management, as 
well as staff from an auxiliary service. Producers, as the end-point enactors of the 
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public service remit for programming in-house, are critical to understanding the 
systemic workings of the GTv television system. Understanding their interpretations 
of public service values was therefore essential to constructing an adequate 
description of GTv‘s role through its programming output. The other persons selected 
for interviews provide critical commentaries on other dimensions of the producers‘ 
work as well as system functions at GTv.  
 
 
Sample Frame for Interviews 
Eight participants were recruited through a simple criteria-based purposive sampling 
method (Bryman 2008). Four selection criteria were applied, and participants had to 
be involved, or had been involved, in at least two of the measures: producer 
management or supervision, producer-director, involvement in content decision-
making at supervisory level, and involvement in non-News production and 
development communication programmes. In all eight participants were recruited 
participated in the research, out of which three were senior managers in production-
related capacities. Of the remaining five, three were junior producers. The remaining 
two respondents had experiences in affective programming decision-making at GTv. 
A guide to interviewees is provided at the end of this thesis (Appendices 7). 
 
Quantitative Data Sampling and Frame 
Three consecutive weeks of GTv‘s broadcast schedules published on its online portal 
were used in the statistical analysis. The aim was to understand the broad structures of 
scheduling per unit of airtime, using enough data to produce an adequate sample 
frame during a non-special season of the year, i.e., out-side of the Christmas, Easter 
and Moslem Hajj calendar, in order to limit programming distortions that may be 
produced by national festivities. 
 
Modern television programmes are often cross-genre or cross-type in format; 
entertainment programmes can have embedded educational values, for example 
dramatic entertainment in Ghana often has public education messages. This approach 
to programme-making can raise complexities for categorisation and gives rise to such 
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labels as ‗infotainment‘ or ‗edutainment‘. The analysis for this research, however, 
required an attempt to understand programming in strict categories. To achieve this 
therefore required a process of reductive categorisation to the prime intents of a 
programme to which the labels of ‗entertainment‘, ‗information‘ and ‗education‘ 
could be applied. To achieve this, programmes were first coded into general genres 
and then reduced into ‗type‘ categories as in Fig. 1. A total of eight hundred and 
thirty-one programmes were counted in the sample, which were then categorised into 
twenty-five genres distributed over the three programme types, as well as an 
‗Unknown‘ category, for programmes for which there was no available or reliable 
means of determining content, genre or type. Approximately five hundred hours of 
broadcast programming was captured within the sample frame (500.81333* hours). 
 
Research Implementation 
The research project was implemented over a four year time-span, after the initial 
project proposal and indicative literature write-ups. The three categories of data were 
collected without co-dependent links in order to ensure that their connection would be 
unbiased and without prejudice to the objectives of the research. 
 
Respondents were informally contacted directly and scheduled for interviews 
according to their convenience. The project was explained and consent received prior 
to their inclusion as participants. Interviews were carried out using semi-structured 
questionnaires, by recorded phone-call, and each lasted between one and one and a 
half hours. Semi-structured questionnaires allowed the researcher to explore 
tangential questions from core questions that simply asked respondents to define 
personal understandings about work roles. Producers particularly were asked these 
questions in relation to their personal understandings of ‗public service‘, ‗production 
processes‘, ‗social cohesion/nationalism‘ and development communication. Other 
respondents were asked similar questions and specific questions relating to their job 
functions. All interviews were done by recorded telephone conversation and 
transcribed for analysis. Interviews were carried out between October and December 
2010. 
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Textual data was acquired from internet sources over the same timeframe. With 
regards to the programming output data, using a simple numeric coding method, all 
programmes were coded according to the following variable factors: type, genre, 
government communication, language employed, programme origination, in-house 
production, out-house production, in-programme audience participation and audience 
targeting. Also language usage within programmes can vary depending on screen 
personalities and can employ language-switching or presenter translation, the use of 
over-dubs or sub-titling. Such types of programmes were categorised on the basis of 
prime language usage within the format or coded as ‗multi-language‘, where the 
format is known to often use variation in languages employed.  
 
The programming data was rendered in pie-charts and numeric cross-tabulations using 
IBM SPSS version 19 statistical software. 
 
Strategy of Analysis 
According to Yin (2003), analytical strategies for case study research is often not 
considered well in advance of doing research, leaving most researchers struggling to 
complete data analysis, despite the existence of some helpful tools to mitigate the 
problem, and the essential need to fully develop methodological outlooks.  
 
This research develops a logical approach to integrating and analysing data collected 
from its different methods. The primary aim of this study is to describe the role of 
Ghana Television in the social development framework of Ghana as a post-colonial 
developing country and arrives at its conclusions from a ‗constructive-interpretive‘ 
understanding of the ―pattern‖ (Yin 2003, pg. 116) outcomes from  interview data, 
juxtaposed to similar themes from the text analysis and compared to broadcast 
samples for contextual commentary.  
 
The thematic analysis organised the data into four themes: 
1. Meanings and concepts relating to the ‗public‘ broadcasting remit and 
UNESCO endorsed standards (Banerjee and Seneviratne 2005). 
2. Challenges. 
3. Programming Outcomes. 
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4. The media environment and the organisational future. 
 
While there are many points at which data evidences overlap, the effort has been 
made to preserve the thematic structure and indicate points at which data overlaps 
occur. 
 
Several theoretical frameworks have been explicated in the literature review to this 
thesis and forms the bedrock on which the investigative questions posed to 
respondents were formed. The analysis of the data was interpreted through the 
framework theories within the conceptual framework that offer interpretative 
accounting of the relationships between the theoretical strands and the data, thus this 
work has followed a process of ―deductive‖ (Bryman 2008, pg. 9 - 11) theorising. 
 
On Validity and Reliability 
The logic of imposing rigorous quality tests in terms of ‗reliability‘ and ‗validity‘ 
rejected by qualitative methodology traditions owing to inherent inferences to 
―measurement‖ and replication (Bryman 2008, pg. 376). Interpretivists suggest that 
the nature of qualitative data requires that data be judged on the basis of 
―trustworthiness‖ and ―authenticity‖ (ibid. 377 – 378), which would strengthen the 
world views described and explained; using multiple sources of data to build depth, 
cross-checking data-recording with ―members of the social world‖ (ibid.) for fidelity, 
ensuring data integrity and giving fitting, accurate contextual links to employed 
theories, and within the society, that helps its members connect to the research 
(Bryman 2008, citing Guba 1985; Guba and Lincoln 1994; Geertz 1973a). On the 
other hand, quantitative research constructs rigorous frameworks to test the quality of 
data both within the study and in regards to its wider generalisations, emphasising the 
reproducibility of results and statistical measurements and accuracy of measuring 
tools (Bryman 2008).  
 
This thesis has employed a use of statistical data but has ensured that the data 
recordings are as exactly accurate as observed and has utilised computational software 
to ensure that measurements are accurate within tolerable computational margins of 
error as detailed exactness and rigor were not considered salient to this study‘s focus. 
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‗Soft‘ data was recorded and transcribed faithfully and accurately, and interpretations 
of ‗Ghanaian‘ English are included in square brackets to facilitate readers‘ 
understandings. Throughout interviews, recorded data was represented to respondents 
to offer the opportunity for checking meanings and exactness in implied or inferential 
statements. The data reported was weighted to overcome personal biases by reporting 
the perceptions that were recorded from more than one participant.  
Methodological Limitations 
Sample Size 
The qualitative enquiry methods used access to individuals willing to participate in 
the research to enumerate its sample. Building perceptual conceptions of social 
realities relies very much on the researcher‘s ability to accurately and validly interpret 
the data generated, as well as on having a broad representation of views to inform the 
validity of claims made. The sample size was considered adequate for the 
representation of views about GTv as an organisation, however the exclusion of 
representation from the News department was considered to have been an over-sight 
in gaining an understanding of the importance of that department‘s self-perception on 
contributing to the social role of GTv. It was, however, possible to theorise its 
production significance from the literature reviewed. 
 
Data 
Statistics of the per capita distribution of television sets and audience viewing were 
not available. Such studies have not been done in Ghana for many years, and although 
at the time of this research a partial study had been done by the GBC‘s Audience 
Research Department the information was not available as it was considered 
incomplete and only available through pursuing ‗diplomatic‘ and bureaucratic 
channels. However, it was considered that due to the study‘s focus on the structural 
elements of GBC as an organisation, audience studies was not a major limitation to 
understanding the likely social affectations of agency due to the strength of the data 
gathered. 
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Methods 
While the statistical data was intended to be illustrative of the general make-up of 
GTv‘s schedule, in considering the social affectations of content, there were details in 
the programmes that are not revealed by the statistical method. It makes it important 
for supplementary studies to consider the social significance and affectations of 
specific programmes within the schedule, notably the Local Drama series, Mmaa 
Nkomo, Adult Education and Stand Point, which are GTv productions. 
 
Thus, following the implementation of the research‘s methods for gathering the 
research data, the significant findings and analysis are presented in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter IV: FINDINGS 
 
The research data presented below offers insights into the perceptions of television 
producers at GTv about their outlook on their work and the role of GTv as a social 
institution that could contribute to the social development of Ghana. It is set out 
thematically in relation to connections between macro and micro structural links 
between the type of broadcasting service that GTv is and what it achieved through its 
agency. It also constructs an understanding of GTv as a public broadcasting service; 
its values and challenges, from a ‗social reality‘ construction based on the perceptions 
and insights of respondents, juxtaposed against statistical data and the textual analysis 
of the remit that is meant to regulate the service. It then examines the salience of the 
organisation in relation to assumptions about its social role and synthesizes an 
explanation of the facets of the data through the lens offered by the conceptual 
framework of the study. The overall implications for development communication as 
a social development objective of public broadcasting are then discussed 
subsequently.  
 
Defining Public Service at GTv 
The reviewed literature showed there was no specific definition of ‗public service 
broadcasting‘ (Banerjee and Seneviratne 2005), but an appreciation of ‗commitments‘ 
to four key standards, or benchmarks, that could suggest the degree to which ‗public 
service broadcasting‘ was being achieved by a broadcaster. Those standards make it 
necessary to exclude state-owned media services but it does not mean that such media 
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systems are not capable of functioning as ‗public service‘ media. It was possible then 
to assess GTv from the viewpoint of its function as public service broadcaster in order 
to understand its degree of fit to this type of broadcasting purpose. 
 
Instead of considering specificities of definitions for a public service, the National 
Media Policy recognised the importance for active social debate in the media, and 
ascribes to the enablement of this as a function of the State-owned public media. 
Following many years of limited civil liberties under various military regimes, there is 
also a provision in the Ghanaian Constitution that suggests a public interest-based 
approach to the functioning of the publicly-owned media services which follows from 
its guarantees of freedom and independence for all media (Appendices 1, Article 162, 
section 1): 
 
 ―All state-owned media shall afford fair opportunities and facilities for the 
presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions‖. 
 
The Constitution, thus, sets out clearly that a vibrant public sphere is important for the 
nation, and recognises that the media can contribute to this. If the ‗public‘ is 
constructed as an amalgam of varied communities of opinion, then this provision 
recognises that ‗the public‘ is to be served by the state-media through inclusive social 
debate opportunities. The Constitution, however, does not set out specific criteria for 
doing this, nor does it set out to delineate specific groups of the public within the 
national community as a means of constructing the public that must be served. How 
then may ―divergent and dissenting opinions‖ (ibid.) be identified within the nation in 
order to ascribe plurality of representation to the work of State media?  
 
In assuming the ―one nation‖ (Asante 1996, pg. 59) stance and inferring that airing 
differences in ‗expressed‘ opinion on a diverse range of issues would enable the 
public sphere in the media, the Constitution leaves the protection of that public sphere 
to citizens, even though it sets up regulatory bodies to supervise media performance. 
Its spirit agrees with a ‗social emancipatory project‘, which sees social development 
as a product of diverse debate within the public sphere (Garnham 2000, citing Kant 
1970 and Habermas 1989). It also makes state-owned media directly responsible for 
the facilitation of that public sphere and, thereby, suggests that the Constitution 
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writers were following the continuum of the Enlightenment philosophy that is also 
reflected in Habermas‘ original posit of the public sphere as central to the solution of 
social problems through debate. 
 
For GTv to exercise its mandate, it would require an operational understanding by 
staff of what that remit is. That understanding will underpin their actions as content 
producers. Since producers are important as communication agents, whose role 
performance is in controlling and deciding what and how content is produced (Ettema 
and Whitney  1982), what is their understanding of the 'public service broadcast' 
concept, operationally or notionally? Consequently, to what extent can it be assessed 
that their decisions are motivated by personal ideologies or an organisationally 
socialised culture? 
 
Respondents answers did not identify directly with the construct of public service 
benchmarks put forward by Banerjee and Seneviratne (2005). Their responses, 
however, fell into two primary rationalisations of function, the ‗nation as public‘ 
and/or the ‗nation as State‘. Both notions were expressed but did not appear to be 
mutually exclusive to respondents: 
 
The ‘Nation as Public’ 
The ‗nation as public‘ notion considers the functional operation of GTv, primarily, 
within a national post-colonial context and connects functions to a social 
emancipatory ethos that is located in an envisaged participatory role in national social 
development, as X5 states: 
 
X5: You see, that is the main purpose of GBC; to educate the public within the 
context of national development, because when we are educating the people, 
informing the people, it would accelerate development. 
 
AT: Do you believe that all producers understand this? 
 
X5: Yes, I do. You can find that in the kind of programmes that we do, 
especially in the Adult Education programmes, we [are] doing agricultural 
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programmes, health programmes, as well as all those entertainment 
programmes that was done before and we are still doing.  
 
X5‘s position, which connects the core programming types to social development, 
was found to be a fundamental understanding amongst all respondents. They saw the 
organisational function and the producer‘s participation within the organisation as 
public service agency, as summed up by X3: 
 
X3: Everything we do is public service and I'm part of the chain. 
 
This can be understood as a conceptualisation of public service broadcasting as a 
catalytic service given to the national population who constitute ‗the public‘. It 
indicates the notion of ‗broadcasting‘ function in its widest paternalistic sense: it does 
not adduce a role for this ‗public‘ within programme-making, nor does it conceive of 
a variously differentiated national ‗publics‘. This ‗scatter-shot‘ notion is rooted in 
both the colonial and the immediate post-independence media practices urged by the 
application of the ‗dominant paradigm‘; to provide the broadcasting service with the 
aim of ‗diffusing innovations‘ as a means of prompting or promoting developmental 
ideas. The challenge to this notion is to consider whether in the service delivery an 
audience-centred, participatory, approach is utilised in the conceiving and making of 
programmes, even if in the end programming is provided in a ‗scatter-shot‘ manner. 
 
The ‘Public as State’ Definition 
The other understanding of the meaning of ‗public service broadcasting‘ was primed 
on the provision of a media platform through which State functions and the 
government agenda are broadcast without consideration for organisational 
commercial reward: 
 
X4: For them public service broadcasting is with the ones that we do like Meet 
The Press, these ceremonials and all these things that we do for the 
government and all that. Those ones they call public service broadcasting.  
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X5:... For instance, if we went to parliament to go and cover parliamentary 
proceedings, which would come freely without any commensurate 
[compensation], … it‘s also within the public service domain. Now, once in a 
while, the Ministry of Information also brings things concerning the 
government, some development things, and when that also comes it goes on 
air free of charge.  
 
This notion perceives ‗public‘ as constructed as government/State. That perception 
sees that GTv‘s coverage of national and State functions is a ‗public‘ service provided 
to the widest national audience. It identifies closely with being a government ‗mouth-
piece‘, which is the dominant conception regarding public service broadcasting across 
the continent (Article 19 2003).  
 
However, both constructions of the ‗public‘ still result in a misconstruction of the 
‗public interest‘ as ‗what is in the interest of the public‘; the social well-being is the 
basis of the broadcasting ethos in this type of broadcaster. As shown in the literature 
review and introduction chapters, presenting the State‘s voice and programming 
intended to educate for development and civic action is conceptualised as the essential 
work of the public broadcasting service across developing democracies, and 
especially the case in Africa.  
 
X8 considered that there were fundamental errors in these rationalisations and 
suggested that they emanated from a fundamental misunderstanding of it should mean 
‗to do‘ public service broadcasting, as a concept, based on a organisational 
misconception of what it meant to perform the function in a contemporary setting: 
 
X8: … they've got an idea of public service that is set in a completely different 
paradigm from the present. The first thing is that we don't have a monopoly on 
public service any more…. Second thing is people have feedback channels 
through the other kinds of stations. They don't just necessarily take everything 
that GBC would say as the gospel truth, so the idea of being the sole 
communicator of the public truth is the wrong perception to go with now, and 
there is a certain, almost papal, assumption of divinity that is built into the 
structure; where people think that they are the ones who must speak and, 
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because the feedback channels are not particularly well-organised, there is a 
self-congratulatory, self-affirming pattern, that allows them to continuously 
send out messages without knowing that the public is not even watching any 
more.... 
 
It was certainly problematic for GTv producers to have narrow concepts of what the 
public service ethos was meant to be and brought to the fore the importance of 
defining and engaging with ‗the public‘ as fundamental to the exercising of a public 
service broadcasting mandate. While the State represents the expressed will of ‗the 
public,‘ as the outcome of a participatory civic exercise, the role of public service 
media is certainly not to only reflect this ‗officialdom‘ but to also enable a continual 
national dialogue that encourages the contribution of the diversity of social groups in 
an effort to balance ‗the power of the State‘ with ‗the will and aspirations of the mass‘ 
in the project of national social development. 
 
However, it was found that neither the Ghanaian Constitution, the NLCD 266 
(Appendices 1 and 2) nor the National Media Commission‘s Media Policy documents 
(Appendices 3) provide definitions of ‗public service‘ broadcasting. The exercise of 
‗public service‘ in the media, inferred from Article 162 (Appendices 1) of the 
Constitution, considers a ‗public‘ medium to be one that disseminates ―information to 
the public‖. It specifies their general and inclusive duty to be constitutional guardians 
and watchdogs of government. The Constitution, therefore, does not distinguish in its 
treatment of freedom and responsibility guarantees for the private and State-owned 
media, and provides these as absolutes in addition to human rights but proscribed by 
the need to uphold considerations for personal reputations and national security. This 
infers that all mass media in Ghana are, necessarily, ‗public media‘ distinguished by a 
―matter of degree‖ (Appendices 3 Section 5.1, pg. 20), and providing services either 
for commercial gain, or as public institutions, to deliver socially beneficial services.  
 
The NMC Media Policy is, therefore, intended to locate media institutions in Ghana 
within categorised frameworks in order to achieve an overall industrial policy to guide 
services provision in the country. It starts from a recognition of the historical 
antecedents that have shaped the development of the media in Ghana and formulates 
specific sector policies for types of media organisations both public and private. It, 
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however, also specifies ‗public media‘ as the State-owned. It further regards these as 
having the ―special‖ responsibility to ―meet the information, education and 
communication needs of the nation‖ (Appendices 3 Section 6.2.1, sub-section i, ii, iii, 
and v, pg. 32), and specifically defines them as ―not-for-profit organisations‖ tasked 
to operate commercially ―efficient‖ business models (ibid, sub-section vii). The policy 
reflects the spirit of the Constitution and, importantly, enjoins all media into a ―public 
trust‖ (Appendices 2, pg. vii) to work in the ―public interest‖. Thus, ‗public service‘ 
media in Ghana are two types of service, State-controlled or private, and both are 
charged with delivering socially beneficial services. Thus, it can be understood that 
within this environment, some respondents identify more with their type of ‗public 
service‘, which is the type that provides a not-for-profit service for the national good.  
 
This type of service is founded on a specified remit stated in the NLCD 226. The 
decree lists functional duties for GBC in its Section 2 (Appendices 2). It specifically 
states that GBC should ―prepare in the field of culture, education, information and 
entertainment programmes reflecting National progress and aspirations‖ (Appendices 
2, Section 2 (b)). In this, it is clearly stated that the prime duty of the GBC is to 
exhibit the continuum of the nation‘s stages in development, and evidence public 
―aspirations‖ through programming. The objective to use the GBC and its operations 
in the promotion of national social development is evident, and that ethos is joined to 
the production of specific programme types that should ideologically both inspire and 
provide catalysis for social development in nationalist causes. The phrase ―reflecting 
National progress‖ is indicative of an intention to have programmes also mirror the 
contemporaneous society. It indicates an intention to have broadcast programming 
that portrays advances and progresses; that mark and celebrate successes, as well as 
providing points of reckoning of the growth of modernity within the country.  
 
Importantly, it can be seen in the wording of both the NLCD 226 and the Media 
Policy that while the importance of reflecting the nation is valued, the integration of 
the national ‗mass public‘ is not fundamental to the construction of the remit and 
duties of GBC. This reflects the historical development of GBC from its inception as 
a government service department. It is also reflected in the responses of interviewees 
who showed that as a foundational notion, producers identified with a public interest-
centred approach to conceptualising their work. That construction of the public 
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interest that sees the mass population as needing to be served with a pre-determined 
communication agenda intended for their good but determined without their 
participation. A true public interest approach would require producers to assess the 
organisational function in a reversing of their outlook to an audience-centred 
perspective. Thus, the purpose of GBC, and hence GTv, is located in what 
interpretation of the remit by GTv staff gives them a notional understanding of what 
their social role and agency is through television programming and broadcasting.  
 
Purpose 
Respondents considered that the purpose of GTv was to ―educate, inform and 
entertain‖. These values were repeatedly cited like a mantra and have likely been 
acquired through organisational socialisation as they did not state that these were 
specific values in normative guidelines for programme-making. The values were 
found to serve as notional benchmarks used by producers to categorise types of 
programmes, and thus serve to indicate the types of programmes they make. As 
values, their real integration into production ideation processes was not evidenced by 
practices and approaches to making programmes, even though it was found that there 
was the understanding that fulfilling the values was important for impacting social 
development
22
 through programmes: 
 
X5: … to inform, educate and entertain. You see, that is the main purpose of 
GBC, to educate the public within the context of national development, 
because when we are educating the people, informing the people, it would 
accelerate development. 
 
X4: Policy guidelines that, I would say is written, is that you have to educate, 
entertain and inform. That is first and foremost. … but really, really, on paper 
there is nothing. So it‘s only out of experience that you will get it that ―this‖ 
thing is not allowed, it‘s not done here, or this and that,… but hugely no 
written guidelines, we are just using our own heads. 
 
                                                 
22
 See X1‘s comments on pg. 214 
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Thus, respondents relate to a connectedness between their work and social outcomes 
in the larger context of driving development forward. However, there were no 
evidenced criteria for programme-making that would encourage producers to 
systematically embed these values in making programmes. Programme-making was 
an activity born out of ‗experience‘. However, as a notion, it was found to be in 
alignment with the Media Policy‘s identification of GBC as a support system for 
―national socio-economic development‖ (Appendices 3, pg. 46).  
 
Thus, to what extent are these purposed types of programming constituted to align the 
media policy, and the reflected producer‘s understandings, with actual outcomes in 
broadcasting? The NMC policy identifies cornerstone principles in public media as 
the provision of information and education, among other ―communication needs‖ 
(Appendices 3 Section 6.2.1 (ii), pg. 32.), and thus the levels of these programming 
types should be the foundational evidences through which a measuring of outcomes 
can be performed. 
 
The statistical data on broadcast output (Fig. 1) showed that GTv was providing 
almost equal measures of information, education and entertainment in its schedule; 
less than one and half per cent of programming was unaccounted for.  
 
 
Figure 1 Hours of Programming by Type of Programming 
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Table 2, below, shows the programming composition within the statistics. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Types of Programmes 
 
Types of Programmes Nos. of Programmes Airtime % 
Information 339 32.02 
Education 272 30.45 
Entertainment 207 36.29 
Unknown 12 1.23 
 
Thus, the vast majority of programming was clearly attributable to specific 
programme types and, prima facie, suggested that GTv was providing a broad, 
equitable, service in providing equal amounts of the core programming areas stated in 
the remit and thus would have been reflecting the dominant cultural uses of television 
(Holtz-Bacha and Norris). Table 3 below shows the distribution of programming from 
producer sources, and shows that GTv was involved directly, or through co-
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production, with producing about forty percent of the programmes captured in the 
data (Fig. 2). However, the greater amount of programming was externally sourced, 
therefore how much of the purposive intentions for GTv, as expressed, is actually 
fulfilled by GTv itself?  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Production Sources by Airtime 
 
 
 
Table 3: Types of Programming by Production Source 
 
 
 
Prod 
Total   In-house Out-house Co-prod. Unknown 
   1 0 0 0 0 1 
Information 0 267 63 2 7 339 
Education 0 66 154 5 47 272 
Entertainment 0 31 144 7 25 207 
Unknown 0 0 2 0 10 12 
Total 1 364 363 14 89 831 
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Programme Types 
The statistics showed that the greater percentage of ‗information‘ type programming 
was in News (256 programmes out of 339, representing 19.31% of airtime), 
Programme Line-up and Announcements, and Factual (28 programmes, representing 
17.90% of airtime) programming, as in Table 5 (See below). The Factual 
programming in this count was composed of News-type programming (Newsreels and 
live events). Thus, the information type of programming was found to be essentially 
News programming and the domination of the programme type by a single genre 
showed a narrow realisation of potential forms of programming that could be possible 
for this type of programming. Further, the engagement of GTv producers with the 
provision of education and entertainment programming types was marginal, 
constituting less than half of the effort in the production of information programming 
as shown by Table 3 and also Table 4 below. Thus, the internal production of content 
at GTv is biased in favour of a predominantly News-driven production agenda. The 
statistics therefore suggested that GTv, at least internally, was not fulfilling its 
purpose as a provider of the types of programming that are understood to be at the 
core of its remit. The dominance of the News in the internal production process 
therefore also suggests that politics and politicking is mostly driving the 
organisation‘s production agenda, and the analysis supports Hastings‘ (2005) 
observation that Ghanaian state-owned media were notably biased in their coverage of 
government in the News agenda. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Genre by Production Source 
 
 
Prod 
Total   In-house Out-house Co-production Unknown 
Genre   1 0 0 0 0 1 
News 0 196 60 0 0 256 
Telenovela 0 0 21 0 0 21 
Culture (Art, Music) 0 2 4 1 0 7 
Christian Teaching 0 1 94 2 0 97 
Fashion/Beauty 0 0 2 4 0 6 
Local Drama 0 7 0 1 1 9 
Islamic Teaching 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Series, Serial 0 0 8 0 0 8 
 145 
Game Show 0 2 2 0 0 4 
Talkshow 0 18 7 1 0 26 
Soap 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Sport 0 11 5 0 12 28 
Quiz 0 3 4 0 1 8 
Line-Up, Announcements 0 46 0 0 0 46 
Brand Infotainment 0 0 7 0 4 11 
Life 0 2 4 0 0 6 
Unknown 0 1 3 1 14 19 
Product Advertising 0 0 5 0 3 8 
Film 0 3 34 0 0 37 
Factual 0 48 12 1 46 107 
Learning 0 16 25 0 0 41 
Sitcom 0 0 12 0 0 12 
Variety/Magazine 0 0 3 3 2 8 
Music (Pop) 0 2 49 0 6 57 
Music (Religious) 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Total 1 364 363 14 89 831 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Percentages of Genres in Sample 
Genres 
Percentage of 
Airtime 
 News 19.31 
 Factual 17.9 
 Film 12.31 
 Christain Teaching 10 
 Music (Pop) 6.5 
 Sport 6.11 
 Learning 5.86 
 Talkshow 3.8 
 Unknown 2.7 
 Telenovela 2.4 
 Local Drama 1.7 
 Sitcom 1.68 
 
 146 
Quiz 1.37 
 Line-Up, Announcements 1.28 
 Series, Serial 1.15 
 Variety/Magazine 1.02 
 Culture (Art, Music) 0.85 
 Branded Infotainment 0.81 
 Product Advertising 0.78 
 Fashion Beauty 0.58 
 Life 0.57 
 Game Show 0.5 
 Music (Religious) 0.3 
 Soap 0.28 
 Islamic Teaching 0.25 
 
    
In summary, out of a total programme count of 831, GTv produced 364 of which 196 was News, a 
further 28 in News-related production, 48 in Factual and 16 in Learning. 
 
Considering that GTv, should be providing a fair composition of programming within 
the three types of programming values, the statistics indicated that other in house 
programming would suffer from the prioritisation of News. Thus, non-News 
producers would have lower priority and this would be reflected in access to resources 
for programme-making. They would also be more likely to feel a disconnection 
between themselves and their work and contribution to the achievement of 
organisational purpose, especially when measured in terms of their contribution to 
programming in the three programing categories. Hence, it becomes useful to 
consider the achievement of the overall public service broadcasting objective through 
benchmarks that offer a holistic means of appraisal.  
 
PBS Values Benchmarks 
To test the level of appreciation of these standards within the existing culture of 
production, the research interviews discussed the broad frames of the benchmarks 
with both producers and supervising executives. Considering that GTv‘s producers 
have a centre-to-periphery orientation in their understanding of the public service 
broadcasting function, it becomes important to discover if within this orientation there 
is an unconscious recognition and use of the benchmark values and features in their 
work performance.  
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Universality 
Access 
GTv provides a service that is the most widely available within Ghana; broadcast 
signal coverage is assumed to reach most of the population
23
. This provides reception 
access to the vast majority. However, without reliable statistics on the ownership of 
television sets it is not possible to actually judge the extent of the social benefit in 
terms of reception and service use. No recent statistics were available to indicate 
whether public viewing facilities put up, post-independence, have been maintained or 
gone into decline, though it can be assumed that the latter is more likely to be true, 
considering the general economic decline over the years. Most viewing, in rural and 
extra-urban communities, traditionally has been by shared viewing in homes and 
shops. How then does the broadcaster operationalise the demand to be both national 
and communal? 
 
Language use is fundamental to enabling audience access, in terms of comprehending 
and making sense of television programmes. Respondent X1 stated that GTv 
continues to employ the six local languages instituted at the inception of GBC: 
 
X1: We are talking about Akan, Dagbani, Hausa, Ewe, we have Ga and we 
have Nzema. 
 
The languages are employed within the working week on allotted days and have at 
least one programme in a week devoted to them – the News in a local language and a 
local drama. On their dedicated days the languages are used in a summarised News 
bulletin as well as in the Adult Education segment before the prime evening News. 
However, although Hausa and Dagbani are the most widely spoken languages in 
northern Ghana they are not used in programming in the same manner as other 
languages. Though predominantly spoken in northern Nigeria, Hausa has been widely 
spoken in the West-African Sahel even before Ghana‘s independence and the creation 
                                                 
23
 NCA has not published market performance or penetration data in detail for tv and radio as it does 
for mobile telephony 
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of national boundaries
24
. Respondent X4 explains the use of the languages in Adult 
Education: 
 
X4: … Hausa and Dagbani alternate, they go [on air] on the [same] day. 
 
And, furthermore, concerning its use in Local Drama: 
 
X4: ... the Hausa one is only for their Eid festivities, the Eid ul Fitr and Eid ul 
Adar, those two. That‘s when we feature Hausa because the argument is that 
Hausa is not a Ghanaian language. 
 
In X4‘s use of ―their‖ as an attributive pronoun, and the connection of the language to 
the Moslem religion, there was a construction of Hausa speakers as social entities 
defined by not only linguistic difference but also an assumption that the language 
represents a religious affiliation in Ghana. This is not so for while northern Ghana has 
most of the nation‘s Islam adherents (Gocking 2005), it is thought to be mainly 
animist in its religious composition. However, the languages employed are suggested 
to represent the majority of linguistic access to programmes: 
 
X1: Yes, I think … these languages, like the Akan, be it Fanti [a] person 
speaking or Akuapim, [it is understood by most of the language group], yes. 
And I think that maybe Nzemas [may] not be able to understand Fanti or 
[other Akan], I don‘t know, so there is a section for Nzema to be covered. And 
in the North most people would understand the Hausa and some will 
understand the Dagbon, so that access too is covered. So I think it‘s a fair 
representation of the languages within the country. 
 
Fig. 3 shows that more than ninety per cent of programming on air was done in 
English), and less than ten per cent in indigenous and other languages. In a country 
with a low estimated adult literacy rate at sixty-seven per cent, which includes literacy 
in local languages (UNICEF 2012), this means that a significant majority of the 
audience would have resorted to visual cues and semi-literate interpretations of 
television content.  
 
                                                 
24
 For linguistic discussion on origins and usage of Hausa see Phillip J. Jagger, 2001. 
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Figure 3: Percentages of Languages in Sample 
 
Thus, the data suggests a very, narrow use of the diversity of Ghana‘s indigenous 
languages in programming. Significantly, however, it also showed a bias towards the 
employment of Akan. In a total of eight hundred and thirty programme events, the 
discrete count of programmes (ignoring periodic counts) was one hundred and eighty-
three. The count of programmes with Akan titles and/or language use was twenty-four 
programmes. There were three programmes with Ga titles. Respondent X6 suggested 
a growing centrality of the Akan language: 
 
X6: Yes, you know, fortunately, should I say fortunately, the Akan language 
goes very far, even in Accra the Ga people understand most of the Akan 
programmes. So when it comes to that, and I think because of our inter-tribal 
marriages and stuff, most of the languages can still be absorbed. To tell you 
the truth, the Akan language is almost universal…from the north to the south 
sectors; some people might choose not to believe that… 
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This assertion could explain the dominance of the Akan language over others and 
indicates an increasingly mediated progression of the Akan. Thus GTv is contributing 
to the evolving cultural character of the nation through its allowance for ‗Akanisation‘ 
(Gocking 2005), even though marginal. This could eventually contribute to the 
evolution of Akan as a dominant language form and its use as a symbolic national 
language. Considering that Akans are the largest ethnic grouping, it is logical to 
assume they may have greater representation of ethnicity within GTv departments. 
Their acceptance, or assumption, of their language dominance could also result in a 
creep towards hegemonic approaches to culture portrayal in programming and could 
repress other cultural forms and artefacts from the diverse character of the current 
nation-state if the processes of production do not facilitate consultation on culture 
representation in content. Thus, production processes need to be able to ensure fair, 
balanced and adequate representation of the ‗cultural needs‘ of the national 
population, and in the manner in which it is ethically segmented, and the National 
Media Policy, as well as GBC, needs to develop guidelines to ensuring the fair and 
equitable representation of the diversity in both languages and the cultures they 
signify. Thus, despite the recognition of the importance of content accessibility in 
assuring service universality, the GTv‘s language policy does not fully represent the 
lingual diversity within the country, and the cultural output of the television system 
promotes the use of Akan as a dominant language over other major languages, and 
altogether ignores about forty other minority languages.  
 
It is also pertinent to note that GTv has added the French language in broadcasting a 
weekly, summarised, News bulletin. French, is non-native to Ghana but is the official 
language in all the border countries, but its use is even more marginal. This, 
ostensibly, is either to show regional solidarity and/or to give some, however limited, 
access to the migrant, or trans-national, French-West Africans who have either sought 
refuge in the country, following recent regional disturbances, or to the transiting 
regional labour force. This particular engagement may be an attempt to re-engage 
with the roots of the GBC in the Nkrumahist pan-African ethos for broadcasting in 
Africa.  
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Access to television programming is not only through the use indigenous languages. 
The sign language is used to bridge the programme access gap for the hearing-
impaired but is only used in the prime-time English-language News. 
 
X2: …With the people we call ‖deaf and dumb‖ we have what is called 
‗missing link‘ or sign language. So in our News currently, which is a major 
thing that happens on TV, if you know Ghana, in our News we have the 
signing person always on to sign the News. 
 
There is recognition of the limited accessibility of programmes for audience members 
with hearing-impairment and X6 explains that resource limitations are the reason for 
the narrow access facilitation:  
 
X6: The idea is there but the problem we are having now is about the other 
side of the coin, that is personnel that would come and help people access this, 
the personnel from sign-language, as at now, they are only able to satisfy the 
News, they are yet to try as much as possible to cover the other programmes. 
 
Other producers have employed a mixed methods approach and have used sub-titling 
to improve access to productions. In relation to sub-titling X1 explains: 
 
X1: Sometime ago we used to do that a lot, especially with the local dramas, 
but these days they don‘t. I don‘t know why but they don‘t. And in our News 
we don‘t sub-title. I think it‘s only when somebody is [speaking vernacular], 
in the documentaries, [for example], I do sub-titles when someone is speaking 
in a particular vernacular language. I would sub-title in English. 
 
GTv does consider programme access to be important to its competitiveness within 
the general industry: 
 
X6: … when you are dealing with audio-visuals, [there‘s] sound 
accompanying the pictures, [but] sometimes the programmes are well-
produced [so] that [people] are excited to watch the pictures alone. Sometimes 
too, yes, if you don‘t understand the language you will not be able to follow 
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[the story] and therefore you‘d have the temptation to switch channels, and 
that is why we are developing our other channels and started with sports to 
that if you switch at all you would not switch to any other competition but stay 
within the GBC channels. So we are taking care of that, and very soon the 
entertainment channel will also start, like I was saying, and News 24 will also 
follow. 
 
X6, however, also explained that technical problems with sub-titling equipment had 
limited the use of the method for improving programme-access.  
 
Beyond the limitations in the local language usage policy, a fundamental error is in 
the over-reliance on English as the main television language in a country that has low 
English literacy rates as just over sixty-five percent of the population is deemed to be 
literate, a measure that includes literacy in both the local languages and English. To 
broadcast nearly ninety percent of programming in English critically reduces GTv‘s 
‗universality‘ reach and effectively makes it an elitist platform for the educated; 
providing a very narrow service that does not meet the challenge to provide a 
‗universal‘ ‗place‘ (Adams 1992) within which the nation can gather to enjoy, fully, 
televised events that provide the opportunity to share equally in socio-cultural events 
that are meant to underline unitary nationhood. The National Media Policy 
acknowledges this over-reliance on the English language and states that it may also be 
causing an ―atrophy of local cultures‖ and ―an exclusion of the majority of the 
population‖ (Appendices 3, pg. 22). This limited communicative ability also means 
that GTv is not engaged with providing a service that would allow the whole nation to 
easily see its ‗reflection, mark its progresses and connect to aspirations‘ expressed or 
embedded in media content; the driving ethos in the law establishing GBC 
(Appendices 2, Section 2 (b)). This error would also be driving audience 
―fragmentation‖ (Raboy 1996); diluting the nationalist ethos of the platform and 
causing, especially, low-English literate audiences to congregate in low culture and 
taste, ‗ghetto‘, genres with low-language and media literacy barriers.  
 
If singular nationhood is an underlying objective in having a ‗national‘ broadcaster, 
then efforts must be made to avail linguistically differentiated audiences with 
alternative language access services so they can share in the same broadcast and 
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content experiences. Also, given the mixed public-commercial funding model of the 
GBC, a fragmenting audience is a challenge to its ability to compete effectively for 
advertising revenue as split audiences may not necessarily gravitate to newly 
introduced television channels. In a liberalised media market, geographic reach alone 
would not make sufficient impression on advertising revenue sources. Furthermore, 
the digital broadcast platform also works against the ‗we reach everyone‘ claim as it 
allows, hitherto, smaller broadcasters to enter the nation-wide broadcasting frame. 
These competitors offer an entertainment-biased schedule, as noted in the NMC 
Media Policy (Appendices 3) that meets the low-literacy needs of a significant size of 
the population. There is therefore a need to rethink the relative importance of 
language and media literacy within the scope of building a socially relevant and 
competitive broadcast offering from GTv.  
Use 
The ability of the general public access and to use a broadcasting system to interact 
and create content that addresses social aspirational, through discussion and sharing 
experiences, also an important measure of the system‘s universality (Banerjee and 
Seneviratne 2005). Audience participation in television programming was estimated 
to be about fifteen per cent of programming, and was largely recorded in seven 
Talkshows that utilised in-studio audiences and public phone-in (compare Fig. 4 and 
Table 4). These were also mostly in the Akan language. Thus, about eighty-six percent 
of programming did not factor general public participation. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Percentages of Audience Participation/Interaction in Sample 
 154 
 
 
Again, although about half of the programming in the schedule were recorded as out-
house productions (compare with Fig. 2
25
), there did not appear to be much effort 
towards originating programming from within communities or enable wide public 
participation as these programmes were mostly filmed entertainment (Table 4). 
However, this exposes a tension in that the greater percent of programming on air that 
was captured in the data was made in Ghana, and almost fifty per cent of 
programming was sourced from out-house producers, while GTv itself produced 
37.42% of programming in the sample. This indicated positively that there was 
available opportunity for producers out-side of the GBC access its platform. It also 
suggested that there was opportunity for an internally diverse programming platform 
should GTv formulate policies to not discriminate against ‗controversial‘ productions 
and its historically State-sanctioned editorial position. 68.02% (see Fig. 5 below) of 
programming was found to be local, and less than twenty per cent was from non-
Ghanaian sources. Thus the percentage of local content exceeded the NMC 
Broadcasting Standards policy (Appendices 4), which stipulates that at least fifty per 
cent of airtime be given to locally originated content. 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Pg. 149 
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Figure 5: Percentages of Programmes by Origination in Sample 
    
 
However, the Media Policy highlights that production is ―severely constrained …to 
the urban areas‖ (Appendices 3, pg. 21) and also notes a need for producers to 
recognise that programming ought to give expressive opportunity to different 
segments of the society. Thus, in practical terms, there is an acknowledgement of 
limited window of opportunity for the general public to contribute directly to 
programming and programme formulation in a manner that would facilitate their use 
of GTv as an expressive medium. Only the children‘s programme, Our Children, Our 
Future, done in collaboration with the Ghana International School, indicated a 
programme formulated to give expressive opportunity to a segmented ‗public‘. Other 
programmes such as The Business Advocate, Adult Education and Mmra Nsem, which 
are in-house productions that address legal and public education issues, specifically 
give opportunities to identifiable public agencies and social leaders to engage in 
public education that is, usually, on specific social and economic issues.  
 
Thus the access of the public to a public debate space (Habermas 1989; Lee Artz in 
McCauley, Eric E. Peterson et al. 2003) on GTv may be biased towards groups who 
are able to avail themselves of the access opportunities in being able to not only 
produce programmes but also pay for the airtime, since the out-house productions 
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were all bought airtime slots. And while the Media Policy considers community 
media as the more suitable mechanism required to improve participation in the public 
sphere, GTv as a national public broadcaster also needs to directly enable the access 
and use of its platform by the public in encouraging true universality of service and 
functions. 
 
Interestingly, the statistics show that content imports from out-side the continent are 
marginal, and the very popular Hispanic Telenovelas, widely shown in Ghana, are 
also marginal at 2.40%. There were, however, a large percentage of programmes from 
unknown sources (11.82%) that was attributed to programmes with non-specified 
titles, for example ‗Documentaries‘. 
 
 
 
The low participation figure measured indicates a challenge in making programmes 
that are formatted to be inclusive of the public. Given the socio-political tensions 
indicated in the country, with regards to media politicisation (Gifford 2004; Ansu-
Kyeremeh and Karikari 1998), this indicated a disengagement of GTv from the public 
and reflects government‘s apprehension that an agitated public sphere may reproduce 
the historical conditions that resulted in political instability under previous civilian 
regimes (Asante 1996), and hence the limitation of the national television platform to 
broad social discussions other than in what is political and, inherently, divisive. 
 
Thus, with limited opportunities to programme participation, content creation and 
limited linguistic access to enjoying programming, even as passive consumers, how 
does GTv perform in a proactive manner to meeting the needs of a variegated society? 
 
Diversity 
Programming diversity (Banerjee and Seneviratne 2005) considers both programme 
subjects and the reflection of social demographics and voices within the large society; 
bringing marginal subjects and social sections into programming in a manner as to 
give opportunity for many different subjects to air. 
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The Media Policy document engages with plurality only from the media ownership 
point of view but does not suggest standards for on the public media platform. The 
bedrock of values for a ‗public service‘ is founded on the notion that the service is 
driven to serve a ‗public interest‘, where the public is the larger commune of a 
national society both within and outside of political interests (UNESCO 2005). 
Plurality is necessary for the broadcaster to serve as the first point of expression for 
the majority of nationals who cannot afford their own media channels. While 
limitations are not put on the broadcasting of party political views and issues on GTv, 
as this would be unconstitutional, there is a stipulation in the NMC‘s Broadcasting 
Standards that such programming be logged, be given access fairly across political 
groups and should present truthful and accurate information (Appendices 4, Section 
17). The limited access opportunities to GTv, the dominance of two parties in national 
politics, and the predominance of programme origination from urban enterprises, 
however, means that the majority of on-air representations may not fully give voice to 
all sections of the national public. In recognition of this the National Media policy 
also notes that the ‗public‘ needs to be ―disaggregated‖ (Appendices 3, pg. 21) for 
effective plurality in order that marginalised voices may be heard and served. 
Applying this as a test in interviewing respondents revealed a fragmented picture of 
contesting opinions: 
 
X8 pointed out that the external media plurality has changed the media landscape for 
GBC as a national broadcaster; the existence of other information sources is 
undermining its, previously dominant, media source leadership. This indicated that 
GBC ought to be more responsive to pursuing an inclusive strategy that builds both 
quality and credibility into output: 
  
X8: … people have feedback channels through the other kinds of stations. 
They don‘t just necessarily take everything that GBC would say as the gospel 
truth… because the feedback channels are not particularly well-organised, 
there is a self-congratulatory, self-affirming pattern, that allows them to 
continuously send out messages without knowing that the public is not even 
watching any more.... 
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X8‘s observation is borne out by the responses of X5, who responds in affirmation 
that the level of access granted government, and perhaps public sector, information 
services equates to championing the ‗public interest‘: 
 
X5: …. Anything concerning the government, they come to us. 
 
However, other respondents do not support this view of a public service that is, 
effectively, a government communication service:  
 
X4: … if it‘s the demand of the government they think we are doing the public 
a service. Of course they are doing it [free] for you so it is a service. Maybe 
Upper East [Region] at Fifty, maybe Teachers‘ Day. So, at least, most other 
departments too enjoy that benefit. 
 
AT: So basically GTv is a play out box for government departments and public 
organisations. 
 
X4: Yes, especially for the government. We are just there, whichever party 
comes on we say ―yes sir, yes sir‖, that is all. 
 
Respondent X7 supports X4 and sees a clear infringement and manipulation of GTv 
resources by the government, even in an environment in which legal frameworks exist 
to insulate GBC from direct government control: 
 
X7: Let me put it this way, various governments will always want to use GTv 
to propagate whatever ideas they have, whether economic, social or other, and 
...[with] the availability of GTv in every Region, this is achieved, .... there is a 
programme, Then and Now, that has been on air for some time. This present 
administration [introduced this], where they take a particular location and then 
a picture is taken of that area and then what has been done presently after they 
came into power, the transformation that has taken place in terms of schools, 
other developments, hospitals, etc. 
 
AT: Is that a government sponsored programme? 
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X7: They don‘t necessarily sponsor it, some are sponsored, some are by 
independent producers, and then they are brought to GBC to broadcast. 
 
AT: Are they paid for by government? 
 
X7: They are not paid for, GBC belongs to the government so those kinds of 
programmes are not paid for. 
 
AT: But if independent producers are making these productions and bringing it 
to GTv how are the independent producers paid? 
 
X7: They will be paid. The government contracts these people to do this for 
them and then they come and dump it and go, and we have no say. If you want 
your bread buttered .... then you have to do it, just close your eyes and do it. 
 
X7‘s statement that GBC ―belongs‖ to any party in power indicates either 
disillusionment with structural protections availed the GBC, indicated an inability to 
resist government demands and signified the high level of control over the 
organisation by governments in power. The suggestion that for organisational 
survival, and perhaps for personal job security, the GBC and its functionaries have to 
do as government wants also indicates that neither Constitutional provisions, nor the 
existence of the Media Commission, provide adequate independence guarantees for 
the corporation. Such perceptual limitations, whether real or notional, may not only 
reside in one person‘s point of view. Any existence of the fear of victimisation will 
limit the ability of the whole organisation to fully work in a plural manner in pursuit 
of the public interest. 
 
The Audience 
Respondent X2 considered that the diversity motive in programming should be 
influenced by an ethos to make content that does not merely respond to commercial 
imperatives, for a broadcaster to claim public service attributes: 
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X2: A public broadcaster is a service that goes out to fish for materials, 
probably information, that doesn't have any commercial dimensions, or to a 
[lesser extent]; it's not for sale [it's airtime].... [It's about] informing and 
entertaining people with the material you have… 
 
X2 is stating that the organisation should have a public serving remit that plugs a 
market gap, presumably, left unfulfilled by private broadcasters that are profit 
motivated. X2 is backing the position that programming ought not to be commercially 
driven (Banerjee and Seneviratne 2005), but should be to provide programmes as a 
public value driven service. X2 suggests further that when subjects are treated within 
mainstream television formats there is opportunity to create wider appeal and greater 
efficiencies in broadening social education; suggesting that television programmes 
with wide-audience appeal are better for diversity programming. Referencing work 
done in sports with social minorities, X2 put it thus:    
 
X2: …. the idea is to bring a change and a different dimension, that is, to add a 
little bit more taste to our station… and to give a different taste to the audience 
about soccer which is the ―passion of the nation‖26… We need to bring it to 
the fore so people get educated..., everybody would benefit, we need to be 
there to capture that thing to inform everybody so that at the end of the day 
every Ghanaian will be very [well informed].  
 
Banerjee and Seneviratne (2005) argue that programme diversity is a public service 
broadcasting feature that shows commitment to broad programming, in both genre 
and subject, in ways that deliberately includes, and reflects, the wide social spectrum 
of a nation. X2 suggests that television is powerful, as a tool, for influencing society 
through education as it is experienced in a temporally and spatially differentiated 
context (Thompson 1995); the home or any viewing place becomes a socialising 
environment for learning about new ideas and gaining perspective on social issues. 
While, diverse programming allows many different subjects to be addressed, a 
strategic approach is still necessary for efficient and effective communication. 
Diverse programming is achieved when programmes are ‗disaggregated‘ in terms of 
                                                 
26
 This reference is common in Ghanaian parlance. 
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content and targeting in order to reflect differentiated needs for information, education 
and entertainment. 
  
Targeting 
 
 
Figure 6: Percentages of Targeted Audiences in Sample 
 
Programming was found to be largely for family viewing (Fig. 6). This indicated the 
intention to reach the whole nation with programming that reflects ―good taste and 
decency‖ as stated in the NMC documents (Appendices 3 and 4). It also reflected 
social conservatism. Although many African films are shown in the daytime hours, 
and such productions have been noted to exploit sensualised content, it can be 
assumed that on GTV these would, very likely, be edited to fit the viewing times and 
to keep within the NMC Broadcasting Standards (Appendices 3) policy that 
establishes a past-10 PM ‗watershed‘ for adult content (Section 6, sub-section (g)). 
Western films, which typically would contain non-African cultural elements, were 
noted to be at very late night viewing times for an adult audience.  
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Youth programming was observed to be mainly music videos. A new wave of 
strength in the music industry, created by a blending of the local Hip-Life (American 
Hip-Hop with traditional Highlife) genre with Nigerian and other traditional music 
styles, with ill-disguised sexual lyrics, is spawning an internationally appealing genre. 
The music videos that accompany the promotion of these artistic releases also blend 
both traditional and American Hip-Hop music videos styles, with scantily clad girls 
and sexualised dance forms that push the traditional decency and taste boundaries. 
However, these have very wide appeal and are available to view on most local 
stations as well as on popular online platforms, worldwide. The Paid Music slots, of 
which there are many in the weekly schedules, are therefore intended to into the 
music industry as a valuable source of income. The content of such music videos may 
very well serve as a barometer reflecting changes in youth culture and indicating the 
growth of a blended western and conservative culture in the urban cities of Ghana. 
 
The data also showed low allocation of time for instructive and learning programmes 
targeted at youth and children. Fig. 6 and Table 5
27
 show that with only one 
programme was targeted at children, and the total airtime given to Learning for adults, 
youth and children was 5.86% of airtime. With nearly twice as much airtime given to 
Christian Teaching, this meant that quasi-educational programming undermined the 
character of the educational type of programming. Thus, this indicated a of limited 
achievement of the educational value purpose in GTv‘s broadcasting as it was 
dominated by programmes which did not have real value in improving the knowledge 
base of audiences in subjects directly connected to the socio-economic and political 
advancement of the country. 
 
Genres 
Thus, within genres it was important to assess the extent to which programming was 
differentiated to address social subjects as well as the provision of the purposive 
programming values discussed before. Respondents showed an awareness of the 
social differences within the nation, particularly with regards to ethnic differentiation. 
While, commonly, stating that there were no structural guidelines to embedding 
specific thresholds of values into programme-making, they suggested that a socially 
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 Pages 168 and 152, respectively 
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aware public, and instances of audience complaints, served as an influence on 
diversity-inclusion in programme-making: 
 
X1: Well, for me, if I think about the different ethnic groups, for example, 
even though a paper wasn't given to me about this, when I'm, at least, doing 
some of the cultural activities I make sure that I don't centre it to one particular 
area. It varies. If I do something about the Akans, then I maybe I have to do 
something from the North, I make sure I don't keep to one [ethnic group] 
because when it's like that people will complain, you know, somebody might 
say [this, that and the other]. So even though it's not spelt out when we are 
programming I have that in mind, so I make sure I am not biased, you know. I 
just vary things. Yes, so that people don't say that because you are in Accra 
you just stay there and do things there, but you need to move around to give 
people opportunities. 
 
The producer is suggesting that the national audience expects its public broadcaster to 
engage with an ethnically differentiated audience. In an ethnically differentiated 
nation like Ghana, the problem of creating a unitary national identity, while 
recognising ethnic and tribal differentiation, can generate frictions that are a resistance 
to the evolution of hegemonic culture. Thus, the salience of programmes like the 
Local Drama productions, in which the major languages provide cultural cues to 
ethnic differentiation, are a means of acknowledging respect for, representations of, 
the differentiations. The problem may be in the balance of motivational ideologies, 
and understanding of society and social evolution, that a producer may bring to 
diversity inclusion. For example, X3 demonstrates a silo-effect approach to 
production that over-looks opportunities to develop an inter-ethnic and national 
culture for building inclusiveness and social cohesion: 
 
X3: ... When you write a local drama I see certain standards working, because 
once you are dealing with their life you are dealing with the tribe. So if you 
are dealing with a story in Ga it presupposes everybody, everything in it is Ga. 
So the issue of tribalism doesn‘t even come in. Tribalism comes in when 
another tribe is introduced [into a drama], so it doesn‘t even come up as a 
factor in Local Drama because it deals with only one tribe…so the situation is 
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in Ga, the story is in Ga, everything is Ga because they are going to speak in 
Ga, so there can‘t be anything else. 
 
X3‘s statement suggests apprehension at the possibility of accusations of tribalism 
may be driving production forms into culturally insular media products. However, the 
Media Policy notes an asphyxiation of local languages in the media generally. 
Banerjee and Seneviratne (2005) suggest that diversity in programming ought to 
pursue modes for building inclusiveness into programme-making in order to achieve 
new formats that stretch the envelope in including and embracing the society, such as 
Lunt (2009) suggests in his analysis of the utilitarian social effects of the talkshow 
format as being contributory to a new form of social education through the mediation 
of personal experiences. Considering the salience of language in mediation, the 
employment of language diversity within media content should be a natural 
mechanism through which to foster both ethnic and national cultural forms. It would 
also work to strengthen the programming access on GTv and, thereby, satisfy the 
Media Policy‘s vision to encourage, at least, sixty percent use of local languages in 
public broadcasting (Appendices 3, Section 7.2.3 (iii)). Greater local language use in 
more programmes throughout the day can also facilitate language learning and culture 
growth. X3‘s position that unitary language use in local drama is desirable for 
deflecting inter-tribal tension ignores the natural occurrence of multilingualism 
(Laitin 1992; Heine and Nurse 2000) within communities. Using the technique in 
dramatic characters will not only be natural representative of local communities and 
tribes, but would also provide further opportunities for language groups to learn and 
share cultural diversity through the public broadcaster.  
 
This biased operation of the broadcaster was confirmed in the statistics from the 
broadcast schedule sample. The sample counted twenty-three programme genres and 
the analysis revealed that News (19.31%), Factual (mainly documentaries; 17.90%), 
Film (12.31%) and Christian Teaching (10%) have the top allotments of airtime
28
. All 
other genres, including formal and informal Learning (5.86%) for adults, youth and 
children had much smaller allocations. A total of twenty-five genres categories were 
counted with more genres in the entertainment type of programmes. Thus, it was 
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observed that while many genres are provided, the heavy bias in airtime devoted to 
News, Factual, Film and Christian Teaching, may be undermining the extent of 
diversity that might be actually possible to create within the airtime resources 
available because the same programmes were repeated each day with few variations 
across the days within the weekly schedule and this indicated important observations: 
 
News 
Firstly, there was an hourly news bulletin broadcast most parts of the day, five-minute 
presentations within working hours with hour-long news at 7pm and 10pm. There 
were not only in-house news productions but also re-broadcasts of news, current 
affairs and culture and arts from Deutsche Welle TV, in the early morning, and live-
news and current affairs programmes from VOA in the afternoon. Such a dominant 
position for News programming could be attributable to its social maintenance 
function, re-assuring the nation about social and political stability, and developments 
therein, or an attempt to deliver orientating information to the national community. 
The news cycle could also be a copying of the formats of global news broadcasters, 
whose programming styles are indicative of modern media practice. Competition in 
the local television industry has seen the emergence of both local and satellite 
broadcasters which carry the 24-hour rolling news formats of global media giants, 
whose programming formats serve could be seen as indicators of modernity in the 
media business. 
 
Certainly, it is likely that all three factors play a role. The political history of the 
nation and the growth of democracy may be salient factors for the delivery of news, 
which could therefore be serving a social maintenance role through re-assurance and 
orientation to socio-political developments. The history of constitutional usurpation 
by the army made the state-controlled media an important source of ‗emergency‘ 
information, and Hastings (2005) observed the central role of news in daily routines 
and inter-personal conversations within Ghanaian society. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the need for the ‗cyclic‘ news on both national and global events has made News 
programming the single most important function of GTv, nationally. Along with a 
historical culture of propaganda on behalf of governments (Hastings 2005; Ansu-
Kyeremeh and Karikari 1998), the production of News at GTv could provide a social 
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stabilising function in prosecuting an agenda of rhetoric in favour of an existing 
government; its frequency indicating ‗normality‘ within the political status quo, even 
as it serves to provide cues for social debate and commentary (Hastings 2005).  
 
The alternate news sources available to the public; through competing radio and 
television stations, makes it important to understand the social relevance of GBC-
produced News in relation to its history of dislocation from the ‗public interest. A 
vibrant private broadcasting industry competes aggressively to provide alternate 
discussions and interpretations of the News, and is much more ready to use 
‗grapevine‘ sources. Such sensationalized media output from competition will 
therefore provide more relevance to a public that traditionally trades on ‗gossip‘ 
(Hastings 2005) and inter-personal news exchanges, and obviate the presentation on a 
station perceived to exercise a ―culture of silence‖ (Ansu-Keremeh and Karikari 1998, 
pg. 2) that does not serve the public interest.  
 
Global news broadcasts, therefore, need to be understood separately from local news 
content. They serve a socialising and orienting role for cuing ideas of modernity, 
place, people and events, and provide connections to the diaspora for expatriates, and 
community-members with relatives abroad. The statistics showed that an estimable 
third of News broadcast was from Deutsche Welle TV; broadcast in the very small 
hours of the morning. It therefore will have limited social impact and relevance. 
While DW TV is a world renowned institution, very much like any other news 
organisation, it is engaged in selective construction of a world view that is editorially 
determined and different, regarding public interest, to what may be conceived of as 
‗interesting‘ to the local Ghanaian. If GTv‘s intent is to tap into a global news source 
in order to offer much broader information content than it is itself able to provide, 
then it ought to consider a critically balanced array of news sources to present on the 
public service platform. The VOA programme In Focus, which has regular live re-
broadcast slots, in contrast to DW TV News, presents an African-issues based 
programme that is necessarily different in intent and ideological slant compared to the 
Euro-centric formats of the news programmes Journal and Global 3000. However, 
the wider social significance of such international news on GTv is difficult to theorise 
due to the social structure of Ghana, in which the size of the literate and professional 
classes are relatively smaller compared to the working and agrarian classes. 
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Definitely, for social elites, the global sources of news will provide cues of 
‗modernity‘ that will inform their debates of public and social issues (Barker 1991; 
Morley 2007; Sparks 2007). Their social debates and the decisions they make, as the 
people invariably in control of politics and social institutions of influence, will be 
informed by a global cultural orientation world view that will either further divide 
them from lower social classes, when not understood, or will filter into mass society 
as modern ideas (Falola 2004; Sparks 2007).  
 
Critically, therefore, the global news events that would also affect the lower classes 
through the assimilated ideas of the social elites that control the political and 
economic reins of the country, needs to be related to lower classes as part of the work 
of GTv in providing an understanding of the evolving world within which the nation-
state, and its development agenda, is situated. Particular to note are incidents in 
global-market trade events in agricultural commodities, mining and petroleum, as well 
as sub-regional political events. All of these instances affect population movements, 
income distribution and national civic activities. 
 
Factual 
Secondly, the Factual genre was made up, mainly, of documentary slots in the 
schedule. It was observed that many of these slots were simply entered as 
‗Documentary‘. These un-named slots were a concern in that it made it impossible to 
infer the nature of content intended for broadcast in those slots. Considering that the 
Factual genre was the second most significant use of airtime, the concern was that 
these slots are left un-programmed in anticipation of government communication 
needs. This conclusion was deduced from respondents‘ strong suggestions that GTv 
carried a lot of programming that was government communication, yet apart from 
three named documentaries on civic education, Meet The Press, News Conference and 
distance learning programmes there were no programmes in the schedules directly 
attributable to a being were counted that were similar. Thus, un-named ‗documentary‘ 
slots could be ways to ‗spring‘ communication on the public without having to log 
these formally, as per Broadcasting Standards Policy (Appendices 4, Section 17, pg. 
7). However, the large extent of government communication, and its disguise, was 
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attributed to the extensive coverage of government personalities and events in the 
News slots
29
 (see Fig. 7 below).  
Christian Teaching 
Thirdly, the Christian Teaching genre was noted to command a high proportion of the 
education type of programming on GTv, approximately a third (50.09 hours of CT as 
a fraction of 154.75 hours of Education programming, and 10% of total airtime 
sample
30
). The programmes were all noted to be from evangelical/charismatic and 
Pentecostal denominations. While Ghana is a largely Christian nation, at about ―sixty-
three per cent‖, just about a quarter of those are Pentecostal although there is a 
continuing growth in these denominations (Gocking 2005) which teach a 
fundamentalist interpretation of Christianity and ‗prosperity messages‘ inspired by 
American evangelistic denominations. Hence the faith branch adopts religious-right 
Americanisms in ideological propagations about faith, life and society (Gifford 2004). 
Yet, that religious minority is monopolising a substantial part of the national 
broadcast resource in regular slots. Pentecostals have shown they can have potentially 
hegemonic influences on the character and nature of nationalist and social discussions 
(Appendices 6). In a decidedly inclusive nation, not necessarily secular, where other 
religious groups do not feel threatened, the dominance of one group over many others 
in the public sphere reflects policy failings, inadequate policy strategies or a lack of 
institutional sensitivity. Islamic Teaching, for example, at only .25% of airtime, is less 
than a tenth of Christian Teaching airtime. The balance of religious rhetoric is not 
plural on national television, and is against the NMC Broadcasting Standards policy 
on representation of social groups (Appendices 4). 
 
The airtime for Christian Teaching is accessed via commercially sold slots to the 
various church organisations that produce the content, whiles Islamic Teaching is 
produced by GTv. The revenues generated from selling these slots to Pentecostal 
denominations, in view of GTv‘s need to operate a commercially-optimised usage of 
airtime is giving opportunity to Christian-evangelistic churches with requisite 
financial resources to dominate religious programming. Thus, without a strategy to 
balance the diversity of religions on television, GTv is failing to provide fairness and 
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 Refer to Table 5 on pg. 152 
 169 
balance in the representation of diverse religions and faiths in the broadcast output. 
This is not within the spirit of the Constitution and is a singular, or limited, opinion in 
the national media is noted to be undesirable in the National Media Policy. Also, 
Article 163 of the Constitution, (Appendices 1), provides that ―All state-owned media 
shall afford fair opportunities and facilities for the presentation of divergent views 
and dissenting opinions‖. The Constitution, thus, sets out clearly that a diverse and 
inclusive media is important for reflecting the varied character of the nation. While 
―fair opportunity‖ relates to equitability of access opportunities, it by no means 
suggests that marginal groups should be allowed to suffer the consequences of their 
inability, or even unwillingness, to avail themselves of existing opportunities. The 
NMC Media policy particularly recognises that a history of monopolised access to 
media has rendered a vast majority of Ghanaians without the knowledge required to 
enable them to gain access to media opportunities that would allow them to engage in 
the public sphere debates of social issues.  
 
Government Communication 
Crucially, the presence of government communication (see Fig. 7 below) in 
programming was found in very few programmes, specifically in News Conference, 
Meet the Press and Distance Learning. Distance Learning was counted as 
government communication only because it is a state-sponsored programme. The 
programme Adult Education is often centred on public and civic education messages, 
some of which includes promoting an understanding of government decisions, 
government-backed social programmes, initiatives and other public and civic 
education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Percentages of Government Sponsored Programming in Sample 
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The marginal presence of specifically generated government communication content 
lends credence to the assumption that other genre forms are co-opted into the 
government communication machine, and is further explored in the qualitative data 
analysis. It may also be an indication of the withdrawal of government from direct 
development communication programming in such areas as health and agriculture 
which have been a historic occupation of the state-media in Ghana (Asante 1996). 
 
Independence 
The independence of the broadcaster, its freedom from political and sectional control, 
is to allow it to solely exercise editorial responsibility, and, therefore, enable its ability 
to present different voices and ideas within the public sphere. Interviewed producers 
were involved in different productions, requiring different approaches to production 
and editorial decisions. They differed in perceptions of their creative and editorial 
freedoms. While some saw checks within their production routines as necessary for 
ensuring quality in eventual outcomes, others saw circumspection; within the learning 
of GBC work culture, which works to limit creative and expressive latitudes. In the 
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first, they point to organisational control mechanisms that, ostensibly, serve as 
editorial quality control checks and expression of a ‗house-style‘: 
 
X8: So you have to have house rules, and in developing those house rules you 
can develop a sensitive but useful set of rules by which [to work]. BBC has 
rules; there are certain programmes that will not fly. Have you seen the 
coverage of the Wiki-Leaks files? You will see that the information itself is 
not on BBC, there‘s only the story about it. So there are certain things that are 
not for the national good that we will not let through. 
 
Censorship in any form limits both the creative and factual expressions of media 
content producers. It is also unconstitutional in Ghana (Appendices 1). However, the 
data suggests that respondents did not see a difference between ‗editorial control‘ and 
‗censorship‘, and indicates the production of ‗self-censorship‘ as a socialised attitude 
from a persistence of a culture of conflict avoidance with political authority. For X8, 
the practical logic of censoring is in exercising careful judgement as to what content 
satisfies the ‗public interest‘ attributes of a subject, without jeopardising ‗national 
security‘. NLCD 226 (Appendices 2, Section 18) makes it possible for a ruling 
government to take over control of the broadcaster in circumstances it deems as 
appropriate in reaction to a ―national emergency‖ (Appendices 2). X7 says that the 
National Media Commission‘s insulation of GBC from direct government 
interference is not trusted for a number of reasons: the NMC Board‘s appointment of 
a Director-General is by Presidential approval, and X7 suggests apprehension that this 
process can be unduly influenced by a government to its ends: 
 
AT: But I think what you are saying is that the Head of State can influence the 
NMC too... 
 
X7: He can influence the NMC because if he appoints the NMC Board then 
why not, he can influence [them]. 
 
AT: So that still makes you ..... 
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X7: Vulnerable, sure, sure. It makes you vulnerable because one thing is GBC 
is not completely independent, it‘s the government, ruling government, which 
pays our emoluments. 
 
Only two appointments, of fifteen, to the NMC‘s Board are Presidential. However, the 
perception that governments are all-powerful may be a residual result of decades of 
military rule, and usurpation of the rule of law, as well as contemporary events
31
. This 
suggests that greater efforts at ensuring transparency in both corporate governance at 
GBC and the work of the NMC is required to erase notions of possible political 
manipulation. 
 
In consideration of these factors, it was interesting to observe that GTv has a 
mechanism to control the editorial contents of its broadcasts. The mechanism, known 
as the Preview Committee, was suggested to work at ensuring both editorial 
correctness and technical quality in productions. However, there are problems with 
the operation of this committee. Its ‗house rules‘ are not comprehensively stated, 
leaving room for interpretations, it reinforces the ‗neo-patrimonialist‘ attitudes of the 
―big man‖ (X1; Gifford 2004, pg. 13) whose biased patronage is essential to 
facilitating processes.  
 
X2 stated that the committee has documentation for standards of quality to aid their 
review work yet finds latitude for individual interpretations that blur the value 
judgements of the committee. X1 and X8 stated that the committee does not always 
carry out the previewing duty, and X8 further stated that experience had shown that 
the absence of clear rules leaves room for infringements on creative work. X1 also 
referred to the committee members as ―big men‖ and imputed that it is in winning 
their ―trust‖ that producers are entrusted with productions. However, X1 preferred to 
interpret the work of the committee as ―editorial‖ supervision, suggesting that the 
culture of re-producing is a form of standardising the editorial leaning at GTv. Some 
respondents indicated that learning on the job socialised them into the GTv‘s work 
culture: 
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 During Gen. Acheampong SMC regime he threatened to withhold public journalists salaries on the 
grounds of a lack of positive co-operation (Asante 1996). The current NDC government is boycotting 
media stations of the MBC for similar reasons. 
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X1: ... what happens is that because you‘ve gone through the mill you know 
what the policy is and what you are expected to do. 
 
X3: Well I think it‘s like this, I think it‘s kind of like the chicken and egg 
thing. You wouldn‘t be given that position to produce and direct if you didn‘t 
have a track record and you hadn‘t imbibed the standards of [GBC].  
 
Considering that this system is applied to vetting out-house productions it may have 
been useful to have evolved a structured commissioning system as a basis on which to 
ensure that content development was within sets of rules without arbitrariness for 
producers. 
 
AT: Are the independent producers given guidelines as to what to bring or is 
the stuff approved to be deemed to be suitable after its been looked at? 
 
X5: No, they do their own thing and it will go through a preview committee, if 
the product is approved then they sign a contract and we put it on air. If its not 
approved then that will be it, it won‘t be on air.  
 
Clearly, there is a critical need for GTv to plug the gap created by a non-existent 
commissioning guide. It tries to manage this with a process that from beginning to 
end is only partially structured and has various informal and socialised enactments 
that locks the organisational culture into a dependence on its socialised culture. X8 
suggested that the inability of GTv to evolve a system of structured guidelines and 
appropriate bureaucracy was due to a systemic inability to evolve system structures 
and operational documents, thus operations are carried out on the basis of a learned 
culture of production.  
 
AT: My question is, if there are such house rules why can‘t there be a 
document put in place that basically would give commissioning guidelines so 
that anybody, third party or in-house, would have clear knowledge of what the 
parameters are for developing content. 
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X8: You are flogging a dead horse and saying why can‘t the horse, at least, get 
up on its knees. 
 
Creative Control 
To base the exercise of a public service remit on a ―trust‖ factor in the production 
control system suggests both dysfunction and arbitrariness. GTv‘s producer-directors 
are trained professionals whose ―editorial‖ decisions should have to fit into an 
operational guide for the different types of programmes they produce. However, GTv 
does not operate a commissioning guide and various departments through a Chief 
Controller of Programmes (CcoP) or Head of Programmes (HoP) determine what 
content needs are (X5). Executive Producers then supervise the productions carried 
out by producer-directors. The system appears organised but actually works on an 
‗idea‘ volunteering basis for both new programmes and content improvement in 
regular slots. 
 
Therefore, what do producers perceive to be their degree of independence and control 
over creative content production within what appears to be a, historically, political-
conflict avoiding system in the state-owned media (Asante 1996; Ansu-Kyeremah and 
Karikari 1998; Hastings 2005)?  
 
Respondents did not all agree on a common view of censorship as an aspect of their 
independent ability to, authoritatively, take charge of productions without recourse to 
higher authorities for the approval of programme-making decisions, in order to 
forestall politically-motivated challenges. X6 defended the GTv system of previews 
and supervision by suggesting that productions are not constrained by norms or 
special interests; that creativity in production is really the essential test for producers 
and producers that are capable of creatively producing content have no impediments 
inhibiting them from exploring social subjects in making content: 
 
X6: … they have a lot of independence. Those who are very creative are 
encouraged to go ahead, those who sit aside are not prevented from exploring, 
actually.  
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That opinion was also supported by X4, who suggested that some producers may have 
lost creativity in approaching their work, but also suggested that this is due both to 
managing producers‘ fear of political out-falls, as well the result of loss of job 
satisfaction due to operational constraints (see Funding):  
 
X4: I think people are afraid of their own shadows so they don't make us go 
beyond some things and I think also creativity has been stifled for some time 
so it's not making a lot of us think, and there are frustrations, you know, 
sometimes logistics… 
 
Ultimately, producers understand that there is a new climate of constitutional and 
legal frameworks that should allow them to be more exploratory in content 
production; however they expressed perceptions of being limited by superiors
32
. Thus, 
the historical experience of management, regarding the treatments of media personnel 
under military regimes, form anxieties that still frame and limits their courage in 
sanctioning productions that could later turn out to be politically ‗controversial‘ 
productions. The fear has socialised the production group into narrow production 
exercises that limit their creativity in choosing subject matter, since they are focussed 
on avoiding what may later be interpreted as political-motivated under a different 
future-governing regime. 
 
While respondents expressed a belief that, to a large extent, they owned their 
productions and ideas, they also expressed that they are sometimes frustrated by 
another kind of political intrusion that originates from outside of GBC; Ministerial 
approval. X4 talked about an idea to produce a documentary that would explore 
effects on households of changing trends in education. The challenge was to get 
ministerial sector buy-in: 
 
X4: …. If I take it to them and they refuse then I have a problem. I cannot do 
it, because if I go ahead and I do it somebody may call me or talk to P1 
[saying] this thing came up and they refused it, but if I do it just like a normal 
drama and I don‘t seek their advice, and talk to just a few people, and I do it 
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without any research that [also leaves me] subject to blame or [I could be] 
applauded. So that is what I am thinking about. When I get back to the office I 
will discuss with a few people and see what to do. 
 
AT: So you are actually suggesting that even as a drama you are still likely to 
face the same problems as if you were doing it as a factual documentary. 
 
X4: Yes, yes. 
 
Does this climate of suggestive interferences and politically motivated checks on 
producers‘ creative processes constitute a form of censorship? While its extent is not 
measurable within this research it appears to be a functional part of the production 
process and is termed ‗self-checking‘ (X1). Essentially it is a process of self-
censoring in the processes of narrative construction and is justified as part of the 
‗quality checking‘ process (X1; X5; X6; X8) within the organisation. X1 suggests that 
such ‗self-checking‘ is necessary as an editorial mechanism in order not to cause 
public offence, i.e. as a mechanism to ensure high public value in a production:  
 
X1: … they expect that you produce quality programmes, and make sure that 
decisions you take in the editorial [stage] is well done so that when the 
programme is shown people will not call back to say ―this thing‖, you need to 
check [and make sure] your facts [are] right because you are going to show it 
to people and if something you‘ve represented is not right they might even tell 
your bosses and then they might get you to [answer] ―why did you do this?‖, 
even though they didn‘t watch it but they will get you back [to answer], so 
they expect quality, they expect you to get your facts right and to take good 
editorial decisions. 
 
Thus there is a tension in the discussion of the subject: some respondents preferred to 
deny the existence of ‗censorship‘ as a politically motivated action, considering its 
legal implications under the Constitution (X8), while others, like X4, saw a wider 
application of the term in relation to supervisory limitations on politically 
‗controversial‘ subject matter discussions in productions. X3 and X1 preferred to 
discuss the subject in terms of creative choices in programme-making, and therefore 
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denied the existence of formalised censorship, but agreeing to ‗self-censorship‘ as a 
naturally professional process. X3 particularly suggests that censorship may be a 
misapplied term in that the notion is more consonant with ‗editorial decision-making‘ 
as opposed to the type of decision-making that is politically motivated to deny the 
‗public interest‘: 
 
X3: Well, censorship is always there, everybody censors, nobody lets 
everything out of the door so it‘s always there, but it depends on what you are 
censoring, how much, and why and all those things, but censorship always 
exists, don‘t let anybody tell you nothing is censored…. 
 
X3 therefore is suggesting that ‗self-censorship‘, occurs in the selective narrative 
construction of a story, and is the result of the natural attrition that occurs when the 
producer chooses what to show, in keeping with the house rules of any media 
organisation.  
 
Thus, despite the protestations, it can be surmised that the GTv media system works 
to avoid conflict in political relationships, both current and in the future. It also seeks 
to avoid criticisms from audiences or parties with special interest (X4). The creative 
constraints that producers face are therefore, partly, a result of the media system‘s 
continual avoidance of conflict. For a media system to avoid ‗making trouble‘ means 
that is engaged in processes that cut it off from the public interest; given that the 
public, when facilitated, will offer the ‗diverse‘ opinions that occur in social debates, 
some of which may well cause offence to sectional interests.  
 
Distinctiveness 
Programming distinctiveness is required, not only in terms of brand differentiation, 
but as an ethos to deliver new genres of content that push boundaries and create new 
ways of programme-making and service provision that marks a difference between it 
and other broadcasting services (Banerjee and Seneviratne 2005). In the monopoly 
environment within which the NLCD 226 was written, the effort was not given to 
marking such a distinction in GBC‘s services. The decree rather attempted to create a 
full-service institution and even included a remit for the corporation to manufacture or 
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license broadcast equipment devices, either for its own use or, arguably, for onward 
sale to the public that received its services. 
 
Respondent X2 was the only interviewee to suggest that the distinction between GTv 
and other television broadcasters was in its willingness to make and broadcast 
programmes that were not simply ―commercial‖ but valuable for their educational and 
social messages. In contrast X8 thought that GBC was not unique in its service 
delivery, and was much the same as other broadcasters in the type of programming 
that is thought of as being ‗public service‘. X3 suggested that there was too much 
dependence on entertainment formats on other stations, however, without statistics to 
compare it is difficult to generalise on this point. GTv‘s distinguishing feature may be 
its business model and the reach of its broadcasting signals; however it may not be 
much different from other broadcasters as they may have replicated its type of 
programming, as well as the use of imported content to out-compete GTv (X7). 
 
The liberalised media marketplace has made it even more important for GTv to 
distinguish it services from the competition, which X7 see as, predominantly, offering 
entertainment programming: 
 
X7: And secondly, because of the advent of these private stations most of them 
only do entertainment programmes, and you know Ghanaians and 
entertainment, we wish that we would watch telenovelas and Concert Party 
from morning to evening, which we cannot do in GBC .... 
 
However, the challenge that now faces the corporation is not only the liberalised 
media market. The very idea of offering a ‗public service‘ in broadcasting is ascribed 
to by the private commercial stations: 
 
X8: They do pretty much what GBC does, AIDS campaign, they give either 
free airtime or sometimes they actually, like GBC, do actual stories, tell 
people how to work on sanitation, stuff like that, actual stories. 
 
The competition have copied the format of the programmes produced at GTv. Ex-staff 
who have joined the private sector have replicated the types of programmes that are, 
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in essence, understood to be ‗how‘ television is done (X8). How does GTv offer a 
differentiated service that would make it the premier provider of public broadcasting? 
 
Respondents did consider that providing ―education, information and entertainment‖ 
were the core values of the public service remit. They also suggested that there is a 
nationalist and development role for GTv. They did not identify other salient factors 
that would distinguish GTv from other television services. However, the use of 
multiple local languages and the sign language is a unique service on GTv. 
 
The basis for creating a differentiated service in public broadcasting is contained in 
the National Media Policy document (Appendices 3) with specific stipulations for 
GTv. It generically stipulates plurality and diversity, and also includes an airtime 
usage quota for local content in programming at sixty percent of airtime, fifty percent 
of which should be aired during primetime (ibid., Section 7.2.3 (iii)). These 
stipulations have not been incorporated into the operational objectives at GTv, and X8 
suggests that this is due to systemic dysfunctions: 
 
X8: Working document. You are talking about an organised system. 
Documents? First of all your budget is not on, you don't have any money, you 
don't have any way of putting a concept to be tried out in place, you don't 
cover anything except for News and some national events… essentially those 
who come to manage GBC are not broadcasters, anybody else but 
broadcasters.  
 
Despite this institutional failure to incorporate content guidelines due to monetary and 
technical constraints, some respondents considered that GTv‘s audience has a 
nationalist expectation of its services that does translate into programmes in culture 
and entertainment that differentiate the schedule of GTv from its competition: 
 
X1: ….with GTv being state-owned, most of the time people expect to see 
these kinds of documentaries, like things dealing with our culture, because 
with some stations that may not be their priority. So these are the kind of 
things that people would expect GTv to do. As [a matter of] national interest 
people would want to see GTv do more of these programmes rather than take 
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programmes from outside and put them on air.…. I think it's because people 
feel that GBC is state-owned and it should take the national interest [to] hand 
and should cover local programmes. 
 
Thus, the respondent holds a viewpoint that suggests a tendency to see commercial 
stations as lacking in public service value commitments, yet there is no research basis 
for the assumption of what reasons people may have for either protesting content or 
asking for a specific kind of content, nor is there a reliable basis for establishing what 
percentage of the population or viewership may hold such views. This patriarchal 
viewpoint was common in respondents‘ views of the relevance of GTv, and it also 
assumes that GTv fills a market gap that would exist without it. Yet, none of these 
assumptive positions are backed by available research, nor was there any suggestion 
of internally generated research; even though at the time of this research‘s data 
collection the GBC had partly-finished a media uses survey. That was yet to form a 
basis for programming policy. X7 actually suggests that, often, programming 
decisions are based on the unilateral decisions of channel managers, as well as in 
response to some public appeals through letters to the GBC when changes are made to 
entertainment programmes: 
 
X7: ….and in most cases we realised the majority were disappointed when 
programmes are discontinued. And people sometimes write asking for GTv or 
GBC to bring back certain programmes which had been rested.  
 
…..They normally happen with the entertainment programmes, especially 
drama. Obra, for instance, was off for some time. It was rested. Cantata was 
rested for some time and people kept asking for [it], and then again there may 
be a particular programme on GTv which [goes] to another station and then 
people [watching] GTv would want it brought back. It‘s normally with 
entertainment. 
 
Thus GTv is seen to have a purpose that is tied to an assumption of the public‘s 
engagement with it as a public broadcaster, and its viewing is linked to a history of 
programming that were unique to it. This attributed purpose was found to hold 
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salience for producers and in their notions was the distinguishing factor between it 
and the competition. 
 
Summary 
The above analysis indicates both socio-political challenges and some positive 
developments within the usage of airtime on GTv. Despite the suggestion of a lack of 
diverse and plural output, it is worth bearing in mind that Hindman (in Demers and 
Viswanath 1999) cites Rheingold (1993) in suggesting that broadcast media are 
unable to provide a wholly inclusive public sphere at all times. This is both true in 
relation to schedule construction per unit of time and the institutional capacity to 
perform in a manner that is abreast with a rapidly changing social landscape in an era 
of technologically disseminated media content. Thus, a well-functioning model of 
public service broadcasting must rest on key fundamentals in the provision of a public 
service; not competing for audiences or hampered by economic limitations, or 
attempting a whole-sale satisfaction of ‗publics‘ (Lee Artz in McCauley, Eric E. 
Peterson et al. 2003, pg. 4). It should be able to provide programming that meets a 
‗public service‘ commitment to building an inclusive, plural and diverse mediated 
public sphere over the entire frame of programming provided. 
 
The Challenges of GTv  
Thus, the data shows that producers notionally define ‗public‘ as both State and the 
national community of citizens and public institutions. The former connects to an 
emancipatory notion that is based on an understanding of public service 
broadcasting‘s role in social development through the communication of education 
and information programming. The latter considers public communication on behalf 
of government as public service broadcasting. The suggestion from respondents was 
that this was the view taken by management, however, both viewpoints are dually 
held and salience of the latter over the former may increase with staff seniority. 
 
The data also shows that while producers did not immediately identify with the public 
service benchmarks of universality, plurality, distinctiveness and independence, as set 
out in Banerjee and Seneviratne (2005), it was still possible to evaluate these concepts 
 182 
in the interviews as notional understandings of them were found to be present in the 
data. The National Media Commission‘s Broadcasting Policy document also discusses 
the salience of these factors both in achieving and shaping a public broadcasting 
service, as well as recognising their interdependence. What then is the resulting 
impact on producers at GTv in relation to how functional roles help to define the 
social contributions of GTv to the national social development project? 
 
Given that social debate in the public sphere is necessary to inspire social change 
through challenging conventions and established opinions and ideas, the withdrawal 
of GTv from the mediating role that is necessary to create the enabling public sphere 
suggests that the media system is unwilling to engage strategically with social change 
communication, in the kind of debate that may affect changes to political power 
relationships in Ghanaian society. 
 
Media systems are able to play a role in social change through the enablement of 
communication elements and systems within societies. The ability of media systems 
to play such a role is linked directly to the formation of a public sphere in which they 
play the role of mediators. Factors that limit the ability of media systems to achieve 
this mediation role in an unfettered manner; including political interference, 
ideological preventions, social institutions of culture and structure within media 
systems, also act as social retardants that contribute to the maintenances of a status 
quo. Media systems therefore need to be free in order to enable them play a role in 
social liberation agenda. The data shows that GTv‘s media system is constrained as 
much by its producers‘ ritualised routines, organisational ideological conflicts in the 
different viewpoints on production routines that lead to frustrations, as well as 
external conflicts with other media systems that perform in the same or similar role, 
as suggested by James Ettema (Ettema and Whitney 1982). 
 
Funding 
While respondents differed on issues such as their independence, and by the extension 
GTv‘s, they were unanimous in blaming what they perceive to be a flawed business-
funding model for remit fulfilment difficulties and their premier challenge. The 
funding model of a public broadcaster is also one of the contentious issues in the 
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literature that reflects on the independence and ability to perform a public service 
remit (Holtz-Bacha and Norris 2005; Galloway undated; Banerjee and Seneviratne 
2005), in Africa state-owned media especially rely on government funding sources 
and this makes many broadcasters unwilling to be critical of governments (Galloway, 
undated). 
 
In the case of the GBC, its funding model is based on three revenue streams: 
commercial operation and advertising revenue from airtime sale, a television license 
fee provision, and government grants for the purposes of infrastructure procurement 
(Appendices 2, section 10). Respondent X7 explained that as public sector workers, 
the salaries of staff are paid from national tax revenues – the Consolidated Fund, 
however, operational expenses are to be paid from operational revenues. Yet, both X7 
and X8 suggested that the operational costs are too much for GBC to offset through 
the judicious management of revenues, especially if a key objective of the corporation 
is the delivery of a universally accessible broadcast signal. X7 further suggested that 
utility bills for the large staff population also present a challenge. However, X8 and 
X6 suggested that the corporation is over-staffed, with no political will to deal with 
the labour issues and financial implications of making redundancies.  
 
However, some respondents, such as X2, saw the mixed-model approach as being 
inimical to a public service ethos. It suggests that there is a fundamental problem with 
the understanding among staff of public service broadcasting, both as a type of service 
and as a type of organisation.   
 
X2: …and when you are getting information you don't have to think hard 
about what would come out of it but what you are going to give and the 
success of it that makes you a public broadcaster. 
 
For a public broadcaster to function in the public interest requires making 
programmes, and not ones that are necessarily profitable financially. X2 judges that 
social benefits and public value outcomes are more important when judging between 
the costs of funding public television, as a business, to its social benefits.  
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To X8, there are more fundamental problems regarding the organisational structures 
at GBC, including the remit, staffing, and funding model.  
 
X8: You see, it is because the government, …. has not paid attention to the 
basic structures, they sit and wring their hands in despair and expect 
somebody else to walk into GBC, weed out the [problems], you know, shed 
the blood on the floor, and become sacrificial lamb. 
 
Implementing ―basic structures for GBC‖ would therefore include updating, and 
passing as law, the legal framework within which it operates; especially in regard to 
its funding mechanism, in order to strengthen clarity in the operational mandate and 
provide adequate protection, in law, for the actions of staff. However, the structural 
issues also extend beyond what may be written in tangible organisational codes; 
respondents‘ basic notion about ‗public service broadcasting‘ needs to be addressed as 
part of a communicated re-structuring process in order to fully engage staff with 
organisation purpose and ethos: 
 
The responses of interviewees have suggested an equation of a ―free‖ service to 
―public broadcasting‖. ‗Free‘ has been suggested to mean either ‗free cost of access to 
broadcasting service‘ (X4), or ‗state funding without regard to cost due to public 
need‘, (X2). These notional suggestions have sprung from an historical equation of 
‗public service‘ to ‗civil service‘, in the Ghanaian psyche (X8), in which the State is 
seen as the bearer of costs of services provided to the national public, paid out of tax 
collections. In that historically formed psyche, the State is seen as wealthy and 
patrimonial (Gifford 2004) and should have resources to expend on, at least, ‗public 
services‘. 
 
Thus, ‗going commercial‘ (X5) carries with it a pejorative suggestion of loss of 
direction, a creeping towards neo-liberalist economics away from the communal, and 
‗charging service fees‘ for services that should be free provided: 
 
X2: this time on GBC they have changed our direction a little to a financial 
drive. If there's no money ―don't go‖, but not everything is money when we 
think of the nation's broadcaster, we are public broadcasters. 
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Therefore, there is a tension in the understandings of respondents between what a 
public service broadcaster does and how it is funded.  
 
X5: You see, the subvention is supposed to pay salaries and then run 
operations but, you see, as money becomes so hard to [find] we have to do our 
best to find it somehow to make our operations work. Because if you saw the 
Act that set up GBC, virtually, we are not supposed to go commercial, but 
silently we are going there because we are not getting enough money from the 
government to do all the things that we would like to do. 
 
AT: So the move towards being commercial was not out of a government 
mandate but out of necessity? 
 
X5: Yes. Gradually. It‘s out of necessity. 
 
In reality, the mixed-model approach was instituted within the provisions that created 
the new GBC after the ousting of Nkrumah. However, it is the ‗free‘ model that 
Nkrumah instituted that remains the referential understanding of respondents. The 
NLCD 226, in Section 10 (Article 19)(c) (Appendices 2), does make clear that 
commercial returns can be made from service delivery. Thus, by interpretation, GBC 
can run a fully commercial service, that provides broadcasting on the basis of a public 
broadcasting ethos.  
 
Thus the legal frameworks that stipulates government funding for the corporation 
(Appendices 2, Section 10), and the Media Policy position that also enjoins 
government to adequately fund infrastructure needed for service provision, need to be 
translated into a broader management communication process that situates the vision 
of the broadcaster within its funding mechanisms in a manner that is unambiguous to 
staff. For respondents to necessarily equate ‗public‘ to mean ‗that which is funded by 
the State, without regard for cost‘ does not indicate callousness on their part, but a 
lack of education and a failing of management communication in terms of pursuing a 
‗public value‘ measurement of the corporation‘s work output and organisational 
processes. 
 186 
 
Yet, it is not so much as that respondents did not fully understand the funding model, 
even though they also suggest an abdication of State responsibility for funding 
provision. The confusion is due to a lack of understanding regarding the extent to 
which commercial functioning has been part of the original mandate. The question 
then, is how a national public service broadcaster, with the widest reach, and hence 
the logical argument to charge premium rates for advertising, come to be struggling 
for funds? 
 
X6: Because, you know, as a state-owned media that takes care of state 
functions and other elements of any programmes connected or coming from 
government, we budget for it but we are not given the money as it should be 
because the government pays the workers. When it comes to airtime [and they 
are able to access this], we are not able to get it from them, you know. Most of 
our space, which is given up for government or state functions, are not 
recapped. That is what I am talking about, and it creates budgetary 
constraints… 
 
 ….. if you look at a situation where, for instance, let‘s take the statutory 
holidays like the 6th March
33
 , the 1st July
34
, and you come to the Moslem 
days - Eid’l Addah, Eid’l Fitr, then you come to Farmer‘s Day, Nkrumah‘s 
Birthday, AIDS Day, all these days are very involving because they are 
statutory holidays and it takes almost about fifty per cent of our airtime… 
throughout the year, … you are supposed to make sure that you get the 
morning programmes and the evening programmes and sometimes even 
repeat. 
 
X7 illustrates the costs incurred in producing and broadcasting State events: 
 
X7: …. If you have to pay 600 Ghana Cedis35 for a thirty-minute programme, 
and sometimes there is a programme like Meet the Press, each of the Ministers 
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 Independence Day 
34
 Republic Day 
35
 About £240 
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meet the press and GBC has to cover it live. We send all our OB
36
 vans there, 
crew and officials, and it‘s covered live and broadcast live. So all programmes 
scheduled for that period will have to be cut. If there are adverts which [were] 
going to generate funds for us, we‘ll have to stuff those adverts and make 
good spots for the advertisers or refund their money to them.  
 
Thus the very ethos of the public broadcaster; its mandate to broadcast the 
programmes that reflect the nation, mediating cultural and social events for the public, 
etc, is seen as drain on its resources because of the times and frequency allotted to 
such programmes. X7 further explains that the opportunity to gain sponsorship for 
such events is thwarted by the government which sees these as national events that 
have to be sponsored at State level, and however does not allow GTv to run 
commercials or programme-sponsorships of these events
37
. The suggestion seems to 
be that government functionaries do not realise that broadcasting costs money. Does 
GTv realise that it can also refuse to provide the State with broadcast services unless 
these are paid for at the threshold cost of provision, and on a basis that it should 
practice good corporate governance and preserve public value, in the mandate to work 
commercially? The organisation‘s management may very well not feel able to 
challenge government in this way, in the interest of ensuring jobs and keeping the 
status quo.  
 
Thus there is a reluctant engagement with a commercial operation in which 
advertising and outright airtime sale to private producers are simply seen as a means 
to generate income, as opposed to a mandatory process of being ‗commercially 
practical‘ or running a business organisation able to soundly fund its operational 
activities:  
 
X7: ... Sometimes we have to go out of our way to broadcast some 
programmes which as a national broadcaster we may not want to broadcast but 
the others are doing it and we realise the audience like it so why don‘t we do it 
too because we need the sponsorship money. 
                                                 
36
 OB – Outside Broadcasting 
37
 This seems to be the case for State-managed events. International sports events are often sponsored; 
for the 2010 CAF Cup GTv needed the Vice-President‘s intervention with corporates to secure 
$2million dollars to pay for the national broadcast rights. 
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X5: and then the other aspect too is we now allow independent producers to 
bring in their material. They buy the airtime, so that is where we generate 
some income to also supplement our business. 
 
There is awareness that competition is challenging GTv for the premier broadcasting 
claim and that this directly affects funding revenues: 
 
X7: …we have to generate our funds in this era of competition with these 
private stations trying to [chip] away [at] GBC and denigrate GBC to the 
background. 
 
While advertising and airtime sales are the ‗uncomfortable‘ commercial income 
stream, the television licence fee exists in legal provision, is less contentious to 
respondents, but requires re-engineering for the mechanism to generate funding: 
 
X5: …. right now it [the tv licence] is useless, you know. The TV license used 
to be three thousand cedis but now this is thirty pesewas. Thirty pesewas, you 
can just use to buy groundnuts and corn
38
 .... It is worthless so nobody is 
collecting that and nobody is paying… 
 
X8: …there is an argument now that the tv license fee, which is supposed to be 
for public sector broadcasting, should be fairly distributed by rating between 
GBC and other stations that do public service 
 
The tax revenue route may be less contentious for respondents, and this may be due to 
the organisation‘s inability to get departments to work together cohesively in the 
corporate value-added model common in private enterprise. GTv has a Commercial 
department charged with responding to the commercial challenge by making the 
value-added propositions that would sell both airtime and brand or corporate 
sponsorship for broadcasts and productions: 
 
                                                 
38
 A roasted snack. 
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X6: .... The bottle-neck might be perhaps there might not be enough money to 
take up the full cost of equipment and that is where our marketing department 
comes into play. Whiles the programme pilot is done, and if it‘s good, they 
take it over and sometimes we get the profit, sometimes we are able to break-
even. People buy space within the programme and then show their products. 
 
The department should be working, in conjunction with the Television Production 
department, to develop such strategies for monetising productions; however, it 
appears that the system does not work effectively and producers find that they are 
required to do the work of finding money for their productions: 
 
X4: Commercial department, they are not up to the task…, as I was telling 
you, everyone seems to be working on their own. If you give [the commercial 
department] programme ideas they don‘t work on it. 
 
And X6 concedes, when asked about the collaborative structure, that there are 
problems:  
 
X6: I wouldn‘t say it works smoothly; there are a lot of problems. As a 
producer it is part of your occupational hazard, even at the best of times. 
Sometimes it‘s easier, sometimes it‘s very difficult. 
 
The resentment towards what is seen as a the gradual commercialising of GTv, by 
respondents, may lie in the dysfunctional operation of the system with regards to the 
difficulty in inter-department co-operation with Commercial, or also in the possibility 
that producers sense a fracturing of their relationships between themselves, their 
creative products, and the audience that usually informs the core of their production 
considerations. That creative relationship is forced aside when the over-riding 
consideration is the commercial viability of a production idea: 
 
AT: I get the sense that producers are free to do whatever they want, if an idea 
comes to you and your line-manager thinks it‘s a good enough idea then you 
go ahead and do it. There‘s no real connection between the audience and 
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producers, or there is no real attempt to prove a connection between the idea 
and the public service and public interest. Is that correct? 
 
X4: That is true. If you think that the concept you have is good the next thing 
is finance, you see; if it will bring money to GBC all well and good.  
 
Some respondents were found to resent the situation that makes them solely 
responsible for creating productions that are not just commercially viable, but also 
responsible for finding the sponsorship to back the productions. Producers are 
adapting to the constrained financial environment and adopting innovative approaches 
to keep productions on air, showing the willingness to be inventive and creative 
within their constrained environment and demonstrating the skills of the classic 
television producer posited by Newcomb and Alley (in Ettema and Whitney 1982), 
but X4 suggests that the creative quality of productions will eventually suffer: 
 
X4: So what we do is that [we build] the programme so that it doesn‘t involve 
too many artistes, it doesn‘t involve too many things that would take money 
out of GBC. Maybe you are only paying the presenter or host something 
small, I wouldn‘t call it peanuts, like an allowance…but you see, it‘s not 
enough because sometimes you need to go out
39
, you need to do this and that, 
so it will happen that you don‘t go out, unless you are really keen on going 
out, you see, but then the frustrations start coming in and then what do you 
do? So you will realise that after sometime you lose interest in the programme. 
 
Negotiating smaller production budgets may get a production signed-off but at greater 
expense to the public interest; a smaller budget means an inability to reach out to 
farther communities, or develop programming that involves participants who may 
need to be transported, accommodated or fed; it means a resort to centralised, urban, 
producing activities that rely on a few groups who are able to afford the cost of the 
involvement in what should be a diverse and plural platforms for not only ideas and 
voices from differing communities, but also talent and cultural expressions from 
around the country. The resource challenge results is the inability of producers to 
                                                 
39
 ―Going out‖ is a reference to production organizing and production management activities outside 
of GTv offices. 
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reach and involve community sections and groups, resulting in an over-representation 
of some social groups through an over-reliance on their ability to engage with 
productions that are key programmes in the broadcast schedule: 
 
X4: …. So it makes us rely on a few [groups] which actually are professional, 
and you are just, if I should call it, ad hoc, that‘s what we are doing to keep the 
station running... 
 
Thus, it is seen that the values of ensuring plurality, diversity, independence and 
distinguished productions can be undermined by the ineffective operation of the 
television system; if the organisation will sign-off a production that have primarily 
demonstrated commercial significance, then the challenge of delivering on the key 
values of public service broadcasting may become subservient to commercial 
interests, creative and logistic convenience, and result in the replication of the type of 
programming that is typical of  commercial broadcasters, and that leaves the question 
open as to how productions that have no clearly demonstrable commercial revenue 
streams, yet may be in the public interest, may get production approval.  
 
The challenge is demonstrated by several points of fracture in the delivery of effective 
planning and resource management that are an essential part of media production 
management. Producers expressed frustrations with the inability of GTv to not only 
fully resource productions, but also plan for logistic operations: 
 
X4: .... there are frustrations, you know, sometimes logistics. For instance, 
[with] the programme I‘m handling, I‘m supposed to actually go out and look 
for groups myself and then book for rehearsals at least once or twice, look at 
the locations, go for recce, but because of transport problems [I] can‘t go. If [I 
go] it‘s from my own pocket, and whatever is affecting you, the corporation 
does not gain or lose, they don‘t bother. Nobody is bothered about you… 
 
X4: We had disks…, when the new system was brought, the digital thing, I 
asked a question that ―my brothers, this disk how long?‖, they said ‖oh, we 
have plenty in the system‖. Before I went on leave, for more than three to how 
many months, we had to recycle and wipe and clean programmes instead of 
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keeping them in the library. In this age, we [shouldn‘t] be wiping programmes 
but this is what we have,....If you ask for vehicle, they tell you [there‘s none 
available]. TV [production department] we don‘t have any car for ourselves, 
we are always sharing, I mean, it‘s not right. … When we used to go on 
location we used to get a TATA bus and it may be around 10 O‘Clock before 
you move from GBC because maybe they are telling you they are now 
charging battery, or the car has gone for fuel,… and when you are on location, 
3:30[PM], the driver starts to blow the horn and you have to go because he‘s 
returning staff home. What work can we do? Nothing meaningful. So … you 
end up shooting long shots, long shots, so you can complete the scene.... If you 
have to shoot in the night it‘s not possible, we don‘t have a vehicle so you 
have to shoot day-for-night. The problems are just too many. 
 
The data suggests that producer‘s frustrations may be undermining professional ethics 
due to developing dependencies, through over-familiar relationships with some screen 
talent and groups: 
 
X4: … Sometimes they are [willing] to give you some money or [gift] you 
something, so they are not too difficult to work with. 
AT: They are actually happy to fund some of the production costs? 
 
X4: Yes. So that is what helps us. So you get more interested in doing the 
programme for them. 
 
X4‘s answer suggests that disillusionment with the organisation has reduced some 
producers‘ work to finding satisfaction in other ways. However, if the corporation is 
unable to meet its operational expenditures to the extent that producers are forced to 
accept ‗gifts‘ to enable them complete some productions, either in desperation or for 
job accomplishment satisfaction, then there is a ‗public interest‘ issue at stake that 
necessitates an evaluation of the corporation‘s financial and corporate governance 
structures. It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss the ethics and legal 
implications of ‗gift‘ receipts, however, best practice would suggest that non-
commercial transactions are exchanges in favours, and exchange processes are two-
way; producers may be receiving a life-line for their productions, but the question 
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then remains, what do the artistes or organisations receive in return: further access to 
national airtime or screen time that promotes individual careers or sectarian ideas on 
the national platform that GTv offers?  
 
Thus, it is logical to suggest that the current management of the operations of the GTv 
system is prone to hijack by sectarian groups, who may have an upper hand in the 
power relationship between themselves and producers, and GTv by extension. 
Hegemonies of ideas and social structures would have an unchallenging, dependent, 
media system allowing access to a national audience through a unidirectional mode of 
communication. The vigilance of the national public and their willingness to protect 
their public service becomes the only safeguard, as put forward in the preamble to the 
national media policy. However, that safe-guard is very much dependent on the levels 
of media literacy, general levels of education and access and feedback systems to the 
GTv system that would allow the challenging feedback to gain currency in the public 
sphere. 
 
However, if the contention is that airtime on GTv is valuable in commercial terms 
then it stands to reason that adequate monetisation of this resource ought to be a good 
source of revenue. Since staff salaries are covered by provision of the Consolidation 
Fund, GBC is only left with covering operational costs for overheads and content 
programming for both television and radio, both of which generate advertising 
revenues. GBC is not prevented from charging commercial prices for its services; 
therefore the difficulty in generating balanced accounting must be a result of other 
factors, for example, higher than commercially justifiable overhead costs that can 
only be controlled by a full restructuring of operations at the corporation. X7 suggests 
that this may be the case: 
 
X7: So the problem GBC is facing currently is with funds because now GBC is 
facing competition, it‘s no more a monopoly but then government is weaning 
GBC off the national purse by now paying only the personal emoluments in 
which case GBC has to raise funds to pay all the utilities - water, electricity, 
telephone bills, these are always in arrears because they are very huge, 
because, for example, the transmitters needs a lot either electricity or oil, so 
[the bills] are very, very, high. 
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…. like head office for instance, [there] are so many, like, over a thousand 
workers. So if all these people are using telephones, electricity, water and all 
that, you can imagine the enormity of the expenditure every month and since 
we have to generate our funds in this era of competition with these private 
stations trying to [chip] away GBC and denigrate GBC to the background, you 
can imagine the burden every Chief Executive of GBC will be shouldering. 
It‘s not an easy task. Those who had to work during the monopoly, they had it 
easy because during those times we were aware of the monopoly and 
everybody depended on GBC but then government was doing everything, 
everything was paid. 
 
Thus, to manage the challenge of financial re-engineering, to enable the corporation to 
deliver its remit at good public value, part of the resolution of the funding challenge at 
GTv should be an effort to re-think and develop creative and new programming that 
would appeal to advertisers, implement a commissioning plan, that makes it possible 
for out-house producers to also provide programming within a public broadcast remit 
while also providing content that makes GTv more competitive in a liberalised media 
market.  
 
However, it is sufficiently established that difficulties with reconciling revenues and 
operational costs, the respondents suggest, are the products of three factors:  
 
a. an incompetent commercial department, that is unable to find sponsorship 
deals to make productions funding and producers jobs easier,  
 
b. the State, blamed for draining the corporation‘s resources, and 
 
c. high operational costs.  
 
 Labour 
However, beyond the mechanics imposed by limited financial resources, X7 also links 
the financial difficulties at GBC with the cost its labour force contributes to the 
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corporation‘s administrative expenses through the use of utilities: electricity, water 
and phone bills accruing from their work. Labour itself, is also a critical aspect of 
organisational performance, in that labour competence impacts the ability of 
organisations to make value-added products for the markets they service, and its 
competence would a direct relationship with its profitability. At GBC, there appears to 
be fundamental problems with labour management. In X8‘s opinion, the situation is 
the result of historical factors, much of which began in the immediate post-
independence era and hinges on human resource management practices: 
 
X8: … the real comedy comes when you go into history of how they‘ve staffed 
the place through the years. First of all, it‘s like, if you are in a range where 
you have no [tertiary] degree and you make an effort to go and do a degree in 
that particular field, and you come back, it doesn‘t affect your standing in 
GBC. If you are doing a Masters degree in certain aspects of our work [it‘s 
worth nothing].... The training and so on went on but it went only up to a 
certain point. It got to a point where those who were trained were not put in 
place. They were trained but were never given the authority because the 
authority ceased to matter on the basis of your ability; it mattered on the basis 
of the connection.  
 
‗Connection‘ means ‗having ‗political patronage‘, and the situation arose as a product 
of the military‘s mismanagement of public service institutions, a characteristic of 
those times (Gifford 2004). In the successive years following Dr. Nkrumah‘s 
overthrow by the military junta, GBC spiralled into a human resource crisis: 
 
X8: That is because of a certain incestuous relationship that developed during 
the previous period of, you know, the dark period…. where people brought 
their daughters, sons, nephews, girlfriends and the like, into GBC as a source 
of work. … Am not saying that there were not some who were taken for their 
professional [ability], but the magnitude of [the problem] is that people who 
come in at a certain [low] level rise through the ranks..... And for many years 
there [were] a lot of people who would just work at it, who hadn‘t the slightest 
idea. If anyone came in with anything like an idea, he got a very very short 
[talking down to]....  
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Thus, incompetent labour became integrated into the organisation at GBC, and would 
have contributed to the formation of its work cultures. For X8, a direct corollary has 
been the instability of GBC management; which has seen several changes at Board 
level even in a Constitutional era. Labour resists changes that it finds threatening to its 
interests, and thus presents a latent threat to both government, which very much relies 
on the GBC, and management. The social power exerted by labour has made it 
difficult for management to restructure operations, internally: 
 
X8: …. the Union, from that time in 1976 or 79 when they were forced into a 
Boardroom and forced, management was forced, to write a collective 
agreement favouring labour, labour has had the ability to harass any P2 out of 
office. ... and it‘s not that labour is unreasonable, no, but if they don‘t 
understand something they act first, and ultimately it becomes power play.… 
then come other things like transportation, subsidised transportation, meals, 
bonuses, and then the focus becomes an administrative structure. So then it 
becomes a public service [civil service] construct rather than a broadcasting 
one… 
 
However, it is not as though governments have been totally unwilling to attempt 
restructuring the GBC: 
 
X5: Yes, they were saying the organisation was over-staffed and they were 
talking about restructuring and, that restructuring, it [meant] that if people had 
to be laid-off they had to be given their severance pay and the government 
never did it because it looks like when they saw the quantum of money that 
they had to pay, it was going to be a lot, [and] those were the times that people 
like me, and I can bet that I was [going to be] the first person to go and write 
my name that I was going, [because] looking at the amount of money that I‘d 
be taking away I was just going to establish my own service company and run. 
But the government never had the courage. 
 
Obviously, governments are averse to creating a labour crisis, unpopular sentiments, 
or may simply lack redundancy funds, if it chose to pursue a staff restructuring policy. 
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Political Interference 
 
It may appear to respondents that dependence on government for the funding that 
directly affects their welfare, beyond government‘s ability to influence the Board of 
the National Media Commission, amounts to the exercise of a shielded threat. Thus, 
real or not, staff may not be keen on finding out the extent to which government may 
go to keep the corporation in line with the political agenda. This fundamentally 
destroys any conception that staff or organisation may imagine in the belief that their 
work is an exercise of a public service remit. The GBC cannot function in true public 
service character, in the public interest, either in spirit or form, while in the immediate 
reach of any Ghanaian government; democratic, benign or despotic. The position of 
the corporation fundamentally is undermined by the its direct dependence on 
government, in spite of constitutional provisions, and the result of that dependence 
over the years has in-grained in staff an acquiescence to government: 
 
AT: But with the new Constitution and the creation of the Media Commission, 
the Media Commission was supposed to make it possible for GBC 
management to run GBC without government‘s undue influence. 
 
X8: That is there but government‘s undue influence is when they call you to do 
something by all means. That, they may have done only once or twice to my 
knowledge. But the undue influence comes from, you know, there‘s some 
influence that are undue that you can‘t see. 
 
… A certain internal culture that government can rely on, so that when they 
say ―boo‖, you have nothing to be scared of but everybody is scared 
[totally].... It‘s too tempting a target [but] if GBC itself were proactive about 
what it is doing then nobody would presume to tell it what to do. 
 
Structural Challenges 
The data has already shown that respondents indicated both structural and 
organisational problems related to the delivery of the public broadcasting service 
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remit, including, a lack of proper insulation from political influence, and difficulty 
with operationalizing the business model. Their responses further indicated fractures 
in the understanding of the key concepts central to delivering a true public 
broadcasting service, while still striving to find social relevance in catalysing the 
social development of Ghana, with which they identify. However, other problems 
with the structural organisation of the organisation require focus. These are problems 
that result from the organisation‘s internal culture due to the interaction of its human 
resource with its organisational purpose; these relate to human resource competencies 
in delivering the service remit. In as much as these constitute a problem with ‗labour‘ 
they are however best examined separately as a structural issue, as X8 explains: 
 
X8: It is sad that when we are discussing something like this it comes down to 
basic stupidities, am afraid what is happening in GBC is that there is no 
purpose. They know what it‘s about, they have an idea what they are supposed 
to be doing from looking at the past, but in the present the organisational 
structure has not been put in place to achieve its goals... 
 
The ‗organisation‘ is a product of its management ability to assiduously put in place 
human resource and process systems to align purposes with objectives
40
. The 
competencies of human resources are revealed partly in the internal work cultures 
they enact, and at GTv there are problems with ‗organising‘ the media system: 
 
X4: Look, professionally we don‘t do things right, everything we do is ad hoc, 
because what must be done is not [done], we sit down and just follow 
Ministers here and there.  
 
While X4‘s comment indicates a frustration with the manner in which ‗work‘ is 
executed, X8‘s comment indicates that the frustration is a product of the inability of 
human resource to ‗envision‘ a purposeful ethos of being for the service they are 
charged with, hence a continual reproduction of past enactments, which not only 
indicates stasis in organisational processes but also an incapability in envisioning a 
way forward with the passage of time; GTv is unable to perform as it should because 
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even though the fundamental understanding exists, as evidenced in the catch phrase 
‗to entertain, educate and inform‘ it does not pursue these ideals in a manner that 
concretizes its work as a public service broadcaster and public service organisation 
that is directly accountable to citizens. It is therefore reproducing the past ‗work‘ of 
relaying as a government ‗mouth-piece‘ and thus fails to perform as an organisation 
that knows what ‗public service broadcasting‘ is. To change this would require an 
organisation-wide reorganising of the ‗work‘ enactments: 
 
AT: Is there a way, internally, to change this culture? 
 
X4: I wish we could but what is done is that every department is sort of 
autonomous [and inward looking], so nobody seems to be bothered. P1, for 
instance, should be bothered about audience research, you know, to know how 
P1‘s faring. That should be P1‘s yardstick, but P1‘s only thinking of P1‘s 
pocket, what P1 gets at the end of the day and so forth, and the car that P1 sits 
in, you know. P1‘s got position and that‘s what P1‘s doing. 
 
The migration to partial-commercial operation has left gaps of competence in an 
organisation forced out of its comfort-zone to compete. The four decade-long years of 
monopoly meant that human resource was often not prioritised as an essential 
component of organisational functioning. Thus, the need to make programmes that 
generate revenue makes it difficult for GTv, to favourably deliver a full-range of 
public service broadcast programming that would also be commercially attractive to 
advertising clients; facilitated by professionally competent staff and a clearly nuanced 
public service mission within a plural media context. Critical of this state of affairs, 
X8 suggests that the organisation is operationally flawed in its management and 
focus: 
 
X8: … the internal revenue priority has become so high that I dare say that if 
there is enough public service programming GBC would be hard put upon to 
actually put those programmes on air because they don‘t earn revenue unless 
they can make those programmes earn revenue. In which case innovative 
marketing would become a part of the programme production process. Now, 
all that means a coordinated, astute, and well-trained system with people in the 
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right places. … and, unfortunately, these elements of best business practice 
have to be received into GBC before we can say anything about being able to 
do anything, and that system would then have to be led into having a vision, a 
very specific mission with strategies, steps and procedures for attaining those 
earmarked goals..... 
 
.... Every Director-General who comes has been removed by coups or sacking 
or something. It means there‘s something wrong with the system. If after 
thirty-two million Euros of equipment GBC still looks the same then it means 
there‘s no system running the equipment. …It‘s not about new equipment but 
a good system. And unfortunately, there are some good people in there who 
are completely made irrelevant because being good is not what counts. That‘s 
the problem. 
 
Thus, a history of poor human resourcing and a myopic delivery of the ‗public as 
State‘ broadcasting service have meant that over time there has been a failure to 
measure performance and consistently improve on organisational outcomes. The poor 
human resource capacity may have contributed to GTv opening up its channel to 
private out-house producers, whose ability to provide GTv with both revenue and 
programming may have falsified the organisational self-perception of service 
provision. However, that situation may have also deteriorated internal programme 
production capacity: 
 
AT: Can you tell me what percentage of broadcast is produced by independent 
production houses? 
 
X5: Something came up late last year about this and we were not able to 
[estimate], because if you went to the Audience Research department [they] 
really can‘t give you any concrete statistics. 
 
AT: What do you think it‘s likely to be? 
 
X5: Let‘s say probably 40-60, which means that we have more independent 
producers bringing in stuff than we produce ourselves at the moment. 
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Unable to use internal competencies to produce commercially-viable productions for 
its own airtime, using both creative and commercial staff, and GTv has taken the 
easier route to funding its survival by selling airtime, rather than facilitating access for 
new productions or using a strategic commissioning processes to enable a plural 
access to its platform by talent and programme-makers in a manner in which it plays a 
central management role that serves the public interest. The ‗revenue priority‘ has 
resulted in a relegation of its own production capacities, as airtime is now simply sold 
to those who can pay for it and use it in their commercial interest. The situation may 
also be contributing to respondents disillusion with ‗going commercial‘. They see 
themselves becoming less relevant as creative talent that with adequate challenge and 
resourcing could supply the station‘s programming needs.  
 
In X8‘s opinion, another part of the challenge for GTv is a fractured understanding of 
the role of television within the wider GBC organisation born out of the historic 
tension between the television and radio departments when television was created and 
made to seem superior to radio, by inference from the special attention given it by Dr. 
Nkrumah (Ghartey-Tagoe 2010): 
 
X8: Three years, no funding for any programme. When vehicles come to GBC 
they are allocated everywhere else, if one comes to GTv you have to share 
with somebody else. Every place else is renovated but Television. It‘s a very 
funny thing. There is an innate jealousy, the perception that television is what 
will carry the station and people who are in Television will become arrogant 
or will have more authority than [others], that kind of thing. Very, very, 
puerile. There is a tension between Television and the rest of GBC.... 
 
The Social Role of GTv 
Being the nation‘s broadcaster what roles does GTv play in the social and national 
agenda, especially in the areas that were the prime motivations for defining its 
legislated role; what affective roles is GTv able to play in enabling social 
development?  
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Thus, it becomes important to discover what affectations GTv producers believe they 
create with their productions, within the existing practices and perspectives of 
television producers. These social affectations are examined within the concepts of 
human and social development facilitations through communication practices, guided 
by the ideas of Halpern (2005) and Lithgow (2008). 
 
Social Cohesion, Socialisation 
The News is identified as being important for bringing the national community 
together, as a mechanism that unifies the nation through the exchange of information 
from locales and communities; mediating belonging and socio-cultural events within 
the national space: 
 
X1: … with regards to GTv. For example, just to make sure that we are one 
country and all that, there are news reporters in all the Regional capitals so 
news is fairly covered in the Regions and not just in Accra ... This makes it 
holistic as one nation … and the reporters in the Regions [are able] to go deep 
into the communities and send reports from there. 
 
X6: Yeah, like I am saying, the helping of national cohesion is key. Whatever 
we do, we think of not only the story. You get the information, you want to be 
sure before you put it out there. ... What we do actually is keep us as a people 
in whatever way. 
 
This perspective is important as News on GTv appears to hold an ―authenticity‖ value 
and salience for national audiences, promoted, X7 states, by adhering to journalist‘ 
ethics about truth in reportage. However, the nation also listens in different languages 
and the salience of multi-lingualism on GTv is identified as a social cohesion 
mechanism: 
 
X6: …. In the sense that the six major languages that are spoken are taken 
good care of in all facets of our production line.  
 
 203 
Thus, two ideas emerge from respondents‘ answers: the use of language as a unifying 
tool, and authentic news presentation for informing the nation, aiding its stability and 
continuance as a community. These two ideas are an operational fulfilment of the 
ethos for local language used in programming on GTv as it envisages to aid national 
social cohesion by providing current information to the different ethnic groups in 
languages that make the News accessible, and verifiable, in inter-personal social 
communication, a key element in Ghanaian socialising (Heath 2001), and thus playing 
a social maintenance function. 
 
The salience of the educational role of television comes to the fore in several in-house 
productions, in which education is embedded with a socialising function. X2 
articulates that the importance of local language use in programming is salient for 
public education and learning, and also for the preservation of social institutions and 
order: 
 
X2: .. Adult Education on GTv which takes care of six major languages, from 
the Northern [to the Southern]; … is such that you can take any topic.… and 
they will discuss it and they put forward pictures and demonstration 
materials...  
 
…And sometimes we do something [programmes in] Akan to try and explain 
the law, simple terms, of the Constitution,..? They call the programme 
Mbrasem
41
 [and it helps the Akan-speaking people understand the law in 
Akan], and we have a programme in Ga that‘s a talkshow, so these are some of 
the things ... 
 
…..now as you watch Sports Highlights what you derive out of Sports 
Highlights is not only the soccer you are watching but there is a culture, way 
of dressing .., there‘s a way of speaking. So .. it is a yardstick that is designed 
between the way of behaviour of society and the way of learning. … If we talk 
like a Ghanaian there‘s a way of phrasing our talk, now if you [watch TV] and 
you know that my pronunciation is not right, you can even straighten up, it‘s a 
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social problem. Straighten up to look very decent and accepted by listening 
and understanding what kind of words are pushed out of your mouth, … 
 
Television is therefore seen as a tool for socialising the public; pronunciation and 
etiquette. The maintenance of culture and tradition is important for social cohesion as 
it makes it possible for people to interact within socially accepted norms. In a society 
that prizes a largely oral mode of communication, the importance of proper-speaking 
is fundamental to social interaction among citizens. X2‘s position is not only personal, 
it is supported as an objective, in the national broadcast standards, to use television to 
provide a socialising reference for good speech (Appendices 4, Section 4); teaching 
the skill and knowledge of cultural references in speech, such as idioms and proverbs. 
 
 
 
 
For development and modernisation, the learning of new ideas and contemporary 
knowledge is a key means of transforming local cultures, practices and 
understandings about the human condition and availing both individuals and 
communities with the empowering ability to change lives and society. The data shows 
that GTv producers consider that the education and information types of programme 
are salient to their perception of GTv‘s social contribution. 
 
X1: … I think that information and education is fairly covered, and I think that 
the programme that does that mostly is our talking programmes, you know, 
like the Adult Education programme, [which] is in the various languages, and 
if anything is happening, even if it‘s government that is introducing something 
or if there‘s any policy that people don‘t understand they normally give them 
slots on those platforms so that they don‘t only speak in English but get to the 
people through those languages. 
 
The Presidential Special Initiative (PSI) on Distance Learning programmes provide 
formal instruction in Science and Maths to upper year secondary school students, and 
are a part of the weekly schedule, given approximately two hours a day in the working 
week days, apart from Friday. There are no other formal learning programmes in the 
schedule. Other educational programmes focus on a wider range of social issues and 
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include such programmes as Talking Point, which focuses on the economy and legal 
issues; and Stand Point and Mmaa Nkommo which focus on feminist social issues. 
 
GTv‘s actual output of formal education is therefore limited, although producers seem 
to believe that a wider range of educational programming is aired. This may be 
because of the educational values embedded in a wide-range of output that also 
includes genres in entertainment programming (X7). While such programmes do 
provide education, the amount of formalised education through television is actually 
limited to the PSI Distance Learning programmes. 
 
Thus, apart from the PSI and Adult Education programmes, it is much more difficult 
to define precisely which programmes contribute directly to the improvement of 
human capital; in knowledge and skills, in the samples of the schedule used in this 
research. Respondent X5 did state that previous programmes in areas such as health 
and agriculture have been farmed out to out-house producers. None of such 
programmes which were aimed at teaching occupational skills were noted in the 
broadcast sample. 
 
Making Change? 
 
X6: … Whatever story you have you are mirroring society so the society is 
now moving on, there is modernisation, acculturation, definitely you have to 
portray such characters also. So it is there,…. 
 
X6 takes the view that television is able to reflect social changes and progresses. It is 
difficult, from this response, to ascertain the degree of engagement that producers 
have with understanding their social development role. While it suggests an 
ideological departure from the view that television should look to the preserving of 
existing social forms in cultural and traditional practices as heritage (Appendices 2 
and 3), perhaps to be used for latter socialisation purposes, it does not emphasis the 
creation of dramatic tensions that explore social changes in relation to aspirations and 
new ideas. 
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The ability of television to influence social change, developmentally, has been argued 
in this thesis to be dependent on the degree to which it engages with ‗new‘ ideas in 
the mediated public sphere; the notion of the ‗new‘ regards the facilitation of ideas 
and information that challenges social conventions. ‗New genres‘ of television are 
arguably facilitating this social dialogue and in ways that depart from the ‗traditional‘ 
television model (see for example Lunt 2009)
42
. The ideological and creative freedom 
available to producers, through incentives and guidelines, are important for realising 
such innovation and forming dialogical channels between programmes and the public. 
 
For X3, there is an ideological imperative to respond to social challenges while being 
conscious of the social environment; and writing stories that resonant with this. That 
consciousness is derived from conversations with friends, and reading social stories 
from local newspapers. All dramatic productions therefore are intended for social 
education purposes, however, writing for English language dramas present a different 
set of challenges to writing for local drama: 
 
X3: What I‘m saying is that stories are shaped by language, from language you 
get culture so I cannot do something that would not be recognisable from the 
tribe, that‘s what I‘m talking of. 
 
In X3‘s explanations, citing examples of drama stories written, there appears to be a 
representation of middle-class issues in English language dramas, and a representation 
of working class social issues in local dramas. However no matter the language used, 
X3 considers a transposition of Western genre elements into Ghanaian dramas a 
transgression, and puts forward an argument that narrative authenticity is required in 
story situation. In this way a producer is able to address social problems in a relevant 
way: 
 
X3: … I hate people copying things from abroad because it doesn‘t fit. It‘s just 
[not authentic]. Like someone trying to do James Bond, it doesn‘t work. 
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X3 and X2, pointed to their own work as mirrors of both social change and new ideas 
that attempt to educate society about the need to change regressive social perceptions 
(excluded in this text to preserve their anonymity). Their examples, however, cited 
programmes that worked as unidirectional communications embedded with social 
education values. All respondents were in agreement that educational content 
contribute positively to social and economic development: 
 
X1: Well, in my production work as far as the social aspects, as for the 
political I‘d leave it aside, but social and economic, fine, …. sometimes some 
of the programmes that I do are things that can get people interested in 
bringing people together, depending on their culture, depending on what they 
are doing, and it entertains them, and sometimes it could be on particular 
activities that women are doing and when you [as a producer] highlight more 
on it and the benefits they can get economically it can help some people. 
 
X7: Yeah, and a programme like Obra also educates, they do educate. 
Normally the story line has some educative element. 
 
The educative elements in such programmes tackle social issues that are, often, on the 
public agenda, gender discrimination in education, disease control, etc, and also serve 
a socializing function in promoting traditional social values; community, marriage, 
the importance of family ties, the importance of individuals regardless of status, etc. 
 
Thus producers are comfortable with considering social change through 
communication, and believe that they predominantly work in this arena, without 
offering resistance or challenge to power-bases, especially the political. What is 
obvious is that without organisational guidelines and policies that would work to 
ensure creative freedoms and security, producers do not consider themselves to be as 
effective as they could potentially be if they worked within normative guidelines: 
 
X4: Policy guidelines that, I would say is written, is that you have to educate, 
entertain and inform. That is first and foremost. … but really, really, on paper 
there is nothing. …we are just using our own heads. 
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Within such a context, how does GTv play a role in the strategic transformation of 
Ghana towards the mass social consciousness that changes social direction through a 
response to socially articulated aspirations? 
 
In this area, it appears that GTv producers and the organisation are not able to 
articulate a positive response that reflects a strategic response to social aspiration, nor 
does the organisation appear to have envisaged a strategic application of resources to 
aiding social development. The evidence, from X1 specifically, is that direct 
engagement, especially with politics, is a conflicted area, and X4 suggests that 
challenge, to directly engage with contentious current issues, is not taken up because 
of inherent organisational inertia: 
 
AT: So you have your current affairs programmes, does that not talk about 
social and political issues? 
 
X4: Not too much. 
 
AT: Why is that? 
 
X4: I think it all depends on who is P3 or P4 and what the producer wants to 
talk about. 
 
Thus, the willingness of senior producers to sanction a production limits the ability of 
the producer to venture into creating new forms of programmes that may address not 
just the political but even current social and topical issues; and senior producers have 
been cited as the barriers to changing content forms from the ‗safe‘ areas traditionally 
accepted within GTv. 
 
Feedback 
Thus, the public, and what its interests may be, is dislocated from the traditional 
centre of public broadcasting television; the public interest is filtered by the 
organisation‘s reflex mechanisms that support its self-preservation, and the ‗culture of 
silence‘(Ansu-Kyeremeh and Karikari 1998). The audience is also not able to 
influence the production of content, and may only have a marginal contribution to the 
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character of programming in some genres. Their contribution is not systematically 
assisted by a frequent canvassing of opinions and suggestions; it is shown to be 
limited to critiquing what has ready been produced, depending on an audience 
member‘s individual ability and willingness to give feedback, or a direct relational 
connection to a producer: 
 
X1: .... People call, sometimes some people see you, at times when the 
programme is on, and someone who knows you might call you to say ―this 
programme is on‖ and that they like[d] it and [this, that and the other]. … 
Mostly the comments I‘ve heard have been good, maybe once in a while 
somebody will say ―you dwelt more on this and it could have been this‖, fine, 
and I take that into account. 
 
X3: You do it, if it‘s good you know it‘s good, … nobody calls to complain ... 
I mean, [the way things are
43
] if there is a problem everybody will phone.  
 
….I get feedback from the audience, the actors; because the actors will tell 
you what the people told them. 
 
Critically, the absence of a formal survey mechanism exposes the deficit in public 
participation and contribution to programmes: 
 
AT: There‘s no formal process of getting feedback then? 
 
X3: No, sometimes your colleagues will also give you feedback. 
 
The contention from respondents is that GBC‘s Audience Research Department does 
not feedback to them information that may help them work more closely with the 
public, consequently, it is not possible for them to appreciate in a significant manner 
the social significance of their work without audience-based research that specifically 
addresses this: 
  
                                                 
43
 A reference to the public‘s uninhibited use of mobile phones to call into programmes or stations to 
register protests 
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X4: … we don‘t know if we are satisfying the public, but, GBC, I don‘t think 
they even [realise] that because they‘ve been enjoying this monopoly for so long that 
it is still stuck up in their heads. 
 
The lack of input from an organised system of audience monitoring and engagement 
means that producers rely on the informal contact processes to judge the audience 
reception of their productions. X1, X3 and X4 (see pg x) all confirm that their means 
of judging audience appreciation of productions are through screen talent, or private 
citizens, who being resident in communities would feedback audience interests or 
criticisms. X4 also indicates that some newspapers may publish reviews. 
 
Yet, all who responded to the question indicated that a good feedback mechanism 
would be desirable for better engagement with social issues in the public interest; as 
X1 puts it:   
 
X1: I think there should be a lot of dialogue, so that people who want things to 
be done can let you know. If you do something they can comment on, you can 
talk to them. I think there should be a lot of ‗in and outs‘, not just from one 
side; you [producer/GBC/GTV] asking for things and all that from them.  
 
X1‘s response is in relation to use of community-resident individuals as research 
information sources. Some genres of production, such as documentaries, lend 
themselves to some degree of public/community participation. However, in this 
regard the involvement is secondary as the participants are essentially subjects and not 
content originators, however, it can also be a  positive way to build involvement when 
producers allows human subjects to dictate the information and experiences shared, 
broadening plurality in the communication and programme-making process. The 
antithetical position is a stasis that strengthens the centre to periphery mode of 
communication and undermines the social participation of communities and 
individuals in the creation of representative productions. 
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Stasis 
The problem of stasis is not limited to the lack of public participation and plurality, in 
production. Within GTv as a creative organisation, stasis results from the cultures of 
production that have existed for years, from the absence of enabling guidelines for 
production, and from the fear of management and senior producers of the 
consequences of taking risks to produce new programmes that engage more directly 
with changing social dynamics in the nation-state:  
 
AT: So basically, you can only push boundaries depending on whether P8 or 
P9 is able to cover for you. 
 
X4: Yes, if you have a good P8 or P9 who would understand and you are 
convinced within yourself that you want to do a programme on ―this‖, if it 
proves that it‘s too critical then P8 or P9 would then go to P1 to discuss the 
topic before you handle it. 
 
….You do things and then maybe a political leader will tell you that your 
station is anti-government and that is all that we can do. So [with] everything 
you have to make sure that you are towing the government in power‘s line and 
make sure you don‘t step on anybody‘s toes. So political issues, we in the 
production side we hardly add them to our productions. 
 
The result is that GTv is comfortable with reproducing ‗old‘ programmes, or making 
new programmes that are related to specific social issues that are not aligned to 
governance politics; for example, Stand Point and Mmaa Nkomo. These programmes 
are also pre-recorded and therefore offer producers more control over the final 
broadcast content. 
 
The preservation of the social status quo, therefore, plays a significant role in the 
content production processes at GTv. Social stasis is maintained as producers are 
encouraged by socialisation to disengage from making content that might be 
perceived to challenge the political relationships in society. State authorities are seen 
to be the determinants of the social structures that underpin social power 
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relationships, and thus further receive legitimation from the non-contesting 
environment in the State-owned media. Should the State-owned media engage in 
content-making that does not ―tow the government‖ line, it will be perceived as 
challenging the legitimate authorities who, ostensibly, serve in the best interests of the 
public, and who may perceive the questioning of their authority as potentially de-
stabilising, and leading to social unrest, or chaos. The history of political unrest 
therefore may serve as a factor in the willingness of GTv to provide further 
legitimation to political authority by offering little resistance to the communication 
agenda of government.  
 
There are, therefore, constraints on a producer‘s ability to work with conviction and 
authority on subject matters that may be ‗controversial‘, although X4 concedes that 
producers could be more creative in developing content that is challenging. However 
for the most part, producers are willing to engage with productions that could 
challenge social cognitive processes. These productions may however pose little 
resistance to hegemonic cultures and social values, unless they are a part of a broader 
government agenda for public education or are of a dramatic nature, in which case 
modernity values in a production are subject to a producer‘s ―idiosyncrasies‖ (X7), 
that is, to suggest dramatic intent: 
 
X4: It depends on whom you are targeting at a particular time and the subject 
that you are talking about. So if the subject is a dicey one you need to do 
enough research. If you think it will be a problem you find a way of taking it 
out of your script or production, you don‘t go there, because there are certain 
things that may be you do [and] at the end of the day P1 will not back you. If 
somebody writes an article P1 [will say] ―it‘s up to you‖, or somebody calls 
from somewhere [then it‘s like] ―why did you do this, why didn‘t you 
consult?‖ And then it starts causing havoc. So most of the time we always 
want to pave a way, to make sure [we] are within some parameters which will 
not cause any problems,  
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…. when it was female genital mutilation that was a governmental issue so we 
could make so much noise about it, and Trokosi
44
. [With] those things there 
was a national outcry so we could easily do programmes on them, but if it is 
something really, should I say minor, you will find your way if it is possible, if 
there are no issues, if there‘s no [objection] to it then we go ahead and do it. 
 
X6: We have specific programmes for our cultural, traditional set up. We have 
been collaborating with the Centre for National Culture
45,
 where we have 
specific programmes meant for our cultural and traditional heritage sort of 
things, .. 
 
AT: These are programmes that teach some of the traditional practices that we 
have. 
  
X6: Yes. 
 
AT: Do you think that our programmes are socially conservative and do not 
tend to challenge conservative values of our society? Is there any attempt to 
looking towards influencing society towards modernity, western values, that 
sort of thing? 
 
X7: Not always. That depends on the writer of the script, the director or 
producer. Most of these are based on the writer‘s idiosyncrasies, what they 
want to portray. So depending on what the writer feels, if they thought people 
are being more conservative they may want to put in a slice of that, then they 
would do it, but then if the producer or director thinks this would do for his or 
her target audience then they film the part. 
 
Established programmes have a format that is already approved and the programmes 
present fewer challenges to producers; cosmetic changes are the challenges a producer 
would have to deal with in an attempt to keep audience interest in the programme:, 
and thus they are aligned with established organisational culture and social 
hegemonies:  
 
X4: So far for all the programmes that I am doing they are long time ago 
programmes in the corporation so the concepts are already there. So all that we 
                                                 
44
 The practice of indenturing young or female relatives to shrines to mitigate wrongs. 
45
 Dwabrem is a programme of history, cultural music and dance produced in collaboration with the 
CNC 
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do is that once a while we want to change the face of it so we remove 
something and add something, yes, so as not to make it too boring. 
 
On the other hand, ‗new‘ programmes that lie outside formatted genres have a more 
challenging creative trajectory that are much more aligned with a producer‘s interests, 
while still working within the socialised norms of ‗acceptable‘ programming at GTV, 
such programmes tend to be of a historical or cultural nature (X3, X1) with an 
education emphasis, and may be signifiers of producers assimilation of attitudes to the 
degree that they have become cultured to the corporation‘s interests, which they now 
assume to be their own: 
 
X1: I think I‘m actually culturally-biased. I get more attracted to things that are 
national, that are cultural, could be for the national, could be for a particular 
region, a tribe, you know, that‘s what I really get attracted to. So could be a 
history of the people, a particular culture, festival or dance. 
 
An illustration of such ‗acculturation‘ is in X2‘s response to questions about the 
imagination process in programme ideation which shows a desire to align with 
organisational purpose, values and aspirations: 
 
X2: My influences come first and foremost from the people that I am going to 
show the thing to, my viewers. That is the major influence that comes to me. 
What kind of package should I give to them so that they would enjoy, they 
would sit and learn, [be] informed and entertained? …maybe the second 
would be the people that I‘m going to cover, the people who are at the centre 
of the documentary I‘m making or the project I am making. The third aspect is 
my corporation, the development of my corporation towards the whole nation, 
whether it‘s bringing something to develop the nation, whether it‘s bringing 
something to add to the role that it is playing in the nation as the leading 
broadcaster in the country. 
 
Respondents‘ answers, thus, show an undercurrent of creative tension in the work of 
producers; a striving to make ‗new‘ productions while working within established 
‗formats‘ – based on a socialised ‗guide to programme-making‘. The conflict is 
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resolved differently depending on the type of project that producers find themselves 
engaged with. However, all producers work in conformity to established traditions 
and do not take risks. In the opinion of X8, the characteristic of public broadcasting at 
GTv is summed up thus: 
 
X8: .....so GBC only achieves public service goals by following the President, 
…ensuring that anything government wants to say is heard, just so everybody 
keeps quiet. But actually delving into issues … actually looking at strong 
change factors, the encouragement of people to have a certain sense of 
national well-being, selfless kind of thing, the attitude of boosting, bolstering 
the national psyche, those things that you can do so well with television have 
all been [forsaken]. 
 
How then do respondents perceive the functioning of GTv, particularly, in resolving 
these problems that challenge the organisation‘s social performance roles, and what 
future scenario did they envisage? 
Ideological Producers? 
Producer-directors at GTv are trained both in-house and at the National Film and 
Television Institute (NAFTI) in Accra. However, the training is biased towards 
developing technical skills the crafts basic to moving image productions
46
. At NAFTI, 
there is a de-emphasis on academic theories that underlie the ideological foundations 
of moving image production, and even less so on developing an integrated post-
colonial studies reference. A broader education would imbue an understanding of the 
mutual dependence of media products on the history and culture of media consumers, 
strategically enhancing the social affectation possibilities of media productions. For 
example, respondents did not understand references to the public broadcasting 
benchmarks or ‗development communication‘, although they had a greater affinity for 
the latter as it follows from cultures of learning at GTv: 
 
X1: Ok, during the training at NAFTI I don‘t think I did, I don‘t remember, but 
communication for development, yes, within GBC, yes, we need to 
communicate to get development, yes, that term I have heard. 
                                                 
46
 www.nafti.edu.gh 
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AT: Were there any guidelines supplied to suggest how you could 
communicate to develop? 
 
X1: No, they just said that the tools that we have, we need to use to develop 
the nation. 
 
AT: Do you think that it is something that stays with you when you are 
producing? 
 
X1: When I am producing it doesn‘t stay, but I think within me I have it but 
when I am producing it‘s not consciously on my mind but sub-consciously it is 
there. So that whatever you are doing you hope that you are communicating to 
help development in that area.  
 
Thus, there remains an ingrained consciousness of the responsibility implied in 
working as a communicator for the nation, even though practical constraints would 
drive these values into the background. Communication values therefore need to 
become part of a strategic approach to production in order to create latitude and 
opportunity through which the strategies and tools for development communication 
can be realised when producers are encouraged to consider the ‗public‘ as the centre 
in developing production content. Training and education of producers also needs to 
be assessed in terms of the narrow perception of ―educate, inform and entertain‖ as 
the purpose of public broadcasting in relation to developing cognitive connections to 
production ideals in communication roles and objectives for the larger society.  
 
 
The Future Organisation 
In the changed market environment that the GTv now finds itself, it becomes 
important for the organisation to see a future towards which it can grow and continue 
to have social relevance. That future scenario, ideally, should be conceptualised to 
address the current failures, re-capitalise on strengths and position for changing 
technology and practices. Respondents were quite aware of the need to change for the 
future: 
 217 
 
X8:....The fact that we reach the widest audience in Ghana is a big sell now, in 
a few years when digital is completely out there it will deteriorate.  
 
Respondents indicated a desire to see the organisation adapt to its new environmental 
realities. They suggested ways through which to improve GTv‘s service for the future, 
and described presents challenges due to organisational inertia. The systemic culture 
was blamed; a ‗civil service‘ attitude that sees ‗public service‘ or ‗government 
service‘ institutions as wage paying occupations within which staff can disregard the 
performance and outcome measurements that are vital to defining organisational 
successes with X4 and X8 especially indicating this. While X4 suggested that 
logistics and transportation problems needed to be addressed, X8 saw a need for 
closer collaboration between the production and commercial departments to 
streamline the ‗selling‘ of programmes to advertisers in more structured, efficient and 
creative manner. 
 
New broadcast technology was also indicated to be a vital part of making changes for 
the future. Part of that change has been a government-led initiative to aid GTv‘s 
migration to digital broadcasting to create a distribution platform from which all 
broadcasters will work. GTv has rolled out new digital channels. The broadcast, 
media market and social benefits that would have informed such a strategic move 
seems to not have been explained beyond the Boardroom; respondents were not able 
to discuss the rationale for new channels beyond the obvious utilisation‘s proposed: 
 
AT: Can you sum up for me why it was decided to have these six channels,...I 
am asking if there is a certain strategy behind the choice of how the bouquet is 
made up? 
 
X5: Well with this one I really don‘t have the information on it. .. as to the 
decision why I can‘t really say, that came from the Executive Directors… 
GBC will have six television channels, in all, … The present GTv will be 
under Public Service and Parliament, and then we have GTv Plus which is 
sports, we will have GTv Entertainment, we will have GTv Local which will 
be only local languages, all the various local languages that we handle in 
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GBC, and then we will have GTv Religion and Culture and then we will have 
GBC 24 which will be the News channel, and with all these we are hoping that 
in time all of them will run twenty-four hours.  
 
However, it can be deduced that the changes are hoped to make it more feasible for 
GTv to provide a more diverse range of programming to achieve a better service remit 
that is it more relevant and appealing to Ghanaians. GBC has also launched an online 
presence, albeit with some operational problems: 
 
X5: .. it was only yesterday that I went [unto the web-pages] with a colleague 
of mine and we were wondering [because] sometimes it takes them a long 
time to update it. We had criticisms during the [elections] about how the 
whole thing is being managed and stuff like that, and in my view, me and my 
colleague, we felt that it should have been updated every day. The amount of 
information [available], with reporters going out and stuff, and, in my view, I 
don‘t see the reason why sometimes sports [journalists] quote Joy Online47,  
.... it seems that those who are handling that aspect of our operations are not 
updating the website everyday ...... 
 
There had also been a move to re-organise aspects of operations, organically, to 
achieve greater efficiency, and an internal report on recommendations for cross-
platform use of content and resources was submitted to the Board, as part of an effort 
to ―re-position‖ (X5) GBC in the media market. However, the organisational changes 
done had been primarily to the News department, perhaps in recognition of the central 
role of the News function for the corporation; including re-training journalists into 
multi-skilled professionals able to news-gather and submit reportage independently. 
While this is good in itself; it would generate greater productivity per head, it leaves 
out other departments like Television Production which handles the non-News aspects 
of broadcasting content production. Considering producers‘ perceptions of bias 
against their department, it will become important to engage them also in a wider 
effort to re-build the corporation. 
 
                                                 
47
 Joy Online is the web portal for Multimedia Broadcasting Corporation, in which GBC has shares.  
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However well-intentioned these new changes being made may be, it appears that 
producers have a different anxiety. X2 and X3 suggested that the corporation has 
become much too focused on its commercial operation to the extent that it is changing 
the character of its broadcasting heritage with commercialism. X3 would like to see a 
de-commercialising of prime airtime and increases in the broadcast of local 
programming. X2 was concerned that the financial basis of the corporation is what 
needs attention, and that an answer would be in reforming the revenue model GBC 
works on: 
 
X3: Before we never had adverts in the News, it was like a holy hour, then just 
within the past year or so they started showing commercials in the News… 
like I was talking about adverts I think we also have too many foreign 
programmes… and it‘s Chinese, Korean, Spanish, too many. Nigerian, it‘s all 
for commercial reasons so a lot of our local work is not shown as it should be. 
 
AT: Nothing from Europe and America? 
 
X3: Well American movies, but you see acquisition rights are cheaper for 
Korea, for Asian and South America the acquisition rights are cheaper, so with 
the American ones we don‘t really see them, just once in a while. 
 
Most productions were African in origin and off-continent productions were marginal 
(Fig. 5), and a significant presence of ‗foreign‘ programmes was not found. However, 
the concern that ‗commercialism‘ is influencing broadcast output was reflected in 
many responses and a strong suggestion was that this needed to change: 
 
X2: My own view is that it needs to change its way [with regard to] finances… 
The current reliance on Government is too ambiguous for now because the 
Government is over-burdened and they should help GBC to find other ways of 
getting resourced in terms of the quest of delivering the public service 
…planning without money is vague, it‘s no planning. You are virtually thrown 
over-board if you need the quality and you don‘t have money to pay for it, you 
go for mediocrity, and that‘s what I‘m talking about. So a way of sourcing for 
funds, that‘s the biggest thing that has to happen to …. 
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With regards to a longer term envisioning of the public television service, X5 was of 
the opinion that the new digital broadcasting platform increases the quantum of 
revenue to be made from airtime sales as well as the opportunity to deliver both new 
programmes and public service programming, especially on the dedicated local 
language channel, and as such GTv would become a much more financially robust 
organisation. 
 
X8, however, suggested that splitting the corporation into separate commercial and 
public service functions and down-sizing the public broadcasting service section, 
which the State would have to pay for, while the commercial division would be run 
solely on a for-profit basis. However, X8 was emphatic that public service 
broadcasting was integral to nation‘s social development project and rejected the 
liberal market view that proposes government disengagement from services provision 
in order to allow market forces to determine better economic efficiency: 
 
AT: …. you have stopped short at saying that GBC should be sold. 
 
X8: … the deal is that, no country, no matter how gung-ho it is about freedoms 
of [expression] and so on, has ever given up its public service. We made the 
mistake with GBC Radio 2, [the] GBC extended service, on which the whole 
[African] liberation struggle fed. We closed it down and left a sizable part of 
the African Union, African Unity, remit which GBC was the head of. We 
trained their broadcasters, we encouraged their governments, and at the end of 
the day we threw it away by simply not buying the transmitter to continue or 
developing a different way of reaching them. If we shut down the public 
service we might as well kiss ourselves goodbye. Not even France has 
switched it off. So they told us not to subsidise our farmers but they subsidised 
the banks so I‘m not following anything any Western, you know, Bretton 
Woods conceptualism, no. We are thinking about ourselves. We do need the 
public service and it can be done properly. The fact that there is failure now 
doesn‘t mean that we throw up our hands. We have to just get to grips with it 
and deal with it, you understand? ... I think GBC can be the leader and be 
remodelled in terms of developing proper public service broadcasting. 
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GTv, as public service broadcaster, is important for the advancement of social 
development in Ghana. It can contribute to development through its programming in 
public and civic education and in the provision of information for economic activity. 
However, in order for that to continue in its future it needs to address some specific 
issues. There are several observations to be made from the views expressed: 
 
The first is that the situation that confronts GTv in its current form, and for the future, 
remains as much an economic argument as it is also a social one: primarily, the 
provision of an efficient public service that is underscored by the maximising of 
public value. Therefore processes of efficiency within production, need to be matched 
to competent staff that are able to deliver content based on a specific social and 
general development agenda.  
 
Secondly, the determination of that development communication agenda must result 
from a closer understanding of the public interest and its intersection with the 
government driven socio-political agenda. Knowledge facilitation and debate on 
courses of action for delivering development goals should be at the nexus of Gtv‘s 
public service within a participatory communication mode that serves to 
‗conscientize‘ (Lehrer 2002; O‘Shaunnessy and Stadler 1999; Tufte and 
Mefalupolous 2009; Ansu-Kyeremeh 1997). 
 
Thirdly, GTv must situate its continuance in the future with providing a service that 
really addresses the cultural plurality of the nation through the sharing of cultural and 
other entertainment experiences that have national relevance. Creating new digital 
channels gives it the opportunity to provide new content that addresses the various 
sections of the national audience in a ‗disaggregated‘ manner, and also provides the 
opportunity for better addressing the funding structures of programming. Revenues 
and savings from popular programmes can fund non-popular but culturally or socially 
essential programmes, as well as seeking funding from the public purse, to ensure that 
programme provision is truly diverse and not pinned to purely commercial incentives. 
 
The bedrock of ensuring such a paradigmatic shift occurs, from current practice, lies 
in GTv‘s ability to enable audience-research and public participation to play 
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significant roles in the shaping and origination of content that is in response to 
identified social needs and public interest. Thus, the validation of an economic model 
for GTv, now and in the future, should be conceptualised in terms of a socially funded 
enterprise with ability to prove a socially beneficial economic argument to the 
national society, and to the government since it is responsible for its efficient 
operation as a public organisation. Its commercial efficiencies may make it 
unnecessary in the future for the public purse to substantially fund its operations but 
some degree of public funding will still be required, as provided in its current 
structure, for the acquisition of new technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter V: DISCUSSION 
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That GTv is nominally a state-broadcaster is moot, however, this research focuses on 
discovering the degree to which its aspiration to be a ‗true‘ public service broadcaster 
is realized through its structural dependencies and its agency, and thereby to observe 
its contribution to national social change. The discussion of the data analysis that 
follows, therefore, joins theoretical perspectives to that data analysis from previous 
chapters. It considers the structural mechanics of GTv in positing ‗television as a 
place‘ constructed through a remit, considers its agency through the actions of 
producers as a result of their perceptions and then attempts an elaboration of its social 
role in social development.  
 
Data analysed showed that producers notionally defined ‗public service‘ as service 
provided to both State and the national community of citizens, as represented by 
public institutions and social structures. The ‗audience‘ is understood to be the 
television-viewing mass population, an aggregation of individual media service users 
who were a part of the nation that exist within the social structures of tribes, religious 
affiliations, and administrative Regions of the State. The dominant conception of 
‗public service broadcasting‘, therefore, linked to notions of State and nationhood in a 
manner that equated the ‗public interest‘ with the national interest, thus justifying the 
belief that ‗education, information and entertainment‘ of the nation was the modular 
objective of public service television in Ghana. 
 
The data also showed that while producers did not immediately identify with the 
public service broadcasting benchmarks of universality, plurality, distinctiveness and 
independence, as set out in Banerjee and Seneviratne (2005); it was still possible to 
evaluate these concepts, through the qualitative method of the research. Notional 
understandings were found to be present in the interview data. Also, The National 
Media Commission‘s Media Policy document was also found to present some 
discussion on the salience of these factors, although it does not mention 
distinctiveness as an aim, for achieving a public broadcasting service in Ghana. The 
document, importantly, recognizes the interdependence of these factors in shaping the 
public broadcasting service. However, these factors were not similarly represented in 
the decree establishing the GBC as a public institution, although equations to 
mediating political plurality and cultural diversity were represented. 
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Placement: Tv as a ‘place’ 
Television as a non-geographically subsisting ‗place‘ (Berrigan 1979) carries the 
notion of an imagined location that is very much real, into which people can come and 
participate, actively, in decoding and interpreting textual messages that are socially 
created in a ‗space‘. It therefore takes a virtual form that exists very much like a 
classroom, bureau and theatre. It can therefore function very much as these in its core 
offerings of education, information and entertainment. However, the success of those 
functions will be shown, by the discussion of the data, to depend on how the space is 
created and its perceived integrity in responding to the needs of those participating in 
its social construction. Thus, the experience and presence of television is a dynamic 
that is provided through the exercise of social institutions, legal and normative, public 
participation and the actions of mediators. The ‗location‘ of that space is important for 
providing these interdependent factors the capability to achieve the mediation purpose 
intended.  
 
In the imagined space of communal social reality, GTv is a freely and nationally 
available service and therefore capable of drawing the nation into a national public 
sphere. This universality of GTv places it not only ‗within‘ the social communities of 
Ghana, participating in its cultural exchanges, but also ‗around‘ the society, in having 
the capability to reflect society back to itself. Its services are freely accessible and 
usable without restriction, as the compulsory license fee has effectively been waived. 
Participatory access to it is, however, restricted by financial barriers and production 
processes. It is, thus, a media sphere that can be experienced largely through its 
offerings; only a few programmes had direct public participation in its format. Thus, 
its location and manner of operations are outside the public‘s immediate reach for 
contribution to the determination of content and service goals. This ‗placement‘ 
removes it from being a public platform that is freely accessible, and although it may 
be accessible at the minimum affordable cost of a phone-call or letter to producers, 
there is not a system in place to encourage such initiative from the audience, but some 
organized groups with sufficient motivation are able to participate in some 
programming. 
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The many years of militarist interventions have formulated a culture of production 
that has resolved into an enduring organisational disregard for an ethos that would be 
more orientated towards facilitating national public aspirations. Even the fact that the 
establishing act was under a military junta suggests that the decree may wilfully have 
chosen to ignore a more centralised role for citizens. The National Media Policy 
(Appendices 3) espouses an aspiration to change this state of affairs yet fails to 
comment on the lack of harmony between the decree and the Constitution 
(Appendices 1), where it makes specific reference to the responsibility of the State-
owned media to build a socially inclusive media, and does not suggest a legislative 
amendment. An amendment process should trigger an organisation-wide assessment 
of roles and functions and create an awareness of the dissonance between current 
organisational conceptions and the internationally benchmarked standards for 
delivering a true public broadcasting service. Thus, the basis for an amelioration of 
GTv‘s failing is in the legal structure of its ‗placement‘ as a public broadcaster. 
 
Legal and Normative Structures 
This ‗location‘ of GTv predates its inauguration as a service. In locating the pre-
cursor to GBC within the government service, Sir Arnold Hodgson was signifying the 
importance of control over programming, and the intended use for electronic media, 
as a social control mechanism. In the post-independence emancipation projects the 
media continued to be seen as an auxiliary tool for social control, and although the 
recognition was made of social change capability, the control over messages and 
content was deemed to be the preserve of trained and professional social elites who 
could operate its machinery and understood within its craft the ideologies desired in 
broadcast content. Nkrumah with this understanding did not create a law to change the 
institution passed-on after independence, but continued it as originally operated, 
changing its content to suit the ideological purposes of Pan-Africanism, Ghanaian 
nationalism and national social development. 
 
Consequently, in reforming the GBC to cast off its association with Nkrumah‘s 
heritage, the NLC ‗placed‘ GBC as a public corporation, and merely changed its legal 
status, but leaving it essentially as it was, a government-controlled department of the 
State. The establishing law, NLCD 226, correctly writes in the aspirational uses for 
 226 
education, information and entertainment for GTv. However, it effectively created a 
government-operated service aimed to give the national public broadcasting services 
that were deemed to be important in facilitating a cause-effect notion of social 
development based on the adoption of some of the more liberal ideologies that came 
from acceding to the global media concepts that were part of the ‗dominant‘ paradigm 
in the 1960‘s. The hypodermic effects paradigm were not much different from 
Nkrumah‘s intention for state broadcasting; the government, through GBC, would 
give to the nation what it needed in terms of educational and instructive content that 
would facilitate the government agendas for development. The law therefore is very 
specific in in its treatment of the government information service duties that were 
required of GTv. In its liberal adoptions, the corporation would now have to earn 
some revenue by providing services that it could charge for. Thus the legal placement 
of the GBC was formed. 
 
In the current era, the terms of that structural placement has not changed. The legal 
status of GBC is inimical to the 4
th
 Republican Constitution. The NMC‘s media 
policy intends to correct this dislocation of the organization from a public, as nation, 
and citizen-centered approach to service delivery, but it is yet to provide an impetus 
for an internalized framework that situates specific outcomes, measured and 
communicated widely within the organization, to serve as a baseline for purpose 
achievements. The construction of GTv is, therefore, as a ‗public-funded‘, not 
‗public-owned‘ organization, and the historical and practical alignment of GBC with 
government has over-shadowed its significance as an organization that was set up to 
be ‗public‘-spirited; that is, to serve the ‗public interest‘ as well as government‘s. 
Thus, in the data, it is observed that respondents recognized and responded to these 
dual notions, but each respondent tended to favour one notion over the other, yet both 
notions were equally represented. 
 
Funding 
The funding model of GBC, and consequently GTv, proved to be the most 
problematic outcome of this research; the normal actions of producers were much 
affected by the lack of adequate funding for productions that would both improve 
plurality, give programming access or even adequate logistic input into production 
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routines. This was claimed by all respondents. There is thus a need for management, 
government and the public to engage in a broad consultation that would address the 
status of GTv in the matters that relate to its funding, and is outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
Social Roles: 
Thus, GTv is a public television service only in name and legal status, but not wholly 
in its service delivery, and this has ramifications for its social roles: 
Social Capital 
Gifford (2004) suggested that Ghana as a nation exhibits low social capital, in 
consideration of the politicization of its public sphere and tribal identities. However, 
this is very much debatable since almost all political traditions stem from the same 
nationalist root, splintered into social democratic or liberal democratic traditions. It 
can be assumed that citizens of Ghana, who identify with its history and desire its 
progression, are nationalist and express their nationalism through political factions. 
Thus, while governments may represent differing traditions, the notion of a nation, 
construed as Ghana, which extends beyond tribe is not in dispute. Cohesion is the 
bedrock of social capital theory, and it is manifested in many ways through 
hegemonies of patriotism, religious faith and cultural expression. The cohesiveness of 
Ghanaian nationhood is thus function of ‗trust‘ that all nationalist political factions, 
no matter how divided, have at various times worked towards national socio-
economic development through the exercise of political power. The belonging to 
factions of political traditions dissects across tribal and ethnic lines and therefore 
suggests that ‗networks‘ of cohesiveness through political affiliations exist across the 
country, ensuring that the broad mass of the nation is engaged with a concerted 
nationalist social development consensus that differs only in policy positions and 
political ideology. 
Communication and the Nation 
The location of GTv, however, within that social reality is a problematic. In 
envisioning social capital as ‗glue‘ that creates ‗togetherness‘ in the commune, 
Putnam‘s (Halpern 2005) usage of the term ‗social capital‘ provides a theory that 
explains social synergy as agency that produces results in cohesion and goal 
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achievement, and thus makes sense in its attributive claim. In reflecting the diverse 
range of cultural and linguistic differences that are attributable to Ghana as a nation, 
GTv plays a role as a visual signifier of national social cohesion. Through the use of 
Ghanaian cultural forms; symbols, language, manners of expression and behaviour 
that signify the national cultural (X1), GTv gives cues to standards of social propriety. 
It thus contributes to socialising the nation through acculturation of ‗Ghanaian social 
attributes‘ by signification (Hall 1997). In using specific cultural forms of expression 
from within the nation it serves as a signifier of cultural attributes that audiences can 
learn from and identify. In this way GTv aids ‗Ghanaian‘ identity choices and is 
therefore salient to nationalist identification (Noelle-Neumann 1981; Kellner 1995).  
 
Projecting such ‗national expressions‘ of culture contributes to national social 
cohesion and nationalism by alluding to the interconnectedness of the nation‘s 
disparate ethnic segments with the unity of the nation-state, joining them in the on-
going ‗struggle‘ for national social emancipation (Mihelj; Cox 2007). GTv is 
therefore important in the national emancipation project as it serves to reflect the 
national community in its growth, development and cultural evolution. Thus, its role 
in mediating national cohesion is not only in reflecting the present character of the 
nation but also connects to an enfolding history that validates ‗togetherness‘ that 
conjoins all tribes and ethnicities in the process of nation formation. It thus provides a 
cultural product of the continuum of history that cues pre-colonial history, is recorded 
in the present in its production archives, and marks unfolding history. 
 
As one of a set of key cultural artefacts, language, especially, was found to hold 
salience indicative of GTv‘s role in national cohesion. GTv employs multiple 
languages, a marginal percentage of which are local indigenous languages. However, 
the significance of the use of six local languages as a means of development 
communication was found to be inadequate. The data indicated that far greater use is 
made of English than any other language. The limited social significance of English 
has already been analysed in the previous chapter. However, it is important to 
reiterate the social significance of the high percentage of English-based 
communication as its use, as a language, is a suggestive cue of social elitism (Boateng 
1978; Falola 2004). It therefore indicates the fundamental separation between social 
classes, and militates against the intention for GTv to serve as a wholly national 
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socio-cultural platform. The limited use of local languages on GTv means that the 
largely semi-literate audiences, that form the majority of the nation, will naturally 
gravitate towards the few segments of programmes broadcast in local languages 
where textual and ideological access will be easier, and to popular entertainment 
programmes which offer more opportunities for audience-originated meaning 
construction and fewer barriers to ‗sense-making‘ (Barker 1997; Baran and Davis 
2000). It, thus, offers less opportunity wide social participation and sharing in the 
televisual experience across all demographics in the almost 80% of programming that 
utilises the English language and singularly, is the most militating factor against the 
achievement of a universally accessible public media platform. 
 
The marginal airtime allotment for indigenous language use also means that GTv is 
working in resistance to the natural language culture in what is essentially a 
multilingual society (Fardon and Furniss 2000). The narrow approach also resists the 
evolution of Ghanaian society because it does not mirror the natural employment of 
multilingualism in most of the population (Laitin 1992; Heine and Nurse 2000), and 
the favourability of multilingualism as a strategic tool in promoting broadcast content 
access (Salawu 2006).  
 
To the extent that the Akan language has a marginal ascendancy over other languages, 
however, is more the consequence of giving access to out-house producers whose 
popular entertainment programmes are more in tune with a social reality
48
; the growth 
of ‗Akanisation‘ in most aspects of Ghanaian culture (Gifford 2004). Thus, a 
multiplicity of ‗new‘ and diverse cultures are being created with similarities to Akan 
traditions and Akan assimilation could be creating new culture-hybrids. As a national 
institution GTv could be seeking to avoid a direct association with the promotion of 
any one culture or linguistic group. It therefore needs to invest more resources in 
creating a fairer language policy operation. 
 
Thus, the notion that offering programmes in a default lingua franca, only taught 
through the formal education system, would offer content messages to the broad mass 
without unambiguity is to ignore that the vast majority of the nation only has passable 
                                                 
48
 See also Table 3 on pg. 150 
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acquaintance with the language, and also ignores the fact that the mass society 
operates a broad array of that is evolving through on-going socio-economic 
circumstances (Boateng 1978; Falola 2004).  
 
Agency  
The data further showed that creativity and production control processes in the 
television production department – which is responsible for non-News productions – 
are based on a set of routines that are the result of socialization into the production 
work group; a set of sanctions and rewards that form part of attitudinal acquisition of 
‗apprenticeship‘ during the in-house socialisation of producer-directors. These work 
routines are documented in stages that require sign-off for production ideas and 
logistics from line-managing staff. However, there is a largely unwritten part that is 
culturally constructed and is acquired from learning to ‗know‘ (X4; X1) what ideas 
and products are permissible. This socialization process produces a ―trust‖ (X1) 
relationship between senior and junior production staff. Trust is the foundation for 
gaining responsibility in the production department, and the foundation for the 
working group‘s social capital. It is also partly the result of mastering the 
organizational ‗house-style‘ and editorial ‗culture‘ on the technical accuracy and 
aesthetic quality of content production. Producers who earn trust may also earn a 
degree of autonomous authority, which simply means that their productions may not 
go through the normally instituted production control mechanism – the ‗preview 
committee‘. Prior to gaining such authoritative freedom, key decisions are consulted 
with and taken by Executive Producers and Chief Controllers of Programmes.  
 
Within the Television Production department, ‗trust‘ and other socialization factors 
produce social capital that enables the department to function to meet objectives 
despite departmental difficulties with logistics and funding (X4, X8). That level of 
social capital, and the social networks embedded in it, did not extend to other 
departments with which Production should work; especially, the Commercial and 
Audience Research departments. These departments were seen to be responsible for 
some challenges to the producer‘s work. Trust therefore allows the department and its 
producers to get things done – doing productions without engaging with the politics in 
the State or government, with vested interests, could be seen to be challenged. It is 
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this ‗avoidance‘ factor that, singularly, presents the most challenge to GTv‘s ability to 
meet the benchmark requirements of a true public service broadcaster: 
 
The first constraint is a proscription on productions and creativity caused by fear and 
mistrust of political power, that has historically demonstrated a willingness to curb 
media freedom, has created a ‗culture of silence‘ (Ansu-Kyeremeh and Karikari 1998) 
on socio-political debate in GTv productions. The culture of silence responds to the 
organizational need for ‗self-preservation‘ (Asante 1996); keeping jobs (X7) and the 
existence of the organization as a social entity, rather than focusing on the delivery of 
a nationally valued public broadcasting service. Respondents saw management as the 
gatekeeper that tacitly censors production content on behalf of government; the relay 
that represents the wishes of government in keeping productions in line with 
government agenda in a country that is very much steeped in political traditions and 
faction-polarisation of socio-political events. GTv has institutionalized, through 
socialization and practice, control mechanisms intended as a firewall against 
incendiary content that may damage the relationship between GBC and government. 
It is a relationship that is an evolution, within the current constitutional democracy, 
from a previously coercive relationship into one based on apprehension and 
uncertainty (X8), but which still works, as before, to align GTv with government. 
GTv, as a public media institution, therefore finds itself unable to occupy a central, 
mediation, role between government and society.  The private media is, however, able 
to express the full extent of the judicially guaranteed freedom of the press, while GBC 
and GTv remain muzzled and undermined in institutional capacity. Trained staff, 
therefore, have left for the private sector in order to better realise their professional 
potential (X8).  
 
That relationship between GBC and government is therefore undermining the public 
broadcaster‘s social role and relevance. Its lack of involvement in socio-political 
debates, juxtaposed to the performance of private commercial media means that the 
latter are filling the gap in the socio-political and developmental debates within public 
interest, and it is these stations that are dictating the forms of debates in the public 
sphere. This situation erodes the industrial leadership and national role of the public 
service broadcaster. Hence, the public only expect GTv to only produce content that 
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‗tows the government line‘ (X4), and therefore use GBC News, more likely, as an 
indicator of tensions in the political status quo.  
 
On the other hand, GTv‘s entertainment programmes also appeal to audiences for 
whom they provide another socializing function; their conservative values reiterate 
dominant social notions and a sense of Ghanaian culture and conduct (X2, X3, X5 and 
X7) and confirm GTv‘s social performativity role in social identity choices and 
association (Noelle-Neumann 1981; Kellner 1995). 
 
The value of plurality, which is noted to be the presentation of equivocally diverse 
views on national issues (Banerjee and Seneviratne 2005), in order to create a free 
public sphere, is undermined. The public service broadcaster is charged with 
representing a balanced and fair opportunity for diverse voices to enable the full 
representation of the public interest through the broadcaster (Appendices 3). 
However, the data shows that the State has greater salience in the operational 
translation of service provision. Respondents indicated that government and political 
influence plays an important part in the functioning of GTv (X3, X5, X7, and X8). 
This salience makes it difficult for producers to do work that may be seen as 
unfavourable to government, and limits the level of political plurality that would 
otherwise be possible.  Respondents stated an outright avoidance of political issues in 
programme in order to avoid confrontations and fall-outs that would ―create havoc‖ 
(X4, X1). 
 
This limited plurality is therefore partly the result of an infringement on the 
independence of GBC by government, and is also linked to a history of media 
suppression by previous political regimes. Respondent perceptions of the influence of 
political power is thus seen to be a product of post-colonial history and contributes to 
the perpetuation of a ‗culture of silence‘ and co-operation with governments which 
use the GBC as a mouthpiece. Self-censorship was thus observed to be practiced at 
the ideation stage of programme-making, when producers avoid some subject areas, 
as well as at the editing and proofing stage, where a culture of ‗trust‘ works to 
produce productions that reinforce the culture of silence.  
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On the other hand, broadcast plurality is not limited to ensuring political diversity. 
The level of out-house productions measured in the data was about fifty-percent of 
airtime; X5 had estimated this at between sixty to forty percent, in favour of out-
house productions. The data therefore confirmed an assumption that GTv was 
broadcasting more out-house content than it produced. However, the bulk of this was 
in filmed entertainment and Christian Teaching. Christian religious teachings out-
weigh all other religious programming by more than a factor of ten. Islamic 
programmes are done by GTv, while Christian programmes are out-house productions 
funded by church organisations. There is thus an over-representation of the Christian 
voice, even though it is largest religious identity in the nation, and does not reflect the 
fairness criteria in the statute establishing GBC as a public corporation. A strategic 
and rationalised approach to balance the representations of differing religious opinion 
and teaching is, therefore, required as a matter of policy from GTv. 
 
Most programmes on air do not interact with the general populace, and do not center 
public participation at the core of programmes. Some programmes use studio 
audiences, expert panels and phone-ins to discuss issues; however these programmes 
focus mainly on economic and social hygiene or feminine gender-specific issues. 
Thus the diversity of opinion; the plurality of voices representing different views in 
programmes made by Television Production department, which produces the bulk of 
in-house productions, is limited. This means there is a failure to champion the public 
interest in programming decisions, and results in a dislocation of the citizen‘s voices 
from the core of GTv‘s broadcasting. That dislocation is also the result of a lack of 
ability to conduct audience research that could facilitate programme-making decisions 
with a genuine polling of public opinion. Such data would be useful for the 
development of content directions for specific programmes, genres and the overall 
constitution of programme types on air. It also impacts the ability of producers to 
create more elaborate productions, and to allow greater participation from diverse 
groups and talents from within the national community.  
 
The situation is primarily due to the failure of GTv to generate enough revenue to 
fund its operations from its mixed funding model. GTv is unable to sufficiently fund 
its production requirements (X4, X8, X7, X6), and thus cannot fund regular research 
exercises.  The lack of funds has led to an increasing reliance on out-house producers 
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to both purchase airtime and provide programming. Low funding was also seen to 
cause some producers to rely on the ‗generosity‘ (X4) of some social groups and 
persons who, having the financial capacity to partly fund production activities, have 
annexed some productions and could be directly contributing to the reduction in 
plurality and diversity within programmes. That specific factor underlies has resulted 
in the opportunity for a minority in the Christian population to become over-
represented on a national media platform to the detriment of other groups in the 
society, contributing to a mediation of a hegemonic ‗Christianisation‘ of the national 
public sphere which does not reflect the dominant national social structure in its 
religious structure (Shanahan and Jones  in Demers and Viswanath 1999), neither 
does it reflect what could be conceived as a dominant social point of view (Burgoon, 
Dillard et al. 1983). GTv, therefore, fails to fulfil the requirements of its remit 
(Appendices 2) and the ethos of the national media policy (Appendices 3), to 
providing a public service medium that does not over-represent sections or factions in 
the nation-state. 
 
Thus, the ‗agency‘ of GTv needs to be re-situated in a comprehensive set of 
procedures and production attitudes that allows it to exert control over the social 
outcomes of broadcast content and determine the purposive intent of all programmes; 
understanding that not all programmes will be interpreted or received as producers 
may intend. Such procedures and production attitudes therefore need to be founded on 
a communication mode that allows broadcast to play a mediation role within a 
cultural communication context that is interactive with the public sphere. Producers 
need to understand that mediation for social development does not happen by 
assumption of institutional relevance when, in reality, the content of programming is 
determined from outside direct engagement with the public interest. It is in striking a 
balance in the centrality of mediation between the public and ‗official voices‘ that a 
functional representation of ‗the public‘ can be resolved, leading to an establishment 
of credibility and therefore institutional relevance to society. 
 
Social Development 
Thus, how does a medium that is, in its core social affectation aspects, not in tandem 
with public interests perform in the facilitation of social development, considering the 
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disengagement from the public interest between the producer, as messenger, and the 
audience, as receivers (Umberto Eco in Alvarado, Buscombe et al. 1993)? This 
tension is especially salient if social discourses are in subjects other than what the 
government‘s development communication agenda intends to achieve through public 
broadcasting (Ansu-Kyeremeh and Karikari 1998; Garnham 2000; Harriss 2002; 
Gifford 2004; Burton 2005; Gocking 2005; Hastings 2005). 
 
The data showed that Christian Teaching and the News; together forming about 21% 
of the broadcast sample, dominate education and information type programmes on 
GTv. In addition Learning and Factual contributed 5.86% and 17.90%, respectively. 
Thus, a third of broadcast sampled, adding Christian Teaching, News and Factual 
data, present hegemonic and potentially subverted content, leaving the minimal 
contribution of formal and informal learning in the Learning genre to represent 
potentially bias-free content. The levels of public participation in these genres are, 
arguably, minimal as the programme events recorded with these genres all presented 
no opportunities for public participation.  
 
Respondents held the view that television could have a direct effect on social 
development and social consciousness. This was the dominant ideology informing the 
core of creative ideas for production of producers, who, therefore, considered their 
role to be important for social development communication. This observes a 
continuation of the ‗dominant paradigm‘ notion that formed the basis of development 
communication thinking during the 1960‘s, at the time if GTv‘s creation, which 
suggested the power of broadcasting communication could lend a ‗hypodermic‘ 
impetus to development. This view of communication was found to still form the 
basis of socialisation into producing work at GTv. Respondents particularly related to 
the ‗nationalist‘ project intentions relating to the establishment of GBC as a public 
broadcaster: social cohesion and national social development. Respondents saw a 
direct fit between these concepts and key programmes such as Adult Education and 
the News in local languages. 
 
However, the data findings and analysis suggest strongly that GTv has a minimal 
content output that is directly salient to enabling aspirations, knowledge and skills 
acquisition, or the creation of a public sphere for social debate. Social development 
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facilitation intentions would require for all these factors to be present in the structural 
processes of content creation and programme participation. Its outcomes should also 
be represented in measurable evidences of public satisfaction and dependence of GTv 
as a source of development communication programming.  
 
Conscientization, Consciencism and Social Praxis 
In the given that ‗participatory‘ approaches to development communication would 
offer more opportunities for the community voice to determine the content of 
educational programming (Mefalopulos and World Bank 2008; Tufte and 
Mefalopulos 2009), what does the data suggest to be GTv‘s contribution to evolving a 
public sphere that is engaged with social development? 
 
Applying the notion of Freirean ‗conscientization‘, understood as ―education is a 
cultural act‖ (Ansu-Kyeremeh 1997, pg. 23) to the levels of public participation, and 
education and information facets in the data suggests that GTv has some programmes 
that genuinely provide a ‗collectivist‘, dialogical, education to both participants and 
audiences, when the audience are deemed to be represented by their peers involved in 
programme participation. An exemplar programme was Mmaa Nkommo (Women‘s 
Conversation), and local language dramas, assuming they are typically imbued with a 
participatory logic due to utilizing talent from within the community who contribute 
to producer‘s decisions in fashioning the messages and cultural codes in programmes, 
and are noted to be a site for social values education, that are based on modern 
African values. These programmes can be presumed to inform ‗praxis‘ as they are 
both popular and informed by community beliefs and contemporarily resolved notions 
of social realities. These programmes are therefore important for not only 
socialization but for social development as they meet the threshold criteria of 
mediation, expert facilitation, public participation and are instructive as well as 
dialectical. Such programmes are important in providing cues to a social 
‗conscientization‘ process in also connecting to the logic of ―philosophical 
consciencism‖ (Nkrumah 1964) offering opportunities for the expression of the 
contemporary ideologies that form the underpinnings of the modern Ghanaian society; 
they reflect contemporary values from the sections of society that are represented, 
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even though such representations may be more likely to be from within dominant 
social groups and likely to represent hegemonies. 
 
However, it also means that the vast majority of programmes do not effectively 
contribute to social development through dialogical formatting; when participation, 
language use and content ideation, usually derived from producers‘ instincts or 
narrow research methods and further mitigated by a socially non-representative 
organizational production culture, are considered all together. This is the gap that 
presents a challenge in institutional relevance for the social role of GTv, and needs 
assessing and validation to reconnect the organization to society. 
 
If mediation is understood to be the conductivity of a media system‘s messaging 
relationship with its society, then there are key elements that need to be assessed in 
terms of GTv‘s affection and contribution to Ghanaian society. GTv was shown to be 
engaged in a ―paternalistic‖ mode of development communication (Frank Gerace and 
Hernando Lazaro in Dagron and Tufte 2006, pg. 64). The importance of Freire‘s 
―conscientization‖ is in the collective and dialogical communication of mediation as 
an aid to the public sphere engagement of citizens. GTv therefore needs to integrate 
development work, which refers to its productions in social education and information 
genres, with community-level actors (McPhail 2009) to assert a more inclusive and 
socially relevant role in social development. A closer interconnection of culture and a 
changing of the communication mode, as well as the significance of language and 
symbolic communication would be necessary to communicate effectively to the 
public. Since development is directional, retrogressive or progressive, mediating goals 
and aspirations in concert with social relationships (Haferkamp and Smelser 1992; 
Ansu-Kyeremeh 1997; Wilkins 2000) are fundamental to social change through 
creating a more affective social agency role. The social relationships implied are those 
embedded within the social capital (Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002; Castiglione, Deth 
et al. 2008) and human capital factors within communities. Social capital can be aided 
by fostering a socially collaborative and cohesive public sphere in which goals can be 
identified. GTv‘s mediation should also recognise the importance of power 
relationships (Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002) in social decision-making processes; 
class and status distinctions are important to the functioning of social structures, and it 
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is in the harmony of relationships between social structures that effective 
collaboration can occur.  
 
The facilitation should also recognise that human capital can be enhanced by 
identifying and filling knowledge gaps within the communities that limit their ability 
to perform. Thus, working jointly with the public in identifying and crafting 
knowledge teaching material that fits into a community‘s cultural contexts – such as 
using language and metaphoric symbols that fit in various Ghanaian milieux would 
enhance organizational agency. Gocking (2005) also wrote about the integration of 
symbolism and its centrality to Ghanaian life. These are communication concepts that 
ought to be central to programme-making as it affords a replication of cues that are 
socially evident and relevant. Also within the national context, the milieu is inhabited 
by many distinct groups, which must be ―disaggregated‖ for effective communication 
targeting. Thus, a strategic operation that centres on the public interest would produce 
a much more diverse array of programmes in the schedule to a disaggregated 
audience, based on social demographics and programming interests from the audience 
point of view. Disaggregated groups will also be in different cultural and language 
settings and this necessitates the development of a culture-matching matrix for similar 
groups to be matched to specifically targeted content, with communication access 
provision characteristics that align to the cultural forms of these ‗media communities‘ 
to avoid the ‗scatter-shot‘ approach of a universal targeting. 
 
It thus, also becomes necessary for GTv, and the NMC, to develop a broadcasting 
operations policy that reflects the historical context of Ghanaian cultures; the 
traditions of the people who use its services, as well as the contemporary public 
institutions that are changing the ways of interaction of people within contemporary 
Ghana; judicial, economic and political (Hooghe and Stolle 2003) in enabling a 
crafting of content that properly reflects cultural transformations in the modern state. 
This would better reflect changes from the old communal, village-centred, small-
group interaction to an increasingly media-fed and urbanised community in which 
social distances are increased as more and more people migrate into non-native spaces 
that remove them from older social networks that were essential to pre-existing 
structures of social capital. Thus by providing socially relevant forms of mediation 
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new structures can be created through mediation to rebuild the social capital necessary 
for development. 
 
John Harriss (2002) argues that there are analytical failings in the arguments of 
Putnam‘s version of social capital as the key to development, and criticizes the World 
Bank for latching onto impecuniousness in the concept to explain the lack of 
development in developing countries. However this thesis considers that the 
impreciseness of the theory is not a failing; communities that ―trust‖ in the mutual 
benefits of a development objective would work together, given the right impetus and 
ability to accomplish goals, therefore social capital theory is relevant in helping to 
formulate communicative strategies that bind people together in a community in 
which they see mutual benefit. The idea of social capital is reflected in understandings 
of collectivism or communalism that is inherent in African societies. The lack of 
progress in such societies may have more to do with historical disruptions that occur 
in all societies and provide impetus for changing social forms and making social 
change; colonialism was such a disruption, and military interventions and poor 
governance have also been disruptive (Haferkamp and Smelser; Gocking), and thus 
Harriss is correct in identifying history as causative to development, or the lack of it. 
 
Also, as Navarro (2002) counters, the evidence of the ‗capital‘ claims of the theory is 
much harder to prove. Governments, in the development project geared towards 
socio-economic emancipation, have through most of the post-independence years 
enlisted GTv in development communication following the prescriptions of the 
‗dominant paradigm‘ (Schramm 1964) and Nkrumah‘s ‗philosophical consciencism‘ 
(Nkrumah 1964) before that. GTv has produced programmes to inform and educate 
the nation, yet its per capita output steadily declined for many years till much 
recently, at the beginning of the present decade when oil production improved the 
national budget balance sheet. 
 
Thus, the ‗participatory paradigm‘ of development communication (Midgley 1986; 
Madzingira 2001; Dagron and Tufte 2006; Sparks 2007; McPhail 2009) may evoke a 
sense of rightness in suggesting that development should be based on grassroots goal-
setting. However, development goals are, necessarily, different at local and regional 
levels, although there may be an over-lap. Mediation of goals and consensus building 
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in order to satisfy the needs of the national public on matters that affect all in society 
therefore becomes the test for the national media platform – its ability to facilitate the 
national discussion of ‗ends and means‘ is vital to cohesion and consensus building 
for development. In this area, GTv fails to deliver the promise of social change 
through media use for two major reasons. In the first, this is because it still relies on a 
‗hypodermic‘, and thus, unidirectional mode of communication, and secondly, 
because its close affiliations to all government have eroded any credibility it may 
have had in terms of providing an opinion mediation function in the public sphere that 
puts the ‗public interest‘ at the core of its communication functions (Gifford 2004). 
And taken alongside its affiliations with governments, it would have lost credibility as 
to the integrity of its programming agenda as this would be seen as products of the 
socio-economic policies of existing governments; where that credibility would be 
intact would be with programmes known to be unrelated to government agenda, hence 
the popularity of its local dramas such as Obra and Cantata, which are entertainment 
and are likely to be seen as being un-subverted for nationalist causes.  
 
Furthermore, GTv, in practice, caters specifically to a family audience; programmes 
for youth and children being as much family-friendly as others. It assumes that the 
audience is primarily interested in entertainment (X7), but believes that a public 
broadcasting service should attach more salience to information and education 
programmes in the effort to play a role in the development aspirations of the nation. 
The low discrimination in programme targeting, and the high emphasis on educational 
content in programming (X7) assumes a homogenous national population and culture 
(Shanahan and Jones in Demers and Viswanath 1999), differentiated only by tribal 
languages, and hence justifying the high usage of English and Akan as bridging 
languages. It has also led to the construction of the public as a recipient, universal, 
mass for which an essentially ‗hypodermic‘ public education service is being 
provided in order to aid a development process. Programming therefore may be over-
looking contemporary development communication techniques and utilization of 
programme formats that blend information, education and entertainment in ways that 
the audience would find more accessible, to produce more diverse forms of television 
genres suitable to the audience (Lunt 2009). Considering the absence of strategic 
guidelines, and structured communication production objectives or measured 
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outcomes, that could be used to validate or correct the manner of functioning of the 
media system, it is more likely to be the later logic.  
 
That logic, together with the low participation of the national public in programme-
making strengthens the center to periphery mediation and undermines GTv‘s plurality 
and diversity; considering also that the station offers limited opportunity of access to 
its platform, only those who can afford to buy its airtime, or are invited to 
programmes, are able to participate in the process of making programmes. It therefore 
fails in the role of being a mediated public sphere-enabling tool. 
 
The criticism of social capital theory as being centred on the suggestion of ‗capital‘, 
as an intangible social attribute, that is a transmutable to an economically physical 
phenomenon (Navarro 2002), this thesis would argue, offers a narrow 
conceptualisation that is not reflected in the theoretical development of ‗social 
capital‘. The essence of the concept suggests that it should not be considered merely 
an economic measurement, as the terminology is constrained to mean. Theoretically, 
‗capital‘ is a resource that gives ability to perform at social, economic and political 
tasks. Thus, changing social structures requires capital – knowledge and consensus, in 
order to establish and achieve goals. In this way it can be seen that social capital is 
useful as a theory that seeks to explain the abilities of communities to get things done. 
All of the criticisms and theoretical positions concede that there are elements of 
progress to be gained from conceptualising a theoretical foundation that seeks to 
explore the existence of ‗social glue‘, a culture product, that ties people in a 
community together to produce mutual benefits in social development. Whatever 
features are ascribed to it, the dominant ones should include networking, 
cohesion/togetherness, trust and political will; a motivation that should embedded in a 
mechanism to reach consensus. Understanding the ability for people to work together 
is the thrust of the theory, and thus its usefulness as a perspective to understanding the 
functional communities. People cannot achieve ‗development‘ together if they do not 
express a willingness to work together. Such expressions may be intangible – in 
networks and social trust, or tangible in expressed civic choices and engagements. 
Mediation has a place in building and fostering social capital when the defined role of 
the medium is the creation of a safe public sphere. It is then useful as a social capital 
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engineering mechanism, in a modern world in which people tend to live, increasingly, 
disparately; over-taken by consumerism, urbanisation and mediated global cultures, 
even in the rural districts of a nation like Ghana. 
Thus, the essential factor of ‗communication for development‘ emerges from 
understanding the fostering of communal actions towards development; the centrality 
of plurality and unfettered public sphere actions are relevant. Plurality makes it 
possible for a media system, such as GTv, to encourage and foster social capital when 
it creates a safe public sphere within which political power and social segments are 
enabled to contribute to issues through debate. On the nation-wide stage there must be 
an ability to truly represent the broad plurality of views and voices. GTv would 
therefore become a stronger and socially relevant institution when it is able to follow 
through on facilitating social development by enabling the dialogic opportunities that 
would make it possible for consensus formation on development objectives and goals. 
Media technology affords the ability to make such wide consultations possible – 
moderated phone-ins, moderated online spaces, and in-studio or out-studio 
programme participation in which the public, whose voice in the public sphere are 
central to the exchange and debate of ideas necessary for modernist development, is 
enabled to participate fully. Contributions must be evaluated for their relevance and 
diversity and not be censored except where they fail value tests for ethical behaviour 
within the society. 
 
Social Control 
The data also showed that producers have ideological beliefs about the socialisation 
influences of their programmes, assigning to them ‗standards‘ of propriety in making 
sure that content not only reflected best behaviours in speech and conduct, but also 
correctness in representational values in culture. Thus ideologies of identity are 
central to programme-making decisions based on reiterating the social values 
communicated to producers through their social interactions with talent, and as a 
result of their in-house training; which is based on the values included in the 
establishing decree of the NLCD 226. As a structural element of society; in aiding the 
imagination of what is and the way things are, the media play a vital role in social 
maintenance and disseminate ideological messages based on social conservatisms that 
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are fundamental to stasis and assurance for the mass population in that the messages 
confirm and reiterate social identities (Kellner 1995; Noelle-Neumann 1981; Barker 
1997; Rosengren 1981; Garnham 2000), and the structural maintenance of power 
relationships in society that serve to convey as sense of ‗normalcy‘ (Gripsrund 2002). 
In this theoretical trajectory, the data and historical review in the literature shows that 
GTv, and other state-owned media corporations, has been fundamental to the social 
maintenance of Ghanaian society, primarily as a result of years of domination of the 
mediascape. The media messages of state media have been important for ordering 
society, primarily through their news functions. This explains the large percentages of 
the News and information genres in the broadcast sample analysed. The historical 
reliance of the nation on that function has confirmed a vital social role of the 
corporation in providing assurances of social order and events in which the 
government, as legitimate power, shows direction and leadership, connecting 
naturally to the social expectations of authority in the ‗cultural imaginations of power 
and praxis‘ (Hastings 2005) and normalities (Gripsrund 2000). The structural function 
is, thus, very much embedded in the production culture of the organisation, which 
respondents indicate is yet to adjust to its competitive and plural media environment. 
 
Hindman in Demers and Viswanath (1999) suggested that a lack of plurality 
contributes to the formation of hegemonies, as alternative opinions are excluded from 
the public sphere, and serve to confirm the status quo and the reproduction of social 
class structures and stasis. In the case of GTv, the constriction of the public voice can 
be suggested to be contributory to social stasis; the affirmation of governing 
legitimacy and public authority through diminution of critical voices in the public 
sphere forces a state of ‗normalcy‘ in the status quo, resisting opportunities for 
mediated social change. This may have contributed extensively to the history of social 
instability, where only those with the coercive power to change the status quo have 
had the opportunity to make changes to governance and the structures of public 
authority; the post-independence military and Nkrumah‘s populist pre-independence 
social insurgencies inciting the mass population. Thus ‗revolution‘ has been the 
slogan of governance changes when those changes had resonated with the mass 
population, especially in the Rawlings eras (Asante 1996). The use of GTv to reflect 
that voice of legitimacy, especially through the News, in that is focuses on 
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government activity reportage, may thus suggest a ‗normalcy‘ in the social and 
governing status quo, but may be under-serving society in not allowing a free public 
sphere to present its concerns and indicate its preference in government and 
development agenda. Muzzling the public voice and enforcing stasis is in opposition 
to the tendency of societies to not only change but reform their social structures and 
objectives in order to naturally grow (Nisbet 1969; Nkrumah1964). 
 
Opining that modern media‘s social agency role is realised through overcoming 
censorship and control through the use of instant messaging technology, Hindman 
(ibid.) advocates that technology can aid the transformation of conditions of stasis that 
are contributed by organisational cultures of regulation through subverting those very 
tendencies to self-regulate. However, developing such a new culture may be much 
easier for private commercial media, where the sensational ‗quick-to-publish‘ cultures 
are essential for competitive survival. The public broadcasting service must be more 
adhesive to high standards of reporting in order to build and maintain the social trust 
that is critical to ensuring its role in maintaining social cohesion, as well as providing 
industrial leadership. 
  
However, the research data does suggest that beyond stasis in political debate, GTv in 
allowing its platform to over-represent dominant hegemonies in religion and Akan 
cultural forms is contributing to a formation and redefinition of Ghana society as a 
largely ‗charismatic‘ Christian and Akan society that is ‗new‘ in terms of the 
evolution of the character of broadcasting, but also static in that it reflects already 
established cultural traditions – the changes in the Christian demographics are not 
changing the ratios of Christians to Moslems, for example. More importantly, it 
reflects a lack of growth in modernist ideologies about development in a society that 
naturally is rooted in ‗supernatural‘ cause and effect anticipations of social growth, 
and the agency of authority and patronage as answers to development problems 
(Assimeng 2007; Hastings 2005).  
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Reforming GTv 
The continuance of the social role of GTv depends very much on its strategic vision 
for the future, as well as the expectations and aspirations of its producers. The data 
strongly suggests that the tension between public service broadcasting and 
commercial operation needs re-balancing to situate the corporation‘s business model 
in a paradigm that is less problematic for producers and management, and the 
summarised views indicate that: 
1. Funding for programming needs to be tied to specific types of programmes 
and genres in which education for development and entertainment exert 
different values. Producers want the social values in output to be emphasised 
and properly resourced to enable them realise satisfaction and worth in their 
work, 
2. A repositioning of the organisation‘s outward image is desired to enable them 
also to realise a more definitive engagement with the social relevance of the 
corporation to the nation, and 
3. There was an indicative belief in the ability of the organisation to positively 
affect social change direction in the future when digital terrestrial broadcasting 
allows the delivery of segmented programming streams on different channels. 
 
Peter Lunt agrees that such modifications would be necessary to respond to changing 
audience uses and producer approaches to modernising public broadcasting in order to 
locate the changing pattern of the individual as a media consumer at the core of 
programming; a response that would create the ‗new‘ genres of programmes that 
focus on the individual within the mass audience as an active interpreter (Barker, 
1997; Baran and Davies, 2003) as opposed to the traditional view of the public as a 
singular un-segmented audience, and thus creating a more purposive media system 
(Indrajit Banerjee and Kalinga Seneviratne 2005). 
 
 
Chapter VI: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
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The analysis of the data makes it possible to draw several conclusions and to make 
observations about the social roles of television based on contextual history and 
structural mechanisms of agency. The conclusions that follow consider these issues of 
context and structure, building on the outcomes of analytical synthesis in the previous 
chapter. The over-arching conclusion from that discussion is that GTv was shown to 
have marginal relevance in the process of enabling real social development; it was 
mostly focused on its role as a communication vehicle for government propaganda 
despite an assumption by most respondents that it was fulfilling a much wider social 
agency role in development communication. The contextual problems are discussed 
below in terms of the antecedents of organisational historicity; considering supportive 
and structural mechanisms in legal frameworks, and the development of a purposive 
public service broadcasting ethos that is based on the connections that are common 
between African ideologies of cultural social democracy that could enable 
development, social capital, as a social science theory, and media and communication 
theories.  A summative argument is presented to show the interconnectedness of these 
themes to ‗producer agency‘, which is the starting point for content creation in aid of 
social change/social developmen agency in television production. 
 
Tv and the Ghanaian Public Sphere: Historicity and Power 
The first conclusion from the research is that there is a policy weakness in addressing 
the importance of the national public service broadcaster within the historical 
development of the media. The national media commission‘s policies that apply to 
GBC recognise its location in the history of media development in Ghana yet fails to 
acknowledge the implicit social results that are an affectation of this historicity. In a 
nation that has suffered human rights abuses of media practitioners for decades, and 
now noted to have grown in free expression within the plurality of media (Heath 
2005, Ansu-Kyeremah 1998) as a result of constitutional provisions, mechanisms for 
the realisation of  public media‘s freedom is not provided in legal frameworks in a 
manner that removes susceptibility to political power, and its potential, to threaten 
from among GTv staff. Respondents‘ perception that political agents commanded 
irreproachable power shows the fundamental limitations to the willingness, and 
ability, of GBC to exercise and build a public media platform that meets the 
benchmark values of a true public service broadcaster as discussed in Banerjee and 
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Seneviratne (2005). Also respondents‘ perception that political power was a naked, 
silent, presence was found to be a structural impediment to the functioning of GBC as 
a ‗public‘, national, organisation that answers to the nation and not to its 
administrators, and that apprehension is transferred to the public through the uncritical 
culture of production. The consequent social affectation could be distrust for GTv as it 
may be seen as having been, and continuing as, an extension of the political power 
that has had a socially dysfunctional relationship over time with the public 
(Thompson 1995). NMC policy therefore fails in not establishing an external, and 
public, mechanism for the protection of the ‗public trust‘ for media even though it 
advocates that the vigilance of the national public is important for such protection and 
suggests ―public accountability‖ (ibid. pg. 25) by the public media to demonstrate 
their ‗public value‘. In acknowledging that the vast majority of the public fail to 
connect with their central role in public media accountability and yet failing to 
institute a periodic inclusive mechanism, the policy does not do enough to advance 
the growth of Ghana‘s media into a socially accountable public sphere. 
 
Thus, a better structural mechanism, for the supervision or exercise of oversight of 
GBC, is should be provided for in an institution that embodies the plurality of 
Ghanaian voices. The constitutional provisions for the empanelling of the NMC did 
not foresee a situation in which a one-party State effectively emerges from a 
coalescing of ideologically similar political traditions and, thus, does not guarantee an 
unbiased media commission evolving over time. With five out of fifteen 
commissioners currently appointed by the Executive and Parliament, there is a 
proportional prevalence of political appointees on the Board of the NMC and this, 
perceptually, will militate against the freedom of the NMC itself from political 
motivations (for a broad discussion see Article 19 2003). The NMC‘s policy 
framework acknowledges that the safe-guarding of media freedom lies within civic 
vigilance among citizens, therefore, it infers that the safety of the nation‘s media lies 
where the nation is best represented; in its parliament, as suggested by Principle 35.1 
of Article 19‘s Access to Airwaves Broadcasting Standards (Article 19 2003) and 
traditional power institutions. Appointments to the commission should, thus, be in a 
manner that reflects the diverse nature of the national polity. Chieftaincy, as 
represented by the National House of Chiefs, reflects a tradition of stable power, 
which when joined to a representative Parliamentary sub-committee could produce a 
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mechanism to balance the representation of social and political plurality in monitoring 
and supervising the performance of GBC. Ideally, the appointment of Board persons 
to State-media should also be independent of the Executive, and such a mechanism 
should instigate a removal of the clause for Presidential approval of such 
appointments in light of an embedded tendency to perceive heads of State-media as 
sources of political manipulation. 
 
Legal and Normative Documents 
The second conclusion of the research is that the substantive legislation defining the 
functions and responsibilities of the GBC are no longer consonant with the current 
Constitution. The legislation needs Parliamentary amendment to reflect changes in the 
political climate and rule of law in the country. The National Liberation Council, and 
all military juntas as outlawed entities, should not have legislative legacy in creating 
public institutions for a constitutionally ruled State, as this undermines the ethos of 
republican democracy. 
 
The undermining of plurality and diversity is also created by the absence of 
documented guidelines to ensure that content is made to standards that reflect exiting 
law and policies on public broadcasting services. Normative documents need to be 
created by management to ‗disaggregate‘ the national community in relation to tribe, 
gender, ability, education and learning, as well as other orientations in social life that 
are consonant with social realities and can be mirrored on television to reflect the 
character of the nation, as well as its social achievements and progresses. The absence 
of commissioning and operational guides that are written in to ensure the operational 
achievement of key features of public broadcasting, as well as the policy quotas for 
broadcasting standards, into the programme-making process should be a concern to 
both the NMC and the Board of GBC. The failure to realise this is not only weakening 
the ability of the GBC to meet a public value test, it perpetuates the ‗culture of 
silence‘ that militates against the development of the nation. Its constituted public 
sphere is weak in reflecting ‗diverse voices‘ and programming lacks a reflection of 
the true national character of the nation‘s social development. 
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The National Media Policy needs to include an active monitoring provision that 
enables the commission to judge the degrees of compliance with the policy 
framework with a view to strengthening the relevance of its provisions and the 
conformity of media institutions in the country. To the extent that the policy seeks to 
encourage the growth of media plurality, generally, and diversity within the national 
public media services, especially in the area of electronic broadcasting, there ought to 
be such a mechanism requiring, especially, the national public media broadcaster to 
report its compliance to the policy. This would make it possible for further strategic 
policy interventions to encourage institutional development in identifying challenges 
and best practice innovations. 
 
An Ideology for Media in Development  
Thirdly, it is also concluded that the purpose of the GBC was to serve as a form of 
‗conscientization‘ tool, based on Nkrumah‘s ‗philosophical consciencism‘ and the 
inherited traditions of the European public broadcasting model for the social 
development aspirations of the post-colonial Ghanaian State. There has been a 
dislocation of that ideological purpose from GBC‘s performance through political 
instability and short-sighted legal provisions that only partly provide for the visionary 
realisation of the post-colonial aspirations of the nation‘s founding fathers, and the 
emancipatory imagination. Rootedness in traditional social forms such as 
‗communalism‘ have been a part of the growing culture of media practices at GTv, 
but have yet to yield results through ‗conscientizing‘ the public for development and 
this has contributed to the inability of the public broadcasting service to advance the 
national social development project through media use. There, therefore, needs to 
be a concerted and strategic effort to connect communities to development goals by 
enhancing social and human capital through the use of local languages, and other 
forms of content access facilitations such as audio translations and sub-titling. This 
also needs to occur in a greater diversity of programmes in development 
communication with an understanding of the contribution of ‗active audiences‘ to 
content co-creation or ‗meaning-making‘, as well as the centrality of television 
viewing within communities, and the importance of facilitating idea exchange in order 
to grow culture and enable social progress. 
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It needs to be understood that ‗communalism‘, ‗conscientization‘, ‗consciencism‘ 
and the public service ethos of ‗education, information and entertainment‘ are 
ideological constructs that proceed from a socialist worldview, striving for an 
egalitarian ideal that equips the mass society through televisual content values. 
However, these ideologies are now in tension with the neo-liberal context of social 
development and the progression of Ghana‘s contemporary society towards Western 
social formations that are more individualist, competitive and consumerist. While the 
basic forms of traditional society still exists in fraternal small groups, clans and tribes, 
the dispersion of the population through modern economics and aspiration brings 
tensions into conceptualising discrete ethnic or tribal formations. Thus, GTv needs to 
respond by changing its foundational principles to fit in an environment where 
programme popularity is a lynchpin to ‗getting ahead‘ and being relevant; public 
television must now reflect the different ‗public interests‘ that exist in the national 
society and that also reflect growths in modernity and ideological differences. It must 
do so in order to better provide a socially relevant service; not continuing in the 
assumptive positions of its paternalist approach to programming.  Programming on 
the basis of ‗popularity‘ does not suggest ‗going commercial‘ and succumbing to 
commercialism. It is in developing an approach that factors both mass-appeal 
programming, and the need to compete for advertising sources of revenue, with 
making programmes for social minorities and niche interests. The test for all 
programming should always be a justified connection to public service values: 
 
Such reforms must always be guided by the principle that a public broadcaster works 
for the community, and thus belongs to the whole rather than a few interests – 
advertisers/sponsors, government or social elites and organisations. In doing so, 
notions such as plurality, diversity, universality and independence contribute to 
enhancing both human and social capital and facilitating the continuous growth of 
emancipation through the exchange of ideas and shared ideals in public sphere 
discourse. 
 
General Conclusions 
Within the post-colonial worldview of social changes, the results of this study show 
wider implications for social development: 
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Firstly, the social role of public broadcasting was found to have perceptual salience to 
national development, as a social development construct. That salience, however, 
appears to be more determined by sentimental values and political ideologies than as a 
result of the application of tested communication, media and economic theories.  
 
Secondly, the salience of such public broadcasting institutions is in their connections 
to national histories; their developmental history is in tandem with national histories 
and thus contributes to their sentimental salience, which can have the effect of over-
stating their economic purpose. More, importantly, they can provide a record of 
political history that may not be achievable by private media. Also, as social 
signifiers, national public media are symbolic institutions of nationhood, like a 
national flag; Cox (2007), for example, argues, concerning ethnosymbolist ideas of 
nationalism, that nationalism is a sentiment that produces social institutions and 
cultures through which are manifested the collective empathies of the nation. 
 
Lastly, the increasing capacity of post-colonial public media for institutional agency 
indicates growth and changes in modernity and social governance. As a microcosm of 
society, such post-colonial public media institutions more intensely reflect changes in 
politics and culture. The perceptions of staff influence their actions within the 
organisation and indicate the extent of liberalisation, modernity and political change 
within the nation. Hyden, Leslie et al. (2003) suggest that media development has 
been critical in shaping the growth of political modernisation in Africa. Thus, as GBC 
evolves and develops stronger institutional structures and processes for achieving its 
remit, reflecting society and acting as a social agent, it will be a signification of 
evolving social development and social change in Ghana.  
 
 
Further Research 
The research exposes a gap in understandings about social ideologies within 
television content and the historical underpinnings of the practices of public 
broadcasting in a post-colonial country such as Ghana. In as much as the attempt has 
been made to provide an academic contribution to communication and media 
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research, in terms of understanding the structural underpinning of a post-colonial 
heritage industry, it also shows the gap identified by Hyden, Leslie et al. (2003) as 
existing in the literatures that focus on understanding the role and structures of the 
media industry between post-colonial and transitional countries and the developed 
West. There is no doubt that there have been transformations in both practice and 
ideas regarding the making of ‗the message‘ in television content between these two 
geographical and social spheres. The result can only be that different programmes 
have different impacts on different societies, and programming also reflects, in 
differing ways, the salient aspects of these globally disparate societies. Thus, while 
cultural theory accepts the importance of local cultural factors in theory building, 
more general theory has often over-looked these considerations and assumed that 
Western-based research is applicable in generality to the rest of the world.  
 
The African Media Development Initiative (BBC World Service Trust 2006), and the 
African Broadcasting Policy (Article 19 2003), are indicative of the attempts to close 
this gap in understanding the mechanics that are important for new theory-building. 
There, however, needs to be further research, similar to this thesis, to deepen 
understanding about the contributions that programme-making, production systems 
and specific programmes make to perceptions of the broadcasting media. Such 
research is needed to understand audience perceptions of institutional roles and the 
social functions of specific programmes, as well as to understand developments in 
internal cultures. There is also a need to understand these developments in relation to 
changes in social attitudes. This would facilitate cross-discipline understandings 
between media and communication theories and social anthropology in efforts to 
better understand social changes as they occur with developments and growth in the 
media. 
 
Again, there is a need to close the research gap with regards to understanding the role 
of the audience and patterns of media consumption within both the social and 
individual use contexts. With a fifty-percent urban population and large tracts of 
agrarian populations segmented into small villages and townships across Ghana, the 
transference of modernity ideas and cultures in message negotiation that are the result 
of demographic differences should be important for informing programming in 
development communication. 
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Another aspect for further research, and theory-building, would be to improve the 
framework for understanding modernity representations in televisual content in 
relation to theories about culture transmission, industry organisation and regulation, as 
well as media nationalism and mediated social development. This would extend the 
envelope of the theoretical field by including work on the suggestive effects of the 
ideological transmission of 'what modernity looks like', especially to developing 
societies with aspirational objectives.  
 
Mediating Social Change in the Post-Colonial Context 
The socio-political context of post-colonial nation-states is often one that exhibits 
political tensions between factions of political power. While coercive power, through 
military regimes, had also contributed greatly to the structures of government for 
many decades, there are changes in many of these states, and they have progressively 
adopted Constitutions and varying forms of democratic governance. This has often 
been in the hands of the social elites who inherited the politics and governance 
methods of colonial powers and the post-independence traditions of political ideology 
(Falola 2004; Fanon 1963). In many of these states, there are also contestations for 
power between elite groups, and between elites and lower social groups. The result of 
these tensions have been most evidenced over the last two decades in parts of Africa, 
and the Middle East in recent times. Most importantly there are, in many of these 
states, national Constitutions that guarantee press freedoms, that make it possible for 
public media and their media personnel to function within some protective legal 
frameworks, and other human rights. 
 
Ultimately, the thrust of media freedom is to guarantee protection of what is in the 
public interest. The public interest is, in ideal, constructed as the enablement of 
citizens to participate fully in their nation‘s ―political economy‖, as well as in its 
ordinary social topics and consumerist gratifications; and these can be realised when 
facilitated by access to information, education and entertainment through the media 
(McCauley, Peterson et al 2003, pg. xix).  
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Thus, what results as values and representation of modernity and modernisation in 
television, is an embedding of cultural ideologies and representations of modernisms 
in televisual content through the agency of the television producer. The role of the 
producer is to command and control, to persuade and to determine what becomes 
content (Ettema and Whitney 1982). The challenge for the producer, therefore, is to 
realise their role within the constraints that are imposed by limited resources and 
organisational imperatives that proscribe what is possible to do.  
 
It is the outcomes of the producer‘s work that define the social role and agency of the 
public television service. Thus, the agency of the organisation rests on the agency of 
the producer. Consequently, the validity of outcomes of agency depend on the degree 
to which broadcast programming is based on knowledge of the public interest. In 
order for such public interest claims to be valid, they must be founded on well-
researched constructions of social realities; which are authentic not only in scientific 
constructions of fact, but in measurements of perceptions of truths among the public.  
 
This therefore means that the public‘s participation in the production process is 
critical to establishing a basis for validating the public service broadcaster‘s work. 
Through such participation, the plurality and diversity of public interests can be 
included in broadcast programmes (Shanahan and Morgan in Demers and Viswanath 
1999). However, the producer must recognise that hegemonies are present in 
socialised worldviews, and it is the inclusion of the various social realities of social 
segments, among the public, that would constitute a facilitation of the public sphere in 
media. While hegemonic values and voices are represented within the public sphere, 
the agency of the producer is also to ensure a fair and balanced representation of all 
views (as required in Ghana‘s Media Policy and the NLCD 226) and, thus, facilitating 
balanced social debate is critical to facilitating the public sphere and the kind of 
development communication that is possible by the communication processes of 
television. 
 
The producer must also realise that development communication is dependent on their 
understanding of the communication processes that occur through television use, and 
should therefore create programmes within appropriate cultural frameworks of 
representation – language, symbols, etc. This is needed to facilitate understanding or 
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meaning-making, between viewer and programme, necessary for social discussions to 
occur within cultural contexts of appropriation that can result in ‗conscientization‘ 
(Ansu-Kyeremeh 1998; Barker 1997). Also, producers need to understand that 
television does not instantly imbrue knowledge in citizens, but could facilitate a 
cultivation of understandings and values which are filtered by belief systems and 
experiences (Gripsrund 2002). Hence, modernisation, constructed as national social 
development is a functional result of indeterminate communication processes in 
which the media, and television especially, may not be able to provide opportunity for 
catalysis.  
 
However, the extent of a producer‘s agency is a function of their ideological pursuits 
and institutional ability to provide a supportive mechanism for the producer‘s work. 
Thus, Constitutional provisions, legal structures and media policies, remain the 
underpinning supportive mechanism for making the public interest representation 
within the public sphere possible, where a media system forms the basis of the public 
sphere. Thus, there is a continuum of progress and facilitation for social development 
through development communication in a publicly-owned media system: 
Constitutions must provide for the freedom of expression in media, and such 
provisions must provide safety to the media organisation, and hence to the producer, 
who in return must act in respect to serving the public interest, equitably, and in 
respect of development objectives represented within the interests that are represented 
in the public sphere. 
 
Thus, producers are the functional points for development communication and it is 
their competence, knowledge and understanding of their social environment, as well 
as their ability to resist hegemonies and media cultures of production, that is salient to 
ensuring that efforts towards social development are representative of the public will. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE MEDIA 
162. 
(1) Freedom and independence of the media are hereby guaranteed. 
 
(2) Subject to this Constitution and any other law not inconsistent with this 
Constitution, there shall be no censorship in Ghana. 
 
(3) There shall be no impediments to the establishment of private press or media; and 
in particular, there shall be no law requiring any person to obtain a licence as a 
prerequisite to the establishment or operation of a newspaper, journal or other media 
for mass communication or information. 
 
(4) Editors and publishers of newspapers and other institutions of the mass media 
shall not be subject to control or interference by Government, not shall they be 
penalized or harassed for their editorial opinions and views, or the content of their 
publications. 
 
(5) All agencies of the mass media shall, at all times, be free to uphold the principles, 
provisions and objectives of this Constitution, and shall uphold the responsibility and 
accountability of the Government to the people of Ghana. 
 
(6) Any medium for the dissemination of information to the public which publishes a 
statement about or against any person shall be obliged to publish a rejoinder, if any, 
from the person in respect of whom the publication was made. 
 
163. 
 
All state-owned media shall afford fair opportunities and facilities for the presentation 
of divergent views and dissenting opinions. 
 
164. 
 
The provisions of articles 162 and 163 of this Constitution are subject to laws that are 
reasonably required in the interest of national security, public order, public morality 
and for the purpose of protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of other 
persons. 
 
165. 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, the provisions of this Chapter shall not be taken to limit 
the enjoyment of any of the fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed under 
Chapter 5 of this Constitution. 
 
166. 
 
(1) There shall be established by Act of Parliament within six months after Parliament 
first meets after the coming into force of this Constitution, a National Media 
Commission which shall consist of fifteen members as follows - 
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(a) one representative each nominated by 
 
(i) the Ghana Bar Association; 
 
(ii) the Publishers and Owners of the Private Press; 
 
(iii) the Ghana Association of Writers and the Ghana Library 
Association; 
 
(iv) the Christian group (the National Catholic Secretariat, the 
Christian Council, and the Ghana Pentecostal Council) 
 
(v) the Federation of Muslim Councils and Ahmadiyya Mission; 
 
(vi) the training institutions of journalists and communicators; 
 
(vii) the Ghana Advertising Association and the Institute of Public 
Relations of Ghana; and 
 
(viii) the Ghana National Association of Teachers; 
 
(b) two representatives nominated by the Ghana Journalists Association; 
 
(c) two persons appointed by the President; and 
 
(d) three persons nominated by Parliament. 
 
(2) The Commission shall elect its own Chairman. 
 
167. 
 
The functions of the National Media Commission are- 
 
(a) to promote and ensure the freedom and independence of the 
media for mass communication or information; 
 
(b) to take all appropriate measures to ensure the establishment and 
maintenance of the highest journalistic standards in the mass 
media, including the investigation, mediation and settlement of 
complaints made against or by the press or other mass media; 
(c) to insulate the state-owned media from governmental control; 
 
(d) to make regulations by constitutional instrument for the 
registration of newspapers and other publications, except that the 
regulations shall not provide for the exercise of any direction or 
control over the professional functions of a person engaged in the 
production of newspapers or other means of mass communication; 
and 
 
(e) to perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law 
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not inconsistent with this Constitution. 
 
168. 
 
The Commission shall appoint the chairmen and other members of the 
governing bodies of public corporations managing the state -owned media in 
consultation with the President. 
 
169. 
 
Editors of the state-owned media shall be appointed by the governing 
bodies of the respective corporations in consultation with the Public 
Services Commission. 
 
170. 
 
The Commission shall appoint the officers and other employees of the 
Commission in consultation with the Public Services Commission. 
 
171. 
 
The administrative expenses of the National Media Commission, 
including salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of 
persons serving with the Commission shall be charged on the 
Consolidated Fund. 
 
172. 
 
Except as otherwise provided by this Constitution or by any other law not 
inconsistent with this Constitution, the National Media Commission shall 
not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority in the 
performance of its functions. 
 
173. 
 
Subject to article 167 of this Constitution, the National Media 
Commission shall not exercise any control or direction over the 
professional functions of a person engaged in the production of 
newspapers or other means of communication. 
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Section 1 - Establishment of Ghana Broadcasting 
Corporation. 
(1) There is hereby established a body corporate to be known as the Ghana 
Broadcasting Corporation, in this Decree referred to as "the Corporation". 
 
(2) The Corporation shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue 
and be sued in the name assigned to it by sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph. 
 
(3) The Corporation shall have power, for the discharge of any of its functions, to 
acquire and hold any movable or immovable property and to dispose of such property, 
and to enter into any contract or other transaction. 
 
(4) Where there is any hindrance to the acquisition of any property under sub-
paragraph (3) of this paragraph, the property may be acquired for the Corporation 
under the State Property and Contracts Act, 1960 (CA 6) or as the case may be, under 
the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125), and each such Act shall, as the case may be, 
apply with respect to any such acquisition with such modifications as may be 
necessary to provide for the vesting of the property acquired thereunder in the 
Corporation and for the cost of acquisition to be defrayed by the Corporation. 
Section 2-Objects of the Corporation. 
(1) The objects of the Corporation shall be— 
 
(a) to undertake Sound, Commercial and Television broadcasts; 
 
(b) to prepare in the field of culture, education, information and entertainment 
programmes reflecting National progress and aspirations; 
 
(c) to broadcast the programmes prepared under sub-paragraph (b) in the main 
Ghanaian languages and in English and such other foreign languages as the 
Corporation may determine; 
 
(d) to carry on an external service of sound broadcasting; 
 
(e) to enter into agreement for the utilisation of programmes prepared in other 
countries; and 
 
(f) to carry on such other activities as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of 
all or any of the foregoing. 
 
(2) Without prejudice to the general effect of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph, the 
Corporation shall have power to carry out all or any of the following activities:— 
 
(a) to erect, maintain and operate transmitting and receiving stations; 
 
(b) to install and operate wired broadcasting services; 
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(c) to enter into arrangements for the purpose of obtaining rights, privileges and 
concessions; 
 
(d) to produce, manufacture, purchase or otherwise acquire films, television, 
gramophone and other mechanical or electronic records, and materials and apparatus 
associated therewith, and to use them in connection with the broadcast services; 
 
(e) to provide to and to receive from other corporations and persons matter to be 
broadcast; 
 
(f) to organise, provide and subsidise public entertainment for the purpose of 
broadcasting; 
 
(g) to collect news and information in any manner that the Corporation deems fit in 
any part of the world and to subscribe to news agencies and services; 
 
(h) to acquire copyrights; 
 
(i) to publish printed matter that may be conducive to the discharge of any of the 
functions of the Corporation; 
 
(j) to do such other things conducive to attaining the objects of the Corporation 
including the provision of facilities for training and education for the purpose of 
advancing the skill of persons employed by the Corporation and the carrying out of 
research to improve the efficiency of the equipment of the Corporation and the 
manner in which that equipment is operated. 
Section 3-The Board. 
(1) The governing body of the Corporation shall be a Board. 
 
(2) The Board shall consist of— 
 
(a) a Chairman; 
 
(b) the Director-General of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation referred to in 
paragraph 6 of this Decree; and 
 
(c) eight other members. 
 
(3) The Chairman and the other members of the Board to be appointed under sub-
paragraph (2) (c) of this paragraph shall be appointed by the National Liberation 
Council on the recommendations of the Commissioner and shall hold office for a 
period of two years: 
 
Provided that of the first members to be appointed under sub-paragraph (2)(c) of this 
paragraph four shall hold office for one year and such period shall be specified in 
their instruments of appointment. 
 
(4) Persons to be appointed Chairman of the Corporation or as members of the Board 
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under sub-paragraph (2)(c) of this paragraph shall be persons who have recognised 
public standing in the community or persons who have had experience in and shown 
capacity in any of the following fields of endeavour that is to say:— industry, trade, 
finance, science, administration, education, public entertainment, social service, 
journalism, broadcasting and law. 
 
(5) No person shall be qualified to be a member of the Board— 
 
(a) if he has been sentenced to death or to a term of imprisonment exceeding twelve 
months without option of a fine or has been convicted of an offence involving 
dishonesty and has not, in each case been granted a free pardon, 
 
(b) if he is a person who, having been declared insolvent or bankrupt under any law 
for the time being in force in Ghana or in any other country is an undischarged 
insolvent or bankrupt, 
 
(c) if he is a member of any Legislative Assembly or other body having for the time 
being authority either alone or in conjunction with any other body to enact laws which 
have effect throughout Ghana, 
 
(d) if he is adjudged to be of unsound mind, 
 
(e) if in the case of a person possessed of a professional qualification, he is 
disqualified or suspended, otherwise than at his own request, from practising his 
profession in Ghana or in any other country by order of any competent authority made 
in respect of him personally, 
 
(f) if he is an officer of the Corporation other than the Director-General or is a public 
officer where there are already not less than three public officers on the membership 
of the Board. 
 
(6) Without prejudice to sub-paragraph (5) of this paragraph, a member of the Board 
other than the Director-General may be removed from the Board by the National 
Liberation Council on the recommendation of the Commissioner— 
 
(a) if he suspends payment with his creditors, 
 
(b) if he is absent from three or more consecutive meetings of the Board without such 
ground as appears to the National Liberation Council as reasonable, 
 
(c) if he is guilty of unethical behaviour or if he is guilty of any serious misconduct in 
respect of his duties as a member of the Board and such behaviour or misconduct is 
certified in writing by not less than seven members of the Board. 
 
(7) Any member of the Board other than the Director-General may resign his office 
by notice in writing addressed to the Commissioner. 
 
(8) Where the office of a member of the Board becomes vacant prior to the expiry of 
his full term of office the National Liberation Council shall, upon the 
recommendation of the Commissioner and subject to the provisions of this Decree 
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appoint another person in his place to hold office for the unexpired portion of his 
term. 
 
(9) All persons ceasing to be members of the Board shall be eligible for re-
appointment to the Board. 
 
(10) The Board may pay to its members and also to persons co-opted under paragraph 
4 of this Decree to attend any meeting of the Board such subsistence, travelling and 
other allowances and at such rates as the Board may with the joint approval of the 
Commissioner and the Commissioner responsible for Finance determine either in 
relation to any particular member or generally. 
 
(11) The Chairman and members of the Board while holding office on the Board shall 
not— 
 
(a) hold any office in or be a member of any committee of any political organisation; 
 
(b) offer themselves as candidates or nominate any other persons as candidates at any 
election of members to any Legislative Assembly or other body having for the time 
being authority either alone or in conjunction with any other body, to enact laws 
which have effect throughout Ghana or to a Council within the meaning of the Local 
Government Act, 1961 (Act 54); 
 
(c) indicate publicly their support for or opposition to any political parties or 
candidates or to the political programmes of such parties or candidates; 
 
(d) publish or cause to be published any article or other matter of a partisan political 
nature; 
 
(e) canvass on behalf of political candidates; 
 
(f) speak in public or broadcast on any subject of a partisan political nature; 
 
(g) allow themselves to be interviewed or express any opinion for publication on any 
subject of a partisan political nature, 
 
and any contravention of the provisions of this sub-paragraph may be certified to be a 
serious misconduct in relation to the duties of a member of the Board for the purposes 
of sub-paragraph (6) of this paragraph. 
 
(12) There shall be a Secretary to the Board who shall be an officer of the Corporation 
and who shall, subject to such general directions as the Board may give and subject to 
the other provisions of this Decree, arrange the business for, and cause to be recorded 
and kept the minutes of all meetings of the Board. 
Section 4-Meetings of the Board. 
(1) The Board shall ordinarily meet for the despatch of business at such times and at 
such places as the Chairman may appoint but shall meet at least once in every month. 
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(2) A special meeting of the Board shall be called by the Secretary to the Board upon 
a request made to him for that purpose in writing signed by not less than four 
members of the Board including the Director-General. 
 
(3) At every meeting of the Board at which he is present, the Chairman shall preside 
and in his absence, a member of the Board appointed by the members present from 
among themselves shall preside. 
 
(4) Questions proposed at a meeting of the Board shall be determined by simple 
majority of members present and voting and in the event of an equality of votes, the 
person presiding shall have a second or casting vote. 
 
(5) The quorum at any meeting of the Board shall be four so however that no quorum 
shall be formed unless the Director-General is present at the meeting. 
 
(6) The Board may at any time co-opt any person or persons to act as an adviser or 
advisers at any of its meetings so, however, that no person so co-opted shall be 
entitled to vote at any such meeting on any matter for decision by the Board. 
 
(7) The validity of any proceedings of the Board shall not be affected by any vacancy 
among its members or by any defect in the appointment of any of them. 
 
(8) Any member of the Board who has any financial interest in any company or 
undertaking with which the Corporation proposes to enter into any contract or who 
has any financial interest in any contract which the Corporation proposes to make 
shall disclose to the Board in writing the nature of his interest and shall be 
disqualified from participating in any deliberations of the Board on the contract or 
voting in any decision of the Board on such contract. 
 
(9) Any contravention of the provisions of sub-paragraph (8) of this paragraph may be 
certified to be a serious misconduct in relation to the duties of a member of the Board 
for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6) of paragraph 3 of this Decree. 
Section 5-Role of the Board. 
(1) The Board shall be responsible for the broad direction of the affairs of the 
Corporation, the conduct of corporate relations with the Government and its agencies 
and the authorization of the annual report of the Corporation's activities. 
 
(2) For its deliberations, the Board may utilize Finance, Programme Advisory and 
Staff committees which may deal with such matters as the following which are not 
necessarily limiting in scope:— 
 
(a) establishment and revision of bye-laws and other instruments made under 
paragraph 19 of this Decree; 
 
(b) establishment of basic policies and directives deemed necessary for the guidance 
of the Director-General; 
 
(c) establishment or approval of objectives with respect to administrative, coverage, 
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finance and control, management, programming and sales; 
 
(d) consideration of bi-annual reports of accountability by the Director-General; 
 
(e) advice and guidance with respect to any aspect of the affairs of the Corporation. 
Section 6-Director-General and Deputy Directors-
General. 
 
(1) There shall be a Director-General of the Corporation who shall be the chief 
executive officer of the Corporation and shall be responsible to the Board for the day-
to-day administration of the Corporation. 
 
(2) There shall also be two Deputy Directors-General of the Corporation who shall, 
subject to the provisions of this Decree— 
 
(a) be charged with the performance of any of the functions of the Director-General 
when the Director-General is absent from Ghana or is otherwise incapacitated from 
performing that function, and 
 
(b) otherwise assist the Director-General in the discharge of the said functions and 
perform such functions as the Director-General may delegate to any of them, 
 
and accordingly unless the context otherwise requires any reference in this Decree to 
Director-General shall include reference to a Deputy Director-General. 
 
(3) The Director-General and the two Deputy Directors-General shall be appointed by 
the National Redemption Council and shall hold and vacate office upon such terms 
and conditions as the National Redemption Council may determine. 
 
(4) A person to be appointed Director-General or Deputy Director-General shall be a 
person who has had experience of and has demonstrated competence in one or more 
of the following fields of endeavour, that is to say, public utility operation and 
practice, industry, broadcasting, trade, finance, science and administration. 
 
(5) The Director-General shall exercise supervision and control over the acts of all 
employees of the Corporation and shall be responsible for disposing of all questions 
relating to the pay, privileges and allowances of the Corporation's employees as laid 
down by the Board. 
 
(6) The Director-General is responsible for the implementation of the Corporation's 
policies, bye-laws, other instruments and objectives in the day-to-day operations of 
the affairs of the Corporation. [As substituted by the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation 
(Amendment) Decree, 1975, (NRCD 334) s. 1a]. 
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Section 6-(A) Directors and Regional 
Directors/Managers. 
(1) There shall be in charge of each division and regional office of the Corporation a 
Director and Regional Director/Manager respectively. 
 
(2) The Director or Regional Director/Manager shall be appointed by the National 
Redemption Council on the advice of the Director-General."; 
Section 7-Staff. 
(1) The Board may from time to time appoint such employees as may be necessary for 
the proper and efficient conduct of the business and functions of the Corporation. 
 
(2) Employees of the Corporation shall hold and vacate office upon such terms and 
conditions as the Board may determine. 
 
(3) The Corporation may also engage the services of such consultants, advisers and 
other persons as the Board may determine and upon such conditions as the Board may 
prescribe. 
 
(4) Public officers may be transferred to the Corporation or may otherwise give 
assistance thereto. 
 
(5) The Corporation shall have an Internal Auditor and the appointment and dismissal 
of any person to or from the post of Internal Auditor shall be made by the Auditor-
General. [As inserted by the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Decrree, 
1975, (NRCD 334) s. 1b]. 
 
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Decree, an Internal Auditor shall be responsible to 
the Director-General for the performance of his functions. 
 
(7) As part of his functions under this Decree, an Internal Auditor shall, at intervals of 
three months, prepare a report on the internal audit work carried out by him during the 
period of three months immediately preceding the preparation of the report and shall, 
as soon as practicable after the preparation of the report, submit the report to the 
Director-General. 
 
(8) The Director-General shall, as soon as practicable after receiving any report 
submitted to him under sub-paragraph (7) of this paragraph, forward a copy of the 
report to the Chairman and also a copy thereof to the Auditor-General. 
 
(9) Without prejudice to the general effect of sub-paragraph (7) of this paragraph, an 
Internal Auditor shall make in each report such observations as appear to him 
necessary as to the conduct of the financial affairs of the Corporation during the 
period to which the report relates. 
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Section 8-National Requirements of the Corporation. 
(1) It shall be the duty of the Corporation to provide as a public service, independent 
and impartial broadcasting services (sound and television) for general reception in 
Ghana. 
 
(2) The Corporation shall in collaboration with such departments of State as may be 
appropriate provide an external sound service through transmission for general 
reception in countries and places outside Ghana. 
 
(3) The Corporation may engage in commercial broadcasting through the sale of paid 
advertisements scheduled at prescribed spots in its programme service. 
Section 9-Output Requirements. 
(1) In its public service broadcasting, the Corporation is expected to provide for— 
 
(a) Government pronouncements, that is, speeches by members of the National 
Liberation Council and Commissioners responsible for departments of State 
consisting of statements of fact or explaining the policies and actions of the 
Government; 
 
(b) party political speeches dealing with the views and policies of the various political 
parties (when they come into being); 
 
(c) speeches expressing different points of view on matters of controversy; 
 
(d) matters of any kind (including religious services or ceremonies) representing the 
main stream of religious thought or belief in the country. 
 
(2) In its broadcasting of the items mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph 
the Corporation shall allocate and apportion air-time equitably between the parties, 
points of view and religious bodies according to their respective claims upon the 
interest of members of the public of Ghana. 
Section 10-Funds of Corporation. 
(1) The funds of the Corporation shall include— 
 
(a) grants made by the Government to the Corporation; 
 
(b) loans obtained on the guarantee of the Government from the National Investment 
Bank or such other Banks as the Commissioner responsible for Finance may approve; 
 
(c) any moneys accruing to the Corporation in the course of the discharge of its 
functions. 
 
(2) All moneys received by the Corporation shall be deposited to the credit of the 
Corporation in the Ghana Commercial Bank or such other bank as the Commissioner 
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responsible for Finance may approve. 
 
(3) No loans shall be raised by the Corporation except with the prior approval of the 
Commissioner responsible for Finance. 
Section 11-Accounts. 
(1) The Corporation shall keep proper books of account and proper records in relation 
thereto. 
 
(2) The Corporation shall prepare, in respect of each financial year, a statement of 
account which shall include— 
 
(a) a balance sheet, a statement of income and expenditure and a statement of surplus 
containing such information as had the Corporation been a company registered under 
the Companies Code (Act 179) would be required to be laid before the company by 
the Directors at an annual meeting, and 
 
(b) such other information in respect of the financial affairs of the Corporation as the 
Commissioner or the Commissioner responsible for Finance may require. 
 
(3) The Corporation shall, as soon as possible but within three months after the 
termination of each financial year, submit to the Commissioner an annual report 
which shall include the statements of account specified in sub-paragraph (2) of this 
paragraph and the Commissioner responsible for Information shall as soon as 
practicable cause it to be laid before the National Liberation Council. 
 
(4) The Corporation's financial year shall end on the 30th day of June in each year. 
 
(5) For the purposes of this paragraph the period extending from the commencement 
of this Decree to the 30th day of June, 1968, shall be deemed to be a financial year. 
Section 12-Audit. 
(1) The books and accounts of the Corporation shall be audited each year by the 
Auditor-General or an auditor appointed by him. 
 
(2) The Auditor-General shall, not later than the 30th day of September in each year, 
forward to the Commissioner a copy of the audited accounts of the Corporation for 
the financial year ending the 30th day of June immediately preceding and his report 
thereon. 
 
(3) The Auditor-General or the auditor appointed by him shall report annually to the 
Board the result of his examination of the accounts and financial statement of the 
Corporation, and the report shall state whether in his opinion— 
 
(a) proper books of accounts have been kept by the Corporation; 
 
(b) the financial statement of the Corporation: 
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(i) was prepared on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year and is in 
agreement with the books of accounts; 
 
(ii) in the case of the balance sheet, gives a true and fair view of the state of the 
Corporation's affairs as at the end of the financial year; 
 
(iii) in the case of the statement of income and expenditure, gives a true and fair view 
of the income and expenditure or profit and loss of the Corporation for the financial 
year; 
 
and the Auditor-General or the auditor appointed by him shall call the attention of the 
Board to any other matter falling within the scope of his examination which, in his 
opinion, should be brought to the attention of the Board. 
 
(4) The Auditor-General or the auditor appointed by him shall, from time to time 
make to the Corporation such other reports as he may deem necessary or as the 
Commissioner responsible for Finance may require. 
 
(5) The annual report of the Auditor-General or the auditor appointed by him shall be 
included in the annual report of the Corporation. 
Section 13-Power of Corporation to Authorise Entry of 
Lands. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph any person authorised in that behalf by 
the Corporation for the discharge of its functions under this Decree may enter and 
remain on any land— 
 
(a) for the purpose of erecting, maintaining and inspecting any installations belonging 
to the Corporation (such as its wired broadcasting installations) or for the purpose of 
repairing, altering or removing any such installations; 
 
(b) to cut and remove on the site of any proposed or existing installation all such trees 
and underwood as may interfere or be likely to interfere with the construction or 
proper working of any installation; and 
 
(c) for the purpose of carrying out any other work or activity reasonably necessary for 
giving effect to the principles and purposes of this Decree. 
 
(2) Except with the consent of the owner or occupier of the land or of his authorised 
agent no person shall enter upon any land under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph 
except by day or unless the owner or occupier or his authorised agent has been given 
reasonable notice of the intention to enter the land and of the purpose of such entry: 
 
Provided that where the condition of any installation is such as to endanger life or 
property a person authorised by the Corporation may enter any land on which the 
installation is situated at any reasonable time for any of the purposes set out in sub-
paragraph (1) of this paragraph. 
 
(3) If the owner or occupier of any land to be entered under this paragraph or his 
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authorised agent cannot be found after reasonable enquiry it shall be sufficient for the 
purposes of sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph if the notice referred to in that sub-
paragraph is put into writing and affixed to some conspicuous place on the land 
proposed to be entered for a reasonable length of time. 
 
(4) Any person authorised to enter any land under this paragraph shall, in discharging 
any function under this paragraph do as little damage as possible and the Corporation 
shall pay compensation in respect of such damage and where the surface of any road 
or street has been disturbed in the discharge of any such function, the Corporation 
shall, as far as practicable restore it to its former condition. 
 
(5) The amount of any compensation to be paid under sub-paragraph (4) of this 
paragraph shall, in the case of difference, be settled by arbitration in accordance with 
the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38). 
Section 14-Interference with Wires, Etc. of Corporation 
by Other Person. 
Where any Government Department, local authority, statutory corporation or any 
individual or other person undertakes any repairs or alterations of any road, street, 
railway, wharf, pier, bridge, waterworks or of any telegraphic, telephonic, or electric 
power cables, entailing the removal of or any injury to any wired broadcasting output 
or plant, works or equipment belonging to the Corporation, the expenses of the repair, 
removal and replacement of such wired broadcasting output, plant, works or 
equipment shall be borne as the case may be, by the Government Department, local 
authority, statutory corporation, individual or other person concerned. 
Section 14-(A) Unauthorised Connection to Broadcasting 
Output, etc. of Corporation. 
Any person who with intent to receive or disrupt any broadcasting service of the 
Corporation and without the authority of the Corporation, makes a connection to any 
part of the wired broadcasting output, network, plant or equipment, of the Corporation 
commits an offence and shall be liable on a first conviction to a fine not exceeding 
fifty new cedis, and on a subsequent conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred 
new cedis or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months or to both such fine 
and imprisonment. [As inserted by Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) 
Decree, 1969 (NLCD 385)s.1]. 
Section 15-Radio and Television Receiving Set Licence 
Fees to be Fixed on the Recommendations of the 
Corporation. 
Where power is granted by any enactment to any authority or person to fix the fees to 
be paid for obtaining a radio receiving set licence or a television receiving set licence 
the power shall only be exercisable upon the recommendations of the Corporation and 
the Telecommunications Act, 1961 (Act 112) and the Television Licensing Decree, 
1966 (NLCD 89) shall have effect accordingly. 
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Section 16-Corporation Exempted from Provisions of Act 
112. 
The provisions of the Telecommunications Act, 1962 (Act 112) shall not apply so as 
to require the Corporation to obtain any licence under that Act. 
Section 17-Exemption from Income Tax. 
The Corporation in its commercial and ancillary business operations shall be 
exempted from the provisions of the Income Tax Decree, 1966 (NLCD 78). 
Section 18-Emergency Power of the Government. 
(1) Where at any time the National Liberation Council is of the opinion that a national 
emergency has arisen in which it is necessary in the public interest that the 
Government should control broadcasts made by the Corporation, the National 
Liberation Council may so declare by notice published in the Gazette or by such other 
mode of public announcement or notification as the circumstances may permit. 
 
(2) Where an emergency has been declared under sub-paragraph (1) of this 
paragraph— 
 
(a) the Commissioner may give such directions to the Corporation as the National 
Liberation Council may deem to be necessary to meet the requirements of the 
emergency so declared, and the Corporation shall give effect to such directions, 
 
(b) the Government may take over the Broadcasting Service of the Corporation, so, 
however, that it shall only do so by specific demand made in that respect by the 
Chairman or in his absence by the Deputy Chairman of the National Liberation 
Council. 
Section 19-Power to Make Bye-laws and Other 
Instruments. 
The Corporation may by the Board make bye-laws and other instruments not being 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree for the purpose of regulating its 
business or any matter falling within the scope of its functions and without prejudice 
to the generality of the foregoing, such bye-laws or other instruments may regulate the 
application of the Corporation's seal to legal documents and may also regulate the 
conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation. 
Section 20-Interpretation. 
In this Decree, unless the context otherwise requires— 
 
"Corporation" means the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation established by this Decree; 
 
"Commissioner" means the Commissioner responsible for Information. 
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Section 21-Dissolution and Transfer of Assets and 
Liabilities. 
(1) The body corporate known immediately before the commencement of this Decree 
as the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation is hereby dissolved and consequently the 
Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Instrument, 1965 (LI 472) is hereby revoked. 
 
(2) All assets, rights and liabilities of the said body are hereby transferred to the 
Corporation. 
 
(3) The Director-General, the Deputy Director-General and all employees of the said 
body holding office immediately before the commencement of this Decree shall 
continue in office subject to the provisions of this Decree. 
 
(4) Any instrument made under Part X of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation 
Instrument, 1965 (LI 472) and in force immediately before the commencement of this 
Decree shall continue in force as if made under paragraph 19 of this Decree. 
 
(5) Any reference in any enactment in existence at the commencement of this Decree 
to the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation shall be construed as a reference to the 
Corporation established by this Decree. 
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GUIDELINES FOR BROADCASTING 
 
PREAMBLE 
 
Taking into consideration the importance and sensitivity of the electronic media for 
the promotion of freedom of expression, democracy, national culture, as well as 
social and economic development, the following standards shall apply in the 
preparation, presentation and transmission not only of programmes but also of 
advertising material on any broadcasting station transmitting in Ghana. 
 
1. National Identity of Programming 
 
(a) In pursuance of the stated cultural and social development objectives of             
broadcasting in Ghana emphasis shall be placed on the broadcast of local             
programmes and the development of a national identity as a major priority by all 
broadcasting stations authorized to operate in Ghana. 
 
(b) Broadcasting stations shall endeavour at all times to reflect and promote             
national development in their programmes and other output including advertising, 
protection of the environment, family planning and gender issues. 
 
(c) Broadcasting stations shall, in particular, facilitate the participation of marginalized 
individuals and communities in national priority-setting and decision-making by 
providing them access to express their views and share their knowledge in 
programmes. 
 
 
2. Accuracy, Objectivity and Fairness 
 
(a) Information given in any programme, should be presented accurately, honestly 
and impartially. 
 
(b) All issues of public interest should be adequately presented to ensure fairness. 
 
(c) The right of reply should be guaranteed to any person or body with a genuine 
claim to misrepresentation. 
 
 
3. Good Taste And Decency 
 
(a) Broadcast programmes should avoid all indecency and incitement to ethnic, 
religious or sectional hatred and disaffection. 
 
(b) Obscene or vulgar language, expressions and presentations should not be used. 
 
(c) The sanctity of marriage and family values should be promoted and strictly 
upheld. 
 
(d) Care should be taken not to offend the sensibilities of disabled and handicapped 
persons. 
 
(e) The use of lewd or profane expressions, except in a specifically relevant context, 
should be avoided. 
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(f) Foreign values should be presented in a manner as not to have a negative 
influence on the community. 
 
(g) Ghanaian cultural rites and practices of value should be promoted with accuracy. 
 
(h) Standards and guidelines set for locally-produced programmes, advertisements 
and other broadcast material shall apply equally to foreign originated programmes 
and advertisements relayed or re-broadcast over the airwaves of Ghana. 
 
 
4. Language in Broadcasts 
Presenters and speakers on radio and television serve as role models, as far as the 
use of language is concerned. Broadcasting stations should ensure at all times that 
their presenters and participants in their programmes speak language appropriate to 
the programme and of the highest possible standard. 
 
 
5. Authenticity 
(a) Great care must be taken that broadcasting does not blur the distinction between 
truth and fiction. 
 
(b) Fictional events, including reconstructions, shall be identified as such. 
 
(c) Statements or information that could be ambiguous or misleading should be 
avoided. 
 
 
6. Morality and Social Values 
(a) Undesirable aspects of human nature, such as cruelty, greed, lust, selfishness, 
and vindictiveness should not be glamorized. 
 
(b) Drunkenness and robbery should not be allowed in programmes except as 
destructive habits to be avoided or denounced. 
 
(c) The use of narcotic substances should only be presented to educate the public on 
their harmful effects. 
 
(d) Sex-related crimes, such as prostitution, rape, bestiality, incest, etc., should be 
portrayed as destructive practices to be avoided or denounced.  
 
(e) Liquor consumption and smoking should be shown only when consistent with plot 
and character development. 
 
(f) Suicide should not be treated as an acceptable solution to human problems. 
 
(g) Programmes meant for adults of 18 years and above should be broadcast only 
after 10:10pm. 
7. Portrayal of Sex 
(a) Treatment of sex in all programmes or as part of entertainment should be handled 
in a manner not to offend the moral dignity, decency and sensibilities of the audience. 
 
(b) Documentaries or programmes dealing with a variety of sexual themes shall not 
make public and explicit what should be private and exclusive. 
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(c) Where a story involves actual sexual relations, it should be presented without 
undue exploitation of its sexual aspects. 
 
(d) In representing sexual activity in televised or filmed drama, producers should 
consider whether the degree of explicitness is justified by the context in which it 
occurs. 
 
(e) Actual sexual intercourse between humans should at no time be transmitted. 
 
 
8. Crime, Law and Order 
(a) Language or scenes likely to encourage or incite crime, glorify war or lead to 
disorder should be avoided. 
 
(b) Criminal tendencies should be presented as undesirable. 
 
(c) The treatment of the commission of crime in a frivolous and permissive manner 
should be avoided. 
 
(d) The presentation of techniques of crime, in such detail as to invite imitation, 
should be avoided. 
 
(e) Law enforcement should be upheld at all times in a manner that affirms that law 
and order are the universally-accepted norms of society. 
 
 
9. Broadcasts and the Law 
Broadcasters should satisfy themselves that the contents of all programmes are not 
at variance with the Constitution of Ghana nor infringe laws and regulations such as: 
 
(a) Laws of libel and sedition 
 
(b) The Copyright Law of 1985 (P.N.D.C. L110) 
 
(c) Copyright Society of Ghana Regulations 1992 (L.I. 1527) 
 
(d) Any other relevant laws, regulations, international treaties or obligations relating 
to broadcasting and the standards set out in these guidelines. 
 
 
10. Portrayal of Violence, Cruelty and Horror 
(a) Broadcasting shall at all times uphold respect for the dignity of human beings and 
their environment. 
(b) All forms of domestic violence should be presented as undesirable. 
 
(c) Excessive or detailed portrayal of physical suffering and pain or images of human 
and animal parts shall be avoided. 
 
(d) Sexual violence and violence directed at older people or children should be 
reported with particular sensitivity. 
 
 325 
(e) In representing violent crimes, programmes should not glamorize the criminal or 
soften their image in a manner which may diminish the ugliness and severity of 
crime. 
 
(f) In reconstructing a crime involving violence care should be taken not to over-
emphasize the dramatic aspects of the incident nor discuss the weapons used in 
unnecessary detail. 
 
(g) Violence should not be portrayed in drama as an end in itself or for the purposes 
of entertainment. 
 
(h) Care should be taken about the intrusion of violence into locations regarded as 
places of safety such as hospitals, places of worship and homes which may threaten 
some people’s sense of security and seriously reduce the quality of their lives. 
 
(i) Violent crimes should not be presented to the extent that they will have a “copycat” 
effect. 
 
(j) TV stations should avoid repeated exposure of their audiences to violence, which 
will desensitize them and make them indifferent to the plight of victims. 
 
(k) The degradation of women as objects of male violence should not be encouraged. 
 
 
11. Children’s Programmes 
(a) Materials likely to affect adversely the sensitivities and sensibilities of children 
should be avoided. 
 
(b) Any programme which contravenes social values, shows disrespect for law and 
order, or departs from an honourable life-style should be forbidden. 
 
(c) Programmes with “adult” content e.g. sexually-explicit scenes or language should 
not be broadcast when children are likely to be watching or listening. 
 
(d) Swearing or blasphemous language of any kind should be avoided. 
 
(e) Children should be protected from ethnic or other complexes resulting from 
careless or deliberate comparisons or information. 
 
(f) Violence and crime should not be glamorized but should be portrayed as 
punishable. 
 
(g) Foreign folklore and values should be identified as such and treated with caution 
to prevent undue influence 
(h) Ghanaian culture, folklore and values should be promoted. Popular superstitions 
should be handled with discretion. 
 
 
12. Quiz Programmes 
Programmes such as contests of knowledge, information, skill or luck should be 
absolutely genuine and not contrived through collusion with, or amongst, 
contestants, or any other action which will favour one contestant over another. 
Results shall not be the product of any malpractice. 
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13. Music 
(a) In the choice of music for all applications in broadcasting, emphasis shall  be 
placed on African music particularly Ghanaian music. 
 
(b) Ghanaian and African music shall constitute a minimum of fifty (50) percent of all 
music broadcast by any radio or television station in any particular week. Care should 
also be taken to have a fair representation of local ethnic talent. 
 
(c) The provision covering good taste and decency, morality and social values, shall 
also apply to music, particularly lyrics and visual presentation. 
 
 
14. Schools Programmes 
(a) All Stations must endeavour to broadcast instructional educational programmes to 
support the work of the Ministry of Education. Such programmes are referred to in 
this code as Schools Programmes i.e. educational programmes based on a specific 
curriculum designed for systematic teaching of a subject with an object of preparing 
people for an examination at any level of the educational system. 
 
(b) Schools programmes must be of high quality and broadcast in consultation with 
appropriate educational authority 
 
(c) The integrity of schools programmes must not be compromised or influenced by 
sponsorship or advertising considerations. 
 
(d) Advertising in school programmes should be in conformity with the theme of the 
programme and should give useful and relevant information with credits for the 
Sponsors. Sponsors’ advertisements shall only be allowed at the beginning and at 
the end of schools programmes. 
 
(e) People who present schools programmes must have the appropriate qualification 
in the subject(s) they present. 
 
 
15. Drama and Film 
(a) Film and Drama programmes must serve as important means of education, 
promotion of national consciousness, entertainment, as well as vehicles for 
promoting the social, economic and cultural objectives of the Nation. 
 
(b) As far as possible, broadcasters shall devote at least 50% of their airtime to local 
productions. 
 
(c) Television broadcasters are encouraged to show Ghanaian and African films. 
 
(d) An internal mechanism of censoring local and foreign films and radio programmes 
should be established to safeguard Ghanaian values and interests. 
 
(e) Films and radio and television programmes with adult content should not be 
broadcast when children are likely to be watching or listening. 
 
(f) Violence and crime should not be glamorized in films but should be 
portrayed as punishable. 
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(g) Pornography and copying of foreign values and expressions, which are likely to 
impact negatively on Ghanaians, should be discouraged. 
 
(h) Upgrading of the quality of local productions should be encouraged and 
promoted. 
 
(i) The scheduling of all films and television programmes should be guided by 
existing classification policy. 
 
(j) Discretion should be used in the portrayal of women in film and drama to 
avoid presenting a consistently negative and stereotyped image. 
 
 
16. News and Current Affairs Programmes 
(a) In order to promote diversity, broadcasters should endeavour to have regular 
news programmes in their broadcast schedules. 
 
(b) All news reports should be truthful, accurate and impartial. 
 
(c) News commentaries and analyses should be clearly identified as such. 
 
(d) Programmes devoted to he discussion of controversial public affairs should 
ensure fairness and balance of views. 
 
(e) Commercials and paid-for items in news and current affairs programmes should 
be placed and presented in a manner that will make them clearly distinguishable from 
the programmes. 
 
(f) All transmissions intended to supply information and help form public opinion 
should be thoroughly researched and assertions of fact should be verifiable. 
 
 
17. Political Broadcasts 
(a) All broadcasts in support of political parties or candidates whether paid for or on 
free air-time basis shall be clearly identified as such. 
 
(b) Coverage of political activities must include the aim of collecting and 
disseminating truthful, unbiased information on political parties and their activities to 
the public. 
 
(c) Broadcasters must provide the public with information that would enable the 
electorate to make intelligent choices during elections. 
 
(d) Stations are to ensure that coverage of political activities is comprehensive and 
fair to all and that the information gathered is presented also objectively and 
impartially as possible. 
 
(e) Broadcasting station operators shall maintain a logbook with detailed records on 
all political broadcasts. Such records shall be made available on request to the to the 
National Media Commission and members of the public. 
 
(f) Details to be recorded in the log-book shall include, but shall not be limited to, the 
following: 
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i. Date, time and duration of broadcasts; 
 
ii. Personalities involved, and 
 
iii. Subject matter. 
 
(g) Media practitioners must remain neutral in partisan politics and avoid all 
associations and activities that may compromise their integrity as journalists or 
damage their credibility. 
 
(h) The host of any political programme who is identified with a particular 
political party should be required to be fair to all parties. 
 
(i) Presentation of government activities during elections should be weighed carefully 
to ensure that the incumbent party does not gain unfair access to the media. Bona 
fide news should be covered without giving the impression of bias. 
 
(j) All political broadcasts should be in decent language. 
 
(k) Controversial or offensive references to opponents must be avoided, if at all 
possible, unless there is clear justification. 
 
(l) Conditions for broadcasting political and party candidates programmes should be 
the same for all political parties. 
 
 
18. Religious Programmes 
(a) The opportunity for religious broadcast presentations should be made available to 
the various religions in the community, but caution should be applied that the 
expectations of listeners and viewers are not abused. 
 
(b) Religious broadcasts that relate to religious doctrine exclusively, should be 
presented by responsible representatives of the religion. 
 
(c) Religious broadcasts should not contain any attack on, or ridicule of, any other 
religion. 
 
(d) The content of religious programmes shall be prepared with due regard 
and respect for the beliefs and sensibilities of all religions. 
 
(e) Conditions for broadcasting religious programmes should be the same 
for all religious groups. 
 
 
19. Advertisements 
(i) Advertisements shall be clearly identified as such and distinguished from normal 
programmes. There shall be not more than ten (10) minutes of advertisements in any 
one (1) hour. 
 
(ii) Legality 
(a) No advertisement shall be broadcast in connection with a product or service, 
which is illegal. 
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(b) It is the responsibility of broadcasters to ensure that all claims made on behalf of 
a product or service can be substantiated. 
 
(iii) Programme Sponsorship 
(a) Sponsorship shall be allowed for entire programmes or parts of a programme, 
except the news and programmes dealing with current political or industrial 
controversy. However, sponsorship may be allowed for specialist reports, e.g. 
financial news, weather, traffic and sports. 
 
(b) No political party will be allowed to sponsor any programme other than a political 
broadcast. 
 
(c) Sponsorship conditions shall not interfere with the integrity of the programmes. 
However, commercial breaks may be allowed in such programmes. 
 
(d) Editorial responsibility for sponsored programmes remains with the broadcaster. 
 
(e) Sponsorship of a programme or part of a programme by a promoter of a product 
or service shall also be considered as advertising. 
 
(iv) Unacceptable Advertising 
(a) No advertisement shall cause those who see or hear it unwarranted anxiety. 
Neither shall there be an appeal to fear. 
 
(b) No advertisement shall promote stereotypes or in any way denigrate any 
individual or group in society, religions, faiths and philosophies of life. 
 
(c) It is unethical for certain professions to advertise. They are Physicians, Lawyers, 
Dentists, Osteopaths, Chiropractors, Occultists, Optometrists and others of a similar 
nature. 
 
(d) Advertising of tobacco products should not be allowed. 
 
(v) Advertising and Children 
 
(a) When children are likely to be viewing or listening, no product or service may be 
advertised and no method of advertising should be employed which takes advantage 
of their natural credulity and susceptibility. 
 
(b) Advertisements should not exhort children to purchase or to ask 
parents/guardians to purchase items/services. 
 
(c) Advertisements for the following should not be transmitted during children’s 
programmes or adjacent to them: 
 
i) Alcoholic drinks 
ii) Medicines 
iii) Contraceptives 
iv) Traillers of films with adult content, that is sex, violence, nudity and bad language. 
v) Any other items that could pose a danger to children. 
 
(d) Advertisements, which may frighten or cause distress to children should be 
subject to appropriate restrictions on time of transmission. 
 
(e) Children in advertisements should be well mannered and well behaved. 
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(f) Raffles and lotteries should not be advertised in or juxtaposed to children’s 
programmes neither should advertisements for such events be targeted at them. 
 
(vi) Alcoholic Drinks 
(a) Advertising of alcoholic drinks should not be directed at persons under 18 years in 
contravention of the Liquor Licensing Act 1970 (Act 331). Presentation of 
advertisements on alcoholic drinks likely to be of particular appeal to children should 
be avoided. 
 
(b) Children should not be seen or heard in an advertisement for alcoholic drinks. 
 
(c) In advertisements for drinks containing alcohol anyone associated with drinking 
should be or appear to be at least 18 years old. 
 
(d) Advertisements for alcoholic drinks should not feature any personality whose 
example persons under 18 years are likely to emulate or who has a particular appeal 
to persons under that age. 
 
(e) Advertisements should not imply that drinking is essential to social success or 
acceptance or that refusal is a sign of weakness. It should also not be implied that 
the successful outcome of a social occasion is dependent on the consumption of 
alcohol. 
 
(f) Advertisements should not claim that alcohol has therapeutic qualities nor should 
it be presented as a stimulant, sedative or tranquiliser.  
 
(g) While advertisements may refer to refreshment after physical performance they 
should not give any impression that performance can be improved by alcoholic 
drinks. 
(h) Advertisements should not suggest that a drink is to be preferred because of 
higher alcohol content or intoxicating effect. 
 
(i) Nothing in an advertisement should link drinking of alcohol with driving or the 
operation of potentially dangerous machinery. 
 
(j) Advertisements should neither claim nor suggest that any alcoholic drink can 
contribute towards sexual success or can enhance sexual attractiveness. 
 
(k) Advertisements should not suggest that regular solitary drinking is acceptable or 
that drinking is a means of resolving personal problems. 
 
(l) No advertisement should suggest that drinking is an essential attribute of 
masculinity. Advertisements featuring toughness or bravado in association with 
drinking should not be used. Alcoholic drinks should not be advertised in the context 
of aggressive or anti-social behaviour. 
 
(m) Alcoholic drinks should not be seen to be consumed in a working environment 
unless it is clearly established that the working day has ended. 
 
 
(vii) Financial Advertising 
(a) Advertisements should not present a financial product or service in  
misleading terms. 
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(b) References to taxation or interest on savings etc. should be clearly explained, and 
be factually correct at the time of transmission. 
 
(c) Advertisements should comply with legal requirements. 
 
(d) Any advertisement which falls in a grey area should be referred to the appropriate 
authority for clearance. 
 
(viii) Comparisons 
Advertisements should not unfairly attack or discredit other products or services, 
advertisers or advertisements expressly or by implication. 
 
(ix) Health Claims, Medicines and Medical Treatment etc. 
(a) Medicines require great care in their advertising, and health claims require very 
close scrutiny. Therefore all advertising of medicines and pharmaceutical products 
should be screened by the Pharmacy Council. 
 
(b) No script or advertisement should be accepted which may mislead persons to 
believe that the product or service has the endorsement of any health authority. 
 
(c) Advertising for alternative medicines and medical treatment should meet the 
same requirements as do orthodox non-prescription medicines and treatment. 
However these may need to be channelled through an establishment familiar with 
that area of alternative medicine. 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Station Identification and Monitoring of Programmes 
(a) Each station shall, during its normal broadcasting hours, transmit at intervals not 
exceeding 30 minutes, a station identification which shall include the station name 
and operating frequencies. 
 
(b) Broadcasting stations shall operate logging systems. Station logs shall be 
available at all times for inspection by the appropriate authorities. 
 
(c) Each station shall keep a daily log of all transmitted programmes for a period of 
(six) 6 months. 
 
 
21. Programme Relays 
Caution should be exercised in the relay of foreign broadcasts since they may 
directly or indirectly subvert national identity, culture and self-respect. Such 
broadcasts if any, should only be relayed through a local station. 
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General Interview Guide 
 
Name: 
Position / Title: 
Main Programmes worked: 
 
 
Normal Processes 
1. Describe you normal process of beginning a programme production: 
a. How is programme content developed? 
b. Is there an ideological underpinning to ideation for productions? 
c. What criteria (standards & content) are employed for production 
d. To what extent are ideas influenced by social, political and economic 
factors? 
e. To what extent are ideas influenced by offerings on imported foreign 
content? 
 
2. What outcomes (quality, message, audience feedback) are desired for 
productions 
 
3. How do you intend to monitor/measure production outcomes? 
 
Public Service Values 
4. How would you relate your work to a ‗public service values‘ influenced 
process? 
 
5. To what extent are the international benchmarks of ‗public service values‘ 
applied? 
a. Explore notions of diversity, universal access to the content of 
productions, distinctiveness and independence. 
b. Explore notions of social cohesion and social capital enhancement in 
the educative nature of content 
 
6. Can you relate these to the work you do and give examples? 
a. Diversity – genres, regional representation, ethnic (esp. minorities) 
representation, programme participation for disabled and sensory 
impaired, socio-economic and political plurality 
b. Universality – access nationally, access for sensory impaired, access 
across language divides, 
c. How do you relate these values to your work and Ghanaian society? 
 
7. How do you relate these to your work process within GTv? 
 
Reflective Processes 
8. Is there a use of a formal documentation of programme aims, objectives, 
standards, desires in programme content making and outcomes from the 
beginning? 
a. What documents are these drawn from? 
b. How often do you refer to these documents? 
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c. How are these outcomes monitored/measured? 
 
9. Is there another formal process for deciding aims, objectives, standards, 
desires in programme content and outcomes? 
a. How do these processes work? 
 
10. How are these outcomes monitored/measured? 
 
11. What learning has been gained through the monitoring process? 
 
12. Training 
a. Are there formalised training processes aimed at helping you improve 
your work? 
b. Are these sessions aimed at development communication 
understanding and enrichment? 
 
 
Development Communication 
13. Is there a formalised objective to create programmes for social and national 
development in your work? 
 
14. How often do you refer to these formal objectives? 
 
15. What processes are used to develop such programme ideas? 
 
16. How are affected communities engaged with when making such programmes? 
 
17. How are outcomes monitored / measured? 
 
18. How much dialogue should there be between GTv and its audience? 
 
19. In what ways, do you think GTv contributes to national development? 
 
20. How could this be improved? 
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Broadcast Data and Number Codes for SPSS Analysis 
 
Codes    
Programming 
Types Genre Audience Production 
1 Information News Adult In-house 
2 Education Sport Youth Out-house 
3 Entertainment Film Children Co-prod. 
4 Unknown Factual Family Unknown 
5   Learning     
6   Sitcom     
7   Variety     
8   Music (Pop)     
9   Music (Religious)     
10   Telenovela     
11   Culture     
12   Christian Teaching     
13   Fashion/Beauty     
14   Local Drama     
15   Islamic Teaching     
16   TV Serial     
17   Game Show     
18   Talkshow     
19   Soap     
20   Quiz     
21   Line-Up/Announcements     
22   Branded Infotainment     
23   Life     
24   Unknown     
25   Product Advertising     
 
Codes    Origin Interactivity 
Language 
Used 
Government 
Communication 
1 USA Studio English Yes 
2 Germany Phone-in Akan No 
3 Hispanic None Ga Unknown 
4 Britain Unknown Nzema 
5 Ghana   Dagbani 
6 Nigeria   Ewe 
7 
Other 
African   French 
8 Unknown   Multi-lingual 
9     
Local 
language 
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Rev Minister: Homosexuals compete with babies for diapers 
 
Published On: August 27, 2011, 00:00 GMT 
The argument against homosexuality has taken a new twist with the 
superintendent minister for the Wa Methodist Church of Ghana insinuating that 
homosexual men compete with babies for diapers. 
 
At an induction ceremony, the Very Rev. Samuel. C. Hagan, claimed diapers are 
in short supply owing to the “evil” activities of gay men. 
 
His utterances follow weeks of heated debate over the rights or wrongs of the 
practice of homosexuality in the country. 
 
Human rights advocates have called for the rights of lesbians and homosexuals to 
be respected. 
 
But critics, particularly religious leaders, have been quick to revolt. 
 
The Very Reverend Samuel Hagan minced no words in condemning the activities 
of gay men. 
 
In a report filed Joy News’ Upper West correspondent Rafiq Salam, Samuel Hagan 
criticized pastors who he said presided over gay marriages. 
 
He commended human rights advocates for championing the respect for the 
rights of the vulnerable in society but admonished them against championing the 
rights of homosexuals. 
 
“Your rights of freedom to pursue freedom for others are good but don’t use 
freedom as a covering for evil.” 
 
“Now there are many men who are struggling with babies for the demand of 
pampers,” he noted. 
 
“I challenge all religious bodies to come out clear and state their positions since 
the menace of homosexuality is consuming the society like a bush fire,’ he stated. 
 
  
Source: Joy News/Myjoyonline.com/Ghana 
Link: http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201106/68272.php 
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Homosexuality: Stop the double standards! Anna Bossman 
tells pastors 
 
Published On: August 2, 2011, 00:00 GMT 
 
The outgoing Acting Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice, Anna Bossman has taken a swipe at some members of the 
clergy whom she said have been inciting hatred against homosexuals in the 
country.  
 
Speaking on the Personality Profile edition of Multi TV’s current affairs program 
pm: EXPRESS, Ms. Bossman asked society, particularly members of the clergy 
not to be hypocritical on issues concerning homosexuals. 
 
Some pastors have in recent times condemned the increasing reports homosexual 
activities in the country with a Methodist Bishop in the Upper West region recently 
alluding to the fact that owing to the increasing number of gay men in the 
country, they are now having to compete with babies for diapers. 
 
But Ms. Bossman thinks the hate message by the men of God is out of tune with 
the religion they profess. 
 
“I don’t know whether I can claim to be a very devout Christian... I can’t claim 
that I am someone who reads the Bible all the time but I know one thing, if you 
are a Christian it means that you’re following Jesus Christ and I know from the 
things I have read that when it came to the matter of an adulteress, there was a 
story right in the Bible about an adulteress when people were going to stone her 
because she was an adulteress and they asked Jesus about it what did he say? 
'He who is without sin let him be the first to cast the stone.' That’s what he said, 
why, because the whole religion, Christianity is about compassion, it’s not about 
going and standing and inciting hate.” 
 
“That is what I understand. I am not a priest but in my layman understanding, I 
know that the least I can do is to show compassion to others. That’s the least I 
can do and I will never go and stand anywhere and incite hate against anybody, 
never” she stated. 
 
Ms Bossman accused the priests of closing their eyes to the numerous cases of 
child sexual abuse even though they they know most of the perpetrators and 
failing to condemn the practice and rather focus on bashing homosexuals. 
 
“Why are we not making noise about these people who are preying on vulnerable 
and defenceless children? If you talk to me about these things, yes I’ll have 
something to say about these things. Why are we not talking about parents, 
especially men who are in very high positions and who are regarded as a pillar of 
society. Why are we not talking about them who rape their daughters and we 
know them. You are hiding your face behind things that are really atrocious and 
then you’re going to worry about persons who consensually, they’re not doing 
anything to anybody, they’re doing to themselves – it’s not my problem.” 
 
“These other things that I’m talking to you about, rape of children, the violence 
against women, defenceless women, these are things that we should really be 
talking about and we should try to do something about it and so I take great 
exception to persons and even priests and pastors who can come and stand and 
incite hate against persons who are different but at the same time they are 
protecting persons who are doing unspeakable things to children” she said. 
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According to Ms. Bossman, “the issue is really is not the marriage, I don’t think 
that’s really the issue. But the real issue is the way and manner we treat others 
because they are different from us. That’s the real issue so I don’t think it should 
be brought down to same sex marriage. It’s how are we treating people 
differently. Are we treating people humanely and with compassion and are we 
recognising that people might be completely different from us but do have the 
same rights of respect and do have fundamental human rights, that the real 
issue.” 
 
She urged society not to be hypocritical on the issue since “there are many things 
that we cannot explain and when we cannot explain them then our reaction is 
either because of fear maybe or simply 
javascript:openNewWindow('pix.asp',%20'PhotoGallery','900','800');because of 
whatever reason we start doing things we shouldn’t be doing. What we have to 
accept is that there are people who obviously are not like us or they do view love 
but they find that they are attracted to the same sex.” 
 
 
 
Nii Akrofi Smart-Abbey/ Multi TV/ Ghana  
 
Link: http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201107/68552.php 
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    Personality and Job Function Codes 
 
 
Interviewees: 
X1 - GTv Producer-Director, Documentaries.  
Worked 20 years at GTv.  
Trained in-house, at NAFTI (HND, Television) and Westminster University (MA, 
Television Production) 
X2 - GTv Producer-Director, Sports and Music Entertainment. 
  Worked 6 years at Gtv 
Trained in-house and South Africa on a short-course, and University of Ghana (BA, 
Humanities)  
                         
X3 - GTv Producer-Director, Drama and Live Events. 
  Worked 11yrs at GTv 
Trained at NAFTI (BA, Television).  
X4 - GTv Producer-Director and Chief Controller of Programmes  
  Worked 21 yrs at GTv. 
  Trained in-house and at NAFTI (HND, Television). 
X5 - GTv Head of Programmes   
Worked 33 years at GTv. 
  Trained in-house and at NAFTI (HND, Television) 
X6 - GTv Executive Producer.  
Worked 38 years at GTV 
  Trained in-house and at NAFTI (HND, Television) 
X7 - GBC Researcher 
  Worked 37years at GBC 
X8 - Former Director of Television 
 
 
Job Functions 
P1 - Director of Television (DTv), Head of Television Division 
 
P2 - Director-General, GBC, Head of Executive Board, Ghana  
Broadcasting Corporation 
 
P3 - Chief Controller of Programmes (CcoP) or Head of Programmes (HoP)
   
P4 - Executive Producer or Supervising Producer. 
 
